It is soothing for us when others agree and support our views, but our situation as Global Citizens, calls for proactively seeking to persuade those who disagree with us and to encourage each other to develop and act on specific strategies to address the problematic issues we identify. I am not claiming to know or address the many problems societies are facing today, but for this blog, and its broader project on the Future of Sharia, here is my call for debate:
“The State cannot be Islamic, and Sharia norms lose their Islamic quality when enforced by the political will of the state. The law of the state is always the product of human understanding and choice simply because there is no other way for Muslims to know the meaning and application of the Quran[1] and Sunna[2] except through human reason and judgment. The state may be good or bad, but it is never religious. State law may be good or bad, but it is never Sharia.”
Do you agree or disagree, and why?
If you agree, how will you advance this view– if you don’t advance it, who will do that for you?
If you disagree, what is the alternative you propose?
Let me briefly explain in bullet points for emphasis:
- The secular state is necessary for all societies, and it is an Islamic imperative (faridah[3]) because it is required for being honestly Muslim by conviction and choice. By the secular state I mean one that is neutral, not hostile or indifferent, to religion. I am neither calling for a secular society, nor for importing a so-called “western” model of secularism.
- There is no single, monolithic model of western secularism. None of the major western states of Italy, France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States qualifies as secular by each other’s standards. At the same time, non-western models of secularism like that of India are as successful as any of the western models. India is the home of the third, if not second, largest Muslim population in the world today.
- I am opposed to French secularity (laïcité) because the state in that model seeks to control religion instead of being neutral. The purpose of my support of a secular state is for its neutrality regarding all religions which enables me to be Muslim by conviction and choice, the only way to be a Muslim.
- I am categorically opposed to the fallacy of an Islamic state and the pretense of enforcing Sharia as the law of the state. The claim of an Islamic state to enforce Sharia as the law of the state is a post-colonial hoaxer (bid‘ah[4]) which is based on the European model of the nation-state and positive law, and totally inconsistent with historical Islamic traditions.
- There is no agreed upon criteria for what it means for the state to be “Islamic” and no independent non-political way for evaluating that quality in any state. Since the states of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and now also the emerging Islamic State (ISIS), are diametrically opposed to each other, they cannot all be Islamic if that quality means anything. Which, if any of them, is Islamic and how can we verify its quality as an Islamic state over time?
For detailed analysis and documentation for these propositions, please see my book, Islam and the Secular State (Harvard University Press, 2008), and the articles and book chapters, videos, etc. which can be downloaded free of charge from this website.
A word to our contributors who prefer to use pseudo names, instead of their real names or identifying information:
You are welcome to do so provided that the Editor (Professor An-Na‘im) holds your true names and identifying information in strict confidence. The Editor is unable to approve anonymous contributions, but happy to accept pseudo names, especially when there is concern for the safety and wellbeing of contributors, as long as the Editor has the author’s true name and identifying information to keep for our records.
[1] The final and conclusive divine revelation, according to Muslim belief, received by the Prophet Muhammed and conveyed to humanity.
[2] Traditions of the Prophet Muhammed, as exemplar of Islam.
[3] Required religious obligation on every individual Muslim.
[4] Illegitimate innovation that is unjustified from an Islamic point of view.
April 13, 2015 at 5:18 pm -
Speaking from Pakistan where efforts to impose Islam from the top have always backfired , where people face inhuman violence everyday in the name of Islam , one can sense something seriously wrong with our basic assumptions about religion and its role in our lives; I wonder why our dominant narratives of Islam downplay the notion of ‘no compulsion in religion’. Prof. Abdullahi’s argument makes good sense for Pakistan , provided we are willing to listen and enter the debate.
April 14, 2015 at 3:17 am -
Although I cannot speak as an expert, but only as an American Christian who has lived in a Muslim-majority country (Turkey) for many years, I believe it is correct to view today’s Islamic states (i.e. theocracies) as a historical aberration. Historians have explained to me that the appearance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1923 roughly simultaneously with the establishment of a secular state in Turkey (once the Ottoman Empire and HQ of the Caliphate) was no coincidence. Some have posited that the Muslim Brotherhood arose in reaction to republican (secular) Turkey, and this seems to make sense. It would also explain why the ‘Islamic State’ is an unnatural phenomenon.
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is hailed as a great statesman not only by Turks, but by (perhaps especially) Western historians. Indeed, there is much about his vision that I think can be admired. However, Ataturk was a dictator, and the personal dictatorship he established lasted until the end of the rule of his successor as president, Ismet Inonu. Thereafter, republican Turkey enforced secularism through passive military rule, and even outward expressions of faith were severely punished if they appeared in the ‘public sphere.’ It is difficult to say whether, over time, this policy created a strain of liberalism in Turkish society, or whether urban liberalism arose in spite of it. That was the problem with the enforced secularism, extending even to modes of dress: it was not clear what the actual religious demographic of the country looked like, even among those who actively participated in the life of the secular state, because no one could see it. It was hidden.
As it turned out, the vast majority of the population remained provincial and piously religious. As such, after many decades, an Islamist political party swept to power as military rule was softening in accordance with the demands of the European Union for membership. The Islamist party remains in power today, more than twelve years later. This party speaks for a vast majority of Turkish citizens who had previously felt excluded or alienated, and who have descended on the major Europeanized cities (especially Istanbul) and transformed the social landscape. But the social and legal landscape they are attempting to impose (through the current party of power) is perhaps no less intolerant of Western liberalism than the former, military-backed regime was intolerant of Islamism. And so Turkey has reached a critical crossroads in its history. The state is still formally (constitutionally) secular, but the majority is pressuring the state to enforce its interpretation of the majority faith. It is a ‘tyranny of the majority’ in a country that is overwhelmingly Muslim (probably over 99% if all sects of Islam are considered).
When contrasted with, for example, Egypt, one sees a situation where a significant non-Muslim minority has coexisted with the Muslim majority since ancient times. In a country of roughly 80 million, perhaps 8 million – 10% – are Christian. At first glance, this situation does not look hopeful. The atrocities committed by advocates of political Islam (Islamism) in Egypt against members of the Christian minority are already notorious, and now a situation has arisen once more in which the military has taken a leading role in politics after a brief spell of Muslim Brotherhood rule. However, there may be hope in the Egyptian situation, in that – assuming the majority can be prevented from repressing the minority – there will be an opportunity to witness the coexistence of Muslims and Christians in a ‘civil society’ over time. Turkey does not have this characteristic, because there is no significant Christian minority there.
Of course, territorial partition – as in neighboring Sudan – is another scenario, and one that the world generally wants to avoid. If Islamism (i.e. the Islamic state) is a 20th-century phenomenon beginning with the Muslim Brotherhood, then the goal is to create true secularism whereby the religions are not regulated or controlled by a central authority, but treated equally, and equally prevented from applying sectarian laws in governing society. I think that is the challenge. Prior to the 20th century, Muslims in places like India did not conceive of political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizbollah, etc. Likewise, in Syria before the French colonized the country, there was a Christian prime minister who was well liked by the Muslim-majority populace. It did not matter that he was not a Muslim.
Also, although I am an American, I think perhaps another question that is worth studying is whether the record of constitutional monarchies with regard to harmony between Muslims and Christians is better or worse than that of constitutional republics. I think the jury is still out on that question, since France has not solved the problem of creating and consolidating social accord between its 10% Muslim population and the rest of the citizenry any better than Great Britain or The Netherlands have. At least, it does not appear that way at the moment.
April 14, 2015 at 7:13 am -
The question is a bit puzzling; it is asserted that the state cannot be Islamic! But the state law (or constitution) can be what its subjects aspire, so if the citizenry yearn to be governed by Sharia, why cannot be the state Islamic, it can be. I believe the substantive dimension of such dispensation is exercise of free will by the people, which is dictated by the political philosophy underlying a political system.
I understand when you refer to notion of ‘secular’ state; you imply separation of church or mosque from government, thereby rendering religion into personal domain. This perception primarily stems from democratic norm of precedence or otherwise of contestation between divine and popular will. The latter is least visible across Muslim history wherein a Khalifa was picked by following different electoral procedures except for evoking popular will in literal sense. We find traces of such discretion until today in the insidiousness of secular statecraft practiced by contemporary Muslim leadership for self-actualization.
Use of reason essentializes religious codes. However, it ought to outline a social contract that does not contravene or compromise semblance of stability, I mean it should not be allowed to access beyond a line wherein it turns social peace into chaos. Besides, we have witnessed too much use of reason in the case of Mutazalies who applied it to link Greek philosophy with Islam, but only to corrupt sacred text. Identically, development of science by Muslims during 9/10th centuries owes itself to use of reason, that when bounded by limits, gave in to bigotry. A parallel with these examples is the rise of post-modernism which rejects reason or science in favour of multitudes of individual mind images or metaphors.
The upshot is conditioned popular will and moderation in application of reason to build state and its political or ideological character.
