What is the role of anthropologists and other social scientists in producing knowledge for political and military strategies, as described by Packer and alluded to by Stoler? What do you think this role should look like?
HIST 285 / AFS 270 | SPRING 2019
I can’t believe this is the last discussion post! I feel like the semester just started! More on that at the end of my post though, first I must respond.
Packer argues that “in a counterinsurgency, … armed force is only a quarter of the effort; political, economic, and informational operations are also required.” This informational component, he says, is often believed to be important for “defin[ing] the enemy in narrow terms.” In his discussion of Afghanistan, Packer also argues that the Taliban wages war through information, saying “information strategy seems to be driving the agenda of every radical Islamist” and quotes David Kilcullen as saying, “it’s all about an information operation that generates the perception of an unstoppable, growing insurgency.” However, he argues that “America’s information operations … support military actions, and often badly” and says that “intelligence agencies habitually rely on satellites and spies, when most of the information that matters now … is available to anyone with an Internet connection.”
Stoler does not talk as directly about information and intelligence agencies. She does, however, talk about how Americans were encouraged to consider “the advantages and costs of resorting to torture and intimidation in seeking vital human intelligence about enemy plans” after September 11th. She also speaks about how the sharing of information leads to “widespread fear” of non-Americans and implies that the idea of “knowing your enemy” perpetuates racial othering and “replay[s] the historical anxieties of who is really ‘us’.”
Both Packer and Stoller present the producing of intelligence for military strategies as a rather negative and unessential part of politics and war. I am obviously not an expert on war, but I do not think it is the responsibility of anthropologists and social scientists to report information for military purposes. As someone who is studying Anthropology, I could never see myself using my research in another country to help the United States military or promote war, racism, or xenophobia. That being said, I understand that when war is occurring, knowing information is an important part of it, but citizens, anthropologists, and social scientists should not be responsible for gathering it.
Now, at the end of my very last discussion post, (although we still have a few more weeks of class) I want to thank you all for a great semester full of engaging discussions. I have enjoyed hearing everyone’s point of view on each of the topics and readings and I hope to be in class with you all in the future. Thank you, Professor Stone, for encouraging us all to look more deeply into the world around us and question why things are the way they are. I know I speak for the entire class when I say we are grateful to have had you teach us this semester.
“Students of imperial history depend on having a solid archival trail to track, on elaborated cultures of documentation for which agents of empire were rewarded and in which they invested their careers” (Stoler, 142). This quote from Stoler near perfectly ties anthropologists, historians, and other social scientists together in their importance in producing accurate, diversified, and (as much as possible) unbiased information concerning cultures other than one’s own, which will then be utilized by political and military strategists. In a class I am taking about Latin America, we spent a week focused on the complicated nature of archives, how they can store but also reinvent narratives. Stoler speaks of archives as being able to hold a history that cannot be re-recorded, as we can identify empire very easily through “scraps of paper,” and when those are missing, a rhetoric of denial ensues. While national, well-researched archives most certainly provide undeniable proof of the past, their presence as static documents of the past can become troublesome, and they become vulnerable to interpretation by these political and military strategists, thus building a new and inevitably twisted narrative of other cultures and the United State’s history of imperialism. Perhaps it is the role of anthropologists and other social scientists to ensure that archives do not become twisted, that neither their static or living nature can be exploited, and that history is well-recorded and preserved on every side.
“This is fundamentally about the broken relationship between the government and the discipline of anthropology. What broke that relationship is Vietnam. And people still haven’t recovered from that” (Packer, 11). Packer discusses American presence and military experience in Vietnam and, separately, in the Middle East in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and claims that the disasters that ensued in these areas, what often felt like, to the American public, a reckless and fruitless grasping at some sort of ideology to base the war efforts on, was ultimately a result of the US government’s (really their political and military strategists) inability to understand each of these respective cultures. Packer argues that the reason the war in the Vietnam was such a military, humanitarian, and political nightmare was because no one in these strategists teams ever bothered to attempt to understand Vietnamese culture. This would be the “broken relationship” he speaks of, claiming that when things go to a metaphorical hell, it is because of the disconnect between the government and anthropologists, and, more broadly, the public’s misunderstanding of a faraway, foreign, frightening culture– one that many Americans know too little about to be able to pass any judgement at all. It is the role of anthropologists to be included in these conversations between strategists in the highest levels of the US government, to speak directly and with an unpartisan stance, and to ensure that their culture is understood enough to, as unsavory as it is, wage a more ‘applicable’ war against them, one that, ideally, does not betray their culture.
