Month: October 2018

Samuel Tavakoli

Unit 6: Understanding Laws

In this unit, we read firsthand Maimonides’ account on normative practice of Jewish laws. To me, more interesting than what he states is how he says it. In reading his laws as seen in the Mishneh Torah, we see a continuation of a trend that we have seen previously: the weaving of normative statements on how commandments should be fulfilled, combined with philosophical reasons as to why the practice is the way that it is. The system Maimonides uses is unique, as he departs from previous standards of accounting topics by following the order as seen in the either the Mishnah or the Talmud. Maimonides presents his laws independently of those two norms, and provides “the original and independent presentation of halakhah overall”(Halbertal, 229). Some chapters from the Mishneh Torah in this unit are from his second book in the Mishneh Torah, Sefer Ahavah (The Book of Love). This is another example of his novel organization of Jewish laws. Halbertal provides a breakdown of the schematic organization of the Mishneh Torah, and we see that he is indeed creative and puts forth several topics that are not new in content, but in structure, and did not exist as independent topics in previous halakhic literature. Examples of this are “Laws Concerning the Foundations of the Torah and Laws Concerning Repentance”(Halbertal, 235).
We see in the text of the Mishneh Torah examples of Maimonides using historical reasons to defend certain practices. One thing that jumped out to me specifically was in his discussion on the Laws of Purity, specifically the laws on Uncleanliness of Foodstuffs. He states “The pious of former times used to eat their common food in conditions of cleanness, and all their days they were wary of every uncleanness. And it is they who were called the Pharisees, “separated ones” and this is a higher holiness” (Twersky, 154). He takes this historical context for a stringency and uses it as a base point for a spiritual defense of their practice. He continues “For separation leads to the cleansing of the body from evil deeds, and the cleansing of the body leads to hallowing of the soul from evil thoughts, and the hallowing of the soul leads to striving for likeness with the Shekhinah”(Twersky, 154). This excerpt to me is a prime example of connecting a legal practice with a philosophic rationale that is emblematic of Maimonides’ works. Further, he seamlessly jumps from a historical rationale to a spiritual one, using logic to deduce how cleanliness can bring one closer to the Divine, or Shekhinah. In a later section of the Mishneh Torah, the Laws of Mourning, we see an interesting juxtaposition. The Laws of Mourning are contrasted with a series of commandments that do not deal with mourning, rather they are a series of mitzvot that are Rabbinic and derived from the Biblical verse “And you shall love your neighbor as thyself” (Leviticus, 19:18). These laws include visiting the ill and escorting strangers. It is interesting to me that these laws are discussed under the umbrella of Laws of Mourning, as these do not involve death and ritual mourning in any direct capacity. Yet, at the end of this chapter, Maimonides states “It seems to me that the duty of comforting mourners takes precedence over the duty of visiting the sick, because comforting of mourners is an act of benevolence towards the living and the dead.” (Twersky, 215).
In Strauss’s piece, “Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Al-Farabi”, he discusses a political philosophy that drove Maimonides work. In essence, it is the premise that men require laws to drive and shape their lives, towards not only moral perfection, but towards the understanding of “supreme truths and thereby towards supreme perfection”(Strauss, 4). In a time where church and state were one, religious law was political law, and “the prophet occupies in this medieval politics the same place the phisopher-kings occupy in Platonic politics”(Strauss, 5). Further, he points to a precedent set by Al-Farabi that Maimonides continues, namely uniting metaphysics (theology) and politics. This view is essential to understand, and this is a lens that Maimonides works through in order to reach his conclusions. Viewing the Torah as a supreme political document, to which all other laws are imitations qualifies many of Maimonides works, and gives us insight into the conclusions that he reaches.

 

Within the first few chapters of “Basic Principles of the Torah”, Maimonides introduces the reader to his opinion surrounding God.  He states that, “the basic principle of all basic principles and the pillar of all sciences is to realize that there is a First Being who brought every existing things into being” (Twersky 43).  This shows that all living beings are dire need of Him and would not be existing without Him. We cannot live our lives as we know it without the presence of God. As the creator of all things, it is important to realize that this existence stems back to this one figure.  Additionally, human beings naturally try and personify God so that we may create some type of image in our head. As the text states, the Torah speaks in the language of men, and “all these expressions are adapted to the mental capacity of the majority of mankind” (Twersky 44).  In reality, God has no tangible form or visible figure, but the human mind must picture some type of figure anyways.

Another important aspect of the “Basic Principles of the Torah” is that we must love and fear our God.  In chapter 4, we are presented the differences between the Maaseh Merkavah and the Maaseh Bereshit. The latter is not taught in public simply because, “not everyone possesses the breadth of intellect requisite for obtaining an accurate grasp of the meaning and interpretation of all its contents” (Twersky 48).  While this may be the case, it is through the process of learning and studying that humans love and yearn for God. As one’s love increases, so does the fear, “as he becomes conscious of his own lowly condition, poverty, and insignificance, and compares himself with any of the great and holy bodies” (Twersky 48).  Humans love Him because they exist because of his existence, yet they fear him simultaneously for his divines status which makes any human being’s life looks miniscule compared to that of a divine figure.

