First and foremost I commend Regan on his piece “The Case for Animal Rights”. Coming from one who is not an animal rights activist, I found that his argument was very compelling. Although he didn’t change my mind about animal rights; however he did open my eyes to unjust that is done when people talk about animal right. He explains why things haven’t changed and why the problems aren’t being recognized. In this text, Regan dissects other positions that one shouldn’t use as arguments for animal rights, then he gives one that he believes is suitable.
Contractarianism is one of the main positions he shuts down. Contractarianism is the idea that mortality consist of rules that one voluntarily agree to follow, as one would do when they sign a “contact”. These set of rules are the rules that people collectively abide by and enforce. People who accept “contracts” are directly covered and thus are able provide protection for others that can’t sign the contracts themselves. Regan explains how, for example, parents who sign “contracts “have indirect duties to young children, since they obviously can’t understand the rules and regulation that the “contract” holds. However, the case is made where the duty is only based on the sentimental interest of others. Since animals are similar to children in the case that they too can’t understand the rules of the contract, they must have someone who cares about them have indirect duties towards them. The argument is then made that people don’t have any duty towards one’s animal but instead to the owner of that animal. Thus, one only has a duty not to hurt any animal, if they have an owner. If this animal doesn’t have an owner then one doesn’t have a duty towards that animal. The indirect duty view, doesn’t rationally help the case for animal rights.
Similar, Regan tries to solve his problem from the Utilitarian view. Utilitarianism is the idea that everyone’s interest count in a situation to find the best outcome that will bring about the most satisfaction ( happiness) for everyone affected in that situation . This may sound all good since utilitarianism counts everyone interest; however, the problem is that utilitarianism doesn’t have room for equal inherent value or worth. The only thing that matter are the satisfactions that come from an individual not who the person is themselves. For instance he uses the example of someone killing there Aunt because the results that can happen with her money after she dies are more beneficial, then having her alive. According, to the utilitarian philosophy, killing her is moral if her death will result in more satisfaction than having her alive. However, non-utilitarian would find this idea morally callous. Regan, then concludes with the argument that “a good end doesn’t justify evil means” (185); thus, utilities fails.
Regan believes that inherent value is what justifies animal rights. Inherent values are the equal rights that all individuals have. Inherent values entail the idea of being treated with respect, and not being reduced or used as resources. Humans’ ae experiencing subjects of life. With that, Regan argues, that animals should also be seen as experiencing subjects of life just like humans; thus, having inherent value. Although some may say that animals don’t read, build things, and etc., some humans don’t express these abilities either. These humans aren’t seen with any less value the next, thus animals shouldn’t be seen with any less value either. Animals need to be treated with respect just like humans.
As stated early, I may not be an animal rights activist but I do think Regan’s argument was compelling. He found claims within outer philosophical views that were wring and justified why he believes why animal rights should be taken into consideration. He didn’t change my views on animal rights but he did open my eyes to see the reason to why people are so adamant about animal rights. What are you options about his argument?
References:
Regan, T. (1986). A case for animal rights. In M.W. Fox & L.D. Mickley (Eds.), Advances in animal welfare science 1986/87 (pp. 179-189). Washington, DC: The Humane Society of the United States.