The role of anthropologists in these panic-room meetings hold a precarious place in military strategizing. Anthropologists have the ability to inform, but also, whether purposefully or not, sway this delegation. The knowledge they present about culture, but, ultimately, the interpretation of culture, could easily lead to a vicious war that goes to attack that most precious, deeply-held notion of national identity. On the same token, it could allow the United States to wage a war that more effectively combats the issues at hand, and aims to maintain peace and order in areas that there aren’t said ‘issues.’ For me, anthropology would best be utilized as a measure to be taken before the word ‘war’ even crosses a lip– in international delegations, discussion, and dialogue, anthropologist from everywhere could be able to give insight of intercultural problems that could, perhaps, prevent or delay wars that are primarily about cultures, or the difference between them.
Packer’s article for The New Yorker focuses on one of America’s key strategists after 9/11, David Kilcullen, who has been at the forefront of defining the war on terror and counterinsurgency. He drew a disparity between terrorist and insurgent: “[a] terrorist is ‘a kook in a room,’…an insurgent has a mass base whose support can be won or lost through politics”. By reviewing the definition, it alters how strategists, military planners, and intelligence agencies look at insurgents. One of the powerful aspects of having anthropologists and social scientists in the room is that they do not just look at acts of terror in terms of numbers and strategy. Social scientists look at the motives behind an act of terror, just as Kilcullen has after 9/11. They look to understand the terrorists’ actions in terms of why and for what cause. There are drawbacks to this, as these social scientists look at a problem with”an analyst’s rationalism and a practitioner’s matter-of-factness, [often] deceptively detached from its consequences”. Social scientists are a vital way to understand a “prime cause of American setbacks in fighting global jihadism,” because very few tactics seem to be working to fight this war.
In addition, looking at Stoler’s piece, Stoler doesn’t look at specific events or scientists, but looks at colonialism and imperialism and its relationship to insurgency. Stoler makes the point about borders and how “[c]olonial empires were always dependent on social imaginaries, blueprints unrealized, borders never drawn, administrative categories of people and territories to which no one was sure who or what should belong”. This allows social scientists to look at the motivations of insurgents, who fight lines on a paper that doesn’t exist. Stoler’s piece looks at anthropologists and social scientists as people who monitor information and keep it for the future, but also asks questions about their role in society.
War and terrorism are incredibly difficult subjects to study, but they do require different looks at these problems. On the one hand, anthropologists and social scientists can provide vital insights in wars that do not just look at people, in terms of the number of casualties, allowing people to understand the motives better than if people just assumed Islam and religion are drivers for the “war on terror”. In contrast, anthropologists don’t have the same impartiality that can sway military strategists from blowing up a school bus or fighting insurgents on the ground. People listen to social scientists, and if they share one-sided information, they can work to further the divide between the people and insurgents, which will never allow for the war to end.
To begin, Packer evaluates the Departement of Defense’s employment of both anthropologists and social scientists. Packer states, “Anthropologists were hired and sent abroad to conduct a multiyear study of the factors that promote stability or war in certain societies” (Packer 2019). Anthropologists are used to understanding the nature of societies at war and the lasting impacts. At the same time, anthropologists must explain the practices and cultures of far-away societies to government officials as they discuss the waging of war. Social scientists, on the other hand, are involved in examining social networks, institutions, and practices. Social scientists understand and explain the importance of social networks, psychological processes, and cultural ideologies that influence relationships both within and outside of a country. All individuals take part in these aspects of society; thus, influencing the connotations and opinions on waging a war.
Stoler uses a more imperial and colonial lense when discussing the purpose of anthropologists and social scientists. Stoler believes that the role of anthropologists is, “not about the interpretation of culture but interpretations in cultures, about the critical and alternative reflections of those who pushed on their limits” (Stoler 2006). Anthropologists study the relationships between groups and how these are embedded in cultural and societal understanding. Anthropologists examine the interpersonal relationships on the groups and their connection to group outcomes. Stoler does not go into much detail about the role of social scientists but does state the creation of a “two nation” ideology. This ideology takes the belief that the enemy of the threat to safety is no longer in a far-away land but is instead now within the country. This fuels the concept of a constant threat from a group that lives on the same soil as everyone else.
