Paul Churchland, an American philosopher, defends eliminative materialism, or that common-sense folk psychology is a theory, and must be substituted with neuroscience. In order to argue this, Churchland demonstrates how folk psychology is only a theory and why it might be false.

Churchland begins by stating that seeing folk psychology as a theory unifies problems such as “the explanation and prediction of behavior, the semantics of mental predicates, action theory, the other-minds problem, the intentionality of mental states, the nature of introspection, and the mind-body problem.” (594) In order to argue how the intentionality of mental states is a “structural feature” of folk psychology, Churchland relates to a theory in the physical sciences. He begins by giving us an example of “numerical attitudes,” or expressions such as “…has a mass of n, a velocity of n, a temperature of n.” Substituting a number for n forms a predicate in the same way that substituting a proposition for p forms a predicate. Churchland states, “The structural features of folk psychology parallel perfectly those of mathematical physcics.” (595) Although this was only a small part of his larger argument, I believe that Churchland was effective. I am personally more inclined to accept an argument that is proven valid through science and mathematics. Churchland’s thorough explanation of the parallels of folk psychology and mathematical physics make his argument obvious and clear.

Again, Churchland takes the perspective of the physical sciences when he argues why folk psychology might (really) be false. Folk psychology may only be a theory if it “fits well with other theories about adjacent subject matters.” (597) Churchland claims that folk psychology doesn’t fit in with the sciences like the theory of the homo sapiens does. Since the physical sciences are undeniable when it comes to explaining human behavior, Churchland is strong in his claim that this theory is false. Again, this seems to make sense to me. It is difficult to deny the physical sciences as it is logical in explaining many different aspects about the universe.

Churchland claims that science can explain human beings’ constitution, development and behavioral capacities through physics, chemistry, evolutionary theory, biology, physiology and neuroscience, and that using these explanations, science can beat folk psychology.

Sterelny makes a logical response to Churchland’s arguments. He says that folk psychology is an important component of cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychology includes the study of mental processes. Cognitive psychology takes part in research programs to understand processes like learning and memory. In contrast to Churchland’s scientific explanations to deny folk psychology, Sterelny says that folk psychology indirectly follows modern scientific advances. (http://philosophy.hku.hk/courses/old/ronmallon/phil2230/phil2230l13.html)

Thus, both Sterelny and Churchland use science to prove their argument. However, I am leaning towards Churchland’s view that folk psychology should be eliminated. Churchland makes a rational argument that neuroscience is a better way to understand the brain.

For many years philosophers, psychologists, and scientists have all struggled with the concept of mental states and the truth about what happens inside of the human brain. With ongoing breakthroughs in each of the fields, bridges have been created in hopes of gaining insight towards the mysteries of the mind.  In 1981, philosopher Paul Churchland proposed the idea of eliminative materialism, which posed an attack on folk psychology and suggested that mental states simply don’t exist. This extreme theory poses a radical argument with many strong points; however, some believe it to be too drastic to be precise.

Churchland begins his argument by suggesting that folk psychology is simply just a theory and not fact. Through examining a number of mental states that psychologists have struggled with explaining for years, he states, “FP (folk psychology) has been a stagnant or degenerating research program, and has been for millennia.” (567) Although I am not arguing that folk psychology is completely accurate in all of it’s claims, I do believe that it is at least sufficient in explaining very basic fundamentals behind human behavior. Surely, it is not the case that folk psychology can explain all of human cognition a microscopic level just yet; however, with the current breakthroughs in neuroscience, folk psychology simply needs to revise its claims instead of completely reject them.

Aside from Churchland’s refutation of folk psychology, his radical theory of the elimination of all mental states seems a bit too hard to believe. How can one possibly be mistaken about his own mental state? Mental states are the basis of human cognition and to say that they simply don’t exist seems quite absurd. If one were in pain, it would not make sense for an eliminative materialist to say that he is not because mental states can be experienced first-hand.

Furthermore, take for example the famous case of Phineas Gage. In a tragic railroad accident, the man’s brain was impaled with a metal rod. The after effects clearly showed a change in behavior and mental states when the biology of the brain was altered. Of course, exactly what happened may or may not be able to be completely explained with folk psychology; however, the causal relationship between the mental states before and after the accident could not have been a coincidence

In a sense, Churchland was correct in believing that folk psychology was not the only answer; however, I believe that folk psychology is definitely a part of the answer in determining the truth behind our cognition. Just as philosophy advanced to generate eliminative materialism, folk psychology will also change with the ongoing discoveries in modern day neuroscience.