Analytical Essay 1

Olivia Morgan

LING401W

Throughout his work, Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein frequently applies dialogic speech to explain his ideas and explanations of concepts. The dialogical discourse serves as a tool for Wittgenstein to attempt to answer his own questions and formulate his own responses to said uncertainties. The dialogic framework Wittgenstein employs directs readers to his true thoughts on the matters at hand and his utilization of opposing voices allows him to ‘create’ problems that he then decrypts with his own beliefs. This writing tactic may make it more difficult for his readers to follow along, but allows for Wittgenstein to proclaim his current beliefs and thoughts without necessarily providing a resolution for the concepts and ideas presented.

The conversational approach Wittgenstein adopts is present in the first section of his work. The engaging dialogue with the reader and the use of alternate voices propel Wittgenstein’s arguments and act as exposure to thoughts that differ from the beliefs he ostensibly upholds. The incorporation of ideas that are not necessarily supported by Wittgenstein allows him to assert his claims and object those that diverge from his views. In this first section, St. Augustine is brought into the dialogue to assert  an idea that Wittgenstein refutes in one sentence. He gives the reader time to ruminate and understand the ideas he does not support, only to subsequently diminish them in a few words. While he may not be providing an ample explanation as to why his beliefs should be the precedent, he also does not provide the space for it to be questioned. To him, his way of thinking is correct and there is no way to refute that because he has already attempted to disprove the alternative answer. Therefore, this tactic he utilizes may not be the most effective in the long term, but in the moment it forces the reader to acknowledge his side of the concept.

As seen with St. Augustine, a whole paragraph is dedicated to Augustine’s thoughts on language. The next paragraph is a rebuttal to his argument. Wittgenstein states, “(Augustine’s) philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours” (30. He definitely finds fault in Augustine’s idea, but decides to entertain it further in order to outwardly disagree with it once again. Wittgenstein creates a hypothetical scenario, a language-game of sorts, with many moving parts and the idea of language as a network of communication between “builder A and an assistant B” (30). After a detailed explanation of Augustine’s thoughts, Wittgenstein likens St. Augustine’s “conception of language” to an “oversimplified script” (40). Wittgenstein once again downplays the ideas of Augustine in one instance despite explaining his point in a matter of paragraphs.

The dialogical, stream of consciousness framework of this piece gets more interesting once Wittgenstein starts treating himself (his past self) as a new individual with whom to engage in conversation. Wittgenstein talks in third person when he states, “including the author of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicu” (120). The “author” is Wittgenstein himself. He addresses Socrates’s idea of primary elements and how he believes that everything is either a simple thing or a complex thing. Complex things are composed of the simplest things. The ‘old’ Wittgenstein also held this belief. However, Wittgenstein is now not only disagreeing with the concepts stated by one of the most highly regarded philosophers of all time, he is also diverging from his own previously held beliefs. He know believes that it is difficult to regard something as simple and break something complex down into less complex (i.e simple or essential) parts. Who is to say one aspect of an object, phenomenon, etc. is simpler than another or truer than another when no one can comprehend and, thereby, express what is simple? For example, to one person the smallest unit of a flower could be its petals while another may consider it to be the color of the petal. However, even the petal can be broken down into even smaller aspects. In essence cannot all components of a thing or a concept be considered complex? How do you quantify complexity or understand simplicity? Is something truly simple if you are able to label it such? If it can be known well enough to be named then it is not simple. So here in another instance, Wittgenstein finds a way to very quickly counter claims that are hundreds of years old without outwardly declaring it as incorrect.

Throughout his piece, Wittgenstein has found a way to establish his present voice and proclaim his stances without completely turning the study of language upside down by not wholeheartedly or definitively shutting down every conflicting concept. These conversations with differing viewpoints are still able to coexist. These ‘investigations’ Wittgenstein embarks on are still just that. They remain open to new ideas, but Wittgenstein did effectively assert his thoughts on the topics at hand.

Word Count: 827; MLA Citation

Works Cited

Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics. Ed. Charles Bally and Albert

Sechehaye. Trans. Roy Harris. Chicago: Open Court.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Trans.G.E.M. Auscombe. Malden: Basil Blackwell, 1953.

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