Deadspin – Why The NCAA Needs To Pay Former Players, Not Just The Current Ones

Deadspin – Why The NCAA Needs To Pay Former Players, Not Just The Current Ones

One interpretation of our model is that it speaks to the different roles of brand equity in sports revenues. At the pro level, revenues are twice as sensitive to winning rates as at the collegiate level. Our feeling is that college revenues are driven more by the permanent nature of the fan base, and by the brand equity created over time. We have made an earlier argument along these lines, that while Ed O’Bannon should be able to profit from the use of his image, the revenues that would be generated would have as much to do with Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and Bill Walton as they have to do with Ed O’Bannon.

Why The NCAA Needs To Pay Former Players, Not Just The Current Ones

The continuing debate about whether high-level collegiate basketball and football players should be paid seems to be moving in the direction of these athletes receiving some form of compensation above their scholarship.  In the last year we have seen steps towards forming a college athletes’ union, and increased rhetoric from the Big Five conferences about the need to start providing increased compensation to athletes.  (Of course, a cynic might view the statements by the Big Five conferences as justification for gaining increased control over lucrative television dollars)

At one extreme, we have folks that advocate for no additional payment beyond the athletic scholarship.  An increasingly popular viewpoint is that athletes should be provided an additional living wage type stipend.  At the other extreme, we have individuals that advocate the use of a professional sports-type model.  For example, Roger Noll used a 50-50 revenue split (similar to that used in the NBA) to value player contributions as part of the Ed O’Bannon lawsuit.

A complicating factor in this debate is that the structure of consumer demand is possibly very different between college and professional sports.  Our specific concern is that the affinity between graduates and their colleges may mean that colleges start with more natural and stronger fan bases.  As an example, consider the difference between the University of Florida and the city of Jacksonville.  A UF graduate is by definition a member of the “Gator Nation”.  The graduate belongs to a community of graduates that may tend to use the university’s football team as a natural focal or bonding point.  In contrast, a resident of Jacksonville is supposed to root for the Jaguars merely because of where they live.  Of course, this is a simplification, but hopefully our point is clear.

One way to test the preceding conjecture regarding natural and stronger fan bases is to analyze the relationship between team winning percentage and team revenues for both college and professional sports.  If the relationship between revenues and wins is the same for the professionals and colleges, then it makes more sense to view the college game as essentially a professional league.  If there is no relationship between revenues and wins at the college level, then player quality doesn’t matter (and consequently players probably shouldn’t be paid).

In honor of the upcoming NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament, we modeled the relationship between revenues and win percentage for the NBA and Division 1 Men’s Basketball programs using data from the last decade.  The models for each league had similar inputs or specifications.  The dependent variable in both models was revenue.  In the case of the NCAA, we used the revenue attributed to men’s basketball in each school’s annual Title IX filing.  For the NBA, we used an estimate of home ticket revenue: average ticket price multiplied by home attendance.  In the case of the NBA, the home box office revenue is a proxy for overall revenues (the correlation between our home revenue estimate and Forbes total revenue estimates is about 0.8).  The explanatory variables for each equation included current season winning percentage, past playoff (or NCAA Tournament appearances), past championships, arena capacity, metro area population (or student population), and team level fixed effects (also conference fixed effects for colleges).  Finally, we also used log transforms on winning percentage and revenues so that the coefficients could be interpreted as elasticities.  An elasticity tells us how much one variable (revenue) changes as a function of another variable (wins percentage).

Elasticity Graphic

Our results suggest that NBA revenues are twice as sensitive as college basketball revenues to winning rates.  In the case of the NBA, the elasticity of revenues to win percentage was 0.20 and the R-squared for the model was 0.83.  At the college level, the elasticity was 0.097 and the R-squared was 0.90.  The college model also included an interaction term between winning percentage and membership in a major conference (ACC, SEC, Big 12, Big Ten, Big East and Pac 12).

Where does this leave us in the debate of how much to pay players?  We will defer on providing an exact percentage because doing so would require several more analyses and even more assumptions.  But, it does appear that the two extreme points of view that we mentioned earlier are misguided.  The college players do generate significant revenues, but their degree of responsibility for revenues is far less than the professionals.

