The Trouble A(Foot) With Moral Judgements as Categorical Imperatives

In her essay, Foot argues against Kant’s establishment of the moral judgment as a categorical imperative; she believes that moral judgement qualifies as a hypothetical imperative.  I would like to review her arguments comparing etiquette and moral judgment and then reflect upon how it is impossible for moral judgment to be a categorical imperative if we are to be morally autonomous.

Within the first few pages of her article, Foot makes several arguments and weaves the comparison of etiquette and moral judgment throughout—I will focus on two of these arguments.  First, Foot argues against Kant’s distinction of moral judgments as categorical imperatives by analyzing the use of the words “should” (used in Kant’s hypothetical imperatives) and “ought” (used in Kant’s categorical imperatives).  Foot comes to the point that there is a problem with moral judgments being categorical imperatives because of the implied “dignity and necessity” married to the word “ought”; ultimately, she believes that Kant is incorrect in his belief of the “unconditional requirement” of categorical imperatives (308).  Foot supports this by noting that “should” can be used “non-hypothetically in some non-moral statements to which no one attributes the special dignity and necessity conveyed by the description ‘categorical imperative'”—for example, in the cases of etiquette (308).  This use of “should” does not play to the agent’s desires and interests and does not have “automatic reason-giving force,” as Kant defines it will in a categorical imperative, causing them to fall under hypothetical imperatives (309).  She applies this idea of “should” to moral considerations, which are supposed to “necessarily give reasons for acting to any man” (309). She questions what makes the moral “should” different from other “shoulds” by stating that “the normative character of moral judgment does not guarantee its reason-giving force” (310).  Etiquette, too, is normative and is required behavior.  Thus, Foot asks the question: “but are we then to say that there is nothing behind the idea that moral judgments are categorical imperatives but the relative stringency of our moral teaching?” (309-310).

At this point, Foot moves on to look at the feelings involved in etiquette and in moral judgments.  She proves the force of the “stringency of our moral teaching” by noting the feelings associated with morality—feelings such as the inability to escape.  In this light, she notes that both etiquette and morality bring about feelings of the inability to escape that can cause people to follow (or not follow) etiquette or morality without question. Foot acknowledges that some may still claim that “one has to or must to what morality demands,” but she still asserts that this is merely a feeling that people have (311).  Foot does not doubt the existence of these feelings; rather, she states that these feelings are not ground enough on which we can declare moral judgments to be categorical imperatives. Thus, by Foot’s comparison of etiquette and moral judgment we can conclude that moral judgments are not categorical imperatives.

Overall, I agree with Foot.  I was able to follow these arguments well and found them to be sound.  In fact, I agree with her simply based off of the idea that hypothetical imperatives are more diverse, while categorical imperatives are not.  This brings to light the main problem that I see with Kant’s ideologies: if Kant believes that morality is a categorical imperative, how is it possible to be morally autonomous?  How can one be morally autonomous if morality is based off of set duty and set laws?

Works Cited

Foot, Philippa. “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.” The Philosophical Review 81.3 (1972): 305. Blackboard. Web. 20 Oct. 2014.