April 17, 2015 at 12:56 pm -
I will keep this comment limited to the core problem with the comment by Muhammad Feyyaz of April 14, 2015, and urge him and all viewers to please refer to the “featured publications” on this Blog, and refer to other publications which are can also be downloaded from other parts of this website, including translations of my book, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, in Urdu and other languages.
Muhammad’s wonders: “so if the citizenry yearn to be governed by Sharia, why cannot be the state Islamic, it can be” (as he puts it). One reason why Sharia cannot be the law of the state is that democratic government is the rule by the majority SUBJECT TO THE RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY, even of a single person (who can be M. Feyyaz himself or any other citizen or resident of the country). A second reason is the extreme diversity of interpretations of Sharia accepted by Muslims, including in Pakistan today. As confirmed by the Report of the Munir Commission of 1953, Pakistani scholars and community leaders could not agree on a definition of who is a Muslim, and consequently no agreement on a specific interpretation of Sharia that is acceptable to all Pakistani Muslims for the state to enforce(http://www.circleofpeaceonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Munir-Commission-Report_1953.pdf), It is therefore inevitable that some of the interpretations of Sharia accepted by segments of Pakistani Muslims will not be accepted by M. Feyyaz, so how would he feel if one of those interpretations was made the law of Pakistan? Would he accepted being governed by the interpretation of Sharia that is applied by ISIS in Iraq and Syria today? The point here is that ANY norm of Sharia as accepted by Muslims of any time or place is always the product of a HUMAN interpretation, never Divine Sharia as such.
This does not mean that Sharia is irrelevant to the lives of Muslims, but only that the relevance of Sharia is in lives of individual Muslims in their communities, and not through coercive enforcement by the state. In fact the state has the obligation to ensure freedom of religion so that Muslims and non-Muslims alike can live by their own understanding of precepts of their religion or belief. To Muslims for example it is clear that any act or omission has no religious value unless it is entirely voluntary and with the deliberate intention (niyah in Arabic) to Sharia norms.
April 18, 2015 at 12:19 am -
Being familiar with the state of affairs that has prevailed in Pakistan since its inception, I beg to differ. Of course, there are Muslim polities that can offer fertile ground for the consumption and operationalization of such ideas (Turkey, for instance); though for a state like Pakistan, where conventional notions of a resolutely ‘Islamic’ state are so widely disseminated and deeply entrenched, I consider such a course of action wholly impracticable.
In 1949, when the Objectives Resolution (which was supposed to provide a foundation and direction to processes of law-making and governance for the nascent state) was tabled for debate in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, dissent from non-Muslim members of the assembly was countered by Jinnah’s closest associates. Along with Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, Muslim League stalwarts like Sardar Adbur Rab Nishtar (who was later to become the President of Muslim League) argued: ‘May be the non-Muslims who advocate divorce between religion and politics look at this point from the point of view of their own religion. May be their religion lays down that religion is only a matter which concerns the relations of a man with his Creator and thus far and no further. But we, the Muslims and our Leader, the former Leader of the Muslims, the Quaid-e-Azam, have declared it from thousands of platforms that our outlook on life and of life is quite different from the outlook of our friends. We believe that our religion governs not only our relations with God, but also our activities in other spheres of life. We have always described it, and rightly described it, as a complete code of life!’ (The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Volume 5).
What I want to emphasise in this quote from Sardar Nishtar is his reference to the fact that all these claims were made by Jinnah and his associates throughout the Pakistan Movement from ‘thousands of platforms’. This peculiar political outlook framed in Islamic terms was conceived and conveyed through concerted interaction and alliance-building with madrassa educated Muslim clerics, the ulama. For getting a sense of this sustained engagement and collaboration between the All-India Muslim League leadership and the ulama, the best work to be consulted is the recently published historical account ‘Creating a New Medina’ by Dr Venkat Dhulipala (Assistant Professor of History at the University of North Carolina). And for an exhaustive account of the manner in which Muhammad Ali Jinnah articulated his vision of state and nation -building in an Islamic framework, one must delve into Saleena Karim’s thoroughly researched ‘Secular Jinnah and Pakistan’. The facts established and highlighted by these studies, reveal how the ulama became acknowledged stake-holders in the state and nation -building project called Pakistan. And the two books also help one understand how Jinnah could shun theocracy and – at the same time – maintain that the country he had founded was the world’s ‘premier Islamic state’ (Jinnah’s broadcast address to the people of USA in February 1948).
Since the creation of Pakistan, ulama of all sects have united to block and banish any alternative interpretation of how a Muslim polity can be politically organized and governed on the basis of Islamic precepts. On certain critical junctures these ulama also united for positive ends: an important attempt to declare what an ‘Islamic State’ meant for all Islamic sects, resulted in the ‘22 Points’ propounded by more than 30 leading ulama in January 1951. Later, the ulama secured a decisive presence in legal advisory bodies constituted by the state, such as the Council of Islamic Ideology. These institutions were conducive for other viewpoints only when democracy was off-rails – modernists like Dr Fazlur Rahman and Dr Khalid Masud could only find a leading role in the Council when General Ayyub and General Musharraf (respectively) were at the helm of affairs. I’m implying that: all along, the legal and democratic structures of Pakistan have provided enough room to the ulama for, at least, shaping the broad contours of its constitution and consolidating their presence in key legal institutions.
The foremost expert on Islam in modern South Asia, Professor Muhammad Qasim Zaman has incisively demonstrated how the ulama have established their authority in India and Pakistan as ‘Custodians of Change’. His analysis of major scholarly works by the most formidable ulama (such as the 20 volume magnum opus on legal hadiths by Zafar Ahmad Uthmani: I’la’ al-Sunan), reveals how the traditional scholars grounded their political viewpoint in Islam’s foundational texts. Universities and media have indeed been penetrated by scholars of Islam having no madrassa background and hence they are open to diverse perspectives, though around 75% of Pakistanis are Hanafi Muslims and all along they have been drawn to mass da’wah movements – in particular, the Tablighi Jama’t (Deobandi school of Hanafis) and Da’wat-e-Islami (Barelvi school of Hanafis). These ulama have, therefore, the best chance of retaining and recruiting most Hanafi Muslims here. They can and do exercise their religious authority on the majority of (religious-minded) Pakistanis – no other group claiming expertise in Islam has such outreach and influence.
As things stand, I do not see any significant fragmentation and diminishing of religious authority commanded by the ulama. Yes, demand for religious guidance among Pakistan’s Muslim population may be on a decline, but wherever that demand thrives, ulama have their supply-chains well intact. Therefore, there is little possibility that religiously active Muslims here would ever consider giving up the pristine notion of an ‘Islamic State’ and dismantle the state structures and legal devices devised for realizing that elusive ideal.
April 18, 2015 at 6:04 pm -
Thanks for sharing your ideas Sohaib . I agree with your overall assessment of the situation in Pakistan BUT I think its about time the religiously active Muslims develop some critical thinking skills of their own , for the good of their religion. We need to make sense of the war we are fighting today ; an ‘Islamic state’ and an ‘Islamic army’ fighting people who want the rule of sharia on this land….where do we , the ulama, Jinnah , Muslim League stand in this battle , we can no longer afford to hold on to the same old narratives. We need to rethink and reconsider our traditional notions , if nothing else we must reread Iqbal and make an effort to advance his ideas about ‘the principle of movement in the structure of Islam’. I am sure no one in Pakistan can put a ban on ideas of Iqbal or claim to have an ideology of Pakistan which counters his views.
April 19, 2015 at 10:01 am -
Thank you for sharing your ideas Sohaib. I partly agree with your assessment of the situation in Pakistan but here I would like to point out some facts for your consideration ; a) ‘ the conventional notion of a resolutely Islamic state’ is not so conventional as we do not find such a concept in conventional sharia, what we do find in sharia is ‘the principle of religious freedom’ , no compulsion in religion, no imposition of ones beliefs , views , interpretation on others. This principle is sacred whether we live in the age of empires or in modern state system or move towards a stateless global society anytime in future.
b) Dar ul Ulum Deoband , where the majority of our leading ulama , religious movements and opinion come from , was not a conventional Islamic madrasa when it was established in 1866 . It was an unconventional institution created by ulama of that time because they realized the need to respond to changing times.
c) There were Islamic modernists who called for alternative interpretation of traditional sharia for changing times, before Dr. Fazl ur Rahman and Khallid Masud presented their ideas on the subject , one of them was Muhammad Iqbal who emphasized ‘the principle of movement in the structure of Islam’ . One radical modernist was Sir Syed Amad Khan , Shibli is another leading voice on the subject , the respect that these people command , their contribution towards restoring Muslim dignity in critical times is widely recognized. Somehow before Pakistan built its structure of a ‘resolutely Islamic state’ , the idea of debate on issues related to future of sharia was quite acceptable , in fact popular among the masses .
