Letter from the President
The Great Meltdown of ‘08: Six Variables in Search of an Outcome

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Introduction
The Great Meltdown of October 2008 marks the biggest disruption in the global economy since the infamous bust of October 29. This one is sure to reverberate in policy and politics for many years. It is surely too soon to see all of the effects. Having enjoyed writing a book about crises, and hoping not to live through one, I cannot resist the temptation to offer these observations as a prolegomena to reflections on what would be another chapter to Politics in Hard Times (1986), were I to start writing it today.

1. The centrality of trust
In the end, it all turns on trust. The economy, politics, peace, health — outcomes in all these areas turn on our confidence in long chains of delegation, which allows us to assume that some commitments really are credible. The bank on the corner really will have the money I deposited; the firm really owns the assets of the stock I buy; the politicians I vote for really will respond to my goals; the drugs my doctor prescribed really do what the companies and regulators say; the food labeled “organic” really is free of pesticides; countries really will stick to the agreements they have made not to attack each other.

“How have you known?” You can make inquiries, but with so many items to track, at some point it is about trust.

This is especially true in economic life. Each link in the chain of credibility allowed for efficiency and thus more economic growth: currencies replaced barter; banks (Continued on page 2)
made possible the pooling of savings, and thus credit and investment; stocks made possible the mobilization of savings for industrial purposes through limited liability; mortgages allowed people with limited capital to buy on term, and so on.

We know this but don’t always appreciate its centrality to our lives. The Great Meltdown of 2008 (GM of ’08) has brought it back. So many commitments turned out not to be credible: bond ratings, accounting firms, securitized mortgage bonds, bond risk insurance, and on and on. The “financial innovations” of the past twenty years all involved extending the chain of delegation in credit arrangements: the downpayment, capital sufficiency ratios, margin requirements. All of these were lengthened, built on slimmer and slimmer real assets. The system

The same kind of extension of trust happened in other fields besides finance: the lengthening global supply chain assumes the safety and reliability of products. At the same time, China got caught up in the melamine controversy, raising concerns over the safety of its products. In the US rising controversy over drug testing poses similar questions.1

People trusted, and were deceived. Is this a story of political economy, of “rationalists, economists, and calculators,” as Burke called them? Or is it about norms, habits, interpersonal skills, and value systems, as many in our comparative politics field might argue? This is a familiar divide in our discipline in the battle between rationalists and constructivists. The area of “trust” is where they intersect. Trust can be seen as a cultural attribute, socialized into individuals by a cluster of mechanisms (family, religion, national tradition), sustaining a range of social interactions, which reinforce and perpetuate themselves. Alternatively, it can be seen as an institutional mechanism, a response to incentives that reinforces behaviors that engender trust or its opposite.

Trust and values, confidence and commitment, credibility and assurance — these themes have become the concern of many disciplines not used to talking to one another (Margaret Levi, Russell Hardin). Economists explore values, anthropologists look at the institutions that nurture trust, political scientists look at the institutions that make credible a group’s

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effort to solve a social cooperation problem (Mackie, 1996). From the study of contracts, to that of voters and their representatives, or to interstate relationships, the conditions under which people can make credible commitments has become increasingly central to our work (Fearon, Lake, Laitin, Walter, Glaeser).

For comparative politics, the GM of 08 poses fascinating opportunities to examine how countries differ in the way they provide “trust.” Trust mechanisms can be supplied by markets or by regulation. The logic of market supply has been conceptualized by Coase, Akerlof (1970) and others with the concept of “private bonding.” Can contracts among individual actors produce trust, even without formal government or external enforcement mechanisms? Where the motive is strong, this can be done by private arrangements. Used cars dealers, to cite Akerlof’s famous example, can reassure customers by providing a warranty like that given for new cars; the cost to the dealer of repairs (the dealer’s “bond”) signals credibility to the buyer. The bigger the cost, the greater the signal of reliability (Lupia and McCubbins, 1996). Firms’ incentive to trustworthy behavior lies in the market value of their reputation, protecting their “brand” or their name by providing good service, value, data, and products.

This line of reasoning has been used to justify the case against regulation. In the US, regulations were wound down or blocked. Many countries liberalized their finance and corporate governance, often following the advice of US officials and international agencies. The US tilted toward allowing trust to be private.

Other countries were far less willing to do this, fearing the instability, fearing the risk. In those countries, the counterargument prevailed. Systemic risk can put these long chains of credit in danger. When the rewards for cheating are great, or the rewards for extensive risk taking are enormous, the private bond mechanism proves an unreliable guarantor, and regulation is necessary. Governments can reassure investors by requiring firms to provide information through auditing, by regulating securities markets and corporate governance structures, supervising banking practices. They can enforce strong rules on market competition. They can impose severe penalties on wrongdoing in all these domains, and enforce them.

The GM of 08 allows the return of the anti-risk approach. Meltdown has profoundly discredited the private bonding school. Alan Greenspan said he was shocked that the greed-motivated managers of firms put their own interests ahead of shareholders. This seems a puzzling piece of naïveté for someone who believes in the social virtue of pursuit of self interest, as articulated in the novels of Ayn Rand.

Between these two poles of private bonding and government regulations to handle issues of trust and risk, countries differ from each another, and they vary internally over time. The Meltdown of 08 can be seen as the latest in a long series of crises that punctuate debates over regulation and markets, and with these crises, intense debates, intellectual and political, over what to do about them.

2. Cycles vs. sequence

Does history swing in cycles, back and forth, up and down, or is there an evolutionary sequence, movement along a line? The contrast between the US and the UK vs France Germany Japan. It generates ideas about “stages” and

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“sequences” that conflict with ideas about alternation. The debate resembles those about child development: do all children move through the same stages of development (see Freud, or Erik Erikson)? Or is the experience of each child different because their environments are affected by the presence of other family members? Birth order (Sullivan) shapes destiny in this approach, so that England as the first industrializer had a different experience than the late developers (Gerschenkron, Wallerstein, Gunder Frank, Kurth). Or is it all in the genes, so that personality, talents, skills shape your life (Pinker, Fowler); so that countries never shift out of some primordial features they have, their way of doing things (Dobbin), their genome?

The cycles idea suggests that countries can vary in their behaviors. They move from one policy position to another. The “genome” of the US may be inclined to anti-regulation, but in fact there are periods of extensive government involvement in the economy, from harbors in the early years, to railroads in the 19th century, to science-based projects and education, and so on. The shift from one to the other approach cannot be explained by the genomic constant, as these have no agency, or identifiable initiator, as I noted in my previous letter in this review. In financial regulation we see this clearly. In the late 19th century, the US resembled the German and Japanese model of strong industrial banks. Politics pushed The “legal family” interpretation (Laporta et al.) stresses a constant (common vs civil law) in explaining regulatory differences among countries. Rajan and Zingales (2003) refuted that argument by showing how substantial was the variance within countries over time. The first argument has to do with sequence and lock-in (when countries adopted a pattern) while the second stresses alternation and thus a role for ongoing political processes.

3. Economic shock and politics

The issue of cycles and sequences pushes forward the interaction between economic shock and politics. We can look at the causality in both directions.

a. Politics contributed to the conditions for the GM of 2008. In the US, heavy budget and trade deficits, importing money from China and elsewhere, deregulation of financial systems and banking, etc., weakening labor power — all of these reflect political pressures by various lobbies against the opposite policies which would have raised interest rates, reduced home ownership, slowed down consumption, and other things that provoke obvious opposition.

We can compare countries, therefore, on the degree to which instability-inducing policies were pursued, and thus the vulnerability to the Meltdown when it came. The Meltdown was caused by politics — that is the conceit of our field, political science: there is no eco-
nomics autonomous from politics.

b. Politics produce change in policy: We are of course correct — in the real world, economic policies reflect political variables, not economic doctrine. The great breaks in policy happen when political pressures become powerful enough, not when economic theory changes. After the crash of October 1929 unemployment rose quickly, world trade contracted, countries launched an infamous “beggar thy neighbor cycle” of tariff barriers, currency devaluations, and abandoning the gold standard. Faster breaks from orthodox market policies took a bit longer: regulation like the SEC, unemployment insurance, job creation, demand stimulus. Some economic historians suggest fitful economic improvement until the stimulus of WW II.

c. In the past economic shocks caused political change. Will the same thing happen this time? We have to sort out types of political change: change of majority, critical realignments, coups, revolutions, collapse of regimes. After 1929, major political shifts occurred a full four years after the stock market crash: the Nazis came to power in January of 1933, FDR in March of that year, the Social Democratic coalitions of Scandinavia in 1933, the end of democracy in Japan, the collapse of governments or coalitions in many countries around the world.

As of this writing, we have seen some political change — the Obama election in the US — to which the economic stresses of the past two years contributed. But we have not seen the roiling political turmoil of the 1930s. Should we expect it? If it does not happen, is it because the shock is less severe, governments know how to handle it, governments create safety nets, or the linkage has been decoupled? Has something happened in the institutionalization of politics and political power balances so that governments don’t sit and watch economic distress?

