Samuel Tavakoli
Unit 6: Understanding Laws
In this unit, we read firsthand Maimonides’ account on normative practice of Jewish laws. To me, more interesting than what he states is how he says it. In reading his laws as seen in the Mishneh Torah, we see a continuation of a trend that we have seen previously: the weaving of normative statements on how commandments should be fulfilled, combined with philosophical reasons as to why the practice is the way that it is. The system Maimonides uses is unique, as he departs from previous standards of accounting topics by following the order as seen in the either the Mishnah or the Talmud. Maimonides presents his laws independently of those two norms, and provides “the original and independent presentation of halakhah overall”(Halbertal, 229). Some chapters from the Mishneh Torah in this unit are from his second book in the Mishneh Torah, Sefer Ahavah (The Book of Love). This is another example of his novel organization of Jewish laws. Halbertal provides a breakdown of the schematic organization of the Mishneh Torah, and we see that he is indeed creative and puts forth several topics that are not new in content, but in structure, and did not exist as independent topics in previous halakhic literature. Examples of this are “Laws Concerning the Foundations of the Torah and Laws Concerning Repentance”(Halbertal, 235).
We see in the text of the Mishneh Torah examples of Maimonides using historical reasons to defend certain practices. One thing that jumped out to me specifically was in his discussion on the Laws of Purity, specifically the laws on Uncleanliness of Foodstuffs. He states “The pious of former times used to eat their common food in conditions of cleanness, and all their days they were wary of every uncleanness. And it is they who were called the Pharisees, “separated ones” and this is a higher holiness” (Twersky, 154). He takes this historical context for a stringency and uses it as a base point for a spiritual defense of their practice. He continues “For separation leads to the cleansing of the body from evil deeds, and the cleansing of the body leads to hallowing of the soul from evil thoughts, and the hallowing of the soul leads to striving for likeness with the Shekhinah”(Twersky, 154). This excerpt to me is a prime example of connecting a legal practice with a philosophic rationale that is emblematic of Maimonides’ works. Further, he seamlessly jumps from a historical rationale to a spiritual one, using logic to deduce how cleanliness can bring one closer to the Divine, or Shekhinah. In a later section of the Mishneh Torah, the Laws of Mourning, we see an interesting juxtaposition. The Laws of Mourning are contrasted with a series of commandments that do not deal with mourning, rather they are a series of mitzvot that are Rabbinic and derived from the Biblical verse “And you shall love your neighbor as thyself” (Leviticus, 19:18). These laws include visiting the ill and escorting strangers. It is interesting to me that these laws are discussed under the umbrella of Laws of Mourning, as these do not involve death and ritual mourning in any direct capacity. Yet, at the end of this chapter, Maimonides states “It seems to me that the duty of comforting mourners takes precedence over the duty of visiting the sick, because comforting of mourners is an act of benevolence towards the living and the dead.” (Twersky, 215).
In Strauss’s piece, “Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Al-Farabi”, he discusses a political philosophy that drove Maimonides work. In essence, it is the premise that men require laws to drive and shape their lives, towards not only moral perfection, but towards the understanding of “supreme truths and thereby towards supreme perfection”(Strauss, 4). In a time where church and state were one, religious law was political law, and “the prophet occupies in this medieval politics the same place the phisopher-kings occupy in Platonic politics”(Strauss, 5). Further, he points to a precedent set by Al-Farabi that Maimonides continues, namely uniting metaphysics (theology) and politics. This view is essential to understand, and this is a lens that Maimonides works through in order to reach his conclusions. Viewing the Torah as a supreme political document, to which all other laws are imitations qualifies many of Maimonides works, and gives us insight into the conclusions that he reaches.
I like your summary of the readings Samuel. I too am intrigued by how Maimonides uses rationale to explain the various commandments, never relying on the idea of God’s infinite wisdom that we cannot understand. Also, his novel organization of the halakhah is interesting because it still does not have complete structural clarity,. Halbertal points out that Maimonides places his chapters on the laws of mourning amidst the Book of Judges which deals with “constitutional law and the structuring of society’s authoritative institutions” (Halbertal 236). This is surprising since the laws of mourning have little to do with those topics, they are more social law than judicial law. This passage stands out, since most other laws seem to fit those around them. Such as the laws on the mezuzah being placed with the laws on prayer, sefer torah, blessings, and other religious rituals. Maimonides justifies its placement by linking mourning and the courts when he explains that one does not have to mourn for criminals put to death by the courts, but, as Halbertal points out, this explanation is not satisfactory. Halbertal writes that Maimonides placement of the laws on mourning has more to do with the way Maimonides thought about mourning than where one may intuitively put it. This says a lot about the structure of the halakhah, I wonder if by just looking at the structure we can create a better understanding of how Maimonides thought about and categorized different laws?
