Within the first few chapters of “Basic Principles of the Torah”, Maimonides introduces the reader to his opinion surrounding God. He states that, “the basic principle of all basic principles and the pillar of all sciences is to realize that there is a First Being who brought every existing things into being” (Twersky 43). This shows that all living beings are dire need of Him and would not be existing without Him. We cannot live our lives as we know it without the presence of God. As the creator of all things, it is important to realize that this existence stems back to this one figure. Additionally, human beings naturally try and personify God so that we may create some type of image in our head. As the text states, the Torah speaks in the language of men, and “all these expressions are adapted to the mental capacity of the majority of mankind” (Twersky 44). In reality, God has no tangible form or visible figure, but the human mind must picture some type of figure anyways.
Another important aspect of the “Basic Principles of the Torah” is that we must love and fear our God. In chapter 4, we are presented the differences between the Maaseh Merkavah and the Maaseh Bereshit. The latter is not taught in public simply because, “not everyone possesses the breadth of intellect requisite for obtaining an accurate grasp of the meaning and interpretation of all its contents” (Twersky 48). While this may be the case, it is through the process of learning and studying that humans love and yearn for God. As one’s love increases, so does the fear, “as he becomes conscious of his own lowly condition, poverty, and insignificance, and compares himself with any of the great and holy bodies” (Twersky 48). Humans love Him because they exist because of his existence, yet they fear him simultaneously for his divines status which makes any human being’s life looks miniscule compared to that of a divine figure.
In chapters 4 and 5 of Maimonides Life and Thought, we dive into the origin of Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah and the impact that is has on the Jewish people. The actual cause for the creation of this text stems from the complexity of the previously implemented Talmudic literature. Maimonides concluded that, “the jewish people lacked a genuine book of laws” (Halbertal 164) and he needed to find a way to alleviate this issue. Consequently, the Mishneh Torah came to life. There are essentially two outcomes that have been produced from the Mishneh Torah. The first objective was to stabilize the field of the halakhah. By definition, Halakhah is Jewish Law that regulates the spiritual and religious observances from its people. Maimonides created the Mishneh Torah, in part to initiate a “total transformation of the structure of halakhah” (Halbertal 166). More specifically, this transformation refers to a process leading toward a more unified approach toward halakhah. The second goal of the Mishneh Torah is the need for “true and clear opinions” (Halbertal 165), which acted as a motivation factor for Maimonides when writing this text. In the end, Maimonides needed to create a text that would present the Jewish laws in a much more transparent way. It was the goal of Maimonides to change the difficulties of the text and improve its clarity so that more people may be properly educated in an easier way. He mentions, in his introduction, “that all the rules shall be accessible to young and old” (Halbertal 166). What was previously hidden behind complex understanding and deep analysis became readily available and easier to understand thanks to Maimonides.
One key distinction that Maimonides makes is the difference between moderate and radical understanding of the Mishneh Torah. The text states, “a more moderate one that sees it as an accomplished representation of the halakhah; and a more radical and daring one that sees it as halakhah itself” (Halbertal 184). In other words, a moderate view seems the Mishneh Torah as a form of representation of halakhah while the radical view seems Maimonides’ writing as the actual form of halakhah. Later on, Maimonides informs the reader that he approves of the moderate approach. In particular, “nowhere in the introduction did Maimonides argue that the earlier halakhic literature should be suppressed, and he treated his compilation as a response to a complex literary environment and a state of historical crisis” (Halbertal 190). My takeaway from this is that the radical view of understanding is far too extreme to be taken seriously. Its true purpose is to represent halakhah by attempting to clear up any confusions that were present in previous literatures, but the radical approach is more of an expunging of all previous works to make way for the newly implemented Mishneh Torah. Is it at all possible to have a radical approach and still gain a full understanding of the matter covered in Maimonides’ text?