4. Autonomous state

Can the state regulate in the “public interest” without being captured by the targets of regulation? The bailout in the US seems to have supported existing shareholders and managers, while the pattern in the UK and elsewhere in Europe was to place the money in equity at the expense of these groups. The European approach costs less to taxpayers. Why the difference in response? Several answers are possible, revealing different channels of causality reflective of rival interpretations in our field. The Bush Administration did not wish to take equity positions; true, but why? Ideology —
being against public ownership? True, but again why? When they reversed course so dramatically on the bailout itself, why not on this? Doing it this way leaves substantial public bitterness that the money goes to the perpetrators of the mess. Is the ideology a cover for interests: the people making the decisions? (Paulson et. al. are substantially insiders from the industry itself). Rubin and his successors all come from Goldman Sachs. Can they really be autonomous from the people they are regulating? Are they not likely to think the banks need to be saved in a way which saves their brethren?

The US lacks a well developed civil service, like famous counterparts in France and Japan, where highly trained professionals are delegated substantial autonomy. The US regulators rely therefore on industry specialists to handle problems. The same has arisen with the auto bailout. Replace the guys who did this, many voices say, including the public, which is annoyed at the bailout. But who could do that in absence of strong civil servants?

Would the French and Japanese model really alleviate the problem? Voices have been raised about the American SEC. Why did the SEC not see all this coming — the failure of bond rating agencies, the failure of accounting, unstable banks, weak regulations, and most recently and notably the Madoff Ponzi scheme? Why did the SEC not do better? One answer is that its commissioners seek careers among the very groups they regulate. But this is also true in France, with "pan-toufle," and in Japan, with "amakaduri." So why do these countries not have the same problem with their regulations? To some degree they do: they run them for the groups they regulate.

Or is it more about politics? The SEC did not do better because the dominant congressional and presidential interests did not want them to regulate more. The whole logic of politics was anti-regulation, so why would we expect them to go that way? The logic of regulatory agencies, and of bureaucracies, is that they are delegation chains [...]

5. Ideology and policy response and the academic disciplines

The notion of framing — how you see things shapes your response — has surged in recent years, impressing even the ardent rationalists who used to give it short shrift. The Bush years perhaps made people wonder about fooling the public. Lakoff’s book attracted a lot of attention, but many fields have taken it up even more. Economics papers on value systems, ideology, culture are frequent (Benibou, Sapienza, etc.). Did US avoidance of taking equity shares reflect ideological priors? Perhaps, but why did these ideological views have so much influence and among whom?

Many academic studies were influenced by the great events of the mid 20th century — the revolutions, the depression, the totalitarian dictatorships, concentration camps, mass society. The GM 08 has certainly shaken some fields as well as some points of view. Economics and finance are obvious ones. Behavioral economics can claim some insights against the mechanical views of efficient markets hypothesis, now being beaten hard by events. Systemic risks, regulation, demand stimulus, fiscal policy — these are now back on the agenda. But they can be studied in the regular way. Some stronger challenges are being made, but will they overcome disciplinary resistance? Political science is not surprised to see the power of interest groups, mistakes, etc. Will our ordering be altered, or will we integrate these events into the world view we had when they all started

6. Globalization and domestic
interaction

A final point has to do with the interaction of comparative politics and international relations. Is it still useful to point out that these interact? I have spent much of my career saying so, that neither can

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be studied without the other. With the swift growth of “globalization” as a label in our field, have I been speaking prose, as it were? Has everyone caught up with that agenda, so it is no longer useful to point it out?

It is still problematic how to deal with it. The system/unit issues don’t go away. Which shapes which — the unit to the system or the system to the unit? We have come a long way with ideas on how to articulate this interaction, from agent-based modeling to network theory, and evolutionary models of politics rather than physics-based ones. But the challenge remains: interest groups operate within countries in a global context. Whatever the cant about the global world, businesses in trouble ran to their national governments for financial help, not international ones, unless the country was so small, like Iceland, they could not do it alone. Preferences for policy at home are part of a complex strategic interaction with other interest groups at home and in the world, all refract-ed by institutions at home and abroad. Open economy macro-economics makes a start at this, but leaves out all sorts of mediating institutions.

The meltdown certainly leaves us with one great intellectual triumph: the end of American exceptionalism. It is a country which, like others, is influenced by what goes on in the world and whose patterns of behavior resemble those in other countries. The last area study is gone.

Notes


Note:

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Ethnic Heterogeneity and Social Solidarity in Advanced Countries

Introduction

It is hardly a surprise that whenever people from significantly dissimilar backgrounds suddenly inhabit and interact within the same economic, social, and political space, inter-personal and inter-group frictions often ensue. This said, students of the advanced countries have typically expected that the social stratification grounded in ethnic, racial, or religious group differences will more or less inevitably erode as immigrants are gradually incorporated into their respective host societies and/or the cultures of these societies change to accommodate new conditions of diversity.

In it is within this context that we have noted a recent surge in the number of scholars propagating the view that social heterogeneity, in part the product of accelerating mass immigration from an increasingly diverse set of source countries, is eroding social solidarity and social capital within the advanced countries. As Robert Putnam sums up the problem in his 2007 Scandinavian Political Studies article, "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century," a spike in ethnic diversity in the advanced countries has motivated their populations to "hunker down." Although optimistic these societies can overcome social fragmentation in the long run, in the short term Putnam predicts the major countries of immigration will continue to suffer from comparatively low inter-personal trust, general altruism, and community cooperation.

Because the preponderance of scholarship on the implications of “super diversity” for social solidarity and social capital has focused on the American case, we thought it appropriate in this symposium to invite several scholars who are working outside of the US context to reflect upon the following questions: Is there an inherent trade off between ethnic or racial diversity and community and social solidarity? If so, are these tensions cause for concern? Although we did not prompt our contributors to respond to Putnam’s arguments, it is of course no coincidence that three of the four chose to do so. As Hagendoorn points out in his essay, it was Putnam who pioneered the research which revealed the erosion of within-group trust. Moreover, as Hooghe underscores, Putnam’s major research findings have subsequently inspired European scholars to investigate if and to what extent they can be replicated outside the US.

Somewhat to our surprise, but certainly in conformity with the findings of much of the first wave of scholarship published in Europe, all of our contributors take issue with the thesis that ethnic diversity undermines social solidarity and social capital. Their major criticisms are: it is plagued by measurement problems (Hagendoorn); it largely neglects the pivotal role of institutions in fostering and maintaining social cohesion (Bird); it fundamentally misrepresents the nature and underestimates the complexity of individual identities (Brouard and Tiberj); and it fails to account for the fact that there is greater variation on the independent variable (i.e. ethnic heterogeneity) in the United States than in Western Europe (Hooghe). The sum of their criticisms is that while the new diversity thesis may hold up for the American case, its fit for many if not most of the other advanced country cases is imperfect at best.

Whatever the merits of these criticisms, three things are evident. First, as a consequence of continuing mass immigration virtually all of the advanced countries are becoming ever more ethnically, racially, and religiously heterogeneous. Second, the current conditions of super diversity obviously pose a daunting challenge to policy makers. Third, the question of whether ethnic diversity erodes social solidarity and social capital is hitherto far from settled and, as a consequence, it is likely to remain on the agenda of comparative politics scholars for the foreseeable future.
Community and Diversity: Is Western Europe Different?

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Already in the classical literature of 19th century sociology it was assumed that societies function more effectively in the absence of fundamental cleavages that divide the population. The main theoretical insight was that diversity, whether cultural, ethnic or religious, divided society in a way that hampered the successful realization of the common good. Effective societies were believed to be homogeneous societies. At first sight, this assumption makes sense from a theoretical perspective: it can be assumed that if individual citizens have less in common with one another, they will be less likely to contribute to the common good. Cooperative behavior is thus facilitated if the perceived social distance between individuals (whether in terms of socio-economic status, ethnicity, language or religion) is small. Individuals will be less likely to cooperate if they perceive others as belonging to an out-group, or as fundamentally different from themselves.

The implications of this assumption are far-reaching. We know that contemporary Western European societies are rapidly becoming more diverse. Even traditionally homogeneous societies have had to adapt to the influx of new groups, often from different religious or cultural traditions. Especially for the countries in Southern Europe, this transition was effected very quickly. Through the 1980s, countries like Italy, Spain, Greece or Portugal, for example, were net exporters of manual labor. Thousands of citizens from these countries sought to improve their economic prospects in the northern part of Western Europe or in North America. In the mid-1990s all of this changed quite dramatically. The number of people leaving Southern Europe for economic reasons declined sharply, while simultaneously these countries experienced a massive influx of immigrants from Northern Africa and Central and Eastern Europe.

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Especially in Italy, this influx and the presence of foreigners has led to a hostile backlash, sometimes even resulting in violence. In 2007, Italy and Romania had a sharp conflict about the hostile treatment of Romanian immigrants living in Italian cities. In various other large European metropolitan areas, however, there have also been some negative experiences with clashes between various ethnic and cultural groups. At first sight, therefore, as Western Europe has become more diverse, it has also been confronted with various new problems with regard to managing this new diversity.