One interpretation of our model is that it speaks to the different roles of brand equity in sports revenues.  At the pro level, revenues are twice as sensitive to winning rates as at the collegiate level.  Our feeling is that college revenues are driven more by the permanent nature of the fan base, and by the brand equity created over time.  We have made an earlier argument along these lines, that while Ed O’Bannon should be able to profit from the use of his image, the revenues that would be generated would have as much to do with Kareem Abdul Jabber and Bill Walton as they have to do with Ed O’BannonSo what should be done?  We would like to see a three-way split of revenue.  The colleges get their share, the current players get a piece, but the players that built the college brands should also get something.  As professors that have seen the difficulties of obtaining an education while playing a major sport, we would like to see some type of program that at a minimum provides educational grants for past players.  Furthermore, given that we seem to learn more about the health consequences of big-time football each day, it also seems reasonable to establish a trust fund for future player health issues.

Mike Lewis & Manish Tripathi, Emory University, 2014.

O’Bannon Versus the NCAA: Remove Profit Motivation (Part 5)

For those of you following along, we have done a series of posts regarding the Ed O’Bannon lawsuit.  Our take on this issue has been a little different than most as we have emphasized the value that each entity (athletes, schools) provides to one another.  This discussion is at heart about whether and how college athletes should be compensated.  To conclude the series we will give our take on this overarching issue of compensation for college athletes.

I have seen a number of proposals (Whitlock, Barnhart) for how athletes should be compensated.  A common approach is to look at total revenues and then determine the appropriate split between athletes and schools.  These proposals largely use professional sports as a model.

My take on the issue is conflicted.  On one hand, I think the current state of affairs borders on immoral.  NCAA players have few rights and operate under significant constraints.  Scholarships are renewed on a yearly basis so essentially athletes have one year contracts.  In contrast, coaches operate in a free market system and can sell their services to the highest bidder.  Coaches also typically have contracts that continue to pay them even if they are fired.  Transfer rules are particularly one sided.  If an athlete transfers, he must sit out for a season and the school can limit the athlete’s choices.  Coaches can, of course, move on whenever a better opportunity arises (often the new suitor will pay the coaches buyout).  The hypocrisy of these asymmetric rules is dramatically highlighted when NCAA sanctions are levied.  Often the coach, on whose watch the infractions occurred, moves on while players then suffer the consequences.

My starting point in this discussion is that the NCAA and college sports need significant reform.  A system that allows coaches and schools operate in the free market while restraining the players is unethical and exploitive.  However, I do believe that the argument is not entirely clear cut.  The NCAA platform does provide significant value to players.  In addition to educational benefits, athletes are given an opportunity to perfect their craft and to build their personal brands.

On balance, I think the facts suggest that the players should be paid.  The dollars being collected are just too significant for the current system to be viewed as fair.  Men’s basketball and football are essentially managed as professional franchises and it is unconscionable for the athlete to exist on poverty level stipends while coaches and athletic directors are paid millions of dollars.

However, and this is a big however, just asking whether the players should be paid misses a big part of the fundamental issue.  The missing piece is whether colleges should be in the business of paying players?  My answer to this question is no.  I just don’t see any way in which paying players is remotely consistent with these institution’s fundamental missions.

While some folks may feel that I am being naïve due to the large dollars involved, I don’t think this is the case.  Paying the players is likely to fundamentally change the economics of athletic programs.  The revenue bases of schools like Texas, Ohio State and Florida will make it very difficult for other schools to compete and still remain profitable.  To maintain competitive balance, schools and leagues would likely need to adopt some form of revenue sharing and salary caps.  Will the Big Ten fund the MAC?  Will Florida write a check to Western Michigan?  Short of a significant revenue sharing program or a strict salary cap across conferences, the economics of big time sports would quickly change.  Currently the revenues provided by the Big Ten network and the SECs television contracts means that many schools operate with essentially guaranteed profitability in the major sports.  These profits often fund money losing programs like women’s golf and men’s wrestling.

If a substantial amount of revenues are shifted towards paying players in the major sports (for now we will ignore title 9 requirements that might require paying female athletes at comparable rates).  Schools would likely need to make further cuts in non-revenue programs or even re-evaluate continued D1 participation.  It is one thing for a school to participate in big time sports when the profits are guaranteed.  It is another when the institution would be operating in a financially risky environment.

The other point that is often raised is that the dollars are too big for schools to drop out.  To take an extreme example, the 2012-13 budget for the University of Texas is listed as $2.347 billion.  This budget also lists the athletic program as a self-supporting unit with a budget of $137 million.  So while sports may be the public face of many large research institutions, these sports are a relatively minor part of the overall university.

As marketers we are well aware of the important role played by big time sports. High profile sports may attract future generations of students and may be the foundation for the alumni community.  But, sports are but one way to market a school (e.g. the Ivy League).

