Anthropology is an analytical perspective that can be applied to better understand human behavior in any context (Powell 2019, 130). If every human society possesses elements commonly associated with religion, what better way to understand human behavior than to study religion? The purpose of a definition is to explain the meaning of a term and allow for comparison between concepts. By this line of thinking, defining the concept of religion aids in the endeavor of understanding human behavior. However, appropriately defining religion in an anthropological context is exceedingly complex, as evidenced by the sheer number of scholars who have attempted to do so. Clifford Geertz’s definition works to develop a conventional depiction of religion; however, I find some aspects of this definition too ubiquitously applicable and some that perhaps will not stand the test of time.
Geertz’s depiction of religion establishes the idea that religions form the worlds of their followers and that they lend a guide and impetus for their followers’ actions. Geertz defines religion as a system of symbols that induces powerful moods and motivations in its followers, forms conceptions a general order of existence, and makes these conceptions appear as fact so that the moods and motivations seem “uniquely realistic” (Geertz 1966, 59). Symbols, he explains, are “any object, act, event, quality or relation which serves as a vehicle for conception,” with the conception being the symbol’s meaning (Geertz 1966, 59). Essentially, these symbols shape the world of a worshipper by influencing their character and their concrete actions.
While Geertz develops a fairly comprehensive definition of religion, it is perhaps too encompassing. There are other aspects of life that meet his criteria of religion that are not considered religious. In many countries, secular federal law, for instance, seems to fall under his definition. Law would seem to be a set of symbols based on Geertz’s definition of a symbol. Written law, for instance, can convey a conception of justice. Law also establishes moods and motivations in people, as it inclines them to act in and feel certain ways. It makes these conceptions appear as fact, too, so that their motivations seem realistic. For the most part, these societies maintain the principle that following the law will maintain justice, which is thus a symbol making a conception appear as fact. With this methodology, law satisfies Geertz’s definition. Secular federal law, nevertheless, is not widely considered religious.
Although the issue here seems to be that Geertz does not draw a clear line between religion and other areas of life such as law, I feel it goes beyond that. Talal Asad’s “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category” reflects this sentiment onto a more specific area of Geertz’s definition. Asad questions, “Can we predict a ‘distinctive’ set of dispositions for a Christian worshiper in modern, industrial society? Alternatively, can we say of someone with a ‘distinctive’ set of dispositions that he is or is not a Christian?” (Asad 1983, 114). Here, Asad criticizes Geertz’s assertion that it is the system of religious symbols that give worshippers a set of dispositions and character. Asad contends that social, political, and economic institutions also contribute to an individual’s disposition. This contention would make it difficult if not impossible to discern if it is religion or otherwise influencing the individual. I do not imagine that religion alone could provoke an individual to act the way they act and think the way they think each day. Even when acting in an overtly religious way, like attending a service at a house of worship, there may be other forces of life at play: an individual might decide to attend that day not only for religious reasons but perhaps also because they can afford the trip to the service that day or they know their friend will be there. From this idea, rather than predicating Geertz’s definition does not adequately distinguish between religion and other parts of life, I believe that religious influence is too entwined with social, political, and economic influences when it comes to human behavior. Thus, I feel being skeptical about the broad nature of Geertz’s definition is appropriate.
In addition, pertaining to the ability of Geertz’s definition to last over time, I examine its third section. Under his criteria that religions establish people’s dispositions by “formulating conceptions of a general order of existence,” Geertz says that religious symbols allow people to grapple with “The Problem of Meaning” (Geertz 1966, 68). According to Geertz, the Problem of Meaning is facing the inexorability of ignorance, pain, and injustice while also denying that these are a part of the world. While some religions may have underpinnings in unraveling The Problem of Meaning, I do not believe that everyone today engages in religion for that purpose. Many followers of religions do so, not to cope with the horrors of the world, but to embrace their cultural roots and their family. I wonder if this point undermines Geertz’s logic for definition as the last point did. Is it more important to consider why a religion began or more important to consider how and why people observe it presently? If there is a correct answer and the latter is the case, then I believe the definition loses acceptability.
