Category Archives: Uncategorized

The concept of abortion has been around for centuries and inevitably the question is asked of whether abortion should be legal at all. In the years since the landmark decision by the Supreme Court on the case of Roe v Wade, the abortion debate has intensified as part of the political discourse in America. The question of abortion, of whether a woman should or should not be able to terminate her pregnancy, has many ethical, moral and religious arguments. In the current political climate of the United States, the question of abortion is incredibly polarizing, and data from the Pew Research Center suggests that the divide is increasingly falling along political party lines. The readings for this unit present both sides of the debate and the central arguments behind each side’s position. Judith Jarvis Thompson presents an argument supporting abortion in her essay “A Defense of Abortion” through an interesting series of hypothetical situations and analogies. On the other hand, Faye Ginsburg’s ethnography Contested Lives offers insight into both sides of the abortion debate in America through the rise of the debate within the microcosm of Fargo, North Dakota.

In “A Defense of Abortion”, Judith Jarvis Thompson argues that there are situations in which abortion is not immoral and therefore that abortion should not be entirely illegal. Her essay uses two central arguments to illustrate her point as well as multiple hypothetical situations and analogies to put abstract situations regarding the effect of pregnancy on a woman’s body into perspective. The first argument Thompson makes is that the fetus itself does not constitute a person in the same way we regard ‘you’ or ‘me’ as a person. She makes the point that “the prospects of “drawing a line” in the development of the fetus look dim” (47) but she also makes the analogy that “a newly implanted clump of cells is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree” (48). These points show the complexity of the argument that a fetus is a person from the moment of conception, because it is difficult to argue that a fetus is a person just after conception and it is also difficult to argue a fetus is not a person at the end of forty weeks of pregnancy. The majority of the essay follows Thompson’s second argument regarding the effect of the fetus on the mother’s body. She uses a hypothetical situation in which she prompts the reader to imagine being held against their will and hooked up to a well-known violinist so that he may survive by using the reader’s kidneys to illustrate the idea of carrying a fetus through nine months of pregnancy. Thompson first nullifies the argument of those against abortion even in the case of direct harm to the mother should she carry the pregnancy through to term. Thompson then presents the case of involuntary pregnancy such as that which occurs through rape. Lastly, Thompson discusses the case in which a woman simply is not in a position to be responsible for the fetus.

While Thompson’s logical arguments were sound in her defense of abortion, I found that her use of hypothetical situations and analogies took away from the arguments she was trying to make. Many of the analogies and metaphors she used, such as the involuntary attachment to the violinist, “the only thing that will save [Thompson’s] life is the touch of Henry Fonda’s cool hand” (55), or “the older boy…refuses to give his brother any of the chocolates” (56), were oversimplifications of the ideas of pregnancy and abortion. A violinist attached to you that you have never met would most likely hold a much different value when compared to a fetus that is made from your own genetic material that you are responsible for nurturing. In this sense, I found that her methodology was not as effective as it could have been if, perhaps, she had used more apt analogies or built further on her logical arguments. Additionally, Thompson argues at the end of her essay that “while … abortion is not impermissible, I [Thompson] do not argue that it is always permissible” (65), however, to illustrate this, she uses the example of a woman in her seventh month of pregnancy considering an abortion as the pregnancy is affecting a planned trip. I found that this example did not help to further her argument, because the general population and the government agree that abortions from the sixth month to the end of pregnancy are not commonly allowed unless in the case that the mother or child’s life is at risk. The argument for allowing abortions after six months is not a political argument, but more so a medical argument, dependent on a threat to the life of the mother or the child, thus, I feel that it doesn’t fall within the scope of the abortion debate that Thompson is discussing in her essay.  

Faye Ginsburg’s ethnography Contested Lives centers around the community of Fargo, North Dakota in the years after the Supreme Court’s decision on Roe v Wade in 1973. After the opening of the first women’s clinic performing abortions in Fargo in 1981, the abortion debate quickly picked up steam in the community, and Ginsburg uses this as a model to illustrate how the debate takes place in the United States. Ginsburg’s first goal with the ethnography was to “understand the [abortion] debate at the community level,” which is why she chose the community of Fargo as it is small but large enough to comprise “diversity in class, ethnicity and religion” (3). Ginsburg’s second goal for the ethnography was to “understand the [abortion] debate from the ‘actor’s’ points of view” which is why she chooses to interview both female pro-life and pro-choice activists, as she believes they offer the most relevant insight into the abortion debate (3). Ginsburg accomplishes these goals by first detailing the rise of the contemporary abortion debate in America beginning when physicians began to seek to control over access to abortions in the late nineteenth century and continuing through to the historic decision of Roe v Wade in 1973 and the rise of the right-to-life movement in the following years. She then shifts from the macro view of the debate at the national level to stories of activists within the community of Fargo following the opening of clinic in 1981. Ginsburg ends the ethnography by coming to the conclusion that “the definitions of female gender identity and the domestic domain have focused more and more on questions regarding reproduction and its relationship to nurturance” (213) because of the changes in the last fifty years regarding more women entering the workforce while still remaining the primary agent of accomplishing household labor. Additionally, Ginsburg uses the narratives of the women that she converses with to arrive at the conclusion that women on both sides of the debate are fighting for the same issues, and their differences in how to resolve the issue are governed by their contrasting life experiences.