To bottom line this discussion, if I were a university president and was faced with an environment where college sports explicitly became professional organizations, it would be an easy decision.  I would take this “structural change” as an opportunity to reposition my school to be more consistent with the larger institutional mission.  And remember this is coming from a guy whose primary hobby is college sports.

My ultimate conclusion is, therefore, that for schools to save their athletic programs it is necessary to remove the profit motivation from the system.  This is, however, different from saying that profits should be removed.  As I see it the main problem is that we have evolved to a system coaches and athletic departments can harness the loyalty of alumni and other fans to make themselves amazingly wealthy.

How Would Paying Players Change College Sports: O’Bannon vs the NCAA (Part 4)

In our series on the O’Bannon case and the associated issue of paying college athletes, we have focused on the value that athletes and universities provide to each other.  Another perspective that should be considered is how a shift to paying players might impact fans.  This is a tough issue to contemplate given that the ultimate impact on fans or customers would be a function of the specific system used to compensate athletes.

Our view is that the fan’s perspective should be considered in terms of how paying players would affect competitive balance levels across a mix of very different schools.  Perhaps the most frequent source of concern about competitive balance has been the New York Yankees in professional baseball.  The fear has always been that that large market teams like the Yankees will use their greater revenue bases to attract all the top talent, so that teams in small markets such as Kansas City or Milwaukee will be unable to field competitive teams.  The opening day payroll of the Yankees this year was $228 million while the Houston Astros lagged the field with a payroll of just $22 million.  However, concerns about competitive balance in MLB have faded in recent years as the teams such as the St. Louis Cardinals, Tampa Bay Rays, Colorado Rockies, and the Detroit Tigers have played in the World Series.  Notably, all major US professional leagues have adopted some form of revenue sharing or payroll constraints in order to maintain competitive balance and team profitability.

College sports have their own issues with competitive balance. The University of Texas athletic program is a $150+ million business while the 50th ranked (in terms of revenues) Northwestern program produced only $56 million.  This allows Texas to pay its football coach more than $5 million per year.  Some revenue sharing already occurs but it is at the conference level.  It must be noted that Northwestern’s spot in the top fifty is largely due to its membership in the Big Ten Conference (it has been reported that the Big Ten Network distributes more than $20 million per school).  Whether or not college sports operate with an acceptable level of balance (The SEC has won the last seven BCS Championships) is debatable, but the prohibition against paying athletes can be viewed as an incredibly rigid salary cap.  Paying players means that some other structure for maintaining competitive balance would be needed.

To a large degree, the conference structure of college sports increases the complexity of coming up with solutions for maintaining competitive balance.  Currently, conferences operate with extensive revenue sharing agreements.  But an extension to sharing revenue with non-members would require a paradigm shift.  In addition, Title IX regulations that strive to equalize expenditures on men’s and women’s sports are another source of complexity.  This means that revenue sharing is implicitly required within institutions.  If college football players receive salaries does that mean that women golfers would also need to be compensated?

All this is fine, but the question remains as to how big time college sports would evolve if college players could be paid and how might these changes affect the fans?  While considering the impact on the fans may seem a bit tangential, at the end of the day it is the fans that are the ultimate source of revenues and profits associated with college athletics. We, at Emory Sports Marketing Analytics view the entire situation as driven by marketing considerations.

The O’Bannon case began with a complaint about the embargo against athletes profiting from their own images.  A relatively minor change might allow athletes to market their own images to the highest bidders while still preventing direct compensation from colleges to players.  We would expect that such a change would have significant effects on recruiting, with the end result being an even greater concentration of elite recruits at high brand equity schools.  As high school athletes begin to make their college decision based on their personal brands, we expect that we would see many situations that are analogous to LeBron James’ decision to move to the high profile Miami market.  The potential would also exist for schools to gain recruiting advantages by more aggressively marketing their individual athletes.  While, we could argue that the situation described above already exists (e.g. Kentucky basketball) we expect that the trend would accelerate.   The preceding scenario would likely lead to a “rich getting richer” scenario.  The open question would be whether this increase in the advantages of more marketable schools would create dangerous levels of imbalance.

Allowing players to sign licensing deals would also mean that players would be able to sign with agents while still in school, since they would need representation when negotiating with video game, clothing and shoe companies.  Undoubtedly, shoe companies in particular would become even more powerful players in college basketball.  Shoe companies already sponsor AAU and college teams, and it’s not farfetched to imagine a scenario where a player such as Andrew Wiggins’ college choice would be made by a team of agents and other representatives working in conjunction with shoe companies.  A further question would then arise as to what schools could promise athletes in terms of marketing support?  Would high profile athletes insist on being featured on billboards or in other marketing communications?