In my opinion, the use of social scientist and anthropologists are extremely important in making war-time decisions. Anthropologists can be used to examine historical impacts and rationalizations for war. Also, anthropologists can provide a better understanding of foreign cultures, practices, and beliefs. Social scientists are extremely valuable as well. They examine the social institutions, ideals, and customs that every individual participates in. At the same time, they look at how these things shape our understanding of the world, the events that take place within, and how these occurrences will impact our lives.
As military and political strategies are further intertwined with modern information networks and technology-assisted tactics, social scientists are critical in reshaping public diplomacy and creating multifarious resistance strategies. To this end, Packer animates the role of anthropologists and other social scientists from an underutilized specialty to an urgent necessity by stressing the imperative of social context in resisting extremist influences. Specifically, Packer asserts that the role of anthropologists/social scientists should be to serve as “cultural advisers” or experts on the intimate aspects of the religion, economy, political institutions, and history of a locale; in essence, Packer contends that social scientists are able to facilitate the ascertainment of a “granular” knowledge of the social terrains on which the United States is competing. With a more nuanced knowledge, the United States will be better equipped to provide an alternative social context for youth to choose ways other than jihad.
Stoler contends that imperial administrations are often plagued with the fear of a ubiquitous “hidden force,” and thus are preoccupied with the desire for a secret intelligence mechanism to combat it. This “hidden force,” Packer asserts, is becoming more of an intangible product of open source information rather than a lurking physical force. Specifically, Stoler analyzes imperial formations as geographically ill-defined, constituted by gradated variations of sovereignty and distinct continuums of basic rights. Thus, Stoler implies that social scientists may help to clarify the often opaque nature of insurgency groups that transcend stark geographical boundaries and monopolize information networks. Anthropologists may be better equipped to sort through the “legal and political fuzziness” of certain territories, and thus ameliorate the difficulties of a globalized insurgency through a more nuanced cultural understanding.
The “information battlefield” is only expanding in the future, and I believe anthropologists/social scientists are able to fill the gaps in our knowledge of the traditions, rationale, religion, and political dynamics of insurgency groups. Social scientists, thus, may help the United States transition from an outdated and stagnant reliance on traditional military warfare to a dexterous, multilayered propaganda and resistance strategy; a strategy, likewise, premised on diversified knowledge attentive to the cultural intricacies only excavated by social scientists able to restore the relationship between human complexities and the tactics of war.
The most dominant aspect of anthropologists and social scientists, as outlined by Packer is to report the cultural relativism elements of foreign cultures. Whereas Stoler, argues a more philosophical definition, alluding to social science scholars in a philosophical light. Thus, it lies upon the anthropologists to delve into the unknown worlds; akin to that of astronauts traveling through space. In contrast to the typical approach to the question which assumes the role of anthropologists as looked at with a government lenses, there is another role that should also be considered: one of a moral element.
First, the more obvious role is within the government as a method of collection. A collection of intelligence that can be utilized by the government, and its dependent militaries, when facing its enemies. This is portrayed quite repetitively through Packer’s piece, which focused heavily on an Australian named David Kilcullen. With Kilcullen’s main talking point being the significance of understanding the cultural aspects of how the insurgence is spreading. He offered the notion that it was mainly being done so through a new multi-faceted tactic which relied heavily upon the perception of the war. Kilcullen states that in order to win the war Western governments must “establish competing ‘trusted networks’ in Muslim countries” in order to prioritize the battles being waged. As evident through his indication of how the war is to be won, Packer aligns himself with this ideology, evidenced not only by his obvious favoritism of Kilcullen, but also through his statement that “the government’s traditional approach to national security has proved inadequate in one area after another” in lieu of its refusal to accommodate anthropologists and recognize them for their imperative work in assimilating intelligence for political and military strategists. This aforementioned attitude of Packer is also supported through his examination of the government’s inability to accommodate the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization’s request for sufficient funds, thus leaving them woefully unprepared for their job. Furthermore, in terms of my opinion towards anthropologist’s role in political and military strategy; I’m relatively unconcerned. As anthropology and social science are free methodologies of thinking. Thus, it would be erroneous of me to draw concrete and unforgiving lines that would dictate how one is to use information; you can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink.