In a similar vein, Geertz considers how the symbol systems he describes rouse authority, and he arrives at the idea that it is through ritual performances. By acting together through ritual, worshippers accept the symbolic interpretations of the world to be real (Welsch 2017, 193). To hone in on this ideal, I see two lines of thinking. Geertz puts it as “In these plastic dramas men attain their faith as they portray it” (Geertz 1966, 70). On one hand, this reminds me of the advice to act as if you are a confident person in order to actually become a confident person. Theoretically, if one goes through the steps of acting like a confident person, seeing what they may accomplish will allow them to accept themselves as a confident person. I do subscribe somewhat to this philosophy since I do think it can effectively change one’s self-perspective. On the other hand, I am unsure if this line of thinking in a religious context applies today. Although many people engage in religious activities, they may not accept all the religious interpretations of the world to be real. For example, one can pray or attend religious services without truly believing in god(s). I wonder, does this invalidate that part of Geertz’s definition? Or, is it irrelevant since the people who might not accept the religious interpretations of the world as being real do not truly fit Geertz’s idea of worshippers? In my own view, if these individuals consider themselves to be followers of their religion and they engage in religious activities, then they do fit the idea of a worshipper. In this case, I disagree with Geertz’s assertion that it is through ritual practices that worshippers accept the symbolic interpretations of the world to be real.
Overall, Geertz’s definition of religion as a cultural system does not seem to have total utility. My own position aligns more with Asad’s argument that there cannot be a universal definition of religion because its elements and relationships are potentially too historically specific (Asad 1983, 177) and with the idea that the definition may be too broad in other areas. What’s more, other anthropological frameworks might advise against assigning a definition to religion at all! Just as how transforming “the misery that results from political calamity…into major depressive disorder or post-traumatic stress…” ends up delegitimizing the patient’s suffering (Kleinman 1991, 275), I think that assigning a one-size-fits-all definition to the concept of religion might similarly undervalue individual religions. I admire that anthropologists have sought to codify and standardize interpersonal concepts such as religion, family, and culture in order to facilitate discussion and comparison between cultures. However, I think that attempting to assign one definition to encompass all religions may strip us of the ability to fully understand and appreciate religious differences.
Works Cited
Asad, Talal. 2008. “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category.” In A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion, edited by Michael Lambek 110–126. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
Geertz, Clifford. 2008. “Religion as a Cultural System.” In A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion, edited by Michael Lambek 57–75. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
Kleinman, Arthur and Joan Kleinman. 1991. “Suffering and its Professional Transformation: Towards an Anthropology of Interpersonal Experience.” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 15(3): 275–276.
Powell, Elisabeth. 2019. “Why Businesses and Consumers Need Us.” Journal of Business Anthropology. 8 (1): 130.
Welsch, Robert L. and Luis A. Vivanco. 2017. “Chapter 14.” In Cultural Anthropology: Asking Questions About Humanity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Very thoughtful argument Dina!
I agree with your thoughts on Geertz’s definition of religion, as there cannot simply be one universal description or definition. Religion can come in many forms and cultures and just as you said religious differences could be undermined if we try to combine them into one category. I also believe that religion is intertwined into the social and economic aspects of our lives which give religion a unique meaning to each one of us which is along the lines of Talal Asad’s definition (Asad, 114). Similar to your analyzation of the definition of relgion, I found a similar idea in the reading in Kleinnmann’s work called “Suffering and its Personal Transformation.” He makes a similar point to yours in which suffering cannot have a universal definition similar to religion. There is “contingent misfortunes, routinized forms of suffering and suffering from extreme conditions” which all hold a different value (Kleinnman, 280). Suffering shapes individual experience and is what truly shapes us as Humans. Our different understandings of suffering is what diminishes its universality. Overall, I really liked how you exposed the limitations of the universality of religion and compared the definitions to both Geertz and Asad’s definition and I wanted to mention how Kleinman’s view also supported Asad’s view.
Hi Dina,
I love the points you made in your post! I definitely agree with your skepticism regarding Geertz’s view on religion as a cultural system. I think what Geertz also fails to recognize is the complexity of what it even means to follow a religion. Even within a single religion, people have very different interpretations of how to be a follower and have unique, individualized relationships with the higher power they believe in. These complexities are exponentiated when comparing different religions.
Apart from providing a sense of social cohesion and individual consciousness, I feel that an important role of religion lies in the fact that it provides meaning and a refuge to an individual from life’s uncertainties. Religion provides many people with comfort and a means of coping with problems they face – in fact, many people primarily only turn to religion and faith in times of difficulties. Regarding the Kleinman reading, an individual’s relationship with their religion must be taken into account when interacting with them in a professional sense. While we may not realize it, how we respond to suffering in our life can warrant a “transcendent response”, such as endurance, aspiration, or perseverance (Kleinman 294). These responses are directly influenced by religion. For example, how a patient complains or perceives their illness can be informed through their moral domain, which is dictated by religion. Therefore, it is very important to legitimize and contextualize their experience by assessing what is at stake for the participant within that particular situation.