A more extreme, and perhaps fairer, solution would be to allow athletes to participate in a free market system where they could sell their services to the highest bidder.  We say “fairer” since the college sports marketplace already includes many examples of coaches and athletic directors becoming extremely wealthy.

Moving to a totally free market would be a tremendously interesting experiment.  Just as in MLB, the college sports landscape is composed of schools that vary greatly in terms of market potential and current popularity.  Texas, Florida, Notre Dame, Ohio State and others have resources that would enable them to greatly outspend even other members of the power conferences.  Imagine a scenario where the power schools can outspend other institutions by a significant multiple.  We would also ask the question of what would happen to transfer rules.  How could the NCAA prohibit transfers or require athletes to sit a year when such a regulation would harm players earning capacities?  Would colleges need to negotiate compensation and contract length with prospective student athletes?  The real danger in moving to a free market system is that suddenly many schools would be entering a world of significant financial risk, where previously profitability was almost guaranteed (for examples of this look at the investments in programs made by Big Ten schools such as Northwestern and Illinois).

If our conjectures are true, a move to a free market could well have a negative effect on the capacity of the industry (and therefore on consumer welfare – which is a common consideration in anti-trust cases).  We expect that many schools would need to take a step back from competing at the highest level, unless some system of revenue sharing was put in place.  The challenge would be in creating a revenue sharing or salary cap system across a variety of conferences.  If anyone doubts the challenge this would involve, just consider the case of creating a college football playoff system.  For the last twenty years we have seen the College Bowl Coalition, The Bowl Alliance and multiple versions of the BCS.  Our guess is that this would lead to a system of four or so “super conferences”.  And even within these conferences we might evolve to a Harlem Globetrotters versus the Washington Generals model where perennial winners like Ohio State and Florida finance perennial losers like Illinois and Vanderbilt, so that they have someone to play.

In sum, our speculation is that any move towards paying players would essentially greatly reduce the incentives of many schools to play sports at the highest levels. Opportunities to leverage a school’s brand equity would shift the competitive balance while paying players directly would greatly increase school’s financial risks.  Absent strong revenue sharing mechanisms and some type of salary cap (would college players need belong to a union?) we would guess that a significant set of schools would move to lower levels of competition.  This would limit both consumer choice and, ironically, the choices of prospective student athletes.

Mike Lewis & Manish Tripathi, Emory University, 2013.

O’Bannon versus the NCAA (Part 3): Okay so Florida Helped Tebow. What did Tebow Provide to UF?

Click here for Part 1 (The marketing perspective)

Click here for Part 2 (The value created by colleges)

Click here for Part 4 (How would paying players change college sports)

In part two of our series on the Ed O’Bannon lawsuit, we considered the value that schools provide athletes.  The gist of the argument was that schools provide a high profile stage that student athletes can use to develop their personal brands.  In that article, we focused on the specific example of Tim Tebow and the Florida Gators.  In this next installment, we switch perspectives and consider the value that athletes provide to universities and colleges.  To keep things consistent we will again examine the specific case of Tim Tebow.

The O’Bannon case is fundamentally about the fairness of NCAA rules that do not allow players to share in revenues.  The O’Bannon case is primarily concerned with rules that prohibit athletes from sharing revenues derived from products that use the athlete’s name and images.  However, the O’Bannon case also highlights the issues associated with whether and how institutions should compensate or pay players.

The arguments for paying players tend to focus on the enormous revenues generated in football and men’s basketball.  For example, in the 2011-2012 season, the University of Texas football program generated $103 million in revenues.  Furthermore, while players are limited to receiving scholarships, coaches and athletic directors can often receive significant compensation.  Nick Saban’s salary has been reported to exceed more than $5 million per year, and Vanderbilt’s athletic director David Williams’ compensation exceeds $2.5 million per year.

In our previous post we considered the value provided to athletes by schools using an argument based on brand equity.  A cornerstone of this argument was that for high profile schools such as Notre Dame or Florida that sell out almost every year, it is difficult to claim that individual athletes improve the school’s revenue.  HOWEVER, a major flaw in this argument was that we did not consider the role that athletes play in maintaining and expanding a school’s brand equity.  To make a simple argument, while Notre Dame will undoubtedly sell out next year, if the team became a perennial loser, at some point Notre Dame would likely need to cut prices, and would suffer a drop in attendance.