Next, I would like to discuss the more philosophical role of anthropologists and other social sciences. As the more obvious argument is undoubtedly argued to no avail, the philosophical one I think to be more compelling by nature. This is also in alignment with Stoler’s subtle allusion to anthropologists. For a bit of relation to Packer’s text, whom also argues that previous roles of anthropologists did not delve into much ethical quandary, as evident by the unison actions of anthropologists and government leaders in recognition of differing between the abdication of the emperor and the terms of Japan’s surrender; Stoler also asserts that anthropologists in history once was viewed “as being too comfortably ‘safe for scholarship’, it is (and should be) not so comfortable now” especially in terms of the political and global turmoil that is often associated between governments and culture. This ultimately aligns with the ethical role of anthropologists, as to how their guidelines are not so clear anymore. This also aligns with the inconspicuous new type of war that is proposed by Packer. Thus, the role of anthropologists, in a definition I believe to surmise both Packer and Stoler’s views, is one of bridge builders between what existed in the past, and what is to exist in the present/future of the relationship between governments and culture.
Packer talks about global insurgencies and national governments mislabeling them as terrorist groups. National governments handled terrorist’s groups with conventional warfare with little regard for the society and culture the military is occupying. Anthropologists have brought more attention to successfully countering terrorists by focusing less on military force and more on the political, economic, and informational operations of the pertinent areas more prone to attract insurgents. Packer goes even further and says the natives need to understand working with the US is in their best interests; thus, providing security and resources to the locals. Stoler alludes to the manifestation of an empire-like USA but euphemized as a “benevolent empire.” Stoler still points out that empires stretch out across borders regardless of their objectives; therefore, the USA’s reconceptualization of expansionism is merely just permitting America to continue expanding its amorphous power. Stoler addresses the issues Packer mentions by focusing on the collateral affects—such as culture, the inhabitants, and social construction of the occupiers– imperial occupation may have on the society. I think with both Stoler and Packer that contemporary imperialism has taken different forms than just archaic territorial occupation; it has rooted in the culture, social media, and lives of the occupied. I think the role contemporary expansionism is via culturally understanding and garnering the obedience of the natives to counteract the insurgencies. If you take away the awe of joining the underdogs by providing security and resources to the locals, insurgencies should dwindle in number and favor the occupier. Therefore, brute military occupation is outdated and ineffective in truly occupying an area.
In Packer’s article, he describes the ways in which several social scientists working in the U.S. approach the War on Terror. The scientists and experts in his article, though coming from different backgrounds and specializing in different subjects, seem to agree that the American approach to counterterrorism is flawed because it does not account for differing cultures. For example, one scientist recalls a Marine whom she had interviewed who said that his unit’s big mistake was broadcasting information publicly, when they should have acknowledged that in Iraqi culture, gossip is more powerful, so they should have been in the coffee shops. The role of the social scientists is to fill in these gaps; with their knowledge of anthropology and societal differences, they may be able to help Americans more effectively spread a message. The advantage that many of these individuals notice is held by jihadists over Americans is that they are more culturally conscious, and that they know how to manipulate local populations better because they are more aware of what those populations might need, and are therefore better able to offer what the government cannot provide (strengthening their own movement). The scientists are aware that American tactics may not work optimally outside of America; by informing Americans on local customs and how to utilize social networks more effectively, they aim to level that playing field.
Stoler’s article is broader, but it does discuss the notion of “knowing your enemy” and addresses increasing xenophobic sentiment in former colonies or colonial powers (especially in the U.S. and Europe, with the xenophobia directed toward Latin Americans and Muslims, especially). In this sense, historians and anthropologists (and other social scientists) may be useful on either side, and in the article, it seemed that they are relied upon to define imperialism and apply it to the real and modern world. When it comes to crafting political strategies, social scientists are keenly aware of insecurities that may exist within a given society, and therefore are aware of how to exploit them. This is where “knowing your enemy” comes into play in crafting a more effective political message or campaign. Anti-Muslim xenophobia has long been gaining traction in many European countries, where right-wing politicians are also gaining power. Social scientists who are aware of what drives these sentiments can use them to promote a certain political viewpoint for greater reach and success.