Let us have another look at ‘as things stand’ in Pakistan; I do not agree that ‘demand for religious guidance among Pakistan’s Muslim population is on decline’, and I fail to understand how you may have reached such a conclusion , I observe an ever growing demand for meaningful religious guidance in Pakistan but the supply side should see the need to make it meaningful for a generation which is witnessing a full scale war between an ‘ Islamic state’ and Muslim militants who want the ‘rule of sharia’ on this land. The pristine notion of an ‘Islamic state’ , the structures and narratives built on the idea , demand a thorough reexamination in this context. In my view ‘ as things stand’, we can no longer afford to hold on to ideas which are supposed to resolve our troubles in theory, but which in practice, add to them.
April 19, 2015 at 1:22 pm -
Sohaib and Fatima have enriched my knowledge about Islam and politics in Pakistan. The Pakistan’s experience tells us how political “Islamic” is when it is adopted as an ideology of the state or as the only source of the state law. In this situation, what has happened is that the meaning of Islam becomes a very limited as it is understood and applied by the dominant view endorsed by the politicians or rulers for their own political interests. Any other voices, views and interpretations of Islam are less or illegitimate or even suppressed.
I think this is one of the reasons for which Professor An-Na’im rejects the state as Islamic. The state cannot be Islamic because there is no unified perception or view among majority Muslim as to what it means by Islamic state. Although one state, for instance, officially declares itself as an Islamic state, it will never be the same substantially and technically with other Islamic states.
Mostly, Muslims who propose the idea of Islamic state are imbued by the concept of caliphate or the integration of religion and politics. But if we look at the Islamic history critically we will find that there is no such fixed relation between religion and politics. From the times of the Prophet Muhammad until the last Four-guided Caliph, there was no single method of succession. Only after the Umayya era did the caliphate become a standard of the system of what so called as Islamic politics, where a central Islamic power and political authority was inherited from the ruler and endowed to his offspring, which significantly differed from those of the four rightly guided caliph era. This means that the Caliphate, or Imamate if you may wish to include it as well, is as ‘a historical creation’. As Ali Abdur Raziq argues, Islam provides norms or principles of politics but not the form of Islamic politics because the form is subject to change. What do not change is the principles. The principles include justice, respects, syura, freedom of religion, public prosperity (maslaha) and so on, just to mention some. So long as these principles are preserved, a state, whether it is called Islamic or nor, is automatically, Islamic, in my view. So Muslims are not banned to develop a model of state or to support and live in a state, even if it is secular, which is most relevant to the contemporary challenges and needs without neglecting those principles.
April 20, 2015 at 7:30 pm -
I’m glad that Prof An’Naim’s post has brought in conversation two individuals from the same country – before we promote and prescribe any recipe of reform for Muslim polities in general, it would help to ponder if such ideas can work in our own regional localities. Briefly put, my argument was that: mainstream political Islam in the Indo-Pak subcontinent does not lend itself for criticism on such grounds, easily – it neither succumbs to the assertion that the ‘Islamic state’ is a postcolonial ‘bidah’, nor to the claim that traditional legal argumentation results in interpretative anarchy.
(1) Few would contest that the fountainhead of classical/traditional Islam in the subcontinent is Shah Waliullah Dehlavi (1703-1762). This pre-colonial reformer was just four when the last Great Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb Alamgir passed away. Later during his life, Shah Waliullah saw ELEVEN Mughal emperors ascend to the throne amid increasing chaos and uncertainty. Therefore, apart from lengthy sections of his most widely known work ‘Hujjatullah-il-Baligha’, Shah Waliullah also elucidated the reality of Khilafah in his most lengthy work ‘Izalat al-Khafa’an Khilafat al-Khulfa’, and explored certain facets of Islamic governance in ‘Al-Budur al-Bazigha’. It was the failing and dysfunctional Muslim empire in the subcontinent that provided the backdrop for Shah Waliullah’s scholarly interventions in matters concerning political leadership and governance. Shah Waliullah’s understanding of the early Caliphate of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs as a normative model and benchmark informed his elaborate prescriptions for socio-political reform. He wanted Muslims to rise to a higher level of character and conduct where God would bestow upon them His Khilafah – in keeping with His ‘sunna’ and promise: ‘Allah has promised those who have believed among you and done righteous deeds that He will surely grant them succession [KHILAFAH] upon the earth just as He granted it to those before them, and that He will surely establish for them [therein] their religion which He has preferred for them, and that He will surely substitute for them, after their fear, security, [for] they worship Me, not associating anything with Me’ (24:55). Also: ‘[They are] those who, if We give them authority in the land – establish prayer and give zakah, and enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong’ (22:41).
From Shah Waliullah’s pre-colonial times to the zenith of British colonial rule in the early twentieth century, these Quranic verses were consistently invoked for defining the political goals of Islamic revival. The intervening period also saw attempts by Shah Waliullah’s descendants and followers (during the late 1820s) to restore Muslim rule in north-west India by waging a Jihad against the Sikhs (Ayesha Jalal has given a magisterial account of this quest to secure an Islamic oasis in her ‘Partisans of Allah’). Shah Waliullah’s grandson Shah Ismail bin Abdul Ghani lead that jihad (falling in the battle of Balakot on 6 May 1831), and he also wrote a treatise on the meaning, forms and functions of khilafah: ‘Mansab-e-Imamat’. And by mid-1940s, when the British were about to flee, the notion of an ‘Islamic State’ was owned and avowed by leading ulama from ALL schools/sects. Apart from the All-India ‘Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam’ of Deobandis, there was the All-India ‘Sunni Conference’ which rallied around Barelvis for the attainment of Pakistan. As for Nadwatul Ulama, Shibli’s protégé Syed Sulaiman Nadwi migrated to Pakistan for leading the Islamization board constituted by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, and he also presided over the January 1951 ulama meetings at Karachi that synthesized, in ‘22 Points’, the vision of all schools/sects with regard to the meaning and characteristics of an ‘Islamic state’. So responsibility for popularizing and pursuing the ideal of an Islamic state does not solely rest with ulama belonging to Deoband’s ‘unconventional madrassa’, Barelvi and Nadwi stalwarts were propagating the same political mission. My point is: the ulama inheriting this legacy, and their followers, would never consider their pristine notion of an ‘Islamic state’ as a postcolonial concoction – an aberration from the sharia. Instead, they would allege (as they have always done) that those advocating a divorce between religion and politics are introducing a ‘bidah’ in Islam, and turning their backs to the Quranic injunction: ‘O you who have believed, enter into Islam completely’ (2:208).
(2) Of the early ‘modernists’ you have mentioned, Muhammad Iqbal had the greatest impact. The problem is that his thought does not mark a clear break from the traditional legal framework it seeks to reform. Iqbal’s later writings and views suggest a less radical reworking of the classical Islamic legal corpus. For instance, Iqbal’s close associate in his last years, Muhammad Asad (the Austrian Leopold Weiss who had converted to Islam in 1926) reports that in their first meeting Iqbal had remarked: ‘I have read your ‘Islam at the Crossroads’ and I like what you have written. Only… I disagree with your call for a new ijtihad. In itself, ijtihad is certainly salutary and necessary, but it is dangerous at a time of decadence – at a time like ours – because it could lead to a chaotic divergence of views about Islam, and so to a still greater disruption of our social fabric’ (Home-Coming of the Heart, p. 69). And Dr Javaid Iqbal reports in the biography of his father (‘Zinda Ruud’) that, in his last will Iqbal had declared himself a follower of the classical Hanafi school of Islamic law. So, can we really build on Iqbal’s reconstruction of ijtihad in a manner that existing meta-catagories of traditional legal discourse are re-conceived to any significant degree? Did Iqbal ever try to problematize and unsettle the deep-rooted political underpinnings of traditional Islamic law? To the contrary, this is what Iqbal wrote to Jinnah in May 1937: ‘After a long and careful study of Islamic law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of law is properly understood and applied, at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India’ (Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah, p. 16). So, isn’t Iqbal reinforcing the viability of our classical legal heritage and advocating its promulgation (albeit in a more ‘developed’ form) as law of the state! The ulama would be more than happy to have such ‘modernists’ around.
(3) About your comment – “I do not agree that ‘demand for religious guidance among Pakistan’s Muslim population is on decline’, and I fail to understand how you may have reached such a conclusion, I observe an ever growing demand” – well, I observe a downward trend. These are just our observations really. Obviously we are considering different samples and/or different indicators of ‘demand’. The resolution of this point has hardly any bearing on my arguments, so I’ll leave it there. A sweeping majority of our mosques either carry the label ‘Hanafi (Barelvi)’ or ‘Hanafi (Deobandi)’; and from the pulpits, prayer-leaders voice out the narratives and world-views of ulama who mentored them at madrassas. Moreover, the Deobandi and Barelvi mosques function as bases for their respective dawah movements: Tablighi Jama’t and Dawat-e-Islami. As long as the madrassa-mosque-dawah nexus persists, there is hardly any possibility for an alternative interpretation to strike root and find a critical mass of supporters here.