To consider the potential long-term impact of a player like Tim Tebow to Florida, we conducted the following analysis.  First, we developed a revenue based measure of brand equity.  The idea behind this model  is that a school’s brand (or fan) equity can be measured by comparing a school’s actual revenues to predicted revenues based on factors such as a team’s record, student population and other factors that reflect on a team’s quality level and market potential.  More details on this method are provided here.

In the second stage of the analysis, we then developed a statistical model that explained this brand equity measure as a function of team past performance metric (prior to the current season) such as total wins, bowl games, major bowl games and national championships.  We also included in this model a variable that measured the number of Heisman trophy winners produced by the school.  We found that this Heisman term yielded a positive and significant parameter.

When translated to dollars (2008 dollars) we found that a Heisman winner added to a school’s brand equity by $2.15 million dollars per year.  While this is in itself a significant number, it is important to note that brand equity is an enduring asset.  For example, the brand equity associated with BMW provides value year after year as consumers are more prone to buy BMW cars, and to pay premium prices for these cars.

Calculating the long-term value of this brand equity asset requires assumptions about growth rates and the rate at which brand equity decays.  If we assume a 2% real growth rate in college football revenues and a 10% discount rate for brand equity, the value of the brand equity created by a Tim Tebow is approximately $27.5 million dollars.

A couple of points should be made about the previous number.  First, it is in several respects a conservative number.  In addition to winning a Heisman trophy, Tebow also contributed to two national championship teams.  The championships also greatly enhance Florida’s brand equity.  Second, a challenge in analyzing the relationship between team success and individual player achievements is that the degree of cooperation in football is enormous.  Mr. Tebow himself would likely credit his teammates with helping him win an individual award such as the Heisman.  Finally, please note that we have again taken a fairly extreme point of view by focusing on an extreme example such as Mr. Tebow.

Our plan is to conclude this series with each of our (Mike and Manish) perspectives on the big question of whether and, if so, how should schools pay players.  On a final note, we could also execute the football-based analysis described above using basketball data.  We just want to know if you guys are interested.  If so, please follow us on Twitter, and let us know.

Next: Part 4 – How Would Paying Players Change College Sports

O’Bannon versus the NCAA (Part 2): Does Tim Tebow Owe Florida?

Click here for Part 1 (The marketing perspective)

Click here for Part 3 (The value  created by athletes)

Click here for Part 4 (How would paying players change college sports)

In a previous post, I began a discussion of the Ed O’Bannon lawsuit.  In this second part of the series, we delve a bit deeper into the nature of sports brands and how these “brands” are related to the antitrust concepts at the core of the case.  In this post, we will take the perspective of the university.  Our next post will examine the issue from the individual athlete viewpoint. The original issue in the O’Bannon lawsuit is that the structure of college sports, where athletes are unable to sell their images violates the Sherman act.  Michael McCann, discussed the antitrust elements of the lawsuit in Sports Illustrated, and describes the suit’s two main claims:

“First, by requiring student-athletes to forgo their identity rights in perpetuity, the NCAA has allegedly restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act, a core source of federal antitrust law. Here’s why: student-athletes, but for their authorization of the NCAA to license their images and likenesses, would be able to negotiate their own licensing deals after leaving college. If they could do so, more licenses would be sold, which would theoretically produce a more competitive market for those licenses. A more competitive market normally means more choices and better prices for consumers. For example, if former student-athletes could negotiate their own licensing deals, multiple video game publishers could publish games featuring ex-players. More games could enhance technological innovation and lower prices for video game consumers.
Second, according to the plaintiffs, the NCAA has deprived them of their “right of publicity.” The right of publicity refers to the property interest of a person’s name or likeness, i.e. one’s image, voice or even signature. Last year, when explaining why the NCAA has refrained from suing CBS over its use of player information in its fantasy sports game on CBS Sportsline.com, NCAA officials acknowledged that players’ rights of publicity belong to the players, and not to the NCAA.”

Viewed collectively, these two issues really speak to the concept of brand equity, and about whether players should have the ability to “monetize” their individual brands while student athletes.  Branding issues in sports are fairly complex due to the nature of the sports product.  The key point is that sports products and brands are co-created by a collection of players, teams and leagues. What I mean by this is that while sports are inherently about competition, they also require cooperation between multiple entities.  Furthermore, while it is obvious that athletic success is correlated with an athlete’s or team’s brand equity (think Lebron, Michael or the Yankees) this equity is created through competition with other players and teams.  This co-creation is important because while fans may gravitate to star players, it is also obvious that league and team structures are needed for individual athletes to become valuable brands.  It is probably only the rare athlete, such as Michael Jordan, that can grow a league’s overall revenues or fan base.  The vast majority of athletes only temporarily capture some share of the overall brand equity of the teams and leagues with which they are involved.

