In this week’s reading, Feldman presents an interesting point from D.M. Armstrong. Armstrong states that possession of the “grounds” necessary for the JTB Account are in fact “too weak to serve as suitable grounds” for knowledge (Feldman 68). In other words, regardless of the truth or falsity of the “justifiably believed grounds” that prove a true belief, those grounds are not means to posses knowledge (Feldman 68). Feldman disagrees with this statement and concludes, “there are examples very much like Gettier’s that do not rely on this allegedly false principle” (Fedlman 68). Here, meaning that these other examples do not rely on the defects of Gettier’s argument, yet succeed in the way Gettier’s argument does when discounting the JTB Account.

In our reading in Pritchard, we are given two examples, one with Sally and one with John. In John’s example, he lacks knowledge because his false belief that he is looking at a working clock is considered to be a presupposition of his belief in time. In Sally’s example, she is not deprived of knowledge because her false belief that the clock is regularly maintained is not a presupposition; because she is looking at working clock (Pritchard 27).

These examples together are meant to criticize the reliability of Gettier’s argument, but the result is not enough to make his argument completely wrong. Can we ever find a way to completely criticize this reliability? Gettier’s argument is not completely discounted yet it is not completely bulletproof either (based on what was said about presupposition in Pritchard). Despite this dilemma, what we need to take away from Gettier is “that you need to demand more from the world than simply that one’s justified belief is true if you are to have knowledge” (Pritchard 27).

Furthermore, we discussed in class how the JTB Account was wrong as criticized most famously by Gettier. There are then also those who believe Gettier is wrong. What we see is a succession of “right and then proved wrong” arguments. Will we ever find an answer to how we obtain knowledge and how we can know what constitutes this obtaining of knowledge? I did a little outside research on this. In an article I read in Philosophy News, the author gives us a sort of chronological panorama of the evolution of knowledge. One idea, which is briefly mentioned in Pritchard is the idea of skepticism or “postmodern epistemology.” Basically, postmodern epistemologists, “reject the idea that we can ever be fully justified in holding that our beliefs line up with the way the world actually is. We can’t know that we know” (Pardi).

I think that, based on what we have learned so far, defining “knowledge” goes two ways. One way is that we accept that we will never know exactly how we know or what it means to know what knowledge is, but we can get as close as possible by countering what those before us have discovered. The other way, is that we will never know that we know because we cannot step outside ourselves and our own beliefs – which then brings us back to the criterion: if one doesn’t already know what knowledge is and what the criteria of knowledge are one cannot identify instances of knowledge and vice versa. Up to this point, every argument has had a criticism; all we know is that we can merely speculate how it is we come to know something, and even then do we really know that? What does knowing itself entail? Will we ever know? I wish I had answers to these age-old questions but my conclusion is simply that what we take to be knowledge is determined by our perspective on the world and how it is determined.

Outside source: Pardi, Paul. “What Is Knowledge?” Philosophy News. N.p., 22 Sept. 2011. Web. 14 Sept. 2014. <http://www.philosophynews.com/post/2011/09/22/What-is-Knowledge.aspx>.