I partly agree with your statement – “The pristine notion of an ‘Islamic state’, the structures and narratives built on the idea, demand a thorough re-examination” – we can definitely argue here with the ‘Islamic’ state’s supporter that: the state has been trying to bolster its credentials as an ‘Islamic state’ for weaving a narrative that normalizes its pursuit of counter-productive strategic goals in our region and beyond. How the purported Islamic identity of the polity is open to (ab)use by the state is something that needs to be taken seriously. Similarly, enforcement of Islamic norms inside the country can also involve injustices and abuse – something often trivialized by the pro-Sharia lot.
Having said that, I don’t think there is much room for convincing the ulama and their followers that ‘structures’ and institutions ‘built on the idea of an Islamic state’ need to be undone. Since the mid-1950s when the Munir Report implicated them for being a perennial source of confusion and fragmentation in society, the ulama have increasingly opted for collective ijtihad/fatwas on novel issues and matters of public concern. Characteristically, they have also produced directives and precedents validating such collective endeavours from the Quran, Prophet’s hadiths and the practice of his companions and their followers (in particular Abu Hanifa). And, the religious discourse of the ulama reveals that arrangements and structures enabling collective ijtihad/fatwas have themselves become sacrosanct. The ulama, therefore, would never agree to dismantling the state apparatus that facilitates their ‘duty’ of engaging in collective ijtihad/fatawa – most importantly: the Council of Islamic Ideology, Federal Shariat Court, and Supreme Court’s Shariat Appelette Bench. Emphasising the shortcomings of these state structures to argue that they can be discarded altogether, would typically receive the response that we cannot throw out the baby with the bathwater. These structures and institutions are absolutely integral to the idealized ‘Islamic state’ of the ulama and their devotees.
April 21, 2015 at 1:44 pm -
Thank you Sohaib, what I observe in Pakistan is people like you who seem to genuinely care about issues related to their faith , for me your comment is enough indication of this
April 21, 2015 at 5:45 pm -
Sohaib , what I observe in Pakistan is people like you who seem to genuinely care about issues relevant to their faith , for me your comment is enough indication of this . Let me bring your attention to the fact that Prof. An Naim is not advocating a ‘divorce between religion and politics’ which in his view , remain connected , but ‘religious neutrality of state’ which he explains is in accordance with sharia principles. The difference between the two must be understood to comprehend his work better.
Now, correct me if I am wrong , your argument seems to be that , since ulama in Pakistan would not allow any challenge to the structures and narratives they have built , any attempt to question the status quo is futile and impractical.
Imagine Shah Wali ullah having the same line of thinking in eighteenth century , we would never have the ‘fountainhead of Islamic revivalism’ in India in that case . Critical times demand critical thinking. Shah Wali ullah by any account was a reformer who challenged the status quo of his times, he contested the dominant idea of ‘taqlid’ among ulama of his times and wrote in favor of ‘ ijtehad’. His decision to translate Quran in Persian was highly controversial in his times. If we claim to follow his teachings in anyway, we cannot support the idea of sticking to a ‘fixed ideal’ , especially in times of crisis.
And again ‘ the principle of movement in the structure of Islam’ that Iqbal talks about is ‘ijtehad’ which is very much a part of ‘classical Hanafi school of Islamic law’ , I do not see a contradiction in Iqbal’s ideas . And one thing I do know for sure is that in the current context of Pakistan , the last thing the likes of Iqbal would do , is to stick to a fixed ideal and this , in my view , is true for many other well- meaning and capable people who were trying to respond to new challenges of their times when they visualized and tried to materialize the idea of ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ . I am sure most of them did not claim that the result of their negotiated settlement about the characteristics of an Islamic state is a ‘final word’ for all times .
Having said this, I do agree that any effort to bring any change must be made in a manner that does not
lead to chaos and bring more suffering to the people.
April 22, 2015 at 9:05 pm -
Sohaib and Fatima have enriched my knowledge about Islam and politics in Pakistan. The Pakistan’s experience tells us how political “Islamic” is when it is adopted as an ideology of the state or as the only source of the state law. In this situation, what has happened is that the meaning of Islam becomes a very limited as it is understood and applied by the dominant view endorsed by the politicians or rulers for their own political interests. Any other voices, views and interpretations of Islam are less or illegitimate or even suppressed.
I think this is one of the reasons for which Professor An-Na’im rejects the state as Islamic. The state cannot be Islamic because there is no unified perception or view among majority Muslim as to what it means by Islamic state. Although one state, for instance, officially declares itself as an Islamic state, it will never be the same substantially and technically with other Islamic states.
Mostly, Muslims who propose the idea of Islamic state are imbued by the concept of caliphate or the integration of religion and politics. But if we look at the Islamic history critically we will find that there is no such fixed relation between religion and politics. From the times of the Prophet Muhammad until the last Four-guided Caliph, there was no single method of succession. Only after the Umayya era did the caliphate become a standard of the system of what so called as Islamic politics, where a central Islamic power and political authority was inherited from the ruler and endowed to his offspring, which significantly differed from those of the four rightly guided caliph era. This means that the Caliphate, or Imamate if you may wish to include it as well, is as ‘a historical creation’. As Ali Abdur Raziq argues, Islam provides norms or principles of politics but not the form of Islamic politics because the form is subject to change. What do not change is the principles. The principles include justice, respects, syura, freedom of religion, public prosperity (maslaha) and so on, just to mention some. So long as these principles are preserved, a state, whether it is called Islamic or nor, is automatically, Islamic, in my view. So Muslims are not banned to develop a model of state or to support and live in a state, even if it is secular, which is most relevant to the contemporary challenges and needs without neglecting those principles.
April 27, 2015 at 8:51 am -
Fatima, I didn’t know that after your brief comment there was also a follow-up reply to my last post, I’ll make one last attempt to clarify the problems we have been discussing – within a few days. Thanks for all the probing 🙂
May 3, 2015 at 5:51 pm -
No Fatima, I’m not at all suggesting that ‘any attempt to question the status quo is futile and impractical’. I’ve only tried to explain why certain attempts at radical reform are susceptible to remaining on the fringes of mainstream legal discourse in contemporary Islam, at least, in the South Asian context. My view of constructive critique prizes utility and urgency – our prescriptions must work, without much delay. If our ideas are prone to being outrightly rejected or ignored, we will have to reconceive our reform strategy. And if the attention our ideas receive is predominantly negative, then too we will have to rethink our approach to reform.
(1) From Shah Waliullah to Muhammad Iqbal, every reformer who was received favourably by the mainstream had tried to situate himself within one or more schools of classical Islamic jurisprudence. I’ve discussed Iqbal’s affiliation with the Hanafi school and his cautious approach to ijtihad, Shah Waliullah too did not advocate a fully independent ‘absolute ijtihad’. No doubt, Shah Waliullah was a strong critic of dogmatic taqlid, yet he operated within the classical legal frameworks – for him, the best approach to source-methodology and legal hermeneutics would combine the principles (usool) and maxims (qawaid) provided by the Shaf’i and Hanafi schools of jurisprudence. His eclectic methodology sought to revive the best practices of leading jurists from the classical era. Therefore, to varying degrees, these reformers have clearly inhabited the discourse of traditional Islam which they seek to revitalize. Hence, alongside other ulama (who are not as competent and creative), reformers such as Shah Waliullah have functioned as gate-keepers for the patent praxis of ijtihad.
In recent decades, we in the Indo-Pak subcontinent have observed the careers of two prominent scholars: Wahiduddin Khan (India) and Javed Ghamidi (Pakistan). Both of them tried to reconfigure the political calculus of traditional Islam by recasting certain categories of Islamic legal discourse. Subsequently, it was alleged by the ulama that both of them had violated the internal logic of source-methodology and legal-hermeneutics offered by classical Islamic jurisprudence. Scores of ulama have vigorously argued that these scholars employ an arbitrary approach to ijtihad, and they have belittled and abandoned the political goals of Islam. By asserting and demonstrating the veracity of these claims through polemics and scholarly critiques, the ulama achieved considerable success in curtailing the influence of such dissenting voices. The reason why such reformers make little headway with their agendas is that they fail to ground themselves and their ideas in the Islamic ‘tradition’. In my view, Prof An’Naim’s methodology is far more radical than the approaches proposed by Khan and Ghamidi – and therefore, even more susceptible to being dismissed.