Ginsburg’s purpose with her ethnography was not to argue for one side of the debate or the other as we saw in the Thompson reading; instead, she sought to present both sides of the debate in a truthful manner as it plays out in real communities. For this reason, I thought that her method of interviewing women who are actively participating in the debate was a convincing way to portray both sides in a non-biased manner. Often with pieces of literature discussing controversial topics which are as polarizing as abortion, it becomes difficult to report in an unbiased manner. Ginsburg mentions that she posed as a journalist in the community, which allowed her to “establish rapport quickly with both sides, each of which was seeking publicity” (5). Her position as a reporter allowed her access to information from both sides of the debate without being regarded or judged as being pro-life or pro-choice, and this position put her in a place to receive accurate information to report in the ethnography. She discusses her positionality as an unmarried, Jewish woman entering a largely conservative, Christian population (5). She states this herself that her “cultural strangeness…served to [her] advantage” (5) because she did not have to ‘prove’ her Christian beliefs. I felt that Ginsburg’s positionality and discussion of her positionality was pivotal in showing how she was an adequate person to perform this ethnography. Without this, the question of whether the ethnography is biased or unbiased would arise. Overall, I thought that Ginsburg did an excellent job of reporting both sides of the debate and did so in a manner that can be extrapolated to the national level of debate.

Abortion is an extremely complicated topic in the United States, and far too often with controversial issues such as this one, individuals will take one side and refuse to listen to the other’s point of view. From this standpoint, I enjoyed reading Ginsburg’s Contested Lives because it presented both the pro-life and pro-choice arguments in a clear and concise manner. As someone who is staunchly pro-choice, reading both sides of the debate only strengthened my own view on the subject. This is because Ginsburg presented both sides of the argument with support from discussions with women which allows the reader to understand why people believe that abortion should be legal or not. In particular Ginsburg states that people on either side of the debate are most divided “in their view of the causes for and solutions to the unequal effects of sexual activity” (6). She further explains that pro-choice advocates believe the cause of gender inequality to be rooted in gender discrimination whereas pro-life advocates inherently accept a “social and biological” difference between genders (7). This discussion by Ginsburg allowed me to align my own views along this framework. After considering each statement Ginsburg made, I affirmed that I do not believe that men and women have inherent social roles, but I do agree that their biological roles are different because a man does not carry a child in the way that a woman does. Additionally, I do believe that legal abortion is a mechanism through which women are allowed the same choice as men to decide whether they want to care for a child or not. If a woman falls pregnant, and she is forced to carry the pregnancy through to term, even the option of adoption creates a burden on the mind that some men do not experience because they may never know that they have fathered a child. In this sense I found that my own personal views aligned with what Ginsburg stated to be the “pro-choice” view and because it did fall in line with what Ginsburg had specifically stated, it help me to confirm my beliefs to the root of the abortion issue. In contrast, I found myself retracing the pro-choice argument while reading Thompson’s essay due to the lack of evidence to support the logical argument. I found myself having to draw conclusions myself and connect Thompson’s argument with examples from my own life, which is not as effective as offering evidence that is concrete to a broad audience would be. Thompson’s goal was to present an argument as to why abortion should be legal, but I was not fully convinced by her argument.

The readings for this unit build a solid foundation to understand the complex nature of the abortion debate in America. As someone who is looking to work on reproductive health policy in the future, it is crucial to understand the origins of arguments from individuals on both sides of the debate. Personally, I have always thought the pro-life argument was based in religion, and while it largely is, there is something to be said for the moral side of the argument. While the readings did not change my own position on the subject, I found that together they did an excellent job of presenting the similarities and differences in people’s mindsets on both sides of the debate.