Chapter 5 presents the analysis of an idea that is woven through other areas of Maimonides’ literature. It is clearly established that, “there is a First Being who brought every existing thing into being” (Halbertal 204). However, there is more context to the statement than what is read at first glance. Halbertal provides us with an in depth analysis of each line of the first halakhah, finally concluding that “the reader who believes in creation ex nihilo will find support for his view in the first sentence, and one who favors belief in an eternally existing world will look to the second sentence” (Halbertal 205). There are two ways of thinking here, ex nihilo and external existence, and they generate different images of the divinity (Halbertal 207). In the end, “Maimonides adopts the stance that maintains the eternity of the world” (halbertal 206). This view states that He does not meddle with creation, but is rather the first cause and the start of an ongoing chain reaction that goes on for hundreds of years. This begs the question, is it possible to achieve the same level of understanding of God and Judaism by taking either the ex nihilo or external existence approach or will they lead to different ends?
One particular aspect in Lerner’s Maimonides’ Empire of Light that I found interesting was the benefit that the Mishneh Torah instilled upon the Jewish people. For starters, “the increasing dispersion of the Jews has been accompanied by the fragmentation and decay of Jewish learning” (Lerner 30). The state of Jewish learning, and the Jewish population, was not in the best overall state at this point in time, which is why there became a need for some other form of learning and new text. As a result, the Mishneh Torah was implemented to help mend this issue by making it managable to learn and study. As Lerner states, “composing the Mishneh Torah is thus an action on behalf of the people on the verge of withering away” (Lerner 31). Maimonides’ text serves the purpose of salvaging the Jewish population from spreading itself too thin while also conserving the religious values and beliefs.
I thought you did a really nice job in summarizing the most important points of each of the readings. I also thought that one of the most interesting topics in the readings was the two different approaches that one can understand the Mishneh Torah: the radical approach, that the Mishneh Torah is halakhah itself and replaces earlier halakhic texts, and the moderate approach, that the Mishneh Torah is simply an interpretation and clarification of halakhot that does not replace earlier texts. I agree with you in that the moderate approach seems to be more logical, but I also appreciated the distinction made at the end of chapter 4 of Maimonides Life and Thought. A compromise was made between the two approaches, in that the Mishneh Torah currently serves as an instructive guide for following halakhot, but if it becomes widespread and accepted by all of the Jews in the world, then it makes sense that it would become the new authority of halakhah (Halbertal 195). In my opinion, it is useful to use the Mishneh Torah as a guide for understanding halakhah, but one must also look toward other sources to gain a deeper understanding of the halakhot, instead of relying entirely on Maimonides’ interpretations.
Your blog post was insightful and got me thinking about the readings in different ways than I did when I first read them. One point that I wanted to discuss: in Maimonides’ work, “Basic Principles of the Torah”, he discussed the subject of Pardes, which relates to the further attainment of the knowledge of God. He wrote: “Why is the subject not taught in public? Because not everyone possesses the breadth of intellect requisite for obtaining an accurate grasp of the meaning and interpretation of all its contents” (Maimonides, p. 48). Only certain people are able to grasp this topic, so it should not be discussed in public for all to hear. However, the “knowledge of what is permitted and what forbidden….gives primarily composure to the mind” and “promotes social well-being on earth, and enables men to obtain bliss” (Maimonides, p. 48). By this explanation, we understand that the Law is a tool that any human being, whether it be a man, woman, or child who may be intelligent or unintelligent, can use to achieve composure of the mind. Maimonides then goes on to discuss how there are certain situations in which the Law can be transgressed, with certain exceptions. The way in which Maimonides describes the Law in these chapters makes the Law seem sensible and pragmatic. Further knowledge of God (study of Pardes), however, seems exclusive and far less pragmatic. How can we reconcile these seemingly opposed methods of Jewish understanding? Moreover, are most people completely unable to attain any love of God due to a lack of intellect?