The extent of Prof An’Naim’s departure from the mainstream can be properly gauged by considering some of his most succinctly articulated writings. The following extracts explicate his views on Shari’a and politics, and sum-up his distinct legal approach as well. Moreover, some selections reveal that Prof An’Naim is well aware of the tensions and conflicts his reform-project entails. In ‘Islam and the Secular State’ (ISS, pp.1-2) and his Introduction to Mahmoud Mohamed Taha’s ‘The Second Message of Islam’ (SMI, pp.19-24), An’Naim writes:
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01) ‘When observed voluntarily, Shari’a plays a fundamental role in shaping and developing ethical norms and values that can be reflected in general legislation and public policy through the democratic political process. But I will argue in this book that Shari’a principles cannot be enacted and enforced by the state as public law and public policy solely on the grounds that they are believed to be part of Shari’a. If such enactment and enforcement is attempted, the outcome will necessarily be the political will of the state and not the religious law of Islam.’ (ISS)
02) ‘[D]ispelling the dangerous illusion of an Islamic state that can enforce Shari’a is necessary for legitimizing and implementing the principles and institutions of constitutionalism, human rights, and citizenship in Islamic societies.’ (ISS)
03) ‘Yet this does not mean the exclusion of Islam from the formulation of public policy and legislation or from public life in general. On the contrary, the state should not attempt to enforce Shari’a precisely so that Muslims are able to live by their own belief in Islam as a matter of religious obligation, not as the outcome of coercion by the state.’ (ISS)
04) ‘An initial issue in this regard is whether the success of my proposal is contingent on substantial reform in the way Muslims understand certain aspects of Shari’a … [T]his reform is indeed necessary, and I believe that it can best be realized through the methodology proposed by Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha […] This does not, of course, preclude the possibility of alternative approaches that are capable of achieving the necessary degree of reform.’ (ISS)
05) ‘[I]jtihad itself has its limitations. In particular, ijtihad is not permitted in any matter governed by an explicit and definite text of the Qur’an or Sunnah. It therefore follows that any discriminatory rule that is based on an explicit and definite text – and some of the most obviously discriminatory rules are in fact based on such texts of Qur’an or Sunnah – is not open to reform through ijtihad or any other technique known to historical Shari’a.’ (SMI)
06) ‘Even the intermediate reformers, such as Ibn Taymiya, who died in 1328 A.D., and the modern reformers of the last and present centuries, such as Mohamed Abdu and Jamal al-Din al-Afghany, have accepted the main principles set by the established orthodox schools of Islamic jurisprudence and complied with the acceptable processes of reform as determined by the early jurists.’ (SMI)
07) ‘[T]he main thesis of Ustadh Mahmoud regarding the evolution of Islamic law may be summarized as follows. Islam, being the final and universal religion according to Muslim belief, was offered first in tolerant and egalitarian terms in Mecca, where the Prophet preached equality and individual responsibility between all men and women without distinction on grounds of race, sex, or social origin. As that message was rejected in practice, and the Prophet and his few followers were persecuted and forced to migrate to Medina, some aspects of the message changed in response to the socioeconomic and political realities of the time. Migration to Medina (hijrah) was not merely a tactical step, but also signified a shift in the content of the message itself.’ (SMI)
08) ‘In the Medina stage God was responding, through the Prophet in the Qur’an and Sunnah, to the potential and actual needs of human society at that stage of its development. To that end, some aspects of the earlier level of revelation and Sunnah were subjected to repeal or abrogation (naskh) from the legal point of view, although they remained operative at a moral/persuasive level. This much is readily accepted by most Muslims, although some may object to the candid language in which these developments were discussed by Ustadh Mahmoud. What is revolutionary in his thinking, however, is the notion that the abrogation process (naskh) was in fact a postponement and not final and conclusive repeal. Once this basic premise is conceded, a whole new era of Islamic jurisprudence can begin, one that allows for the development of complete liberty and equality for all human beings, regardless of sex, religion, or faith. As it stands now, historical Islamic Shari’a law does in fact discriminate on grounds of sex and religion.’ (SMI)
09) ‘The only way out of this dilemma, argued Ustadh Mahmoud, is to evolve Islamic law to a fresh plane rather than waste time in piecemeal reform that will never achieve the moral and political objective of removing all discrimination against women and non-Muslims in Islamic law.’ (SMI)
10) ‘Ustadh Mahmoud proposed to shift certain aspects of Islamic law from their foundation in one class of texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah and place them on a different class of texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah. The limitations of reform noted above are removed by reviving the earlier texts, which were never made legally binding in the past, and making them the basis of modern Islamic law. Explicit and definite texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah that were the basis of discrimination against women and non-Muslims under historical Shari’a are set aside as having served their transitional purpose. Other texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah are made legally binding in order to achieve full equality for all human beings, regardless of sex or religion. This shift is made possible through examining the rationale of abrogation (naskh) in the sense of selecting which texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah are to be made legally binding, as opposed to being merely morally persuasive.’ (SMI)
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It is obvious that the legal device of abrogation (naskh) is not being employed here in accordance with its conventional usage. The abrogation of verses revealed in Madina (as providers of operative rules for governing Muslim polities) is done by resorting to a non-scriptural abrogator (naasikh). No clear unequivocal text (nass that is sarih and qat’i) has been invoked for the categorical privileging of Meccan revelations over the Madinan ones. The peculiar understanding of freedom and equality serving as a validating principle for effecting such abrogation has an essentially non-scriptural basis – standards proffered by modernity. Therefore, the validating principle itself needs substantiation on scriptural grounds. Moreover, the ulama would also argue that the Quranic dictum on abrogation states that: ‘Whenever We abrogate a revelation or cause it to be forgotten, We bring one better than it or equal to it.’ [2:106] So abrogation involved superseding of preliminary guidance provided at an EARLY transitory phase by LATER final guidance – these later revelations were always ‘better than or equal to’ the revelations being abrogated. Furthermore, a strong claim can be made that Madinan revelations are as legally binding – bearing the same stamp of Divine ownership and sanction – on the basis of this verse: ‘Today the disbelievers have lost all hope of [overcoming] your religion. Do not fear them: fear Me. Today I have perfected your religion for you, completed My blessing upon you, and chosen as your religion: Islam.’ [5:3] Scholars are unanimous that this verse was revealed after the Prophet had triumphed over Quraish at Mecca. Indeed, the verse is most emphatic in spelling out the utter hopelessness inflicted upon the disbelievers – only the loss of Mecca could have produced such irreversible despair. Once this verse is assigned to the last few years of the Madinan era, it becomes exceedingly difficult to contend that the perfection/completion of religion was attained at an earlier stage. My point is: the wholesale relegation of Medinan revelations to a downgraded non-operative status does not conform with the rationale and trajectory of abrogation/naskh given by the Quran.
(2) I’m glad Prof An’Naim has iterated that: ‘This [proposal] does not, of course, preclude the possibility of alternative approaches that are capable of achieving the necessary degree of reform’ (ISS, p.2). The prevailing exegetical trends in traditional Islamic scholarship are not at all hospitable to such radical re-interpretations and appropriations of Revelation. From 8th century Hijri, the legacy of classical Islam has been gradually consolidated by the synthesizing summative works of savants from across the Muslim world. In the field of Quranic exegesis, the tendency has been to argue that abrogation occurred only rarely: from a total of 6,236 verses, Jalaluddin Suyuti restricted abrogated verses to 19 (Al-Itqan fi Ulum al-Quran, Volume 2), and shah Waliullah brought their number down to 5 (Al-Fawz al-Kabir fi Usool al-Tafsir). Therefore, proposing that we can do away with Madinan verses pertaining to: establishing an Islamic order (Iqamat-ud-Deen), making every strata of the society responsible for enjoining good and forbidding wrong (Amr bil Maroof wa Nahi Anil Munkar), criminalizing vices for upholding divinely decreed limits (Hududullah), etc. – will surely invite resounding repudiation from mainstream traditional ulama.
Perhaps the overly politicized vision of Islamist revivalism can only be redressed in regions like the Indo-Pak subcontinent by promoting interpretations and directives given by critical minded ulama belonging to the mainstream. For instance, presently the leading practitioner and gate-keeper of ijtihad among the Deobandi-Hanafis is Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani (see Kelly Pemberton’s ‘An Islamic discursive tradition on reform as seen in the writing of Deoband’s Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani’ in The Muslim World, 99 (3)). His magnum opus is the detailed arabic commentary on Sahih Muslim ‘Takmilah Fath al-Mulhim’ (6 volumes) that won him critical acclaim from luminaries such as the hadith and fiqh experts Shaykh Abd al-Fattah Abu Ghudda and Shaykh Wahbah Mustafa al-Zuhaili. I’m reproducing here some relevant selections from the third volume of this commentary which focus on the complex relationship between Islam and politics.
(Translation, with slight modifications, is taken from:
http://www.deoband.org/2010/05/general/politics/the-place-of-politics-in-religion/)
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[S]ome Muslims in our time who undertook [the task] of refuting secularism have gone too far in this until they fell into a subtle mistake, that changed the focus and caused many errors in this domain – that is, they made politics and the establishment of an Islamic government the primary objective and highest aim of all the rules of religion, and it is as though the rules of worship etc. are not aimed at [anything] besides one goal which is the establishment of an Islamic government, and it is as though worship and religiosity (diyanah) are all means in the attainment of this primary objective; to [the extent] that they diminished the importance of worship and made it an exercise and training for the fundamental target, which is the establishment of a theocratic government (al-hukumat al-ilahiyyah).
Due to this cogitation, two dangerous causes of corruption emerged:
First: since worship became a means in the establishment of a theocratic government, it is not regarded as an objective in itself, and by its [performance] is intended a gradual progression to the fundamental target. Thus, if the conditions demanded that these means be sacrificed by choosing other means to [attain] that important objective then indeed from the results of this cogitation is that there is nothing preventing sacrificing them because they are not the objective.