I thought you did a great job summarizing the readings from this week Tav. I also found the inclusion of laws regarding visiting the ill under the category of laws for mourning interesting and somewhat confusing. Despite the explanation from Maimonides: “It seems to me that the duty of comforting mourners takes precedence over the duty of visiting the sick, because comforting of mourners is an act of benevolence towards the living and the dead.” (Twersky, 215). I wonder whether this is seconded by the idea that comforting mourners is more important than visiting the sick, as the mourners have a definitive need for additional human action, while visiting the sick may emotionally and socially help them, but it will not physically help them in any manner.
You did well in pointing out several interesting aspects in each of the readings. I was also intrigued by the interesting juxtapositions that Maimonides made by categorizing the halakhot in an unprecedented manner. It was interesting that the laws for mourning were in the same book as the laws for loving and respecting your neighbor and visiting the ill. I was most concerned with the fact that in the “Laws Concerning Mourning” in the final book of the Mishneh Torah, the Book of Judges, there is a law that commands Jews to dress in white, feast, and rejoice if a fellow Jew who did not observe the commandments or go to Synagogue dies, as it says in the Scripture “Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee?” (Ps. 139:21) (Halbertal, 238). Usually if Jews die, we are commanded to honor their status with a proper burial and to comfort and be sensitive toward mourners, but this does not seem to apply to Jews who lived like other nations. Jews are also commanded to love and respect others, as it is written “You shall not hate your brother in your heart” (Lev. 19:17) (Halbertal, 249). But since Jews are commanded to rebuke other Jews who are transgressing, as it is written “You shall surely rebuke your neighbor” (Lev 19:17), does this mean that Jews are required to help guide their fellow Jews to a walk a path according to the commandments, but if these Jews continue down a path like other nations anyway, we are no longer prohibited from hating them and should celebrate their deaths?
Great work! I found your summary and interspersed analysis helpful and thought-provoking.
In the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides wrote that “‘uncleanness’ is not mud or filth which water can remove, but is a matter of Scriptural decree and dependent on the intention of the heart. Therefore…if a man immerses himself, but without special intention, it is as though he has not immersed himself at all” (p. 154). The intention is, according to Maimonides, as important as the act itself in the case of “Scriptural decree”. He goes on to write that “one who sets his heart on cleansing himself from the uncleanness that beset men’s souls…becomes clean as soon as he consents in his heart to shun those counsels and brings his soul into the waters of pure reason” (p. 154). It seems that Maimonides is using the laws of uncleanness to help bolster his argument that the practice of improving one’s character is accomplished through habituation. One needs to set his heart on accomplishing that improvement and commit himself to the “waters of pure reason”, and then he can start to habituate himself to be inclined to act a certain way. From this passage, however, we can derive a distinction in Maimonides’ argument: once we devote ourselves to reason and are set on improving our character, we have already guaranteed that we will accomplish our goal; the habituation is merely the necessary process by which it will be accomplished. This was my interpretation of this section of the Mishneh Torah, and I wonder how others interpreted it.
Samuel, this was a great summary and discussion of Maimonides’ organization of laws. Like everyone else, I agree that Maimonides’ presentation of the halakhah is confusing on a superficial level and deserves to be re-examined in more depth; Halbertal explains in Chapter Six that “he (Maimonides) believed the Mishnah failed to provide the systematic and conceptual framework he needed and that following its structure would not allow him to encompass systematically all the areas of the halakhah and present them in an accessible and transparent sequence.” Similarly, he failed to follow the sequence of topics discussed in the Talmud as its discussion “ambled casually from topic to topic and failed to provide the desired systematic framework” (Halbertal 229). How, then, does Maimonides defend his presentation of the halakhah – the Book of Judges presents many questions, as others have already discussed on this forum. Additionally, the layout of what are, for me, ‘religious laws’ (purity, prayer, etc.) followed immediately with no transition or separation by ‘state/organizational laws’ (criminal, civil, constitutional) is questionable. If the Mishneh Torah is meant to be read in order, the placement of each book must be critical: the laws on immersion pools falls directly before laws of theft, murder, and wounding (Twersky 154-170). I wonder how the statement “just as one who sets his heart on becoming clean becomes clean as soon as he has immersed himself, although nothing new has befallen his body…” (Twerksy 154); I suppose some could interpret this statement falling before more ‘state-oriented’ laws as one regarding methods of punishment – does the same redemption of the heart apply to those who commit theft or bodily damage? If after the act, the perpetrator ‘cleanses his heart,’ what is the purpose of other forms of punishment? Does this act as a transition, or is there another explanation to Maimonides’ presentation of law?