Both of these strike me as somewhat inappropriate and for lack of a better word, “icky.” That said, I don’t feel comfortable giving a formal opinion on the use of social sciences for a military or political agenda. With war specifically, it is impossible for two sides of such a conflict to start out on the same level, and I’m not sure whether that’s a good or bad thing. It makes sense that members of a culture would and should be better-equipped to address the needs of other people in that culture, but when their ideologies and goals are linked to violence and hatred, it’s hard not to think that foreign intervention might be beneficial. From a political viewpoint, I am more strongly swayed to believe that using social scientists to promote a political ideology is simply manipulative and not redeemable, as it more directly disenfranchises people.
“The first tip is: ‘Know your Turf’:’Know the people, the geography, economy, history, religion, and culture. Know every village, road, field, population, tribal leader, and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district.”
The words of political anthropologist David Kilcullen describe the most accurate representation of the role of anthropologists and other social scientists from Packer. Packer believed that they are to inform military and political strategies about the culture in question to provide the most effective strategy. For example, Kilcullen did numerous projects for the government, from intelligence work to informing officials writing literature on political strategies of the area in question.
Stroler alludes to a “two nation” ideology, that the enemy is closer to our culture than we previously thought, in other words, anthropologists and social scientists should inform political and military strategy by not looking at them through a grammar based on difference. Stroller continues by stating “…not about the interpretation of culture but the interpretations in culture…,” further demonstrating the “two nation” ideology and asserting that the role of social scientists to think of the comprehension of other cultures within culture, that is, to look at it inside looking out.
I agree with Sera, I understand the use of social science to inform political and military strategies but I think it is very problematic, especially when it is linked to violence. Additionally, I think that the way social sciences (especially anthropology) studies other cultures is violent to the culture and often times racist.
Packer’s in-depth profile on the role of social scientists in political and military strategy indicates a minimal improvement to the United States’ fundamentally flawed outlook on international insurgency and terror groups. Unlike someone with exclusively military experience, an anthropologist provides the nuance and understanding of human behavior that can guide military and diplomatic action to be most productive and beneficial for all parties involved. David Kilcullen diagnoses US defense forces with “broken relationship between the government and the discipline of anthropology,” and states that “a complex human understanding of societies at war has been lost.” This lack of emphasis on the societal underpinnings of insurgency defines many of US foreign policy’s shortcomings, particularly regarding Middle Eastern conflict. These conflicts are inherently born from social structures and cultural forces, which is why social scientists—experts in those structures and forces—must have significant input in military strategy. A less nuanced approach, which the US tends to adopt in its actions, is more in line with the defining aspects of neo-colonialism and modern day empire described in Stoler’s article. The line between classical military strategy and actions taken with an understanding of cultural forces and separates a colonial intervention mindset from truly productive action to reduce terror and violence; Kilcullen remarked that in order to take effective military action, “you don’t go in there like a missionary.” This perspective that social science academics provide lead to the adoption of such empathetic, just, and effective approaches to military action.
Packer describes the role of anthropologists in the development of political and military strategy precisely and succinctly in his piece. He is careful to note that, “ . . . insurgency runs in families and social networks, held together by persistent cultural narratives” (Packer 10). On this basis, anthropologists — whose very duty it is to discover, probe, and explore “persistent cultural narratives” built on the foundation of deeply embedded “social networks” — are absolutely integral to the work that is done by both political and military figures. Implementing effective counterinsurgency measures against, say, the Islamic State, requires not just knowledge about the terrain the group currently occupies, and not just classic intelligence about the groups’ actions as well. It requires a nuanced understanding of its innerworkings, and how they came to be. What makes any group of people distinct is its culture. Understanding why a group does what it does, and by extension, what it plans to do next, demands that those crafting policy have fundamental knowledge about the cultural origins of a given group of people. It is for that reason that, as Packer describes, the US Departments of Defense and State have found it increasingly necessary to bring on anthropologists to examine the cultural roots and social networks of various actors throughout the world, specifically with regard to counterinsurgency efforts. Indeed, Stoler certainly alludes to this as well: “Washington’s political advisors . . . deftly craft strategic historical comparisons. But the former are not working with those peoples long off their radar, in places rarely acknowledged as figuring on their working political maps” (Stoler 127). Politics, she argues, is self-limiting: to focus merely on its “maps” limits the scope of what can be accomplished. Intel is undoubtedly useful, but it is the study of peoples themselves that will ultimately account to political success. We can study regime change and governmental structure all we want. But I believe that governments are undoubtedly built and maintained within explicitly cultural contexts: contexts which are often, and cannot logically continue to be, ignored by political scholars and actors alike.