As happens all too often, European scholars are strongly influenced by research that is being conducted in the US. Various attempts have been made to replicate the 2007 study by Robert D. Putnam that shows that ethnic diversity has a negative impact on trust in one’s neighbors. Since the initial findings by Putnam started circulating at various international conferences, European scholars took up the challenge and started to work on this relationship with European data. It has to be remembered, however, that European scholars cannot rely on a comprehensive survey like the Social Capital Benchmark Survey used by Putnam. Various data sources had to be combined, and none of them was collected specifically to study the effect of ethnic diversity. Furthermore, even comparisons across European societies are made difficult by strong differences with regard to sampling and definitions. In a country like
France, there is even a legal ban on collecting official records on ethnicity as it is feared that this could lead to discriminatory practices.

As a result, overall conclusions for Western Europe certainly cannot be drawn in the current phase of research. As far as I know, scholarly analyses are now available for the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium. These analyses are now in various phases of the publication process, with some of them published or forthcoming, while others are still circulating as conference papers. We therefore have to be very cautious in drawing general conclusions about the currently available statistical material. However, what is clear already is that the negative findings with regard to the United States have not been replicated in Europe. In most of the studies that are currently available, the conclusion is that there is not a significant relation between the ethnic diversity of a community and various social capital indicators.

A number of caveats however are called for before we accept this very general conclusion. First of all, it appears that the introduction of a sufficient number of control variables is of paramount importance. Poverty, unemployment, and inequality are important determinants of generalized trust levels, while at the same time the regions with a strong concentration of ethnic minorities also tend to score quite low on indicators of social cohesion. Recent British research indicates that the relation between diversity and trust is rendered insignificant if one includes adequate controls for socio-economic exclusion.

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Second, the choice of the dependent variable is important. It has to be remembered that the variable that is theoretically most relevant is generalized trust, since it can be assumed that a lack of generalized trust will render it more difficult for communities to pursue common goals. With regard to this crucial variable, however, European research has not revealed any systematic negative relation with ethnic diversity. For other indicators, on the other hand, some negative findings have been reported. Dutch research, for example, shows that the original inhabitants of the Netherlands report fewer and less intensive contacts with their neighbors if they live in an ethnically divided community. This kind of conclusion, however, seems rather tautological: if neighbors do not even talk the same language, it is rather self-evident that they will talk less often. Furthermore, this kind of relation is hardly theoretically relevant. The real challenge of this kind of research is to determine whether increased ethnic diversity can be considered as a threat to social stability and given the available research on social capital and social cohesion, we can assume that generalized trust can function as a proxy indicator for social cohesion. Whether or not neighbors often talk with one another, on the other hand, is not a valid indicator for social cohesion.

A third caveat is that because of the limitations of the available data, various levels of analysis have been used interchangeably: communities, urban neighborhoods, municipalities, census tracts, regions, and even entire countries. Regardless of the level of analysis, however, the conclusion more or less remains the same: there is not an overall negative relation between ethnic diversity and generalized trust.

Looking at the findings it may appear obvious that Western Europe does not behave like the United States in this kind of research. There are, of course, fundamental differences between these societies. On a purely anecdotal level, I remember showing a colleague around one of the more ethnically diverse neighborhoods of the Belgian capital, Brussels. After a while, passing by some nice Turkish restaurants mainly catering to a Belgian audience, my friend asked me: “So, and when do we get in the really black neighborhood?” I had to disappoint her: this is about as diverse
as we get in Brussels despite the fact that Brussels is the capital of the European Union.

To follow up with more serious statistical evidence, segregation is much more limited in Europe than it is in the US. Even in major cities like London, Paris, Amsterdam, or Brussels, the population is more mixed than in many areas in the United States. Self-evidently, in these cities too, there is a concentration of ethnic minorities, but this concentration effect is not as pronounced as it is in the United States. To put it differently, the variation on the independent variable is much higher in the US than it is in Western Europe.

Second, diversity too has different characteristics. In most Western European countries, the rise of ethnic diversity is a rather recent phenomenon. While ethnic diversity is a stable feature of US society for at least two centuries, the influx of immigrants in most Western European societies started in the 1960s. The demographic pattern of diversity is therefore completely different in the US than it is in Western Europe. A third element that we have to consider is that political reality is different. In general, communities or neighborhoods do not have authority over school boards. Although a process of school segregation is evident in most European societies too, schools are not financially dependent on the fiscal regime within their community. In most political systems schools receive the same amount of funding, whether they are situated in rich or in poor communities, and in some countries even the reverse policy is being applied, with schools situated in ethnically diverse communities receiving additional funding to accommodate the influx of pupils with a different cultural background. Again, this implies that the consequences of segregation will be less visible in Western Europe than they are in the US.

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Systematic research on the relationship between diversity and social cohesion has just begun in Western Europe, and therefore the initial conclusions have to be taken with caution. In the years ahead, additional data sources will become available and it is hoped that this will enable researchers to develop a more fine-grained understanding of the relationship between diversity and trust. Furthermore, all economic forecasts predict that in the five decades ahead the European economy will have to attract more foreign labor, resulting in a further increase of ethnic diversity in Europe. Given the ongoing political concerns about the maintenance of national and cultural identity, this process will lead to some degree of further political conflict. At the same time, the EU member states continue to apply idiosyncratic policies to promote social and economic integration of ethnic minorities, despite some efforts for European-wide harmonization of these policies. It can be safely predicted, therefore, that finding ways to integrate minorities in a successful and fair manner will continue to figure high, not just on the political agenda of European societies, but also on the research agenda of European social and political science.
Ethnic Diversity and the Erosion of Social Capital?

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The Claims

Ethnic diversity is eroding the bonds that tie together modern Western societies. More specifically, the new ethnic diversity produced by mass immigration is eroding the social networks that provide a social basis for reciprocity and trust. According to the new diversity thesis, social capital and social solidarity thrive better in ethnically homogeneous societies than in heterogeneous societies. The dents in the landscape of networks produced by ethnic boundaries in heterogeneous societies eventually affect the whole society and lead many people to withdraw from social life, to become distrustful and to care only for themselves, thus undermining civil society.

“The charges – erosion of social capital and social solidarity – are provocative, but is the evidence convincing?

Most of the evidence deals with just one aspect of social capital, namely social trust.”

with the new diversity thesis. However, in comparison to the focus on trust, much less attention has been devoted to other aspects of social capital and solidarity (see Gesthuizen, Van der Meer and Scheepers 2007 and Letki 2008 for solidarity, and Soroka, Johnston and Banting 2005 for associational membership). A second point is that the research has focused on either the effects of diversity of local (regional) neighborhoods, or, alternatively, the diversity of national states. Studies analyzing the combination of these levels and multilevel analyses of diversity effects from different levels (including schools, organizations and so forth) are largely absent.

The results of these studies show that the negative effects of diversity (either local or national) characterize traditional immigration countries, such as Canada, Australia and the United States. But these effects are absent in Europe (at the national level). In traditional immigration countries, both generalized trust and localized trust are lower in heterogeneous compared to homogeneous urban neighborhoods (Chen 2007; Leigh 2006; Soroka, Johnston and Banting 2005). In a cross-national study of 21 European countries (Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle and Trappers 2006; Hooghe, Reeskens and Stolle 2007) national ethnic diversity had no effect on generalized trust. In another study, national ethnic diversity also had no effect on social capital or social solidarity measures across 20 European countries (Gesthuizen et al. 2007) after controlling for social security expenditures, income inequality, and years of effective democracy. To the contrary, diversity in terms of migrant stock is even positively related to inter-personal help and membership in informal organizations. Letki (2008) found no substantial effect of neighborhood diversity on social trust and solidarity in Britain.

Only one study of a European country, The Netherlands, seems to confirm the diversity thesis. It reports that diversity of city areas (postal code areas) is negatively related to trust in neighbors and in
the neighborhood (Lancee & Dronkers 2008), and even more negatively when direct neighbors are ethnically different. But this study also finds, in contrast to all previous studies, that diversity is positively related to inter-ethnic trust. Moreover, closer inspection of the "trust" measure shows that it measures social distance, not trust. The relationship between social distance and trust remains unspecified, conceptually and empirically, and therefore the relevance of this study for the thesis is unclear.

A New Finding?

At first sight, the evidence seems sufficient to show that diversity has negative effects on social capital and social solidarity. However, closer inspection shows that this is true for traditional immigration countries, like the USA, Canada, and Australia, but not for Europe. According to this view, European states must have specific features making them resistant to the negative effects of diversity — at least at the national level. This finding is puzzling, because traditional inter-group relations research so far has found no systematic differences between Europe and North America in how host societies react to immigrants. In both cases, the larger the size of immigrant groups (national or regional), the more negative attitudes (including distrust) from native/white majorities are, in spite of the possible positive effects of contact between members of the various ethnic groups (Forbes 1997; Quillian 1995, 1996; Tailor 1998). More broadly, in terms of analytical paradigms, the findings of the new diversity thesis largely parallel those of research on social identity and ethnic competition theory in social psychology and sociology, and stand in contrast to findings of research on contact theory. The radically distinctive finding of the new diversity thesis is that trust within ethnic groups, and not just between groups, declines in more diverse environments — but only in immigration countries.