Second: one does not have a relationship with means besides a basic ordinary relationship [which falls] within the domain of necessity, and naturally he will regard it as a transitory passing stage, and will not regard it as his life target and the goal of his efforts, and will not progress in it and excel therein with the sensations of [spiritual] experience, delight and tranquillity within him.
[…]
In sum, these authors in their eagerness to refute secularism, and their focus on the political aspect of the Shari’ah, made all of Islam a political ideology, instead of making politics religious. The truth is that politics is a branch of the branches of religion, just as business and economics is a branch thereof, and indeed the rules of religion pertain to politics, just as they pertain to business. However nothing of politics and business is the root goal of the message of Islam, nor a fundamental objective of its rules and teachings. Thus, just as the connection of the rules of the Shari’ah to business do not entail that business becomes the objective of religion, similarly the rules of the Shari’ah pertaining to politics do not imply that politics be made the fundamental objective of Islam.
Hakim al-Ummah Shaykh Ashraf ‘Ali al-Thanawi (Allah Most High have mercy on him) drew attention to this point in a brief [but] firm statement, all of which is insightful, so we will quote it here, translating it from Urdu to Arabic. He says (Allah Most High have mercy on him):
“Allah Most High said: ‘those who, if We establish them in the land, establish regular prayer and give regular charity, enjoin the right and forbid wrong: with Allah rests the end and decision of all affairs.’ (Qur’an 22:41). It is clear from this verse that the essential objective is religiosity (diyanah) and nothing of politics and jihad is the fundamental objective — it is only a means to establish religiosity. And for this reason, spirituality and the rules [regulating] religiosity were given to every one of the Prophets (upon them be peace) without exception, while politics and jihad were not given to all of them. Jihad and politics were given to some of them when the need and interest [of their communities] demanded [them], and indeed that is the condition of means, since they are not given except for a necessity.
“It is possible that a doubt will arise here in the minds of some, which is that another verse of the Noble Qur’an indicates the opposite of this, that religiosity is a means, and establishment (tamkin) in the earth and politics are the objectives, and this is His statement (Most High): “Allah has promised those who have believed among you and done righteous deeds that He will surely grant them succession [KHILAFAH] upon the earth just as He granted it to those before them, and that He will surely establish for them [therein] their religion which He has preferred for them” (24:55). Since this verse makes belief and good deeds preconditions to the establishment [of Islam] on earth from what is apparent thereof of establishment and politics being the objective.
“The response is that Allah Most High promised in this verse establishment and power, and conditioned them on faith and good deeds, whereby establishment is qualified upon them, so politics and power are promised [to the believers conditional upon] faith and good deeds. It does not follow [however] from it being promised that it becomes the objective, for otherwise Allah Most High said at another place: “If they had observed the Torah and the Evangel and that which was revealed unto them from their Lord, they would surely have been nourished from above them and from beneath their feet” (Qur’an 5:66). So He promised expansion in provision [conditional] upon the observance of the Torah, Evangel and the Qur’an. Can then one say that expansion in provision is the objective of religion? No, rather it is [a] promised [outcome]. Thus, it is established that a promise does not entail that it becomes the objective. Similarly in the verse of establishment [i.e. 24:55], establishment is promised [conditional] upon faith and good deeds, so they are a consequence of them by the decision of it being qualified upon them, but that is not the objective of religion, nor a target of it.
“Thereby it becomes clear that politics is a means from the means and the objective is spirituality. The implication of this is not that politics is not sought after altogether. I only intend thereby to specify the place of politics in religion in that it is not the objective, as opposed to spirituality – for indeed, this is the essential objective.” (Ashraf al-Sawanih 4:28-9)
Takmilah Fath al-Mulhim, vol. 3, pp. 224-7
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In a more recent urdu book ‘Islam aur Syasi Nazriat’, Mufti Taqi Usmani makes the following observation: ‘[A further] detriment [of this overly politicized religious worldview] is that – this vision necessarily results in the conclusion that of all the Messengers that came to the world, a majority failed to accomplish the fundamental objective of Deen […] – only a small number of them could establish political rule. Along with Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) prophets Joseph, Moses, Joshua, Samuel, David and Solomon (peace be upon them) undoubtedly established their rule, though it cannot be proved that any other prophet had formed a government. Does this imply that apart from these [seven] no other prophet could accomplish the primary objective of Deen? […] In sum, politics has its place in Islam, but making it the primary objective of Deen results in a serious disruption of the entire [Islamic] system of precedents and priorities.’ (2010, p. 170)
To conclude, I would contend that an approach to reform that is firmly rooted in tradition is more likely to produce ideas that can work. In the Indo-Pak subcontinent, radical routes to reform have lead nowhere. Moreover, institutions like the Islamic Fiqh Academy (India) and the Council of Islamic Ideology (Pakistan) have allowed the ulama to undertake collective ijtihad, and impair the argument that their internal differences are irreconcilable. Some leading ulama have offered sophisticated responses to threats induced by hyper-politicization of Islam. And, initiatives such as the Amman Declaration which streamline representative voices of traditional Islam can also produce positive outcomes – if, widespread indifference and ignorance are mitigated and broad-based ownership is achieved. By ignoring important insights indigenous to the tradition – even if they are ‘piecemeal’ – we would further postpone progress and prolong the prevailing chaos. Therefore, one may welcome Prof An’Naim’s call to reform and debate as a ‘framework for constant contestation’, but not as a set of ideas than can deliver the solution. The staying power of our arguments inside the discourse to be reformed is of paramount importance, approaches fundamentally alien to the discourse would never suffice.
May 8, 2015 at 4:43 pm -
Thank you Sohaib for spelling out your ideas clearly , knowing the situation in Pakistan I do agree with most of your observations and understand your concerns. There is just a little concern on my side which I would like to express …… As I see it , the problem in Pakistan is not just ‘overly politicized vision of Islamist revivalism’ but also our collective reluctance to listen to any alternative perspective, let alone consider it or discuss it in an academic manner, which according to my knowledge ( which I admit is far from sufficient on the subject) is very much ‘indigenous to our tradition’. ‘ Agreeing to disagree’ , ‘respect for difference of opinion’ is a tradition we must revive at least at scholarly level , if not popular level. So I myself may belong to mainstream Deoband Hanafi tradition and have a huge respect for the the likes of Mufti Taqi Usmani , I may not agree with some ideas of other ulama / academics , that should not mean that I refuse to critically engage with alternative ideas … I think we should create space for debate , Islam is meant for the globe , so we may stay close to our South Asian perspective but we should also open up for other diverse perspectives , and opening up does not necessarily mean having to agree with it .Perhaps some of our insecurities about our faith are rooted in our colonial past. For instance… I feel deeply saddened by the mob hysteria we are prone to create on religious issues ( Dr. Fazl ur Rahman in the past and Junaid Jamshaid in present are just two examples of our intolerance in religious matters ).
Having said this , eventually, I think we both agree with the idea of Prof. An Naim’s call to debate as a ‘frame work for constant contestation not claim for categorical resolution’ . And I am enjoying the fact that Pakistan is taking so much space in this debate 🙂
May 20, 2015 at 12:21 pm -
I agree that one of the problems we have in Pakistan is ‘our collective reluctance to listen to any alternative perspective’ – even the classical construction of orthodoxy wouldn’t have come about if, during the first few centuries of Islam, representatives of the mainstream had not engaged thinkers with diverging viewpoints. There is nothing instructive and constructive about spurning views that challenge our convictions. Even if our certainties are well-founded, we must ensure that our commitment to them is not unthoughtful and dogmatic. Sadly, an unreflective adherence to received wisdoms (religious and non-religious) is the norm.
May 25, 2015 at 8:26 am -
why should there be a single law for a nation-state? why can’t there be a plurality of laws?
why should law be generated by the state? why can’t law be a separate power from that of the state?
why can’t a Muslim-majority country have a plurality of sharia courts–with Muslims free to use any fiqh system/school they see fit?
If one posits that religion (ethics and morality) cannot be imposed through law—then any “law” enacted is an imposition even if it is not “religious”. No matter how “secular ” or neutral a legal system is—it is still coercive….UNLESS humanity is free to choose which legal system it wants to abide by……?……
May 25, 2015 at 1:05 pm -
I am traveling this week, with limited access to email. I would like to attempt responding to these questions as soon as I can, but also invite whoever wishes to respond or add to these questions to please go ahead.
With best regards and appreciation
Abdullahi
May 26, 2015 at 6:58 am -
Thankyou for such an unexpectedly speedy response…since there was an invitation to add to the questions….some more rudimentary thoughts, opinions on my previous questions…….
One POV can be that Islam as a “project” has been interrupted because of the Colonial project. This interruption could be construed in a positive way as an opportunity to rethink the Islamic project (for Muslim-Majority countries) in a radically pluralistic way……?…..
Why? Because there are problems with Secularism (here understood as neutrality of State and law) based on “civic reason” (here understood as human reasoning).
