Samuel Brush
Unit 2
Idolatry, Exodus 33, Moses, and Kavod
In Mishneh Torah and “Laws Concerning Idolatry”, Maimonides constructed a justification for the laws against idolatry in Judaism. He probably wrote this justification because he saw these laws as Hukkim – laws with less obvious rationale that require specialized knowledge to understand. Maimonides communicated his justification by first recounting the story of the laws’ creation and then reinforcing the story with Torah interpretation that supported his claims. He began by addressing the problem of idolatry at its core: “all know that You alone are God; their error and folly consists in imagining that this vain worship [i.e. idolatry] is your desire” (Maimonides, p. 72). Maimonides made a distinction about those who worshipped idols: while they were aware that only one God existed, which they saw embodied as a “particular star”, they were unaware that idolatrous worship was not God’s desire from man (Maimonides, p. 72). He wrote that the misconception spread through “false prophets who asserted that God” had told them to worship a particular star and to create figures of its image (Maimonides, p. 72). Maimonides went on to assert that the world was continually ignorant of the desires of the one true God until “that pillar of the world, the patriarch Abraham, was born” (Maimonides, p. 73). Maimonides relayed the story of Abraham, who realized at a young age that someone had to have been guiding the celestial sphere that was being worshipped by humans at the time. Maimonides claimed that Abraham was “forty years old when he recognized his Creator” and then went on to spread his revelation until “tens of thousands joined him” (Maimonides, pp. 73-74). Maimonides therefore traced Judaism’s laws against idolatry to Abraham, who he claims taught his non-idolatrous, monotheistic conception of religion and morality to his son, Isaac, and the law was then passed down for generations to the lineage of Abraham. Maimonides’ next section of justification for the commandments against idolatry included Torah interpretation. For example, on page 74, he cited Leviticus 20:23, in which the Jews were told that they would not follow the customs of the Gentiles. Indeed, idolatry was an old practice of gentiles. By this commandment, the Jews could not worship idols. Maimonides’ use of the origin story combined with his insightful Torah interpretation made the reasoning behind the laws against idolatry very clear. He masterfully employed an explanation of performative reasoning.
In Professor Don Seeman’s essay “Honoring the Divine as Virtue and Practice in Maimonides”, Seeman argued that the theme of divine kavod, or divine glory, linked Maimonides’ “philosophical, literary, and even medical concerns” with his “practical religious teaching” (Seeman, p. 195). Seeman wrote that Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed was connected to his other works through his understanding of the divine kavod. Lastly, Seeman examined Maimonides’ “consistent fascination with Exodus 33” and its role in organizing his “reflections on human perfection, ethics, and the relationship between idolatry and everyday religious language” (Seeman, p. 195). Seeman explained that Maimonides thought that one had to honor the divine presence of God by recognizing the appropriate limits of human intellect and speculation on the topic: “the individual who aspires to perfection…must continue to press on with all due modesty against the boundaries of knowledge, precisely in order to establish God’s true distinction or kavod” (Seeman, p. 206). Seeman showed that Maimonides’ guide to achieving kavod would “make even the quotidian routines of daily life into a series of sites for reflection upon “His commandments, may He be exalted,” rather than “that which is other than He.” This is divine incommensurability ritualized” (Seeman, p. 245). Seeman argued that Maimonides’ guide to living with kavod in mind gave the individual an intellectual and ethical purpose in their everyday activities and commandments. Lastly, Seeman highlighted the logic behind Maimonides’ unique reading of Exodus 33: “It is not the specific actions of God described in Scripture that are the real focus of divine emulation…but rather the core values—like mercy and compassion—that can be abstracted from them (and from nature) by reflection.” (Seeman, p. 249). In this passage, Seeman was noting the distinction that Maimonides made in his analysis of Exodus 33: the literal actions of God are less important than the values which inspire his actions, such as “mercy and compassion”. Seeman’s analysis of Maimonides’ interpretation of Exodus 33 is integral in developing our own understanding of how Maimonides viewed the concept of kavod.
To digress, one additional passage from Seeman’s essay that was relevant to our first class discussion of Maimonides can be found on page 231: “Maimonides’ son R. Abraham, by contrast, insists that Maimonides thinks imitatio Dei is an ethical directive distinct from general obedience to the commandments because it requires not only correct actions but also the cultivation of freestanding moral virtues” (Seeman, p. 231). This passage is an example of Maimonides advocating against the use of legislative reasoning (i.e. the simple following of laws because they exist); instead, he promoted the use of performative reasoning, accomplished by implementation of freestanding moral virtues, to understand the Jewish religious laws.
In “The Ethical Views of Maimonides within the context of Islamicate Civilization”, Lawrence Berman highlighted the influence of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics on Maimonides as well as on the greater intellectual community in contemporary Islamic civilization. Berman argued that Aristotle saw “the contemplative life” as “that which is most akin to the divine” (Berman, p. 16). While contemplation was important for Aristotle, “life controlled by practical reason” was the way to have “the life of moral virtues as being flourishing (or happiness)” (Berman, p. 17). Berman used this Aristotelian reconciliation of practical reason and contemplation as ideal to show the Aristotelian influence on Maimonides’ thinking. In particular, Berman applied this concept to Maimonides’ justification of the following of the commandments in the Torah. Berman wrote that the ideal ethical man would be “in constant tension between the two extremes of excess and of defect”; in other words, he would not ethically justify the commandments with strictly performative or legislative reasoning (Berman, p. 27). Lastly, Berman analyzed the relationship between intellectual perfection and the actions of God as they pertain to the commandments in Maimonides’ thought: “moral activity as a prerequisite to intellectual perfection…is not an imitation of the actions of God…once intellectual perfection has been achieved, which entails knowledge of the ways of God, the practical activity performed is…imitation of the ways of God” (Berman, p. 30). Berman argued that Maimonides did not see the following of the commandments before intellectual perfection was attained as an imitation of God. No, only after intellectual perfection was attained could a man be imitating God.