Great post, Samuel.
I like how you addressed the common theme we’ve seen from studying Maimonides throughout this semester, which is how he almost blends the’How to’ regarding the application of laws with his philosophical/aristotelian explanations for their reasons. This is consistent with his set goal of trying to provide the Jewish people with a coherent and non-elitist treatise of Jewish law, while reconciling the philosophic questions that arise from the interpretation of these laws. I think that the purity passages that you mentioned in your post reflect this idea very well. Rather than attempt to explain the nature of Purity in a philosophical sense, Maimonides ‘shows’ how to uphold the laws of purity in citing the commandments of cleanliness, preservation of sanctity and separation from the un-pure. After detailing some specifics of these laws of purity, Maimonides explains their reasoning in saying that (to borrow your quote) “For separation leads to the cleansing of the body from evil deeds, and the cleansing of the body leads to hallowing of the soul from evil thoughts, and the hallowing of the soul leads to striving for likeness with the Shekhinah”(Twersky, 154). Here Maimonides provides a basic explanation for why we should be pure, but hidden in what he says is (what I think) is his meta-physical definition of Purity. By not stating an affirmative definition of purity, Maimonides allows the reader to maintain an understanding of purity in which it is neither the object nor the subject. Rather, in describing simultaneously the steps to purity (Separation, cleanliness from evil, hallowing the soul etc.) and the reasons for purity (ultimately likeness to Shekhinah), Maimonides essentially defines purity as an idea who’s actions and intention are the same. I believe this is consistent with other aspects of Maimonides’ work that relate moral or ‘good’ behavior with habit. While Maimonides clearly demonstrates his belief that habit allows one to ‘ascend’ to higher levels of ‘holiness’ or ‘righteousness’ etc. I am curious to hear if any comparisons have been made to the idea of “grace’ in Christianity. Granted that Maimonides believes that ‘achieving’ Shekhinah requires action while Grace is typically seen as something that “finds people,” are Shekhina and Grace not fairly similar concepts?
Sammy, first off I want to say that you did a great job summarizing the readings. What I found most intriguing about your post was the ability to reconnect us with prior class conversations and readings from previous chapters. This allowed me to keep in mind what we covered in class while analyzing the text.
I want to comment on the Mishneh Torah, specifically the fact that its structure is different from the Talmud and Mishnah. The initial inclination, including mine when I first read this, was to believe that Maimonides was doing nothing but restructuring the text to allow readers to more easily understand halakhah, but in reality “it also interprets and shapes the material itself. In gathering separate, fragmented rulings into a single literary unit, Maimonides forged new areas in halakhah” (Halbertal 230). In my opinion, Maimonides had ulterior motives when creating this text. He wanted to grow education amongst the Jewish people, but at the same time, this opening allowed Maimonides to implement his philosophical view into the Mishneh Torah.
As you mentioned in your post, Maimonides connects history with philosophy, which can be seen in the example you wrote about regarding the laws of Uncleanliness of Foodstuffs. Similarly, Maimonides exemplifies this when writing about the laws regarding Mezuzah. Maimonides uses both logic and God to strategically get someone to obey these laws. In this chapter, Maimonides discusses that someone who, “writes the names of angles, holy names, a Biblical text, or inscriptions usual on seals within the mezuzah, âre among those who have no portion in the world to come” (Twersky 95). Those who complete such actions fail to fulfill the commandment while also promoting self interest. Maimonides shows that it is important to follow the law, since, “he will be confronted with the declaration of God’s unity” (Twersky 94). An important thing to consider here is something that we have discussed in class, that Maimonides preaches the fact that God is the First Being and that he causes everything else that transcends in the world. Since Maimonides writes about him in this authoritative way, followers are more inclined to obey the laws, since there is nothing more disrespectful than to violate laws that go against the name of God.
Great summary and analysis! The aspect of this week’s readings that I found the most interesting was the mention of intention in relation to achieving ritual purity. From my limited experience, I am inclined to believe that Jewish Law is heavily oriented on action, whether it be passive or active. Believing this, it is remarkable to me that he placed such a thing in his Code of Law, as it is not something that is observable. He does of course make comments about other emotions such as anger, but usually there are usually outward expressions of this emotion. Such is not the case with intention. As someone with significantly limited knowledge, I am wondering if similar prescriptions exist in other commentaries or bodies of the halakkah. I know that intention or niyyah is major concept in Islam and I wonder if Maimonides was influenced by that at all.