Is Perception Without Production Language?

In the conversation of what it means to be human, language is often cited as a biological tool that humans possess, but animals do not. Experts in the field have argued that with convincing data, animals that have sophisticated forms of communication could potentially have language. However, no form of animal communication exists that is abstract, productive, and uses displacement as human language does. While much of the conversation about language revolves around production, in many cases language is considered an internal rather than external feature. Noam Chomsky further defines this idea into two categories: competence versus performance. Competence is defined as the mental property or function while performance is the actual utterance. Noam Chomsky, as well as other linguists such as John Searle, argue that these types of internal structures are the basis of language, and thus support the claim that competence is key to language, rather than performance. Thus, given the idea that linguistic production and perception are fundamentally different, one could argue that animals can have competence without performance of language.

In Noam Chomsky’s book, What Kind of Creatures Are We? (2015) he writes about the differences between i-language (internal language) versus e-language (external language). He writes that i-language is “essentially an instrument of thought” and that “externalization is rarely used.” (Chomsky, 2015, pg. 14) Chomsky acknowledges that there is a general dogma in the study of language arguing that “the function of language is communication” (15), and ultimately Chomsky argues that i-language is used more often than e-language, and is language’s ultimate function. Chomsky acknowledges that chimpanzees, for example, do not possess the ability to extract language-relevant information to begin language acquisition; yet, given that the reason chimpanzees do not possess language is their internal ability to process information rather than a means of production, this maintains the idea that perception is key to language possession. If a chimp evolved or gained i-language, they would possess language even without a means of production. This supports the claim that competence is of greater importance than production in terms of an animal’s possession of language. Without e-language, or performance, an animal could still possess i-language given that it is competence, not performance, that constitutes language.

John Searle’s theory of language is based on prelinguistic intentionality, the ability to represent for objects, properties, or events within the mind. Searle argues “several species are capable of prelinguistic thought processes…. think of human language as an extension of these prelinguistic capacities.” (Searle, 2009) He ultimately agrees that currently, other species are only capable of prelinguistic thought but not intentionality. However, he argues that the “biological foundations of language [are] in prelinguistic intentionality,” and thus realizes that the constraint is a biological feature. (Searle, 2009,) Therefore, based on Searle’s argument, if another species contains the biological features of prelinguistic intentionality, even without means of production, they possess language. Therefore, to Searle as well, competence, as prelinguistic intentionality, is supreme over performance. Searle’s view maintains that an animal may possess language through competence without needing performance, given that to Searle it is a mental faculty that constitutes language.

Many linguists would disagree that the supreme feature of language is an internal process, whether defined as prelinguistic intentionality or i-language. Michael Tomasello emphasizes production is language, writing that “we must look at how the production of communicative signals works” illustrating that to him, whether vocals or gestures, production is the most important. (Tomasello, 2008, p. 20) He also writes on the cognitive abilities of other species, stating that “the problem is that such “comprehension” skills are not specialized for communication; they are merely general skills of cognitive assessment.” He therefore asserts that the key issue with animal communication is that they lack the cognitive ability to have it. (Tomasello, 2008, 19) However, Tomasello actually mentions several ways that animals do possess the creative means for communicating, such as gestures and types of vocalizations; thus, despite his assertion that production is language, he ultimately demonstrates that the lack of competence to understand language is the difference between animal communication and human language. He furthers the argument that internal language perception is more important than production, and one can possess language without performance if they have competence. Ultimately, even in Tomasello’s production-centered views, internal structures arguably supersede production, considering that according to him the means of production are already in place for many species.

In conclusion, it is not an ability to produce language that is the key underlying trait of language but rather it is the ability to understand language. One final example of this within the human population there are medical cases in which a person may be able to understand language without production, such as “locked-in condition”, where a stroke paralyzes the body and facial muscles while consciousness and cognitive ability remain. Searle and Chomsky would argue that even without means of production the patient would continue to possess language given their perception and understanding of language. Therefore, the competence of language is consistently more important than a means of production in terms of a being’s ability to possess language; performance is the fruition of competence. An animal may possess language if they have competence, or the mental ability to understand language, even if they do not have performance.

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