According to Packer (and referenced by Stoler), anthropologists and social scientists have and should continue to play a significant role in the production of knowledge for political and, especially, military strategies. I largely agree with this perspective.
First, social scientists are, perhaps, better equipped to notice large over-arching patterns between movements and historical events—for instance, noticing the commonalities between and Islamic insurgency and a Christian-separatist one in two different regions. As Kilcullen—a social scientist himself—was able to point out between the two, the problem is not with Islam (not, more specifically, connected to a belief/disbelief in any organized religion) but instead “about human social networks and the way that they operate.” Only somebody like a social scientist equipped with the analytical skills and research capabilities needed to make such comparisons would be able to notice patterns such as these.
Moreover, social scientists do not have to rely on media pressure or reactionary politics when researching, allowing them to dig into the heart of the issue—in the case Packer details, the reason why the United States’ global counterinsurgency efforts have so far been fairly unsuccessful. Kilcullen was not only able to make a connection between Bin Laden’s environmental concerns as implicit propaganda intended to link Al Qaeda to the Democratic party, he was in the process able to offer “a new way to understand and fight a war that seems to grow less intelligible the longer it goes on.”
Finally, knowledge brought to the table by social scientists and anthropologists can be used practically. Kilcullen (who is both a former soldier and a social scientist) argues that in-depth knowledge of a commander’s district from the culture and history to the language and different population groups will make it that much easier to combat insurgencies at the local levels—that is, by helping combatants to understand their locals’ needs and provide them. This practical application of knowledge typically designated to the realm of the social sciences is echoed by McFate—an anthropologist—who believes that the U.S. government must actually understand its adversaries in order to defeat them. This, she and Kilcullen argue, is to be done by actually getting to know and understand the regions, histories, and peoples that are being affected and dealt with in order to develop specialized counterinsurgency tactics for each such area around the world. I agree with the role of social scientists here—as providers of knowledge, as strategists, and overall as a reminder to the United States that their military procedures ultimately deal with real people, real cultures, and real histories.
Packer Argues, through the story of David Kilcullen, that they should study past governments and observe how they were successful in the implementation of their politics and in dealing with conflict. He states that there are many similarities between the threats of insurgency and terrorism that these governments faced and the threats that modern governments face now. These similarities allow us to draw from historical strategies of quelling these types of threats and make our nations safer. Parker talks about the work of Kilcullen and highlights his process of analyzing the greatest threats to historical societies, extracting strategies and tactics to implement in modern societies(with a focus on preventing jihadist terrorism) and his attempts to be heard by government officials in order for his vision to become reality. His work called for a shift in terror prevention that Packer endorsed. He writes, “And future enemies are unlikely to confront the world’s overwhelming military power with conventional warfare; technology-assisted insurgency is proving far more effective.” Stoler also eludes to this idea in her essay. She discusses how the idea of “empire” has resurfaced as a buzz word in the United States because of its newly acquired territories and perceived “overstretch” of power. She discusses how it is important to study how past empires operated in order to compare to the modern US and determine if it actually does “do empire”. I agree with these authors. The anthropologist’s role should be directly related to historical analysis. They should analyze the outcomes of particular military and political strategies that have been tried in the past in order to advise those in power and prevent negative historical outcomes from repeating themselves.
I think these readings were particularly interesting as they were uniquely different from our previous readings in terms of their content. I thought that Packer’s discussions about Kilcullen and the Al Queda was fascinating in terms of the way Packer wrote the conflicts in terms of politics and governments. Instead of writing from a historical perspective, Packer places his opinion on the matter and adds insight for particular themes discussed or said about the US intervention. Additionally, Packer, instead of reiterating events that occurred, analyzes what he makes of these events. This can be seen when Packer states, “the more Kilcullen travels to the various theatres of war, the less he thinks that the lessons of Malaya and Vietnam are useful guides in the current conflict.”