Great summary Ben, I found one point in this week’s reading particularly interesting. When Maimonides is laying out the Basic Principles he makes the prohibition of idolatry, inchastity (premarital sex), and murder the most important commandments by saying that one must die before they commit them. Maimonides says that if an idolator forces you to break a commandment, besides one of those three, or face death then you should transgress and avoid death. However, if there are ten or more Israelites with you then you “should suffer death and not transgress, even if it was only one of the remaining commandments that the idolator wished [you] to violate” (Twersky 49). The important role of the audience in an Israelites choice of death or transgression underscores how important Maimonides thought social cohesion was in regards to religion. Disobeying a commandment in front of other Jews would undermine people’s perception of the importance of God’s commandments and thereby undermine the cohesion of the Jewish community since they were all bound by the commandments. It would no doubt go against the habituation of society that we spoke about last week. Hurting religious cohesion would worsen the state of the Jewish community, so Maimonides making this rule would aid in salvaging the Jewish population and stop them from “withering away” like you wrote about.
Ben, this is a really good interpretation and summary of our readings for this week. I really appreciated how you seemed to synthesize the texts at several points and build each text on the previous ones to provide a clear pathway. To address your interpretation of ex nihilo and the eternal universe, I believe it is interesting Maimonides chooses to derive his opening statement in “Basic Principles of the Torah” from two essentially opposite schools of thought (ex nihilo and the eternal universe), as Halbertal elaborates on in Life and Thought (Halbertal 205-205). What’s more interesting, for me, is that Maimonides subscribed more to the Aristotelian eternal universe view that the “world had always existed, and God’s relation to it is not that of creator to creature…the world exists not because of some willful act on God’s part but by reason of God’s very existence, just as a person’s shadow is inherent in his presence…the world is eternal (and) dependent on the existence of God” (Habertal, 203). This opposes the nature of a willing God present in the ex nihilo explanation for the world. From this, I wonder if, like in last week’s readings, Maimonides’ intention was to ‘cover all audiences’ in order to really salvage the Jewish tradition (as mentioned in both the Halbertal and Lerner readings). Why else would Maimonides write opposing arguments for the creation of the world? Halbertal explains later in the Chapter Five that Maimonides furthers his explanation of the God’s eternity and the eternity of the world in favor of the latter opening statement (or in favor of the eternal universe). This, in many ways, takes the ‘creator’ position out of how God is perceived. Why would Maimonides not perceive God as a willful creator and, rather, as an ever-present (apathetic?) being that our entire existence is dependent on? How does this change the image of God throughout Maimonides’ later texts?
Ben, you did a great job bringing forward some key points in the reading section. Within Maimonides chapters of “Basic Principles”, one thing I found fascinating was the point of personification of the Divine. That the personifications of God were not to be taken literally was not a new or shocking idea to me. Incorporeality of Hashem is a very basic tenant, and in Maimonides 13 Principles of Faith, this idea is explicitly stated. What did fascinate me, however, was the reasons put forth for the personifications. He states “all these were adapted to the mental capacity of the majority of mankind, who have clear perceptions of physical bodies only”( Twersky, 44). This gave me a critical insight of Maimonides’ view of the Torah- that it was written in such a way that it could be comprehended by the masses. This was a tidbit out of the readings that opened up my eyes to the scope of his biblical interpretations. The Mishneh Torah, Maimonides code of law, was similarly written in a way to be understood by masses, and not just elites, as Halbertal discusses. Perhaps he took understandings of his works by the majority to be important, as he points out was a reason for divine personification in the Torah.
Great post, Ben.