Does Diversity Reduce Trust within Ethnic Groups?

Putnam (2007) pioneered the research that shows the reduction of in-group trust. His prototypical type of problematic ethnic diversity is city or village-neighborhood heterogeneity. He defines diversity as the likelihood that two individuals randomly selected from a given community are from the same ethnic category, indicated by the Herfindahl index. Putnam shows that reciprocal trust among Hispanics, Whites, Blacks, and Asians linearly declines with rising diversity across more than forty areas in the USA. Likewise, trust in neighbors declines. Putnam postulates that this shows that in-group trust declines because of "de facto residential segregation," which means that "most Americans' neighbors are of the same race as their own" (Putnam, 2007 147). Although this assumption may be right, no further measures of residential segregation are presented in this study, and residential segregation is not controlled in the analysis (unlike many other factors). In other words, the crucial evidence for the new diversity thesis remains based on Putnam's untested assumption.

The Measurement of Diversity

This is not the only problem with the diversity thesis. Diversity is generally measured by the Herfindahl index or similar indices of diversity. The use of these indices is based on several assumptions. First, it requires that the applied ethnic categories are properly defined, recognized, and
used by those involved. This determines whether cross-national comparisons are possible. States often differ in ethnic/racial classification systems, and people often categorize themselves and others differently than others do (see Habyarimana et al. for levels of 50% mismatch in Uganda).

Second, the prudent use of the diversity index requires that the effects of diversity be the same for all ethnic groups in the area — diversity being a characteristic of an area and not of a group or individual. Third, it requires that the effects of diversity not be contingent on the numerical composition of the co-existing ethnic groups in the environment (area unit). This requirement has not been researched, but such effects are very likely. Imagine that groups A, B, C form 20%, 30% and 50% of the local population. It does not matter which group has which percentage, because the index will have the same value as long as the percentages and the number of groups remain the same. Hence, diversity remains the same value if A is 50% instead of 20% and C is 20% instead of 50%. However, the As of 20% live in an environment with many Cs (50%) or with few Cs (20%). Now assume that Cs are untrustworthy. Then As will be less trusting when the local environment has 50% Cs compared to 20% Cs.¹ Thus, the composition of the ethnic environment may affect the level of trust of one ethnic group in the environment. To test for such effects is to test for the universality, or geographical nature) of the diversity effect.

**Explanations for Possible Negative Effects of Diversity**

What explains the crucial in-group distrust effect predicted by the new diversity thesis? Few reasons have been explicated thus far. However, two come to mind. People may become more uncertain when their environment is more diverse, and uncertainty can breed distrust. Second, the in-group can be divided on how to react to outsiders. Some in-group members may require the assimilation of outsiders, while others opt for multiculturalism. Such political cleavages in the in-group reduce in-group trust.

**An Agenda for Further Research**

Research on the diversity thesis is important. For example, lack of trust may undermine the production of public goods in diverse societies because cross-ethnic networks are thin and common norms facilitating the punishment of group members failing to contribute to collective goods are weak (Habyarimana et al. 2007). However, two questions have to be answered in order to make the diversity thesis more compelling: (1) Does ethnic diversity negatively affect all ethnic groups, including the in-group, and is the effect independent of size, position and composition of the ethnic environment of the group?; and (2) Is diversity equally negative in its consequences for trust and solidarity at all levels of society? My hypothesis is that the answer to the first question is no; and to the second question, that primarily small-scale social environments, such as neighborhoods, will bear the consequences.

**Notes**

Divided They Really Stand? The France Plurielle Case

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Introduction

Social capital, its erosion, and its possible regeneration (Putnam 2000) are currently popular themes in the field of migrant incorporation in Europe. Bonding and bridging social capital are helpful conceptual tools for scholars concerned with migrant labor market participation as well as with the social and political integration process. Integration or separation vis-à-vis mainstream society is related to the opportunity provided by interethnic bonding social capital.

The various uses of social capital in this field of research have largely preceded Putnam’s new theories (Putnam 2007) which address the consequences of ethnic diversity vis-à-vis the cohesion of modern societies. When Putnam turned his attention to racial diversity,1 he made a “provocative claim.” Putnam argues that in-group and out-group solidarities are not negatively correlated; social capital and interpersonal trust decrease when ethnic diversity increases; this decrease negatively affects all ethnic groups and their relationships both with their in-groups and out-groups; and ethnic diversity diminishes the positive outcomes associated with social capital such as voluntary work, collaboration, political trust and political efficacy.

Putnam explicitly raised the issue about the validity of his results for other countries. France has welcomed numerous waves of immigration. Aside from immigrants coming from Europe (54% of the total), the main origins of immigrants in France have been the Maghreb, Black Africa, and Turkey (30%) (Tribalat 2004). Immigrants who contributed to the most recent stream of French immigration, which began at the end of World War II, have been perceived as different from mainstream “Frenchness” in many respects (ethnically, culturally, religiously, etc.). Therefore, France may be a relevant case to replicate the test of Putnam’s hypotheses about the effect of ethnic diversity on civic and social solidarity. In this short essay, we will address Putnam’s four arguments and present some exploratory results. In order to do that, we rely on the CEVIPOF survey “Relationship to Politics among French People of Immigrant Origin” (RAPFI). It consists of two polls conducted in April 2005 using a questionnaire drawn up by the CEVIPOF research team, with a representative sample of 1003 French citizens from Maghrebian, African, and Turkish immigration2 – called RAPFI – and with a national representative sample of 1009 “native” French citizens. The RAPFI survey is the first survey that explores specific dimensions such as integration, perception of racism, and relationships with Islam, as well as general dimensions such as politics, value systems, and policy preferences. As in the surveys used by Putnam, every individual respondent is “geo-coded”. Thus we know the main features of the cities where the respondents live.

In-Group and Out-group Solidarity and Ethnic Diversity?

From our perspective as European scholars, Putnam addresses a key point in raising the issue of the relationship between in-group and out-group solidarity. From our point of view, the implicit negative relationship between in-group and out-group solidarity stems from a narrow and erroneous understanding of individual identities. Too often, individual identity is conceived as a unique and exclusive sense of belonging rather than the articulation of multiple, complex, nested memberships. Individuals alternate among various (and virtually infinite) in-group belongings, mainstream and diversity-blind belongings (national, social, local), and particularistic identities (ethnic or religious, for example) – that is, between many kinds of bridging or bonding identities. Exclusive notions of identity help to draw a misleading picture of in-group ver-
Too often, individual identity is conceived as a unique and exclusive sense of belonging rather than the articulation of multiple, complex, nested memberships [...] Exclusive notions of identity help to draw a misleading picture.
origin may not understand himself as *either* Maghrebi, *or* Muslim, *or* French. Second, amongst both samples, particularistic and general proximities do not contradict each other. Using PCA, all group proximities contribute to the same factor explaining one third of the variance in both samples. This factor taps into a dimension that sorts individuals between two poles: from social isolation to a high level of group solidarity. On this matter, for the ethnic French, bonding and bridging social proximity fuel the same tendency for individuals to develop collective belongings. Particularism leads them to develop solidarity with "what could be but are not" out-groups. Correlations of variables with this factor range from a minimum of 0.396 for proximity toward EU citizens to -0.645 for proximity with social milieu.

Simultaneously, among the general population, general proximity is related to a growing sense of solidarity with the ethnic minorities, and therefore could contribute to a better inclusion of migrants and their descendants. While the common wisdom presumes incompatibility between particularistic identities and integration, our data suggest that they are part of the same phenomenon. As Putnam and some scholars before him (Sniderman and Piazza, 2002) strongly advocated, in-group and out-group solidarities in France are positively correlated.

Given this result, does ethnic diversity decrease the level of these solidarities? According to Putnam's argument, both the majority and minorities become less trustful as diversity increases. Following this logic, the key point is the relationship between the level of group proximity and ethnic diversity. We use as a proxy for ethnic diversity a contextual variable associated to every respondent: the proportion of foreigners in the city. This is the best existing, albeit rough estimate, of diversity in our "republican" census (Maurin 2004). Most of the foreigners in France are from Turkey, the Maghreb and Africa, and the French citizens whose families originate from these sources live disproportionately in the same areas. So the percentage of foreigners in a city is a proxy for ethnic diversity. As French ethnic politics is structured at least implicitly between white and non-white, a higher percentage of foreigners implies a higher level of ethnic diversity in the city. According to Putnam’s hypothesis, we would expect a negative relationship – that is to say, when the percentage of foreigners in a city grows, the level of proximity should decrease. Contrary to this hypothesis, however, the correlation between the percentage of foreigners in a city and the level of group proximity is close to zero. Living in a city with a high or low level of ethnic diversity does not produce more or less in-group or out-group proximity. So far, our results do not support Putnam's hypothesis.