In chapters 4 and 5 of Maimonides Life and Thought, we dive into the origin of Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah and the impact that is has on the Jewish people.  The actual cause for the creation of this text stems from the complexity of the previously implemented Talmudic literature.  Maimonides concluded that, “the jewish people lacked a genuine book of laws” (Halbertal 164) and he needed to find a way to alleviate this issue.  Consequently, the Mishneh Torah came to life.  There are essentially two outcomes that have been produced from the Mishneh Torah.  The first objective was to stabilize the field of the halakhah. By definition, Halakhah is Jewish Law that regulates the spiritual and religious observances from its people.  Maimonides created the Mishneh Torah, in part to initiate a “total transformation of the structure of halakhah” (Halbertal 166).  More specifically, this transformation refers to a process leading toward a more unified approach toward halakhah. The second goal of the  Mishneh Torah is the need for “true and clear opinions” (Halbertal 165), which acted as a motivation factor for Maimonides when writing this text.  In the end, Maimonides needed to create a text that would present the Jewish laws in a much more transparent way. It was the goal of Maimonides to change the difficulties of the text and improve its clarity so that more people may be properly educated in an easier way.  He mentions, in his introduction, “that all the rules shall be accessible to young and old” (Halbertal 166). What was previously hidden behind complex understanding and deep analysis became readily available and easier to understand thanks to Maimonides.

One key distinction that Maimonides makes is the difference between moderate and radical understanding of the Mishneh Torah.  The text states, “a more moderate one that sees it as an accomplished representation of the halakhah; and a more radical and daring one that sees it as halakhah itself” (Halbertal 184).  In other words, a moderate view seems the Mishneh Torah as a form of representation of halakhah while the radical view seems Maimonides’ writing as the actual form of halakhah.  Later on, Maimonides informs the reader that he approves of the moderate approach.  In particular, “nowhere in the introduction did Maimonides argue that the earlier halakhic literature should be suppressed, and he treated his compilation as a response to a complex literary environment and a state of historical crisis” (Halbertal 190).  My takeaway from this is that the radical view of understanding is far too extreme to be taken seriously. Its true purpose is to represent halakhah by attempting to clear up any confusions that were present in previous literatures, but the radical approach is more of an expunging of all previous works to make way for the newly implemented Mishneh Torah.  Is it at all possible to have a radical approach and still gain a full understanding of the matter covered in Maimonides’ text?  

Chapter 5 presents the analysis of an idea that is woven through other areas of Maimonides’ literature.  It is clearly established that, “there is a First Being who brought every existing thing into being” (Halbertal 204).  However, there is more context to the statement than what is read at first glance. Halbertal provides us with an in depth analysis of each line of the first halakhah, finally concluding that “the reader who believes in creation ex nihilo will find support for his view in the first sentence, and one who favors belief in an eternally existing world will look to the second sentence” (Halbertal 205).  There are two ways of thinking here, ex nihilo and external existence, and they generate different images of the divinity (Halbertal 207). In the end, “Maimonides adopts the stance that maintains the eternity of the world” (halbertal 206).  This view states that He does not meddle with creation, but is rather the first cause and the start of an ongoing chain reaction that goes on for hundreds of years. This begs the question, is it possible to achieve the same level of understanding of God and Judaism by taking either the ex nihilo or external existence approach or will they lead to different ends?  

One particular aspect in Lerner’s Maimonides’ Empire of Light that I found interesting was the benefit that the Mishneh Torah instilled upon the Jewish people.  For starters, “the increasing dispersion of the Jews has been accompanied by the fragmentation and decay of Jewish learning” (Lerner 30).  The state of Jewish learning, and the Jewish population, was not in the best overall state at this point in time, which is why there became a need for some other form of learning and new text.  As a result, the Mishneh Torah was implemented to help mend this issue by making it managable to learn and study.  As Lerner states, “composing the Mishneh Torah is thus an action on behalf of the people on the verge of withering away” (Lerner 31).  Maimonides’ text serves the purpose of salvaging the Jewish population from spreading itself too thin while also conserving the religious values and beliefs.  

Howard Kreisel’s titular characterization of contradictions in Maimonides’ approach to ethics deems them to be a problem. In his subsequent writing, he attempts to reconcile this issue with a series of different explanations. From my interpretation of Kreisel’s analysis, my understanding of the primary texts found in A Maimonides Reader, and my current understanding of Maimonides’ life and thought based on the works of Moshe Habertal and Ralph Lerner , I will attempt to discuss the legitimacy of theorizing that the contradictions present may serve a complex utilitarian purpose that refute the discovery of contradiction as a problem at all.