Similarly, Stoler does a great job analyzing the U.S. empire and contextualizing certain aspects. By covering different elements of the empire that Stoler is discussing gives the reader a much wider and critical view of U.S. history than historians would describe.
Cultural sensitivity and being cognizant is vitally important when attempting to intervene in foreign affairs. One example of when a culturally conscious approach would have benefitted insurgency tactics is highlighted through the Packer article when talking about the United States and the Middle East. The role that social sciences play in foreign policy and military strategy is integral and irreplaceable. Fields like anthropology and other social sciences can provide intelligence beyond the standard types collected by foreign policing entities like the United States and with the culturally relevant information provided, more efficient strategies can be developed. One anecdote referenced in Packer’s work is the concept of communication. With the ethnocentric strategy of publicly displaying information, a tactic that was time tested in the west, proved woefully ineffective in the Middle Eastern theater due to the cultural differences and the importance placed on gossip in counties like Iraq. By properly addressing cultural differences, governments interested in foreign intervention can effectively target specific issues without over utilizing military force. In this sense, as Packer and Stoler allude to, a multifaceted strategy of economic incentive, cultural sensitivity and operative force is the only way to effetely engage foreign powers and as mentioned, is the only way to beat terrorist entities at their own game. Where western intervention has deviated is in the fact that their ethnocentric methodology in a foreign and culturally different theater was like trying to carve a path through a mountain instead of utilizing a preexisting network of tunnels. Through sensitivity to cultural differences more effective foreign policy can be implemented with less loss of life; therefore it is not only effective strategically to have a socially conscious and scientifically backed strategy, but is the dominant strategy and should be a more integral and widespread aspect of intervention.
Cultural sensitivity and being cognizant is vitally important when attempting to intervene in foreign affairs. One example of when a culturally conscious approach would have benefitted insurgency tactics is highlighted through the Packer article when talking about the United States and the Middle East. The role that social sciences play in foreign policy and military strategy is integral and irreplaceable. Fields like anthropology and other social sciences can provide intelligence beyond the standard types collected by foreign policing entities like the United States and with the culturally relevant information provided, more efficient strategies can be developed. One anecdote referenced in Packer’s work is the concept of communication. With the ethnocentric strategy of publicly displaying information, a tactic that was time tested in the west, proved woefully ineffective in the Middle Eastern theater due to the cultural differences and the importance placed on interpersonal communication in counties like Iraq. By properly addressing cultural differences, governments interested in foreign intervention can effectively target specific issues without over utilizing military force. In this sense, as Packer and Stoler allude to, a multifaceted strategy of economic incentive, cultural sensitivity and operative force is the only way to effetely engage foreign powers and as mentioned, is the only way to beat terrorist entities at their own game. Where western intervention has deviated is in the fact that their ethnocentric methodology in a foreign and culturally different theater was like trying to carve a path through a mountain instead of utilizing a preexisting network of tunnels. Through sensitivity to cultural differences more effective foreign policy can be implemented with less loss of life; therefore it is not only effective strategically to have a socially conscious and scientifically backed strategy, but is the dominant strategy and should be a more integral and widespread aspect of intervention.
Packer argues that US defense forces and governmental agencies often fail to comprehend the motives behind international insurgency and terror groups. Regarding Middle Eastern conflicts, Packer suggests “The Islamic bit is secondary. This is human behavior in an Islamic setting.” (Packer) Naturally, the root of the conflicts is not Islam, but rather born from social structures and cultural forces. The role of social scientists in this case, is to correctly inform the people the elements of human psychology and social makeup that drives what is happening. Likewise, Stoler argues that “Colonial empires were always dependent on social imaginaries, blueprints unrealized, borders never drawn, administrative categories of people and territories to which no one was sure who or what should belong.” (Stoler) The French colonial rule in North Africa, for example, is more than just an unseemly episode outside of national history. Rather, the colonial rule is essential to the making of modern France. The role of social scientists is to not only interpret the cultures and also understand the connections within the cultures. While the ideologies behind the use of social scientists is justified, the practicality of the use of social scientists in war planning is debatable. Researchers have attempted to collect the believes of everyone in the world, and then create mathematical models to transfer those believes into actions. However, due to the complexities of human interactions and thought, the advantages of using social scientists in context of wars and conflicts is yet to be seen.