This is particularly true in the case of college sports.  With a few exceptions, student athletes are relatively unknown prior to joining college football and basketball teams.  When a player puts on a college jersey, they immediately acquire a devoted fan base.  To take an obvious example, a Notre Dame Football player such as Manti Te’o (neglecting the strangeness that became public at the end of his college career) was the focus of a great deal of attention during his senior year.  Manti could have made money by endorsing products or licensing his image during his time at Notre Dame (again, lets clarify that we mean before December 2012).  However, Manti’s fame and marketability was, undoubtedly, largely a function of his playing at Notre Dame.  An argument could be made that Manti had minimal impact on the revenues of the Notre Dame Football program.  Notre Dame has a long and storied history, and already possessed a devoted fan base along with a lucrative television contract.  Notre Dame has a record of consecutive sellouts dating back to the late 1960s.

Tim Tebow is another, and more extreme, example of a high profile college player that could easily have made significant dollars while at Florida.  And again we could argue whether Tebow’s presence on the Gators actually increased Florida’s revenues.  This table shows that Florida’s home attendance increased slightly during the time that Tebow was on campus.  A comparison between 2009 and 2011 shows that attendance dropped by about 1,500 people or 1.7% per game.  At a ticket price of $25 multiplied by 7 home games, this would equate to an incremental $250,000 in revenue.  Of course, it is not entirely clear what these numbers mean, as Florida reported attendance that exceeded stadium capacity in every year (capacity = 88,548).  Also, we are not considering incremental merchandise sales.  Furthermore, given Tebow’s lack of success in the NFL, and his continuing marketability, a claim could be made that Tebow’s brand equity was entirely built at Florida.  Given that Tebow had little effect on Florida’s football revenues, it could be argued that Florida provided an opportunity for Tebow to build his brand while only slightly benefitting them.  Could Tebow have had similar success at another university?  Of course, this is an incomplete example, as Florida may have benefited from increased donations from alumni or seen an increase in applications from prospective students.

Another easy objection to the preceding argument is that it is based on marginal revenues generated by Tebow’s presence.  The distinction between marginal revenues and total revenues is important if one is truly concerned with fairness.  College athletic programs have significant and valuable brand equity.  This brand equity is maintained by current players.  If a team stopped fielding competitive teams, its brand equity would diminish over time.  In a perfectly fair world, players would enjoy rewards equal in value of how well they maintain and grow the school’s brand.  This would, however, be a difficult quantity to measure, as college teams’ brand equities have been built through extensive histories.  In the case of UCLA basketball, I think most would agree that the Bruin brand was primarily built by John Wooden, Kareem Abdul Jabber, Bill Walton and others.  If this is the case, then players like O’Bannon are merely temporary caretakers of the school’s brand.  Would Mr. O’Bannon have been on the cover of the EA sports game if he could not have been pictured wearing a UCLA jersey?

From this perspective, allowing current individual players to market themselves to the highest bidder could be viewed as unfair to past athletes.  If college athletes were suddenly allowed to pursue endorsement deals, I would expect that current high school players like Andrew Wiggins could become instantly wealthy (the fairness of Wiggins not being allowed to go directly to the pros is beyond the scope of this post).  And while many might view this as a fair outcome, I would have to ask the question as to how valuable the Wiggins’ brand would be in the absence of Kansas, the Big Twelve and the NCAA Tournament.  Consider for a moment that the MLB draft takes place in early June.  How well known are the players that are likely to be taken in the first few picks?  Would not a more equitable solution involve compensating past athletes that helped create the pre-existing fan interest that the next generation of athletes would be able to exploit?

Sports and anti-trust laws have a long history, and likely will generate controversy long into the future.  While competition between firms is typically the best way to improve consumer welfare, in the case of sports, sometimes pure competition may not be feasible.  All the major professional leagues now use some form of revenue sharing or salary caps to maintain some level of competitive balance.  As sports continue to morph into an entertainment product (remember the O’Bannon case began with a video game), it will be necessary to include greater consideration of the role of marketing assets such as a player’s brand equity and a college team’s fan equity to moderate future disputes.

Next in the Series: Part 3 – Valuing Exceptional College Athletic Performances