Noah Brooker
Unit 8: Learning How to Read
Maimonides’ introduction to The Guide of the Perplexed,begins with the establishment of its purpose. However, with close examination, the reader can see that the entire introduction is rife with contradictions. Maimonides states that the guide seeks to explain equivocal terms or obscure parables, but he also makes clear that people are “unable to explain with complete clarity and coherence even the portion that (one) has apprehended.” (Twersky, 239). Additionally, Maimonides references that, ‘proper explanation,’ would lead to both “a state of perplexity,” and deliverance from perplexity. Then, in discussing the structure of the guide, Mamonides mentions chapters “in which there will be no mention of an equivocal term” (Twersky ,241), but then explains how a reader of these chapters might find that “the contrary of the truth is sometimes believed” (Twersky, 241) because of presence of the equivocality of terms.
I personally found that the more closely I read the introduction, the more I could identify contradictions, which, left me feeling… perplexed.
Maimonides also lists seven causes for contradiction or contrary statements, in general, and then identifies two (the fifth and seventh) that appear in his treatise:
- “The fifth cause arises from the necessity of teaching and making someone understand.” (245).
- “The seventh cause: in speaking about very obscure matters it is necessary to conceal some parts and to disclose other.” (Twersky, 245).
The necessity of teaching requires that obscure matters, be addressed by the teacher, but only to provide a basic understanding of that matter so that it can be used as a premise for others. To facilitate discussion, contradictions are necessary for the procession of certain discussions, however, those contradictions must never be revealed to ‘the vulgar.’
So, the introduction of the guide consists of several contradictions, explanation for those contradictions, and then the acknowledgment that those contradictions are concealed from the many. The brilliance of this introduction, then, is that it shows the nature of the guide rather than explicitly saying what it is. Maimonides says that the reader is supposed to gain an explanation/understanding of the terms and parables in Jewish works, while acknowledging that explaining these things is essentially impossible. Maimonides also states that contradictions exist and are necessary in his work, while simultaneously insisting that those contradictions must not be revealed to most people. It appears Maimonides intends to explain the purpose and ‘nature’ of his treatise by establishing these contradictions, which I believe indicates that the existence and purpose of the guide is to make known these contradictions to the people who can identify them. In this sense, then, Maimonides seems to ‘encourage’ perplexity, so long as it is ‘guided’ towards the true reality of God.
In chapter seven of “Maimonides, Life and Thought,” Moshe Halbertal addresses the issues of the stated purposes and contradictions in the guide. He explains that “the genuine addressee of the treatise will understand on his own what he needs to understand and what he properly may understand.” (277). This indicates that a level of self-understanding is necessary, which only partially elucidates the guide because it does not directly reveal the nature of that self-understanding. However, the fact that the understanding can come “on his own,” is telling. First, it implies that proper ‘understanding’ is not communicable because of the limitations of language: “that language is defective in the most fundamental structure of its sentences, made up of subject and predicate.” (298). Therefore, to convey an understanding of God through language would be nearly impossible, as the necessity for object and action defies the Unity of God. Furthermore, trying to explain God as anything other than ‘one,’ is also akin to heresy because any adjectives that might be used in this endeavor “impairs not only the pure concept of unity but also the sublimity of God and his absolute otherness from the world.” (298). I believe that self-understanding, then, involves one’s certainty in the unity of God. This partially explains the contradiction of the purpose and intent of the guide itself: If one has not established for themselves the unity of God, he/she will be perplexed in attempting to understand the nature of God. If one wants to believe in God, he/she will become satisfied with a false understanding of God. If one holds a steadfast belief in the idea of the unity of God without learning matters of science and philosophy, he/she will lack the ability to appreciate the significance of what it means for God to be one. However, with the absolute belief in the unity of God and knowledge of human science, one can use the guide of the perplexed to contemplate God without getting ‘lost.’
I think this is reflected in Halbertal’s interpretation as well. In describing Jacob’s ascent and descent of a ‘ladder’ as an example of the proper pursuit of knowledge of God, Halbertal summarizes that, “at the top of the heavenward ladder, a person realizes that the only thing he is able to apprehend is God’s movement within reality, and in the wake of that realization, he returns to reality as an active participant.” (311). Here we see that the highest point of knowledge comes with a precise understanding of our inability to ‘know,’ and that we can observe the workings of God through being in the world.
In Abraham Socher’s commentary on Amos Funkenstein’s analysis of Maimonides’ historical reasoning, we can see a more comprehendible rationalization of Maimonides’ unique method. It is clear, now, that “the strangeness and opacity of such biblical religion is precisely a result of its historical success in eradicating all but the faintest traces of the cultures with which it was engaged.” (pg. 13). Maimonides understands the necessity of tradition and observance, but disagrees with the notion that any innate quality of these aspects of religion can by itself lead one to truth. Maimonides is likely aware as well, that while most people are incapable of discerning God’s truth, they will still attempt to understand God. With this knowledge, Maimonides had to address the needs of both ‘continuing’ and ‘understanding’ religion. To do this he essentially had to conceal the truth from the people that are not already aware of it.
My question for discussion revolves around Maimonides’s insistence that people do not speak about the guide. I do not doubt that Maimonides was aware that people would break this rule, but my confusion surrounds the reason for the rule itself. On one hand, because it is impossible to transmit one’s understanding through language, it makes sense that Maimonides would encourage people not to attempt to do so. On the other hand, with the notion that “silence is praise,” it seems that the prohibition of discussion is because discussion of God is inherently heretical (language issue). So, when Maimonides says not to speak of his guide, does he do so to: protect the truth? Imply truth by reiterating the impossibility of describing God? A mixture of both? Or something completely different?