In discussing the candid distribution of healthcare in modern-day society, Norman Daniels focuses mainly on his philosophical theoretical concept of \u201cnormal functioning\u201d to justify healthcare as a right. Daniels also argues that healthcare is a positive right (a right that requires someone, in this case, the state, to engage in certain policies). Therefore, the state must enact comprehensive healthcare laws to protect its citizens. Within this argument, Daniels also actively refutes the ideals of utilitarianism and argues that they have no logical place within the sphere of healthcare. The normal functioning model that Daniels argues is, in my opinion, a comprehensive, accurate, and well thought out healthcare policy. If the medical establishment is solely committed to keeping patients within their normal functioning range, it would allow for complete care for very sick patients whilst also preventing the dangerous over-extension of healthcare programs, therefore also accounting for resource-oriented concerns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To accurately dissect and analyze this argument, we must first understand the core piece of Daniel\u2019s theory: that of the \u201cnormal functioning range\u201d. To simplify this analysis, I will use a color-oriented method. Daniels argues that every human properly functions within a range- consider this the \u201cgreen zone\u201d. Within this zone, a person is medically well enough to pursue and attain opportunities within the social, political, economic, and personal spheres of their lives. Consider a patient in this green zone who then contracts a debilitating condition such as breast cancer. Look at this as the \u201cred zone\u201d. Within this zone, the patient is unable to attain success in any of the previously identified fields because of his medical condition. It is in this case that Daniels believes that the patient should have equal access to healthcare- to nurture him\/her back inside their normal functioning range. This system would place a higher priority on patients whose conditions obviously inhibited their ability to attain success in their lives. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is important to note the distinction between Daniel\u2019s argument and the theory of utilitarianism (absolute healthcare equality for all conditions). Daniels refutes this theory for the following reasons: it would not likely be economically possible, the difficulties of justifying any unequal access that would arise, and finally concerns about autonomy and paternalism (e.g could you refuse treatment in a universal healthcare society? What about changing or choosing which practitioner you saw?)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When analyzing this healthcare model, it is critical to consider the impacts this would have on medical practices that do not focus on bringing patients from the \u201cred\u201d to the \u201cgreen\u201d zone. This can be examined through Daniel\u2019s \u201cTreatment\/Enhancement Distinction\u201d. Daniels believes that healthcare should only be responsible for treating sicknesses and that a right to healthcare does not include treatment made to improve conditions that don\u2019t\u2019 take a person out of the \u201cgreen zone\u201d (e.g genome mapping technology, inherited trait modifications on fetuses). This would restrict healthcare to necessary practices, which Daniels believes is necessary to preserve moral integrity of healthcare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I agree with Daniels in almost every facet of his argument. The only criticism I have is that of varying definitions of the normal function. Just as Goldman argued with his theory of value orderings, could different patients not have different intrinsic definitions of their own \u201csuccesses\u201d or opportunities in life? In this situation, Daniel\u2019s model falls apart- when there is no one-model-fits-all that can be applied to the normal function.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
In discussing the candid distribution of healthcare in modern-day society, Norman Daniels focuses mainly on his philosophical theoretical concept of \u201cnormal functioning\u201d to justify healthcare as a right. Daniels also argues that healthcare is a positive right (a right that requires someone, in this case, the state, to engage in certain policies). Therefore, the state […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7007,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4,1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-149","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-healthcare-justice","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/bioethics116-4\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/149","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/bioethics116-4\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/bioethics116-4\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/bioethics116-4\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7007"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/bioethics116-4\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=149"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/bioethics116-4\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/149\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":150,"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/bioethics116-4\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/149\/revisions\/150"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/bioethics116-4\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=149"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/bioethics116-4\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=149"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/scholarblogs.emory.edu\/bioethics116-4\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=149"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}