I like how you referenced Maimonides’ recognition of how the understanding of certain aspects of Hallakah, and consequently the Mishneh Torah, is limited by the strength of one’s intellect. Additionally, I found it interesting when, in distinguishing between Maaseh Merkavah and Maaseh Bereshit, Maimonides establishes a sense of order for learning and studying. He does so by explaining how knowledge of ‘Pardes’ should only be sought after one acquires “knowledge of what is permitted and what forbidden, and similar distinctions in other classes of precepts.” (Twersky, 48). This hierarchy of knowledge is reflected elsewhere in Maimonides’ work, which coincides with the idea of ‘order’ in Jewish law. For example, while discussing commandments, Maimonides explains that one should “live by them, and not die by them.” (Twersky, 49). This shows that while we are commanded to live by G-d’s laws, preserving our lives takes precedence. Additionally, while we should choose life over law when forced to decide between the two (with 3 exceptions), Maimonides notes that “where one is enjoined to die rather than transgress, and suffers so as not to transgress, he sanctifies the name of God” and that making this decision in public makes one a martyr (50). Here, what seems like a contradiction (preservation of life vs. sanctifying the name of G-d), is not… This is not a contradiction for two reasons:
1. Once we understand that G-d is beyond/cannot be effected by human actions, we can grasp why it is permissible, if not commanded, to transgress for the preservation of life.
2. Because we are dealing with the sanctity of G-d’s name, preserving that sanctity, especially in the public sphere, shows a sacrifice and commitment to G-d, while simultaneously setting an example of ‘piety,’ which is martyr-like because it promotes the ultimate belief in G-d to others.
One question that I have after reading this week’s readings relates to the first aspect of your commentary- which addresses the role of intellect in achieving higher understanding of hallakah. My question is, if Maimonides is committed to the idea of free will and self-determination, then how can something that is heavily influenced by hereditary ‘endowments’ have such an impact on the understanding that one can achieve?
Ben, This was a great summary. I really liked how you organized your post in a way that highlights the common themes found in the readings. The texts illuminate a common view of human beings as imperfect creatures that lack the capacity to understand the Divine in its totally. Their innate tendency to anthropomorphize God seems to stems from the same defect, which Halbertal notes originate from when the fear of God precedes the love (202). In the “Basic Principle of the Torah”, the love of God can only be attained through habituation from actively studying and seeking to know him. The fear of God, however, is a latter process that is reached through this habituation, wherein our quest to understand God, we come to the realizations of our own deficiencies in comparison to the Divine (Twersky, 48). According to Maimonides, the error in thinking occurs when the fear of God is practiced without seeking to understand first, or as he states before “one has first filled oneself with bread and meat” (Twersky, 48). Additionally, such a view would allow the opposite of an awe that is reached from the love of God( Halbertal, 199 ). Instead of feeling trivial, they would have an instrumental view of God whose existence depends on their need for his existence( Halbertal,203 ), but according to the first principle, this is false because God is the first being (Twersky, 43). I think this is why Maimonides stressed the importance and necessity for having Mishen Torah as a guide for the people to follow and practice readily. Human imperfection limits the mind to have an introspective view of the Divine. The transformation that comes from learning the laws, however, allows the human intellect to perceive the Divine in a way that understands where they lie in comparison, not in the center but of a small part( Halbertal, 202).
Ben, this was an incredibly solid summary and analysis of the readings. One thing regarding law and Jewish learning that came to my mind was the balance between discipline and curiosity. Lerner recounts Maimonides’ suggestion that one’s time spent studying texts should be broken into three parts and I am wondering how this prescription, if taken on rigidly, would impact a person’s ability to freely ask questions and get to know their Creator. On a larger scale, I am definitely curious about how Maimonides’ pedagogy would hold up against modern scientific data regarding the psychology of human beings. Where does his technique derive from? Is it instinctual or can it be traced back to Aristotle, other philosophers, and Jewish texts?
I thought you did a great job summarizing each of the readings for this past week. One point you made that I found particularly interesting was when you referred to the human necessity to associate god with a tangible form or visible figure. This made me question why the human mind requires this – it is interesting to see that certain factions of the world are more pre-dispositioned to see god as a particular form than others. I also appreciated your emphasis on the reasoning behind Maimonides creation of the Mishnah Torah – the lack of written word from god.