The concept of abortion has been around for centuries and inevitably the question is asked of whether abortion should be legal at all. In the years since the landmark decision by the Supreme Court on the case of Roe v Wade, the abortion debate has intensified as part of the political discourse in America. The question of abortion, of whether a woman should or should not be able to terminate her pregnancy, has many ethical, moral and religious arguments. In the current political climate of the United States, the question of abortion is incredibly polarizing, and data from the Pew Research Center suggests that the divide is increasingly falling along political party lines. The readings for this unit present both sides of the debate and the central arguments behind each side’s position. Judith Jarvis Thompson presents an argument supporting abortion in her essay “A Defense of Abortion” through an interesting series of hypothetical situations and analogies. On the other hand, Faye Ginsburg’s ethnography Contested Lives offers insight into both sides of the abortion debate in America through the rise of the debate within the microcosm of Fargo, North Dakota.

In “A Defense of Abortion”, Judith Jarvis Thompson argues that there are situations in which abortion is not immoral and therefore that abortion should not be entirely illegal. Her essay uses two central arguments to illustrate her point as well as multiple hypothetical situations and analogies to put abstract situations regarding the effect of pregnancy on a woman’s body into perspective. The first argument Thompson makes is that the fetus itself does not constitute a person in the same way we regard ‘you’ or ‘me’ as a person. She makes the specific point that while development from the moment of conception is a continuous process, and any line that we draw to say when a fetus becomes a person is arbitrary, we cannot feasibly say that the amalgamation of cells that arises just after conception constitutes a whole person. The majority of the essay follows Thompson’s second argument regarding the effect of the fetus on the mother’s body. She uses a hypothetical situation in which she prompts the reader to imagine being held against their will and hooked up to a well-known violinist so that he may survive by using the reader’s kidneys to illustrate the idea of carrying a fetus through nine months of pregnancy. Thompson first nullifies the argument of those against abortion even in the case of direct harm to the mother should she carry the pregnancy through to term. Thompson then presents the case of involuntary pregnancy such as that which occurs through rape. Lastly, Thompson discusses the case in which a woman simply is not in a position to be responsible for the fetus.

While Thompson’s logical arguments were sound in her defense of abortion, I found that her use of hypothetical situations and analogies took away from the arguments she was trying to make. Many of the analogies she used, such as the involuntary attachment to the violinist, the hand of Henry Fonda as a life-saving measure, or the boy keeping chocolate from his brother, were oversimplifications of the ideas of pregnancy and abortion. A violinist attached to you that you have never met would most likely hold a much different value when compared to a fetus that is made from your own genetic material. In this sense, I found that her methodology was not as effective as it could have been if, perhaps, she had used more apt analogies or built further on her logical arguments. Additionally, Thompson mentions at the end of the essay that she argues for abortion in some circumstances only and not all situations, however, to illustrate this, she uses the example of a woman in her seventh month of pregnancy considering an abortion as the pregnancy is affecting a planned trip. I found that this example did not help to further her argument, because the general population and the government agree that abortions from the sixth month to the end of pregnancy are not generally allowed unless in the case that the mother or child’s life is at risk. The argument for allowing abortions after six months is not a political argument, but more so a medical argument, thus, I feel that it doesn’t fall within the scope of the abortion debate that Thompson is discussing in her essay.  

Faye Ginsburg’s ethnography Contested Lives centers around the community of Fargo, North Dakota in the years after the Supreme Court’s decision on Roe v Wade in 1973. After the opening of the first women’s clinic performing abortions in Fargo in 1981, the abortion debate quickly picked up steam in the community, and Ginsburg uses this as a model to illustrate how the debate takes place in the United States. Ginsburg’s first goal with the ethnography was to “understand the [abortion] debate at the community level,” which is why she chose the community of Fargo as it is small but large enough to comprise “diversity in class, ethnicity and religion” (3). Ginsburg’s second goal for the ethnography was to “understand the [abortion] debate from the ‘actor’s’ points of view” which is why she chooses to interview both female pro-life and pro-choice activists, as she believes they offer the most relevant insight into the abortion debate (3). Ginsburg accomplishes these goals by first detailing the rise of the contemporary abortion debate in America beginning when physicians began to seek to control over access to abortions in the late nineteenth century and continuing through to the historic decision of Roe v Wade in 1973 and the rise of the right-to-life movement in the following years. She then shifts from the macro view of the debate at the national level to stories of activists within the community of Fargo following the opening of clinic in 1981. Ginsburg uses the narratives of the women that she converses with to arrive at the conclusion that women on both sides of the debate are fighting for the same issues, and their differences in how to resolve the issue are governed by their contrasting life experiences.