**Trust and Ethnic Diversity**

Another main claim of Putnam is that social trust decreases with the growing level of ethnic diversity. To estimate the general and particular level of individual trust, we conducted an experiment on social trust: respondents were asked to assess randomly their level of confidence toward “Maghrebi,” “blacks,” or “people.” Clearly this experiment mixes social capital theory with indicators of prejudice and group perception. We noted that blacks, and to a lesser extent Maghrebi, provoked a higher level of trust than people: respectively 96%, 89% and 46% in the RAPFI survey; 93%, 79% and 52% in the Mirror sample. We did not expect that ethnic diversity would explain different levels of trust according to the subject of the experiment. Nevertheless, if ethnic diversity were to have an effect on individual trust, it should decrease the level of trust on every subject and amongst both samples. The logistic regression demonstrates the need to distinguish systematically in terms of diversity. Clearly education (positively) and authoritarianism (negatively) play a similar role in both surveys, but the percentage of foreigners has a significant and neg-
hypotheses. Nevertheless, racial diversity was said to be so influential that we could have presumed France to be a good replication case, particularly in a polity where ethnic discrimination, though prevalent, has not been politically addressed until recently, and where the extreme Right has enjoyed considerable electoral success. The empirical results do not suggest the connections Putnam has outlined, however; the USA and France seem to differ considerably. Social capital theory contributes to our understanding of citizen incorporation, but its role needs to be reframed and adapted in order to permit comparison across countries.

**Notes**

1 This was not previously so. See Hero 2005.

2 Our definition is the following: individuals of French citizenship having at least one of their parents or their grandparents who had or still has the nationality of one of the following countries: Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, or another country of Africa. In our sample we have naturalized immigrants, first and second generation born in France, whether they are of mixed descent or not.

3 Furthermore, the second factor still mixes particularistic and general proximities.

4 This result is not country-specific: a Gallup survey found a similar relationship (Mogahed & Nyiri 2007).

5 Putnam’s ethnic diversity variable is a Herfindhal index. As our proxy of ethnic diversity is an indirect measure and is expressed as a proportion, it may occur that in fact, at some points, ethnic diversity decreases when the percentage of foreigners increases. Nevertheless, even this curvilinear hypothesis is rejected by the data.

6 In the table we do not present the results for the control variables included in the models.

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**Table 1: Determinants of trust toward a randomized social group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>RAPFI Survey</strong></th>
<th><strong>Mirror Survey</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigner Rate</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Conditions</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>-3.646</td>
<td>0.394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghrebians</td>
<td>-1.038</td>
<td>0.422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.006</td>
<td>0.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psuedo $r^2$</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Control variables are education, authoritarianism, age, gender and occupation. Dependent variable is coded 0 for “no trust” and 1 for “trust.” “Blacks” is the reference category.
Ethnic Diversity, Social Solidarity and Political Community in Canada

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The question addressed in this symposium is whether ethnic diversity erodes social solidarity and, by implication, undermines the order and integrity of the political community. In Canada, enormous creative effort has been devoted to ensuring the survival of political community in the context of ethnic diversity. Indeed, it is fair to say that the questions animating this symposium have been central to the country’s political history.

At the simplest level, the challenge in Canada is one of facilitating peaceful coexistence and a national sense of belonging across three dimensions of ethnic diversity. There is the historic divide between English- and French-speaking communities. There is the presence across the country of indigenous and Aboriginal peoples, many of whom assert traditional claims to self-governance. And there is the highly heterogeneous category of “visible minorities.” While many in this group trace their arrival in Canada back several generations, the rapid growth of the visible minority population today is due largely to recent immigrants, most of whom settle in urban centres. At a more complex level, the challenge lies in the very definition of “political community,” and in its complex and evolving relationship to various forms of ethnic diversity. This can be seen in debates in Quebec over the “reasonable accommodation” of ethnic and religious difference—debates that revealed widely divergent perspectives on this matter.¹ The main point I wish to make in this short essay is that this basic tension in defining political community in Canada has given (most) ethnic groups a critical stake and a legitimate role in national politics. I will return to this argument below, after surveying some of the main empirical findings regarding ethnic diversity and social cohesion in Canada.

What do we know about ethnic diversity, social capital and social cohesion in Canada? One main finding is that, despite Canada’s substantial heterogeneity and contested notion of political community, the population is nevertheless able to generate sufficient civic capacity for constructive collective action. One indicator of this is voter participation. Voter turnout has declined in Canada, and turnout among youth is especially worrisome. Still, Canadians are still much more likely to vote than their American neighbors.² And turnout is not markedly different across ethnic groups.

Canada has also been able to sustain robust social welfare policies, despite warnings in the literature that the redistributive state is one of the main casualties of growing ethnic diversity. Neo-conservatives in Europe and the US have explicitly linked immigrant minorities to patterns of welfare dependency with the result, in many countries, of policy changes to reduce immigration and limit welfare eligibility among some categories of newcomers. In Canada, such ideas never captured public support. Keith Banting has demonstrated, both at an individual attitudinal level and at the level of policy discourse, that increasing immigrant diversity has not led to the erosion of Canada’s welfare state (Banting 2005).

Survey-based research on attitudes of civic belonging and social capital suggests that the greatest challenges to social cohesion in Canada lie not in the beliefs and attachments of newcomers, but rather in the historic fault lines between the oldest nations that make up the country (Soroka, Johnston and Banting 2007). Francophones have posed perhaps the most critical challenge to the Canadian political community. Most spectacularly, the Quebec
referendum on separation in 1995 brought Canada perilously close to disintegration. At an individual level, Quebec francophones (along with Aboriginals and some visible minorities) have been shown to have very low levels of generalized trust—a key predictor of social capital and the capacity to engage collectively in problem solving. It should come as no surprise that historically marginalized groups would have objectively fewer reasons than dominant groups to be trustful of their fellow citizens. Yet, in the case of Francophone Quebeckers, we find abundant evidence that the effects of diversity on social capital can be mitigated via institutionalized forms of recognition. The principal instrument here is the Official Languages Act of 1969, which has placed the French language on par with English and thus ended the second-class social and economic status of Canadian francophones. While bilingualism is widely accepted, other forms of recognition remain more controversial. The idea of formally entrenching in the Constitution any principle of federal asymmetry or recognition of Quebec’s “distinct society” status remains wildly unpopular in most of the country. Nevertheless, for pragmatic reasons, the federal government has long understood the need to negotiate with Quebec’s claims for autonomy, and has reconciled itself to cooperating with the parliamentary presence of the sovereignist Bloc Québécois. For Quebec francophones, this recognition of the authenticity of their difference, and the space it provides for making cultural and political claims, serves to integrate them into the political process and to hold the fragile state together.

Where Francophones have overcome their historical marginalization, among visible minorities there are growing indications of exclusion. Recent cohorts of immigrants have fared less well in the labor market, despite having higher levels of education and training than their predecessors. There is evidence suggesting second-generation visible minorities are more likely than their parents to experience perceived discrimination (Reitz and Banerjee 2007). Despite high levels of naturalization, without dismissing these troubling trends, there are a number of reasons that we can be fairly optimistic about this challenge to social cohesion. First of all, Canadian support for multiculturalism and a liberal naturalization policy has remained resilient. This broad satisfaction in the institutional framework for shared citizenship itself provides a basis for addressing emerging challenges confidently and cooperatively. Second, while some areas of the country, especially the major gateway cities and their suburbs, have been transformed dramatically by immigration in the last two decades, they have remained for the most part safe, vibrant, civic spaces. The ethnic enclaves within these cities tend to be institutionally complete, and are generally not combined with poverty, discrimination and social deprivation (Qadeer and Kumar 2006). Indeed, they may produce more social benefits than disadvantages—facilitating community organization, and allowing ethnic minorities to experience the strength in numbers necessary to generate political interest in their needs and concerns. This theory is born out in studies of electoral participation and political representation of visible minority communities (Bloemraad 2006, Howe 2007, Bird 2009). There are at least two processes related to residential concentration that appear to facilitate immigrant integration into the political process. One is the presence of a vigorous ethnic media providing coverage of Canadian politics that is absent in the “homeland” sources of news to which immigrants would otherwise
The other is a highly competitive political system in which parties seek to mobilize ethnic blocs of voters, both for candidate selection and for the general election. Especially over the last decade, these conditions have produced relatively high levels of voter participation and strong descriptive and substantive representation of immigrants and visible minorities in Canadian politics. Despite some worrying trends, this pattern of strong political participation and representation is a critical mechanism for securing social cohesion.

I turn last to the indigenous peoples of Canada. Here the prognosis for inclusion and social cohesion is very poor. While increasing numbers live off-reserve, in what could be assumed to be more “integrated” urban settings, Aboriginals and indigenous peoples remain the most socially, economically and politically marginalized ethnic group in Canada. Social stresses between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal populations are manifest in violent stand-offs over land disputes and incidents of police brutality, and many Aboriginals remain understandably reluctant to participate in political institutions that they perceive as colonialist and oppressive. The potential for this unrest to cause significant fractures in the social and political fabric of Canada grows as the Aboriginal population itself increases. If the institutional frameworks for accommodating the francophone minority (federalism and bilingualism) and visible minorities (multiculturalism and a liberal naturalization policy) have had fairly positive results for social cohesion, the same cannot be said for indigenous peoples. The policy framework concerning the rights and status of indigenous and Aboriginal peoples is a muddled combination of old-style paternalism along with newer impulses toward recognition and self-government. Failure to fully atone for the injustices of colonialism, and to address the persistent marginalization and racialization of Aboriginal men and women will undoubtedly lead to deepening fractures in social cohesion (Green 2006).

