Anthropology is an analytical perspective that can be applied to better understand human behavior in any context (Powell 2019, 130). If every human society possesses elements commonly associated with religion, what better way to understand human behavior than to study religion? The purpose of a definition is to explain the meaning of a term and allow for comparison between concepts. By this line of thinking, defining the concept of religion aids in the endeavor of understanding human behavior. However, appropriately defining religion in an anthropological context is exceedingly complex, as evidenced by the sheer number of scholars who have attempted to do so. Clifford Geertz\u2019s definition works to develop a conventional depiction of religion; however, I find some aspects of this definition too ubiquitously applicable and some that perhaps will not stand the test of time. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Geertz\u2019s depiction of religion establishes the idea that religions form the worlds of their followers and that they lend a guide and impetus for their followers\u2019 actions. Geertz defines religion as a system of symbols that induces powerful moods and motivations in its followers, forms conceptions a general order of existence, and makes these conceptions appear as fact so that the moods and motivations seem \u201cuniquely realistic\u201d (Geertz 1966, 59). Symbols, he explains, are \u201cany object, act, event, quality or relation which serves as a vehicle for conception,\u201d with the conception being the symbol\u2019s meaning (Geertz 1966, 59). Essentially, these symbols shape the world of a worshipper by influencing their character and their concrete actions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
While Geertz develops a fairly comprehensive definition of religion, it is perhaps too encompassing. There are other aspects of life that meet his criteria of religion that are not considered religious. In many countries, secular federal law, for instance, seems to fall under his definition. Law would seem to be a set of symbols based on Geertz\u2019s definition of a symbol. Written law, for instance, can convey a conception of justice. Law also establishes moods and motivations in people, as it inclines them to act in and feel certain ways. It makes these conceptions appear as fact, too, so that their motivations seem realistic. For the most part, these societies maintain the principle that following the law will maintain justice, which is thus a symbol making a conception appear as fact. With this methodology, law satisfies Geertz\u2019s definition. Secular federal law, nevertheless, is not widely considered religious. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Although the issue here seems to be that Geertz does not draw a clear line between religion and other areas of life such as law, I feel it goes beyond that. Talal Asad\u2019s \u201cThe Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category\u201d reflects this sentiment onto a more specific area of Geertz\u2019s definition. Asad questions, \u201cCan we predict a \u2018distinctive\u2019 set of dispositions for a Christian worshiper in modern, industrial society? Alternatively, can we say of someone with a \u2018distinctive\u2019 set of dispositions that he is or is not a Christian?\u201d (Asad 1983, 114). Here, Asad criticizes Geertz\u2019s assertion that it is the system of religious symbols that give worshippers a set of dispositions and character. Asad contends that social, political, and economic institutions also contribute to an individual\u2019s disposition. This contention would make it difficult if not impossible to discern if it is religion or otherwise influencing the individual. I do not imagine that religion alone could provoke an individual to act the way they act and think the way they think each day. Even when acting in an overtly religious way, like attending a service at a house of worship, there may be other forces of life at play: an individual might decide to attend that day not only for religious reasons but perhaps also because they can afford the trip to the service that day or they know their friend will be there. From this idea, rather than predicating Geertz\u2019s definition does not adequately distinguish between religion and other parts of life, I believe that religious influence is too entwined with social, political, and economic influences when it comes to human behavior. Thus, I feel being skeptical about the broad nature of Geertz\u2019s definition is appropriate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In addition, pertaining to the ability of Geertz\u2019s definition to last over time, I examine its third section. Under his criteria that religions establish people’s dispositions by \u201cformulating conceptions of a general order of existence,\u201d Geertz says that religious symbols allow people to grapple with \u201cThe Problem of Meaning\u201d (Geertz 1966, 68). According to Geertz, the Problem of Meaning is facing the inexorability of ignorance, pain, and injustice while also denying that these are a part of the world. While some religions may have underpinnings in unraveling The Problem of Meaning, I do not believe that everyone today engages in religion for that purpose. Many followers of religions do so, not to cope with the horrors of the world, but to embrace their cultural roots and their family. I wonder if this point undermines Geertz\u2019s logic for definition as the last point did. Is it more important to consider why a religion began or more important to consider how and why people observe it presently? If there is a correct answer and the latter is the case, then I believe the definition loses acceptability. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In a similar vein, Geertz considers how the symbol systems he describes rouse authority, and he arrives at the idea that it is through ritual performances. By acting together through ritual, worshippers accept the symbolic interpretations of the world to be real (Welsch 2017, 193). To hone in on this ideal, I see two lines of thinking. Geertz puts it as \u201cIn these plastic dramas men attain their faith as they portray it\u201d (Geertz 1966, 70). On one hand, this reminds me of the advice to act as if you are a confident person in order to actually become a confident person. Theoretically, if one goes through the steps of acting like a confident person, seeing what they may accomplish will allow them to accept themselves as a confident person. I do subscribe somewhat to this philosophy since I do think it can effectively change one\u2019s self-perspective. On the other hand, I am unsure if this line of thinking in a religious context applies today. Although many people engage in religious activities, they may not accept all the religious interpretations of the world to be real. For example, one can pray or attend religious services without truly believing in god(s). I wonder, does this invalidate that part of Geertz\u2019s definition? Or, is it irrelevant since the people who might not accept the religious interpretations of the world as being real do not truly fit Geertz\u2019s idea of worshippers? In my own view, if these individuals consider themselves to be followers of their religion and they engage in religious activities, then they do fit the idea of a worshipper. In this case, I disagree with Geertz\u2019s assertion that it is through ritual practices that worshippers accept the symbolic interpretations of the world to be real.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Overall, Geertz\u2019s definition of religion as a cultural system does not seem to have total utility. My own position aligns more with Asad\u2019s argument that there cannot be a universal definition of religion because its elements and relationships are potentially too historically specific (Asad 1983, 177) and with the idea that the definition may be too broad in other areas. What\u2019s more, other anthropological frameworks might advise against assigning a definition to religion at all! Just as how transforming \u201cthe misery that results from political calamity…into major depressive disorder or post-traumatic stress\u2026\u201d ends up delegitimizing the patient’s suffering (Kleinman 1991, 275), I think that assigning a one-size-fits-all definition to the concept of religion might similarly undervalue individual religions. I admire that anthropologists have sought to codify and standardize interpersonal concepts such as religion, family, and culture in order to facilitate discussion and comparison between cultures. However, I think that attempting to assign one definition to encompass all religions may strip us of the ability to fully understand and appreciate religious differences. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Works Cited<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Asad, Talal. 2008. \u201cThe Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category.\u201d In A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion<\/em>, edited by Michael Lambek 110\u2013126. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Geertz, Clifford. 2008. \u201cReligion as a Cultural System.\u201d In A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion<\/em>, edited by Michael Lambek 57\u201375. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Kleinman, Arthur and Joan Kleinman. 1991. \u201cSuffering and its Professional Transformation: Towards an Anthropology of Interpersonal Experience.\u201d Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry <\/em>15(3): 275\u2013276.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Powell, Elisabeth. 2019. \u201cWhy Businesses and Consumers Need Us.\u201d Journal of Business Anthropology.<\/em> 8 (1): 130.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Welsch, Robert L. and Luis A. Vivanco. 2017. \u201cChapter 14.\u201d In Cultural Anthropology: Asking Questions About Humanity. <\/em>Oxford: Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Anthropology is an analytical perspective that can be applied to better understand human behavior in any context (Powell 2019, 130). If every human society possesses elements commonly associated with religion, what better way to understand human behavior than to study religion? The purpose of a definition is to explain the meaning of a term and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6855,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/anthropologyofreligion\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/anthropologyofreligion\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/anthropologyofreligion\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/anthropologyofreligion\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6855"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/anthropologyofreligion\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/anthropologyofreligion\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":25,"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/anthropologyofreligion\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10\/revisions\/25"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/anthropologyofreligion\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/anthropologyofreligion\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/anthropologyofreligion\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}