Hi Dina!
Your post is a very insightful discussion of the complex intersection between religion and culture!
Upon reading Geertz’ definition of religion I also found it ambiguous and applicable to many other aspects of life we would not traditionally consider religion. I found your example of Law as meeting Geertz’ criteria for religion an interesting parallel and thought of another example of this to be a political leader and their supporters. He describes religion to be a system of symbols with assigned shared meanings and conceptions that are regarded as fact by its followers. By this criteria, supporters of a political figure, especially one that prides themselves on having power over their constituents, creates a dynamic in which they are automatically the one assigning meaning to the symbols revered by their followers. In this way, a political leader can easily seem to take place of a religious figurehead, as they are able to create shared symbols with meaning and convey the meaning as fact to followers who blindly support. I also found your critique of Asad’s argument interesting as I had not previously considered how deeply intertwined religion may be in someone’s social, political, and economic facets of life. This concept makes me wonder if someone who does not consider themselves to be religious or follow an organized faith actually does have implicit influence of some kind of religion in their lives, as it seems to be so ingrained in other aspects of life.
I really appreciate how your post explained succinctly the problems with Geertz’s definition of religion. There is an inevitable gray area between culture and religion which is not brought up in Geertz’s definition of religion. Certain behaviors and actions cannot be solely explained within the limits of religion or culture. Most of the human behavior and human experience can be defined by an array of religious, cultural, psychological, psychophysical explanations. More importantly, the individual experience is what makes abstract terms like culture and religion impossible to define since everyone’s experience with those terms are drastically different despite there being patterns of similarities. As you said the section in Geertz’s article about the “problem of meaning” is what religion is to a part of the population but not to everyone. Your paragraph clearly shows that people participate in religion for a multitude of reasons other than just to fulfill the gap in their soul that longs for the purpose in their life. I agree with what you said in the second to last paragraph on how the fact that people attend services without actually believing in god(s) could invalidate his point about symbol systems rouse authority. Those who physically attend services and perform worship ceremonies and rituals should be defined as “worshippers” because they are partaking in “religion”. It is unlikely that they are physically at services for no reason at all, they must have some sort of motivation whether it is because their parents force them to or because they think it is the right thing to do or because they grew up going to services and performing rituals so it has become a habit. So, in my opinion, this does invalidate his argument about how symbols in religion rouse authority (in all people). This may apply to the majority of worshippers but, again, it is hard to define how religion affects or what religion is like to all people.
Hi Dina!
Like the others have said, you made some really interesting points. You mentioned that Geertz’s definition does not include practicing religion as a way to connect with one’s culture. You also brought up that one may not believe in God while participating in religious practices. These two ideas feel extremely connected and as you mentioned, potentially contradicting Geertz’s definition of religion. If exclusively following Geertz’s definition, it seems as though many people would no longer be of a certain religion, such as those who practice in these examples that you included. It also opens up the potential for elements of society that may not be considered religion to be defined as just that. Although this raises interesting questions and opens up what may be considered religious or religion, I agree with you in siding more with Asad and the idea is no universal definition of religion because it is so dependant on circumstance and history. However, I think there is a benefit to the broadness of Geertz’s definition because it does not limit or define certain elements of religions. Therefore, it aligns closely with your conclusion that perhaps there cannot be a single definition of religion when attempting to study religion.
Hi Dina,
Amazing blog post! You clearly have thought long and hard about Geertz’s essay!
I think your analysis of what Geertz may say about someone who attends religious ceremonies is interesting, however I feel here is an example where his broad definition about what religion is actually more tactile than not. Firstly, while attempting to define religion is a daunting task to say the least, in my reading Geertz does not attempt to tackle the even greater question of: who a “worshipper” is, as you called it in your response. I do not think he is attempting to make a blanket statement about whether or not an individual’s actions grants them membership to a religion, so I feel it is unfair to critique his definition with the example of someone who participates in religious ceremonies without belief. However if we are to use this example, I personally believe that his definition is actually strengthened. The person whom is so influenced by a “set of symbols,” or has such “powerful, pervasive, and long lasting moods” to feel influenced to attend a ceremony where they externally or even internally deny their personal belief, regardless of that personal belief system, demonstrates the correctness of Geertz definition of religion, and the strength behind it. Regardless of the “viewers” beliefs, the religion – through the symbols and moods – exists, and the denying worshipper – through their being influenced by said symbols and moods- performatively confirms the existence of said religion. I look forward to discussing in class!