I return finally to my main argument. The basic tension in defining political community in Canada has meant that new, creative institutional and quasi-institutional arrangements (including bilingualism, asymmetric federalism, multiculturalism, the Charter of Rights, and so on) had to be developed to generate trust across ethnic divisions. These are based not on value consensus but on norms of reciprocity and equal treatment.3 It is these institutional arrangements that keep Canada’s bumble-bee of a state flying. They have mitigated and even reversed social and political breakdown, in the face of seemingly unmanageable and irreconcilable diversity. They are unstable, imperfect and incomplete. They are also inevitably and intentionally transformational, demanding that dominant and historically subordinated groups engage in new practices, enter new relationships, and embrace new concepts and discourses, all of which profoundly transform people’s identities and practices.

Notes

1 The “reasonable accommodation debates” in Quebec date to the mid-1980s, but became intensified and reached crisis proportions in the period immediately preceding the provincial election of March 2007. Premier Jean Charest responded by establishing the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences. The Commission, chaired by Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, delivered its report in May 2008.

2 Voter turnout in Canada over the past five national elections (from 1997-2008) has ranged between approximately 60 to 67 percent. Voter turnout in the US, over roughly the same period (1996-2007) has ranged from 49 to 60 percent.

3 This process has not yet fully encompassed Aboriginal peoples.
Unpacking the Rule of Law

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Introduction

Components of the rule of law such as judicial independence and transparency play key roles in our models of important subjects in the field, from economic development to the protection of human rights, and even social order. But it is the rule of law itself, in the broadest sense, that has become a kind of mantra for the international policy-making community seeking to improve human welfare. It is thus unsurprising that we are accumulating measures of the rule of law, the validity of which scholars have begun to evaluate only recently (e.g. Haggard et al., 2008; Skanning, 2008).

Unfortunately, serious validity challenges have been raised that seem to derive from the massive, multidimensional, and contested nature of the concept and a failure to explain clearly how its various dimensions interrelate.

In this note, we suggest that there is more to gain from focusing our measurement efforts on the subcomponents of the rule of law, especially those about which we have clear theoretical claims, than from pursuing measures of the overarching concept. We discuss measurement options for a core subcomponent, judicial independence, and summarize a validity analysis of thirteen independence measures. In general, there are reasons to believe that we are validly measuring a widely used concept of judicial independence, even if critical challenges remain.

Why we should focus on subcomponents?

The broad concept of the rule of law is multidimensional and complex. Although it is contested in a number of ways (Carothers, 2003), a review of popular alternatives (e.g., Raz, 1977, 198; Macedo, 1994, 148) suggests three general dimensions: an institutional or horizontal dimension that captures the extent to which the government is constrained by interbranch checks and balances; an individual or vertical dimension that captures the extent to which law enforcement is non-discriminatory; and, a social dimension that measures a state’s general level of civil order. Existing measures of the rule of law attempt to reflect this conceptual breadth and complexity. For instance, the World Bank’s measure aggregates survey questions on issues as distinct as access to land and to water for agriculture, the pervasiveness of money laundering through banks, confidence in the police, the neutrality of the judges, and violent and organized crime (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2007b, 74).

There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with a multidimensional, complex concept. And we think it does an adequate job of describing generally a set of interrelated ideas. Still, scholars have raised fair questions about the validity of rule of law measures, from unclear and biased coding rules (Hammergren, 2006, 14) to a failure to demonstrate empirically that alternative measures are related to each other (Haggard et al., 2008). In our view, however, the most serious problems are conceptual. First, the multidimensional construct groups together concepts that are causally related on a number of accounts, and whose relationships we are still learning about. Focusing on the general rule of law concept takes our attention away from the mechanisms by which its subcomponents are produced. Do fair legal procedures induce institutional trust and ultimately promote social order? On some accounts, they should (Tyler, 1990), but it is certainly possible that under certain conditions procedural fairness is ultimately irrelevant to trust or order, in which case it is not clear why we want to include it within the rule of law concept. Second, it is unclear how to aggregate measures of elements of each dimension, and worse, how to aggregate measures across dimensions. Is a professional police force as important to the rule of law as a low level of violent crime or bureaucratic autonomy? Is it half or twice as important? Does it really matter if your judiciary is independent if a state confronts widespread disorder? This information is never clearly articu-
Datasets

Table 1: Summary of Judicial Independence Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De Facto Independence Measures</th>
<th>De Facto Concept</th>
<th>Years Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cingranelli &amp; Richards (2008)#</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>1990-2004#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tate &amp; Keith (2007)#</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>1990-2004#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraser Institute</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>1995; 2001-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>2006; 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De Jure Independence Measures</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Porta et al. (2003)</td>
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</table>


Judicial Independence

Table 1 summarizes an analysis of thirteen indicators of judicial independence developed in law and the social sciences (Ríos-Figueroa and Staton 2008). We suggest that scholars should be cautiously optimistic about the state of the literature, even if important challenges remain. As always, the first step is conceptual. What exactly do we mean by judicial independence? This literature contains conceptual differences just as the general literature on the rule of law does (e.g. Burbank and Friedman 2002). Unlike the rule of law literature, however, there are relatively few alternatives from which to choose and each reflects a relatively simple idea.

Scholars typically have in mind either a behavioral or an institutional concept of independence. We can identify two behavioral approaches. Under the first, independence requires that judicial resolutions reflect how judges sincerely evaluate the cases that come before them, so that we can say that their decisions are free from undue internal or external influence (Kornhauser 2002). In this sense, independence is autonomy. A second approach recognizes that courts depend on other actors to implement their decisions. On this account, it is difficult to say that courts are independent when their decisions can be ignored or imperfectly implemented. Judicial independence requires that judges are both able to sincerely resolve their...
cases and to ensure that their decisions are enforced (Cameron 2002; Larkins 1996). In this sense, independence is power. Although scholars often invoke independence as autonomy, our content validity review suggests that most measures attempt to capture independence as power. As Table 1 suggests, Howard and Carey’s (2004) measure, derived from US State Department country reports, is a notable exception.

A more familiar distinction in the literature involves the difference between de facto independence, which is captured by one of the two behavioral concepts just reviewed, and de jure independence, which describes rules that should induce those behaviors. In particular, formal rules designed to insulate judges from undue political pressure (e.g. tenure and removal institutions), or which define the set of conflicts courts are formally empowered to resolve (e.g. jurisdictional institutions) should influence autonomy and power. With this causal relationship in mind, scholars have developed de jure independence measures (Feld and Voigt 2003); however, it is critical to stress that the distinction between de jure and de facto independence is not an issue of measurement – it is conceptual. Even if we believe that life tenure increases autonomy, we would not want to measure autonomy with life tenure. Autonomy and the institutions that might promote it are distinct concepts. The practical question is as follows: Are we interested, conceptually, in institutional rules that plausibly insulate judges or expand their formal powers; or are we interested in judicial behavior that we can call independent? It is obviously important to get straight on the concept of independence and pick a corresponding measure, especially because there is evidence that de jure and de facto measures really are not capturing the same concept (Feld and Voigt 2003).

The central challenge of demonstrating the convergent validity of any particular indicator of independence is that there is no benchmark measure against which it can be compared. Nevertheless, insofar as the de facto measures are almost all attempting to capture power and insofar as the de jure measures are all designed to capture institutions that insulate judges from influence, they should be correlated with each other. Our analysis finds that the de facto measures share a great deal of variance, especially so among relatively developed states. We also uncover construct validity evidence, finding that the de facto measures predict well concepts that should increase in judicial independence (e.g. human rights protections), and are even explained by a well-known instrument for good legal institutions derived from information on settler mortality in the 19th century (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001).

The analysis suggests a few tentative conclusions. Unquestionably, scholars have available to them a wide array of measures, so that it is certainly feasible to follow Haggard et al.’s (2008) call for considerable robustness analysis when testing empirical claims about judicial independence. The available de facto measures are likely providing reasonable information on the power concept, and Howard and Carey provide a reasonable measure of autonomy. Further, the de facto and de jure measures are very likely capturing distinct concepts. Finally, we would note that the lack of a strong correlation between de jure and de facto measures raises a question about how precisely rules and behavior are linked. It may be that our de jure measures are capturing the wrong rules, or it may be that the relationship is conditioned by other factors that influence independence.

Despite the positive results, critical challenges remain. Here, we address what we take to be the most pressing one. It presents a serious threat to inference, and there is simple evidence of it in twelve of the thirteen measures. As Table 1 suggests, data availability is an obvious problem.