As Kreisel mentions, Maimonides was very intentional about the presence of contradictions in his writing, as evidenced by his explanation of this in the introduction to A Guide for the Perplexed. He also goes on to say, that while this may seem like transparency, there could very well still be aspects of his intention and process that he has chosen to leave unsaid. Understanding his statements in the context of the audience that the Guide was intended to reach may shed light on his usage of this rhetorical tool to aid in etching his contribution to religious and philosophical thought.

The Guide for the Perplexed was written by Maimonides for the education of his students. When the work was written, his brother had long since passed away and he spent his days mostly practicing medicine (Habertal, Ch. 1). From the background provided by Kreisel, it seems as if these explanatory measures were not the norm for Maimonides. Because his communications at this time clearly convey the immense level of pressure and stress he was feeling, I am inclined to believe that Maimonides explicitly calls attention to that which he would prefer not to acknowledge or for his reader to happen upon himself, to solidify the Guide as a credible work. It is possible that absent this caveat, his students would have interpreted the presence of contradictions as a result of his declined mental state and not as an element of his pedagogical craft.

That being said, Kreisel argues that Maimonides avoids a unified approach to communicating ethical viewpoints to

“…signal to the attentive reader that the perspective by which ethics s viewed must constantly be altered to understand the full picture. The nonperceptive reader, on the other hand, remains with the perspective most appropriate for that reader.”

This rationale thoroughly supports that Maimonides contradictions are not really an issue at all. To achieve his means, Maimonides plays his both his reader’s self-perception and moral capability and drive.

From reading his original writings on moral disposition, I sensed that there was something in his writing that was accessible to everyone. Understanding Maimonides as one of the few philosophers whose writing was made for people in all strata of society, he crafted his works to be a tool for everyone and to enact slow, but eventual change in the community by being sensitive to the orthodox views that existed and having them present, while also introducing his viewpoints subtly, intending them to permeate the consciousness of his readers over time, as he successfully has done.

Ariel Milewicz

Unit 3

On the Attainment of Human Excellence

In “The Eight Chapters”, Maimonides emphasizes the importance of the soul, and the concept that the soul is equally as susceptible to illness as the physical body. He suggests “A soul that produces bad and dishonorable actions or thoughts is sick and needs healing” (Maimonides, 361). His suggested of therapy for the soul is Pirke Avot. Maimonides later suggests the theory of the “golden mean” (Maimonides, 361) – a concept that looks to identify the balance between two extremes – exaggeration and deficiency (Maimonides, 368) – in the attempt to create a healthy soul. Later, he suggests the idea that a soul cannot be broken down into parts in the standard sense. He puts forth the idea that “parts” that comprise the soul are factions which refer to the activities of the soul. He emphasizes five faculties to the soul: nutritive, sensitive, imaginative, appetitive, and rational. However, Maimonides leaves one distinct question: does each activity of the soul account for equal factions of the soul or is there an unequal distribution of weight amongst them?

Similarly, in chapters two and three of Maimonides: Life and Thought, the description of the soul is heavily emphasized. The soul is characterized by moral traits; “dispositions that imbedded in the soul that manipulate the limbs to perform certain activities without prior” (Halbertal, Chapter Two). The soul is essentially what control the physical body, and those activities which comprise the soul are the most influential. The natural tendency of an action becomes natural through habituation and repetition of the action – it is not something which is innate. Does this learned behavior suggest that the soul itself is something that can be taught to behave in a particular manner, and that is what in turn controls the actions of the physical body?

Sokolow argues a similar point in “Habit and Reason in Jewish and Muslim Educational Theory”: “Actions should be habitual, and defective actions can be remedied through the performance of antagonistic actions (just as physical maladies can be cured through antagonistic remedies) thereby restoring a proper balance to the soul” (Sokolow, 24). The ease to which physical ailments are remedied is mirrored in the ease to which ailments of the soul can be remedied. This is an important concept that that further asks the question: is there a general remedy to ailments of the soul? Or is the soul more complex than the physical body, as one might assume, suggesting even more specific remedies than expected for the physical body?

In “The Adaptation of Philosophic Ethics to a Religious Community: Maimonides’ Eight Chapters”, the healing of the soul, as well as finding the middle ground for balance of the soul revolves around the concept of wisdom as a means of attaining balance: “The “wisdom” referred to in this instance is not theoretical in nature. But conduct that brings about an equilibrium within the soul manifests a form of wisdom that “restores” the soul.” It is suggested that knowledge gained has a restorative impact on the soul, allowing an individual to inch closer to the equilibrium that every person is supposed to strive to achieve.

“The Eight Chapters”, chapters two and three of Maimonides: Life and Thought, “The Adaptation of Philosophic Ethics to a Religious Community: Maimonides’ Eight Chapters”, and “Habit and Reason in Jewish and Muslim Educational Theory” all share the same emphasis on the importance of a healthy soul, in addition to or even above that of a healthy body. They do, however, vary somewhat in the distinction of what truly comprises a soul, as well as what makes a soul healthy or unhealthy.