My opinion is that the Western Secular project began as a way to wrest power away from the Church to the State (Monarchy) because both the state and church were competing for the same privileges and benefits. Protestantism was/is a “secular” religion in that it does not have a component for the formation of “law” (unlike the Catholic Church, Judaism, Islam and other religions)
Therefore, American secularism was a byproduct of Protestant Christianity. Thus, all power became consolidated—opening the doors to easy corruption, abuse, and injustice. If consolidation of power is a problem…then the solution to this is a division of power.
Another problem is that of freedom of conscience—if our ethico-moral values are a matter of free-choice—-then any system which enforces a single set of arbitrary but “reasoned” laws takes away the freedom of choice. If religion is understood as affirmation of ,and adherence to, a set of ethico-moral guidance and principles…then in order to ensure such freedom….there must be a plurality of “laws” and these laws/principles must be free of the coercion of the state. This would mean that the state does not generate laws—but institutions independent of the state generate and formulate laws according to whatever ethico-moral principles or values they affirm. This serves 2 purposes—it divides the power of the state and it ensures freedom of conscience…….(at least in theory)…..
If we take a glance at the Constitution of Medina, (622 CE) there is a negotiation of where some practices will be followed according to the traditions of the various tribes and where some practices will be a shared collaboration (between the larger community and the tribe). Such an idea might be modernized so that representatives of various ethico-moral values (religions) can come together and produce a general framework within which a plurality and diversity flourishes…such an institution or committee or whatever, can also negotiate what laws they will generate in collaboration with the state for the purpose of the efficient discharge of the responsibilities of the state……
The purpose of law and state should be the (equitable) empowerment of the people/citizens and this cannot be fully realized under current systems of governments/nation-states….because these have become hopelessly corrupted…….The primary source of this corruption is the unequal distribution of wealth arising from the current (global) economic system. Again, power is consolidated in the hands of the privileged few who then subvert state and law for their own benefit…..In order for the Islam project to work fully in realizing the values of justice, equity and empowerment of all, this aspect of global corruption must also be tackled. The ethico-moral principles of “Islamic” economics may bring hope….if these principles are used to generate laws, rules and regulations that govern global economics……. We can have a plurality of global economic systems so that people have the freedom to choose whichever system is most beneficial for them….?……
I think that Islam—a dynamic, vibrant and wholistic system of timeless Guidance—(a paradox of terms) can only be fully realized with an enthusiastic engagement with the world and its problems—not by privatizing it into a corner……….Secular/Semi-Secular/”Islamic” failed states are in the best position for a new project that empowers humanity through diversity/plurality…..having failed…they can rethink the purpose (and responsibilities) of governance, law, economics and the ethico-moral principles that will guide the nations forward into the future…..
Sahih International: (49:13 and 5:48 partial)
“O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted.”
…and….
“…To each of you We prescribed a law and a method. Had Allah willed, He would have made you one nation [united in religion], but [He intended] to test you in what He has given you; so race to [all that is] good. To Allah is your return all together, and He will [then] inform you concerning that over which you used to differ.”
May 29, 2015 at 6:32 am -
further ruminations….
Is there a future for the “nation-sate”?
The nation-state is a western concept. It has jurisdictional limitations. In an increasingly globalized world, where people have dual or multiple citizenships, where “nations” are forming coalitions and groups (Such as the European-Union, ASEAN plus….etc….) and where corporations are multinational—-what purpose can “nation-sate” serve?…..
If we say that “nation-state” serve to protect the citizens—then this is also disputable, as armies become mercenary/privatized, militaries become internationalized through joint combat exercises and such, and as non-state players/militaries use strategies that defeat conventional nation-states…
In an interconnected globalized future—-one where people no longer find national identity important—can other options of identity be explored?…..
Religions—particularly the larger/major religions are often mutl-inational, multi-ethnic and free of national jurisdictions….such a strategically placed identity option may be the future of a new international/global systems….?…. could a vision of a new radical pluralism offer better options for the future than the outdated notions of secularism and nation-state?
May 29, 2015 at 6:48 am -
Muslims are not the only religious group grappling with issues of identity, modernity, nation-state and secularism….
A link from a Jewish magazine Tikkun Daily….
http://www.tikkun.org/tikkundaily/2015/05/14/ethnic-solidarity-without-militarized-nationalism-insights-from-jewish-eastern-europe/
…and Buddhism….
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_National_Happiness
May 29, 2015 at 2:34 pm -
Salaams to all
I am not sure if my Reply to the preceding comment came through, so please forgive the repetition, if any:
It is of course true that Muslims are not the only religious groups (in the plural, not singular as the author above seem to assume) facing such issues, but that is totally irrelevant to the question whether Muslims are in fact responding at all, and if so, what are their responses. This is what this Blog and website are about.
Since I have never, in my work published or spoken anywhere, including this website, suggested or implied that Muslims are alone in facing such issues, it is irrelevant to our discussion here to assert what is already fully accepted by me and other contributors to this Blog.
May 30, 2015 at 3:22 am -
My apologies for creating a misunderstanding…my intention for posting the links was simply to bring in a diversity of ideas. There are many Muslim groups with many visions, and there are many groups within other religious traditions…..radical pluralism may give a platform to all these people to begin to implement their beliefs fully without compromising to an imposed “secularism”…….
However, as you said…it is perhaps more important to limit our discussions to Muslim ideas only for this blog…in order that these ideas may be explored more fully……
June 14, 2015 at 9:32 pm -
Two Questions: 1) Has anyone seen the movie “Timbuktu” ? If so, please comment. Question # 2) Given the world attention given to human rights violations of groups like ISIS; what response comes from progressive to moderate Muslims in terms of a type of “just governance” that is workable even in the U.S.. given its history of horrible atrocities and current denial of basic constitutional rights to many of its citizens[especially African Americans]. A secular state? An Islamic state? A Democracy? A Republic? Maybe, it does not matter at all if a significant majority of its people are ignorant to the true value of what it means to be human and have no idea as to why we are here on this earth?
June 15, 2015 at 2:48 pm -
Abdullahi A. An-Ma’im
aannaim [at] emory [dot] edu Salaams to all
I have no comment on “Timuktu” because I did not see the movie. In my view, instead of wasting our time and energy “responding” to groups like ISIS, concerned Muslims should strive to develop an Islamic alternative to violent extremists. As you can see from other sections of this website, I have been striving to promote and clarifying a humane and enlightened view of Sharia and the political role of Islam since 1980. Would you please review at your convenience articles and book chapters which you can download free of charge at (https://scholarblogs.emory.edu/aannaim/publications/). If possible, please see my book, Toward an Islamic Reformation (1990). The purpose of this whole website is to invite all concerned, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, to debate, analyze and critique the ideas I am presenting in these publication and through the Video and recordings, all accessible free of charge from this website.
Since there is already a huge wealth of ideas, debates, judicial decisions and other discussions of “just government” for the United States, that should NOT be a matter of concern for concerned Muslims because our higher and immediate priority is to develop and promote a humane and enlightened view of Islam, Sharia and the state. For an overview of my position on these issues, please see the overview in electronic book format at (https://scholarblogs.emory.edu/aannaim/future-of-sharia-2/). When convenient, please also see my book, Toward an Islamic Reformation (Syracuse University Press, 1990).
Hoping that you would want to review my detailed arguments and evidence/documentation for my position, I would offer the following very specific responses to your questions: First, a so-called Islamic state is a total illusion invented by scholars like Maududi (Insidan sub-content) and Qutob (Middle East) in the 1940s. Islam does not prescribe a specific model of the state. In fact, the term “state” is not mentioned a single time in the whole of the Quran and Hadith. These fundamental sources of Islam always address human beings, never an institution or corporate entity. Islam therefore leaves it to Muslims to decide on the best form of governance. The reasons why the state cannot be Islamic include the lack of an agreed criteria for judging the truth of such a claim, in addition to the lack of an independent, none political entity that can decide on such claims and expect their decisions to be accepted in a peaceful and orderly manner. The argument I am making in all the sources accessible through this website is that the state should be neutral regarding religious doctrine so that we can all adopt whatever religious or belief system we choose by conviction and free choices, without fear of coercion or repression. So, the rationale for a neutral state is fundamentally Islamic, namely, to enable people to believe freely. This is the core issue here, and we should not be distracted by whether the neutral state we mean is “secular” or not. In fact, there is no agreed definition of a secular state either. For instance, both the British and French models of the state would be unconstitutional in the United States, and vice versa.
Finally, I would prefer a democratic republic because it can be more accountable to the totality of its population – governments must be freely elected and directly responsible to all the citizens of the republic. Again, this is the core issue, and we should not be distracted by questions like is should the state follow the American, British, German or any other model. Each people should choose and protect their own model for their own historical and political context, and not simply attempt to copy the model of another state, which never works in practice anyway.
Abdullahi A. An-Na’im
July 2, 2015 at 9:10 am -
@A.K.