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“Are we interested, conceptually, in institutional rules that plausibly insulate judges or expand their formal powers; or are we interested in judicial behavior that we can call independent?”

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Some measures are purely cross-sectional, many of the time-series measures begin in the mid-to-late 1990s, and a number are no longer being updated. This is well understood in the rule of law literature. 

“[...] the lack of a strong correlation between de jure and de facto measures raises a question about how precisely rules and behavior are linked. It may be that our de jure measures are capturing the wrong rules, or [...] that the relationship is conditioned by other factors that influence independence.”

What is less familiar, and far more problematic, is that even for years for which measures are available, the pattern of missing data is non-random. For the most part, data are more likely to be available for relatively developed states, though there are a few cases where the opposite is true. Critically, we have yet to identify a published article using these measures that attempts to address the missingness problem, and so there is justification for questioning the estimates of literally every result in the literature. What is more, as mentioned above, the measures are more likely to agree with each other among developed states. If we take Haggard et al.’s suggestion seriously and conduct simple robustness analysis, substituting alternative measures of judicial independence across multiple models, we are likely to be overly optimistic about the results. The reason is that data are more likely to be available in the set of states for which our measures are more likely to agree (i.e. where development is relatively high). Scholars must begin addressing the missing data problem. Fortunately, there are straightforward solutions in the literature and easily obtainable software to implement them (Horton and Kleinman 2007).

Conclusion

As other scholars have noted, serious questions of validity characterize our measures of the rule of law. Given the multidimensional nature of the concept and the failure to describe clearly how the dimensions are related, this is not all that surprising. In fact, the general concept simply may be too broad and vaguely articulated to be of use to many empirical projects. This is not to say that the broad concept is useless. It nicely describes a host of interrelated ideas in law and politics. Moreover, its subcomponents are obviously relevant to a number of important debates in the field.

In contrast to the general rule of law concept, there is considerable evidence that the field is doing a decent job measuring one of its subcomponents, judicial independence. Yet there is also evidence that scholars are ignoring a serious missing data problem when using these measures. Fortunately, this problem can be solved. Finally, we would note that scholars interested in the general rule of law concept might benefit from focusing on judicial independence. It is central to checks and balances and there are theoretical links between independence and both the ways that governments treat their citizens and social order. For this reason, and insofar as we have reasonable measures of independence, we are in a position to learn about the relationships between the dimensions of the rule of law. In our view, the lessons we derive from that process could help clarify the multidimensional concept.

Notes

1 This optimism does not suggest, however, that estimating the effects of judicial independence from existing measures is a trivial
Datasets

PIREDEU Project

In 2009, an ambitious study of voters, elites, parties and the media will be conducted in 27 countries in the context of the European Parliament elections. This large data collection effort will provide a unique resource for scholars interested in analyzing the effect of the political and economic context on political behavior.

The Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) at the European University Institute, and a consortium of 14 collaborating institutions in nine countries, has been awarded a grant from the European Union to fund the 2009 European Election Study. This grant will fund a voter study, candida
t study, party manifestos study, media study, and contextual data study, all of which will be conducted in each of the 27 EU member states in connection with the 2009 elections to the European Parliament (EP). The study, entitled 'Providing an Infrastructure for Research on Electoral Democracy in the European Union' (PIREDEU), will constitute a pilot study for a permanent infrastructure to collect data on European and national elections so as to provide an ongoing basis for monitoring the quality of democracy in Europe.

In addition to studies of voters, there have always been studies of party manifestos and of contextual data (the statistics generated by the elections themselves). Furthermore, on three occasions there have been studies of media activity, and once the EES included a sample survey of the candidates running for election. In 2009, for the first time, studies of all these different aspects of a European Parliament election (voters, candidates, parties, media and context) will be conducted simultaneously.

The entire enterprise is being conducted with full participation of the user community already established over a quarter century of past election studies -- a user community that extends to every EU member country and beyond. The first action of the new consortium was to inaugurate an 'Open Forum' on the PIREDEU website where it solicited suggestions from prospective users for all five of the data collection instruments that will be under development over the coming fifteen months. Over the initial Consultation phase, from mid-April to mid-June 2008, the Open Forum generated a lot of interest and debate. The Forum has 76 registered users and generated over 500 user sessions during June alone. The Consultation phase resulted in 33 proposals for new questions and coding categories, which have been considered by the PIREDEU Steering Committee. Most of these proposals will be incorporated into the final data collection instruments. From October to December 2008, the draft data...
Datasets

instruments will be posted on the Open Forum for comments from the user community.

This project is useful to APSA-CP members for several reasons. First, PIREDEU encourages members to join the Open Forum and comment on the 2009 EES draft questionnaires once they are posted in October. Second, the PIREDEU website provides a general overview on and links to resources from past European Election Studies (EES), including information on the voting, candidate, media, manifesto and contextual data studies. Third, the website lists an extensive bibliography, which includes the scientific output of past European Election Studies as well as relevant publications of the researchers involved in the design study. For further details of the infrastructure, the 2009 European Parliament election study, and past European Election Studies, visit www.piredeu.eu.

Minorities At Risk Project

The Minorities at Risk project is pleased to announce the release of the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset for the Middle East and North Africa. This new dataset covers 112 organizations representing 22 ethnic groups in 12 countries, providing information on 163 variables on an annual basis from 1980-2004. Variables included cover organizational characteristics, state-organization relations, external support, and organizational behavior (nonviolent, violent and criminal).

The MAROB data (in ASCII, SPSS and STATA formats) and codebook are available at www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp.

Please direct any questions about the dataset or codebook to Mary Michael, the MAR Project Coordinator at minpro@cidcm.umd.edu.

MAROB is a project of the Minorities at Risk Project (www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar) and it is sponsored by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (www.cidcm.umd.edu) and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (www.start.umd.edu), both based at the University of Maryland.

Samuel P. Huntington, 1927-2008

by Croydon Ireland
Harvard News Office

Samuel P. Huntington died Dec. 24. He was 81. Huntington had retired from active teaching in 2007, following 58 years of scholarly service at Harvard. In a retirement letter to the president of Harvard, he wrote, in part, “It is difficult for me to imagine a more rewarding or enjoyable career than teaching here, particularly teaching undergraduates. I have valued every one of the years since 1949.”

Huntington was the author, co-author, or editor of 17 books and over 90 scholarly articles. His principal areas of research and teaching were American government, democratization, military politics, comparative politics, and political development.

“Sam was the kind of scholar that made Harvard a great university,” said Huntington’s friend of nearly six decades, economist Henry Rosovsky. “People all over the world studied and debated his ideas. I believe that he was clearly one of the most influential political scientists of the last 50 years.”

“Every one of his books had an impact,” said Rosovsky. “These have all become part of our vocabulary.”

To Stanley Hoffmann, Huntington
Jorge Dominguez described Huntington as “one of the giants of political science worldwide during the past half century. He had a knack for asking the crucially important but often inconvenient question. He had the talent and skill to formulate analyses that stood the test of time.”

Huntington’s friend and colleague Robert Putnam called him “one of the giants of American intellectual life of the last half century.”

To Harvard College Professor Stephen P. Rosen, “Huntington’s brilliance was recognized by the academics and statesmen around the world who read his books. But he was loved by those who knew him well because he combined a fierce loyalty to his principles and friends with a happy eagerness to be confronted with sharp opposition to his own views.”

Huntington, who graduated from Yale College at age 18 and who was teaching at Harvard by age 23, was best known for his views on the clash of civilizations. He argued that in a post-Cold War world, violent conflict would come not from ideological friction between nation states, but from cultural and religious differences among the world’s major civilizations.

Huntington identified these major civilizations as Western (including the United States and Europe), Latin American, Islamic, African, Orthodox (with Russia as a core state), Hindu, Japanese, and “Sinic” (including China, Korea, and Vietnam).

“My argument remains,” he said in a 2007 interview with Islamica Magazine, “that cultural identities, antagonisms and affiliations will not only play a role, but play a major role in relations between states.”


To the end of his life, the potential for conflict inherent in culture was prominent in Huntington’s scholarly pursuits. In 2000, he was co-editor of “Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress.” And just before his health declined, in the fall of 2005, he was beginning to explore religion and national identity.

“His contributions ranged across the whole field of political science, from the deeply theoretical to the intensely applied,” said Putnam. “Over the years, he mentored a large share of America’s leading strategic thinkers, and he built enduring institutions of intellectual excellence.”

And Putnam added a personal note. “What was most rare about Sam, however, was his ability to combine intensely held, vigorously argued views with an engaging openness to contrary evidence and argument. Harvard has lost a towering figure, and his colleagues have lost a very good friend.”

Timothy Colton remarked on his old friend’s breadth of intellectual interests. He used the American political experience as a pivot point (Huntington’s doctoral dissertation was on the Interstate Commerce Commission), but soon deeply studied a globe-spanning range of topics.

“He was anchored in American life and his American identity, but he ended up addressing so many broad questions,” said Colton. “His degree of openness to new topics and following questions where they take him is not as often found today as when he was making his way.”

