Chapter three in Pritchard is titled “Defining Knowledge,” yet much of the chapter presents different, conflicting ideas of what knowledge is. The reason that the definition of knowledge is seemingly impossible to agree upon among epistemologists and philosophers is known as the problem of the criterion. This problem is summarized by Pritchard as, “I can only identify instances of knowledge provided I already know what the criteria for knowledge are,” and, “I can only know what the criteria for knowledge are provided I already am able to identify instances of knowledge” (20-21). This is a Catch-22 of sorts because the claims make both finding criteria for knowledge and identifying instances of knowledge necessary to determine the other. This in itself raises the question if defining knowledge is a legitimate effort at all.
Instead of accepting that knowledge cannot be defined, philosophers have attempted to come up with other working definitions, such as knowledge as Justified True Belief, which is known as the classical account of knowledge. However, this theory hasn’t satisfied the need for a definition as it has “been shown to be completely untenable” (Pritchard 23) by Edmund Gettier. Gettier uses cases, such as John’s Justified True Belief that it’s 8:20am, to prove that one can have Justified True Belief and still not have knowledge. John is justified in his belief that it is 8:20am because his trustworthy clock reflects that time and he comes downstairs at that time every morning. The belief is also true, but he does not have knowledge because he is unaware that his clock happened to have broken at 8:20am the day before.
After deconstructing one of Gettier’s arguments in class, we found that he posed a sound argument. Yet, Feldman tells us that some philosophers such as D.M. Armstrong find fault in Gettier’s argument in that, “Gettier’s examples are defective because they rely on the false principle that false propositions can justify one’s belief in other propositions” (68). Feldman goes on, however, to reject the claim that Gettier’s examples are defective by creating a case in which the proposition that causes one to be justified in their belief is a true proposition, but that person still lacks the knowledge.
So we are faced with Gettier’s argument, Armstrong and others’ counter argument, and Feldman’s counter argument to the counter argument. What this tells me is that there are and have been talented philosophers and epistemologists who disagree about the definition of knowledge and perhaps will never agree on its definition. This brings me back to the problem of criterion. Immediately, I thought that the only solution to the problem of criterion would be that the criteria for knowledge and instances of knowledge are the same thing. Is it possible that an instance of knowledge might BE knowing the criteria for knowledge, and that neither precede the other, but happen at the same time? Perhaps that means that knowledge is self-defined, and each person’s instance of knowledge is knowing their own criteria for knowledge. For example, a scientist knows his criteria for knowledge is that it must be experimentally proved. This is both an instance of knowledge and criteria for knowledge. Do you believe that there is just one definition of knowledge? Is knowledge self-defined?
I want to comment on the defectively of Gettier’s examples. As we discussed today in class the subject is not justified in believing a premise if the subject’s justification includes false beliefs. Using this degree of further specificity we can no longer find knowledge in Edumnd Gettier cases like Justified True Beliefs, since John’s justification would now include false beliefs, therefore he would no longer be justified and he would no longer be classified as knowing it is 8:20 since the clock is broken.
To further examine this argument, the beliefs used to justify an argument, can vary from person to person. A person may believe that a plane is safe up in the air as they believe most planes are safe, the company has a safe track record, and the pilot is accountable. All of these justifications would be true therefore the person would therefore “know” that the plane is safe. However, another person may believe that the plane is safe since the pilot is well trained, planes are safe, and the crew is well trained. However, in this case the staff apart from the pilot has been poorly trained, therefore the second person would be incorrect in knowing that the plane is safe, as his justification would be false.
While I do believe there should be one definition of knowledge the variability in people’s beliefs and justification leaves tremendous room for interpretation, and makes knowledge very hard to classify. In conclusion, people’s varying criterion for knowledge, is what makes knowledge itself so difficult to classify.
I personally think that the definitions and counter examples that were given by multiple philosophers make it difficult for me to find a dictionary, pin point, definition of knowledge. Which leads me to believe that maybe there can be more than one definition of knowledge and that knowledge can be self-defined in certain cases. I believe that various experiences and various perspectives can create a wisdom that a person has, such as street smarts, common sense, and even academic knowledge, and all of those seem to not be able to fit under one definition of knowledge. I also think that knowledge can be very culture specific. There are certain aspects of one’s language that can change a whole aspect of a person’s life and give them answers or specific words to questions that maybe English, per se, couldn’t answer. However, there are some hard facts, some common sense knowledge that can be universal and that should have some parameters and set criteria that makes it knowledge, but other types of knowledge that come from perception and experience and that aren’t so clean cut may not fit into that single definition. Knowing how to write a paper or how to use your own “knowledge” of sorts to answer certain open ended questions is an important “know how” or knowledge, and it cannot be connected to the same kind of criteria or definition that many philosophers are trying to find.
As to your concluding question, I believe that there must eventually be one definition for knowledge that perhaps hasn’t been found yet. When asked the question if John knew the clock was 8:20, intuitively, we say no. When asked if a plane is safe based on false assumptions that the pilot has been trained, we intuitively say no; this person does not know the plane is safe. This implies that we know when something is knowledge and when it is not, we have just struggled to find the perfect definition without any loopholes.
I also don’t think knowledge can be self-defined. By definition, it has to be true in the world, so that is not self defined but rather a definition provided by the world. If I say that snow is white and that I know snow is white, this concept of knowledge is not self defined, but rather simply the truth in the world, universal. (Snow is in fact white.) So, I would argue there is a global, objective definition of knowledge, and that it is not self-defined.
To respond to one of the comments, I also do not believe knowledge is culture specific. How could it be? It needs to be based on truth. Truth should not be culturally specific, but rather universally acknowledged because it is the truth. In example, snow is white. No matter the culture, this is true. And if I say I know snow is white because I’ve seen it and believe it, I in fact have knowledge that snow is white. Overall, I believe that there must be a universal definition of knowledge. Otherwise it wouldn’t be knowledge, it would be perception.
I feel as though there isn’t one ‘true’ definition of knowledge. You gave the evidence in your paper with references to the JTB account, then Gettier’s argument, Armstorng’s counterargument, and finally Feldman’s counter argument to the counterargument. These back and forth claims show that agreement on a singular definition of knowledge isn’t likely to happen. We had one for thousands of years with the JTB account, and all of us in class were more than willing to accept it, however like the rest of the world, Gettier stumped us with his short, terse, proof that the JTB account was flawed.
That is why I say there won’t be a singular definition of knowledge, rather there should be personal definitions or self-defined definitions of knowledge. Individuals have experience in many diverse traits of many kinds. This huge range of diversity leads to each individual having a unique sense on what they define as knowledge which would inevitably skew their perception on a singular, true definition of knowledge if there were one.
This has already happened with the philosophers that we’ve studied so far. The ‘real definition’ has clashed with their original perceptions on what was true knowledge, so they made an argument to show the ‘real definition’ was false. This will continue on and no one will be satisfied, that’s why I feel knowledge should be self defined.
I appreciate all of your comments. Lauren brings up a good point when she says that knowledge cannot be self-defined because of the truth value. If knowledge were entirely self-defined, then I could decide that I know that snow is purple, when that is not true at all. Perhaps the question of self-defined knowledge is a cop out, just used as the only way out of the problem of the criterion, but not even a solution at all. I think if we are to reject the idea of self-defined knowledge, that we must accept that there might never be an agreed upon definition of knowledge. As Bradley said, JTB was for a long time accepted, and now it has been challenged, counter challenged and countered again. So maybe self-defined knowledge is not the answer, but choosing one definition of knowledge that works for you and adhering to that definition in order to determine what you know and what you don’t know might be as close as we can get.