The fundamental principles upon which “Modernity” is founded—when we look at the Magna Carta or the American Declaration of Independence—or French “secularism” as it is practiced today—is the idea that some people are inherently entitled to privilege—the class to whom this privilege extends has been expanded over the years—but the basic idea remains unchanged.. So, During the formation of America — it was the White, male, landed person whose “equality” was debated/considered—the rest were unequal….
The Tawheedic paradigm begins with the idea that God created all humanity—therefore ALL humanity is of EQUAL WORTH—none superior or inferior to the other—and all have been given rights and responsibilities (by God). Among these rights is the right to freedom of conscience/religion.
Thus—any “neutral” state based on the paradigm of “modernity” will be against Islam because it will not align with Tawheed(Unity)—it will be based on Hierarchy not Unity. Thus it will be oppressive—because if “laws” are made by the government to please all—it will end up pleasing none and supposedly “neutral” laws will be coercively applied to those who see them as unjust or disagree with them morally…..
“Modernity” is not the solution for the future—it is a failed experiment. We need a better solution. This solution should have a division of powers that will compete with each other for the betterment of all humanity—-one such solution is the division of “Law” from the grip of “government” and to allow all groups of people to have their own laws. (plurality of laws). Another is to do away with the idea of arbitrary geographical boundaries. In a globalized world—humanity should have the freedom of movement and national boundaries are a barrier to that. The right to free movement will align with the Tawheedic principle that the Earth belongs to God and Humanity is but a temporary custodian. Thus no one has the right to exclude others from what essentially belongs to God not man…..
The right to choose ones economic system is also important—today everyone is enslaved to one system which operates without moral or ethics….A plurality of systems will give people the freedom of conscience to choose which economic system best fits their moral/ethical values….
A world that allows for many choices is less oppressive than one that forces people to conform in the name of Democracy, Secularism, or Islam….
July 2, 2015 at 6:04 pm -
Let us please distinguish between spiritual ideals and historical reality.
With all due respect, the comment above (at A.K.) reflects some familiar confusions. The author is contrasting an actual human material history of Europe and North America with the religious ideal of Islam as the “Tawheedic paradigm”. The author is contrasting a geopolitical reality with an abstract spiritual ideal. Whatever the author understands the “Tawheedic paradigm” to mean, it is not a true reflection of the actual geopolitical history of Muslims around the world.
For example, the author speaks of “the idea that God created all humanity … of EQUAL WORTH…” In fact, Muslims practiced slavery until the end of the 19th century, and in some parts until much later — in Mauritania, for instance, slavery continues as we speak, although more hidden than it used to be in the 1990s.
Muslim scholars like Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha of Sudan have argued that slavery must be abolished from an Islamic point of view (see my book, Toward an Islamic Reformation 1990), but we should not pretend that that humane “Tawheedic” objective has already been achieved from an Islamic point of view… the reality of 14 centuries of Muslim history contradicted that ideal.
A second confusion I see in the author’s reasoning is that he/she speaks of European/North American “modernity” as if it is the only modernity there is, in order to reject it. With all due respect, I am hereby inviting the author to find anywhere in this website, and anywhere in my writing, where I am calling for European/North American modernity as “the solution for the future”. In other words, the author is constructing a false claim in order to reject it, instead of responding to the actual claims I made in my own writings, and the writings of colleagues who share my commitments and values.
Other superficial claims the author makes is “to allow all groups of people to have their own laws. “plurality of laws. In reality, this romantic idea will immediately collapse when we ask: is a “group of people” defined? What is the process by which a group is supposed to “have their own laws”? What happens when the laws of different groups come into conflict with each other? What law governs a contract between a member of group A, and a member of group B?
It is true that a “world that allows for many choices is less oppressive than one that forces people to conform”, but the real question is HOW TO REALIZE THIS GOAL in the real world where all people, Muslims and non-Muslims, men and women, actually live.
with respectful regards
Abdullahi
July 14, 2015 at 4:15 am -
“The author is contrasting an actual human material history of Europe and North America with the religious ideal of Islam as the “Tawheedic paradigm”. The author is contrasting a geopolitical reality with an abstract spiritual ideal. ”
Yes, you are correct in the above statement. Any paradigm is an ideal—when (Western) “Modernity” began its paradigm—it too was an ideal—one based on “Natural law”, “Nature’s God” , the primacy of human reason and science. To be sure—there are many good points to this paradigm—as many Muslim scholars have noted—aspects of this paradigm align with Tawheed (Unity). But…there are also aspects that fall short of Tawheed….and these are problematic.
In our history—we Muslims have fallen short in realizing the full potential of the Tawhidic paradigm. But, that does not reduce its potential for good, harmony, and peace.
The idea that all humanity is of equal worth does not mean that God distributes his blessings evenly—as is clear—some people have been given more wealth than others. What this means is that those who have been given more blessings by God have more RESPONSIBILITY than those who have been given less—Those who have been given less by God—nevertheless still have EQUAL rights to God’s blessings.
Thus, the Quran says that those who have been given more have an obligation to provide for those who have been given less (voluntary redistribution of wealth). Thus, to be “Human” is not just about rights—it is primarily about responsibilities. Our responsibilities towards our fellow Man and towards God.
Slavery–depending on how it is defined—does take many forms from wage slavery to human trafficking..etc. We need to tackle the Modern problem of oppression—but its causation is a complex web of factors. Some have suggested that community based programs are better able to address the specificities of each group/community……
Plurality of laws–there already are a plurality of laws that are grouped by nation-states….but these laws are coercive in that everyone within that nation-state is bound by a single law made by its government.
Instead of having a single law for all—All peoples—in whatever groups they define themselves—should be able to practice their own laws. Further, if there are no national boundaries….then such groups will be global…and this would mean that in practice—-people would be able to adhere to their ethical/moral codes where ever they are……
When groups come into conflict with each other—these problems can be solved by treaties that offer rules of resolution or by arbitration by a neutral party or one approved by the involved parties…..
How to realize the goal of radical plurality—slowly—over time. As we build more plural institutions and navigate the problems that changes will inevitably bring—we will walk towards a more just and less oppressive future…..
October 8, 2015 at 1:54 am -
Although no one appears to have posted a comment since July to this blog, it did occur to me when I saw a news article in August that it might present an appropriate topic for debate with regard to Islam and secularism in the United States.
A webzine called ‘Islamist Watch,’ a publication of the Middle East Forum, published an article about three public school districts in the United States that were currently using federal money to provide free halal lunches to schoolchildren. Apparently, according to current law, if at least 40% of the students from any school district can be classified as coming from low-income homes, the federal government provides free lunches for all students in the district, regardless of family income or wealth. However, three such districts have gone further, providing halal meals as part of this program. The question naturally arises: is this a violation of the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses of the US Constitution?
The article is at: http://www.islamist-watch.org/20699/federal-government-subsidizes-halal-food-in
One issue is whether such a policy advances a ‘secular purpose’ without proselytizing, since the ‘faith based initiatives’ introduced under Bush and continuing under Obama have such a litmus test. However, in this case, it is difficult to argue that the federal government is not favoring one religion over the other. Obviously, poor and disadvantaged children must be looked after by society as a whole (at least we hope so), but is it strictly necessary to cater to a purely religious tradition in order to make sure children can read and write? Whom does the program ultimately benefit? It would appear that it materially benefits whomever performs the halal services. Jews in such school districts could complain that no kosher meals are provided, but it may be unlikely that this policy is causing serious injury to the constitutional rights of Jewish high school students in the districts in question, because perhaps there are no Jewish students in such districts, or else there are, but they do not come from families that need the federal government subsidizing kosher lunches for them. So who has standing to challenge such a policy?
The following quotation from the article sums it up:
“Media stories about lobbying efforts to serve halal food in New York City and San Diego public schools largely framed the issue as one of poor Muslim children going hungry because government-funded public schools failed to provide food satisfying their religious requirements… The articles presumed parents could not or would not provide lunches, or argued that unheated packaged lunches were insufficient to enable children to learn effectively. Adds David Loy, legal director of the ACLU Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties, “The [San Diego] school district has a valid secular purpose of promoting equal educational opportunity by ensuring that low-income students eat lunch and therefore learn more effectively.” New York City’s proposed legislation shares these assumptions.”
It seems an interesting topic for debate in the matter of Islam and secularism, even if not directly Sharia.
February 7, 2018 at 12:29 am -
I am surprised that Saleena Karim’s book Secular Jinnah and Venkat Dhulipala’s book Creating a New Medina are being cited as authorities on Jinnah. Anyone familiar with Jinnah’s career from 1906-1948 knows that he was an avid secularist who in the end was using Pakistan demand as a bargaining counter. He did not speak of an Islamic framework as such. What he did argue was that modern democracy was compatible with the dictates of Sharia which is what Professor An Na’im argues in his book Islam and Secular State. As for Dhulipala his book has been described as being in bad faith. I suggest people here read Dr Faisal Devji’s review.
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Abdullahi A. An-Na'im
Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law
Emory University
1301 Clifton Road Atlanta, Georgia 30322-2770 USA
Email: aannaim [at] emory [dot] edu & futureofsharia [at] gmail [dot] com
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