Huntington’s first book, “The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,” published to great controversy in 1957 and now in its 15th printing, is today still considered a standard title on the topic of how military affairs intersect with the political realm. It was the subject of a West Point symposium in 2007, on the 50th anniversary of its publication.

In part, “Soldier and the State” was inspired by President Harry Truman’s firing of Gen. Douglas MacArthur — and at the same time praised corps of officers that
in history remained stable, professional, and politically neutral.

In 1964, he co-authored, with Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Political Power: USA-USSR,” which was a major study of Cold War dynamics — and how the world could be shaped by two political philosophies locked in opposition to one another.

According to his wife Nancy, Huntington was a lifelong Democrat, and served as foreign policy adviser to Vice President Hubert Humphrey in his 1968 presidential campaign. In the wake of that “bitter” campaign, she said, Huntington and Warren Manshel — “political opponents in the campaign but close friends” — co-founded the quarterly journal Foreign Policy (now a bimonthly magazine). Huntington was co-editor until 1977.

His 1969 book, “Political Order in Changing Societies,” is widely regarded as a landmark analysis of political and economic development in the Third World. It was among Huntington’s most influential books, and a frequently assigned text for graduate students investigating comparative politics, said Dominguez. The book “challenged the orthodoxies of the 1960s in the field of development,” he said. “Huntington showed that the lack of political order and authority were among the most serious debilities the world over. The degree of order, rather than the form of the political regime, mattered most.”

His 1991 book, “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century” — another highly influential work — won the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order, and “looked at similar questions from a different perspective, namely, that the form of the political regime — democracy or dictatorship — did matter,” said Dominguez. “The metaphor in his title referred to the cascade of dictator-toppling democracy-creating episodes that peopled the world from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, and he gave persuasive reasons for this turn of events well before the fall of the Berlin Wall.”

As early as the 1970s, Huntington warned against the risk of new governments becoming politically liberalized too rapidly. He proposed instead that governments prolong a transition to full democracy — a strand of ideas that began with an influential 1973 paper, “Approaches to Political Decompression.”

Huntington’s most recent book was “Who Are We? The Challenges of America’s National Identity” (2004), a scholarly reflection on America’s cultural sense of itself.

A longer version of this article appeared in the Harvard Gazette. It is printed here with permission from the managing editor.

S. Huntington, The Man

by Naunihal Singh
University of Notre Dame

Much has been written about the intellectual legacy of Samuel P. Huntington, which is only fitting given his stature as a scholar. My purpose here is more modest, to make sure we don’t forget Huntington the man as we remember Huntington the intellectual.

I was not one of Huntington’s close friends, but I was one of his students, and for most of my time at Harvard I knew him simply as Sam. Even though he was one of the most senior professors in the department, having taught some of the others, he was also one of the first I addressed by first name, an important point in my personal transition from student to fellow scholar.

It was hard to get to know Sam unless you had the privilege of interacting with him regularly over a period of time. Sam was acutely shy, so he was not much for small talk or personal conversation. In the beginning I mistook this reticence for the aloofness that often accompanies status, but I was mistaken. I never saw him happier than when I interrupted his solitary walk across Harvard Yard, on a day when he looked like a man who did not want to be disturbed, to congratulate him on the birth of his grandchild. On his part, he went out of his way to ask me how I, a turbaned bearded Sikh,
was being treated in Boston after 9/11. This was not just a polite or rhetorical question, he put down his briefcase to listen in an unhurried way to the unpleasant account I had to share.

Huntington’s political beliefs were more complex than one could tell from reading the sharply drawn positions he took in his work. Although the outside world saw Sam as a conservative political figure, he was actually a life-long Democrat. He once interrupted a talk I was giving to correct my statement that America had never experienced a coup, quipping that Bush had come to power via a constitutional coup after losing the 2000 election. While others saw the tragic events of September 11 as confirmation of the “Clash of Civilizations” theory, Sam disagreed: he said that Bin Laden was a criminal from one civilization who attacked another, hoping to precipitate a broader clash.

Despite his shyness, Huntington was an intellectual provocateur who went out of his way to provoke vigorous intellectual disagreement. I don’t mean to characterize him as a sophist, since he clearly believed the positions he took, but I think appreciating his love for a good academic dispute is helpful in understanding his scholarship. His final book, ‘Who Are We: The Challenges to America’s National Identity’, is perhaps the most controversial. Yet when he presented chapters of the manuscript in a seminar devoted to works in progress, we couldn’t tell what the ultimate conclusion of the book would be.

When we asked, he refused to tip his hand, and would only talk about the issues he was coalescing and framing. At the time, he appeared to have no particular attachment to any of the positions he was laying out. This process is not what one would have expected in light of the book’s ultimate reception.

Similarly, Sam did not surround himself with a cadre of loyal acolytes. Instead, the graduate students who worked with him held widely differing perspectives, often quite far removed from his own. In fact, I asked him to be on my committee precisely because my thesis was critical of some of his scholarship, and thought it would be valuable to have his feedback. As a result, he produced a lineage of scholars who are known for many things, but replicating his views is not one of them.

Call for Papers

Comparative Sociology (www.brill.nl/coso) is a quarterly international scholarly journal published by Brill of Leiden, Netherlands dedicated to advancing comparative sociological analyses of societies and cultures, institutions and organizations, groups and collectivities, networks and interactions. In addition, book-length manuscripts may also be submitted to the related book series, International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology (www.brill.nl/issa). Two issues of the journal each year are devoted to “special topics,” and six topics currently open for submissions (through July 2009) are: Democratic Quality and Social Democracy, Constitutional Courts Cross-Nationally, Institutional Design, Bourdieu on Professions, Public Realm Ascent v. Field Autonomy Ascent, Enlightened Localism (edited by Benjamin Gregg). Consult the Website for descriptions of each.

Editor-in-Chief is David Sciulli, Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M University, and Columbia University Ph.D. in Political Science (compsoc@tamu.edu). Submissions are welcome not only from sociologists but also political scientists, legal scholars, economists, anthropologists and others. Indeed, the journal and book series are particularly keen to receive works of comparative political sociology and comparative legal sociology. All submissions are peer-reviewed and (initial) decisions are typically made within less than three months.

APSA Comparative Politics Section, 2008-9 Nominations and Awards Committees

Luebbert Book Award

Committee membership:
Isabela Mares, Columbia University, Chair (im2195@columbia.edu)
Benjamin Smith, University of Florida, (bbsmith@ufl.edu)
Regina Smyth, University of Indiana, (Rsymth@indiana.edu)

Luebbert Article Award
The committee will award the Gregory Luebbert award for the best article published in comparative politics in the last year.

Committee membership:
Robert Rohrschneider, Indiana University, Chair (rrorsch@indiana.edu)
Margaret Keck, Johns Hopkins (margaretkeck@mac.com)
Devra Moehler, Cornell (dcm37@cornell.edu)

Sage Best APSA Paper Award
The award, supported by Sage Publications, is for the best APSA paper presented at the 2008 APSA meetings.

Committee membership:
Chris Anderson, Cornell (cja22@cornell.edu), chair
Yoshiko Herrera, Harvard (Herrera@fas.harvard.edu)
David S. Brown, Colorado (david.s.brown@colorado.edu)

Dataset Award
The award recognizes development of high-quality data sets that contribute to the shared base of empirical knowledge in comparative politics and calls attention to the contribution of scholars who make their data publicly available in a well-documented form. The committee’s decision will be made in time for its deadline of June 1, 2009.

Committee membership:
Kaare Strom, U. of California at San Diego (kstrom@ucsd.edu), chair
Johanna Birnir, U of Buffalo (jkbirnir@buffalo.edu)
Kenneth Scheve, Yale University (kenneth.scheve@yale.edu)

Note from Peter Gourevitch:
Endowing the Data Prize

Three distinguished colleagues -- Arend Lijphart, Adam Przeworski, and Sidney Verba -- have agreed to let their names be used for our data prize, to be called the LPV prize. To do this we have to raise the money! So we are calling on members to make contributions to the APSA. A check made out to APSA with "Data Prize" on the memo line will do the trick! You can send it to the APSA office (1527 New Hampshire Avenue, Washington, DC 20036), or to any Comparative Politics board member or officer (myself, Susan Stokes at Yale, Ian Lustick at Penn, et al.) and we can forward it. We are a large group -- more than 1500 members. We have to raise $7000 to pay out $300 for the prize (at 4.5% rate) before the Association can formally make an endowment out of it. SO... that is less than $5 each!!! Please make a contribution and urge your colleagues to do the same!
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Letter from the President
The Great Meltdown of '08: Six Variables in Search of an Outcome, Peter Gourevitch

Symposium:
Community and Diversity: Is Western Europe Different?, Marc Hooqhe
Ethnic Diversity and the Erosion of Social Capital?, Louk Hagendoorn
Divided They Really Stand? The France Plurielle Case, Simon Brouard & Vincent Tiberj
Ethnic Diversity, Social Solidarity and Political Community in Canada, Karen Bird

Datasets
Unpacking the Rule of Law, Julio Rios Figueroa & Jeffrey Staton
Dataset Announcements

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Nominations and Awards Committees

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