The Existence of Cooperative Communication in Humans and Primates

Michael Tomasello [2008] discusses intentionality and cooperative motives and how both relate to human communication but are partially lacking in primate communication.  He uses these terms to explain that humans communicate bidirectionally through language, whereas primates use one-sided communication, only with their own individual roles in mind.  While language does not exist amongst primates, there is reason to believe that Tomasello’s classification of what makes human communication unique from that of primates is not entirely accurate. Primate communication does, in fact, share certain characteristics which Tomasello states are exclusive to humans.

To begin Chapter 2, he discusses primate vocalizations and gestures, and introduces the idea that while gestures are, perhaps, more flexible than vocalizations, these social interactions do not have true meaning, and are instead pre-existing or innate (Tomasello 26).  He also explains that the communicator uses gestures “without knowing the role of the other” (Tomasello 22). In doing so, Tomasello does not give primates the credit they deserve in terms of the awareness they have for other primates’ roles and actions. This can be seen through Robin Dunbar’s [1996] book, Of Brains and Groups and Evolution.

Dunbar is able to provide evidence that would refute Tomasello’s claims, and also convince me that primates are actually communicatively cooperative mammals.  Chapter 4, “Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language,” discusses grooming and bonding of mammals, and Dunbar explains that there is a positive correlation between neocortex size and group size.  Within these groups exist coalitions of mammals who have a higher proclivity of grooming one another than others. For example, a vampire bat will help out other bats in its coalition who have been unlucky with finding food by regurgitating their own and sharing it with the other.  Later on, “it will repay that debt when its friend has a bad day” (Dunbar 65). Although vampire bats are not a perfect comparison to primates, they have a large neocortex size just as primates do. It is, therefore, possible that primates also have the capacity to perform such acts.

 The idea that the bat would remember the generous act of another and reciprocate days later shows that there are certain gestures that can be learned and are not necessarily “built in” amongst mammals, as Tomasello would suggest (Tomasello 26).  Additionally, it is important to note that Tomasello classifies cooperative communication as a unique feature of human communication, stating that “to qualify as cooperative communication…the communicator’s proximate goal must be somehow to help or share with the recipient” (Tomasello 15).  If we follow Tomasello’s definition, it is clear that mammals such as vampire bats are capable of doing just this, and so I can conclude that perhaps primates, who also have large neocortices, are capable as well.  

Tomasello also uses Seyfarth and Cheneys’ [1990] study in order to show that primate vocalizations are fixed.  He explains that “monkeys and apes do not learn to produce their vocal calls at all” (Tomasello 16). He references the study in order to strengthen his argument, but in doing so, he dismisses the “one dimension of flexibility” where “individuals may not give certain calls when they are alone or without kin” (Tomasello 17).  He briefly makes this statement and then moves on. Even more interesting is that Dunbar uses the same study to prove the opposite of what Tomasello is saying, making me further question Tomasello’s argument. Dunbar references the study by explaining that “monkeys are much more likely to pay attention to the distress calls of individuals with whom they have recently groomed” (Dunbar 68).  He also carries out his own experiment with wild gelada baboons, where the animals who groomed one another were “more likely to support each other in fights against a third party than were animals which rarely groomed together” (Dunbar 68). Although grooming and human language are not a perfect parallel by any means, this shows a distinct connection between relationships and communication amongst primates.  This gives me reason to believe that Tomasello is incorrect in saying that primate vocalizations and gestures are strictly fixed and inflexible. Speaking from a human perspective, I would be far more likely to take advice, for example, from someone I have had a relationship with than I would from someone I have had limited verbal interaction with. A similar awareness amongst primates has been demonstrated through Seyfarth and Cheneys’ study along with Dunbar’s personal study.  From this data, I am persuaded to believe that primate vocalizations and gestures must actually be learned, and are not involuntary. If it were otherwise, it would make more sense for primates to respond to all vocalizations as opposed to mainly or only to those from whom they are familiar with.

While Tomasello’s understanding that humans have language and primates do not is correct, his ways of proving this are not convincing enough.  There are clearly instances in which primates prove to have the capabilities that Tomasello claims they do not. Dunbar’s evidence along with personal experiences, demonstrate to me that primates are capable of cooperative communication.  It is also clear that gestures and vocalizations which primates make are learned through experience and interaction rather than being innate. Language is indeed unique and exists only amongst humans, but there is compelling evidence to show that Tomasello’s understanding of why is flawed.

 

 

 

Citations

 

“Primate Intentional Communication.” Origins of Human Communication, by Michael Tomasello, MIT Press, 2008, pp. 13–55.

 

“Of Brains and Groups and Evolution.” Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language, by Robin Dunbar, Harvard, 1996, pp. 55–79.