Ginsburg’s purpose with her ethnography was not to argue for one side of the debate or the other as we saw in the Thompson reading; instead, she sought to present both sides of the debate in a truthful manner as it plays out in real communities. For this reason, I thought that her method of interviewing women who are actively participating in the debate was a convincing way to portray both sides in a non-biased manner. Often with pieces of literature discussing controversial topics which are as polarizing as abortion, it becomes difficult to report in an unbiased manner. Ginsburg mentions that she posed as a journalist in the community, and this allowed her to build connections on both sides of the spectrum as they all saw Ginsburg as a publicity mechanism (5). Her position as a reporter allowed her access to information from both sides of the debate without being regarded or judged as being pro-life or pro-choice. She discusses her positionality as an unmarried, Jewish woman entering a largely conservative, Christian population, and I found that this gave her more credibility in her reporting. She states this herself that since she was Jewish, she did not have to ‘prove’ her Christian beliefs. Overall, I thought that Ginsburg did an excellent job of reporting both sides of the debate and did so in a manner that can be extrapolated to the national level of debate.

Abortion is an extremely complicated topic in the United States, and far too often with controversial issues such as this one, individuals will take one side and refuse to listen to the other’s point of view. From this standpoint, I enjoyed reading Ginsburg’s Contested Lives because it presented both the pro-life and pro-choice arguments in a clear and concise manner. As someone who is staunchly pro-choice, reading both sides of the debate only strengthened my own view on the subject. Ginsburg presented both sides of the argument with support from discussions with women which allows the reader to understand why people believe that abortion should be legal or not. This forced me to consider my own life experiences and what leads me to believe in the choice argument, and by relating my own experiences to those discussed in the book, I was able to confirm my belief in a woman’s right to choose. In contrast, I found myself rethinking the pro-choice argument while reading Thompson’s essay due to the lack of evidence to support the logical argument. Even though Thompson’s goal was to present an argument as to why abortion should be legal, I was not fully convinced by her argument, because I personally did not relate to the hypothetical situations and analogies she used.

The readings for this unit build a solid foundation to understand the complex nature of the abortion debate in America. As someone who is looking to work on reproductive health policy in the future, it is crucial to understand the origins of arguments from individuals on both sides of the debate. Personally, I have always thought the pro-life argument was based in religion, and while it largely is, there is something to be said for the moral side of the argument. While the readings did not change my own position on the subject, I found that together they did an excellent job of presenting the similarities and differences in people’s mindsets on both sides of the debate.

This week’s readings focus on ethnographic approaches to surrogacy in several ways. They examine a variety of ethnographic methods in relation to surrogacy and other bioethical issues, while also analyzing how these ethnographies may or may not successfully represent a culture and impact public policy.

Arthur Kleinman’s “Moral Experience and Ethical Reflection: Can Ethnography reconcile them? A quandary for the new Bioethics” critiques current ethnographic approaches to bioethics for not focusing enough on the lived experiences of the individual and failing to generalize conclusions to inform policy change. Kleinman begins by explaining different approaches to bioethics. Basing bioethics on the idea of human nature and universal objective truths, he claims, cannot work because of widespread disagreement on what human nature entails. If there is no universal understanding of human nature, natural law cannot be universal. Using evolutionary arguments is even more hopeless, as we cannot know our ancestors’ evolution of ethics. Complete cultural relativism also has pitfalls, with local ethics only being able to be understood in the context of a translocal framework. Further, using only locally-based ethics may lead us to condone acts like genocide where it is locally accepted, even if outsiders know that it is universally wrong. Thus, a combination of local and translocal ethical principles must be used to assess individual moral reasoning. 

Kleinman’s solution is to use ethnography to inform bioethics. He complains though that clinicians generally do not understand the research approach of ethnography, while ethnographers perhaps lack training in the pragmatic side of ethics. Kleinman argues that ethnography should be used directly to impact ethical deliberation, and that ethnographies that fail to do so are unsuccessful. The work of Paul Farmer, and ethnographer and physician, is seen to be successful by Kleinman because it reformed the global strategies for dealing with MDR tuberculosis. 

While it’s great to hear a case of systemic change as a result of ethnography, Kleinman fails to note that Farmer’s job as a physician puts him in a unique position to make credible recommendations for changes to clinical care standards. Many ethnographers may recognize systemic issues in the course of producing an ethnography, yet not feel comfortable directly approaching policymakers with recommendations on bioethical issues as a non-clinician. So while it’s true that ethnography often ends at description and interpretation, it is perhaps not the burden of the ethnographer to move to further action unless they are so inclined and qualified. I would not call an ethnography ending in description unsuccessful, because it can be used for later prescriptivist interpretation by those with training in that field.

The second focus of Kleinman’s article is the gap between the lived experience of individuals and their culture’s official views. Kleinman provides the example of abortion in China. Decades of ethnographies focused on religious, governmental, and philosophical views regarding abortion. Jing Bao Nie then conducted an ethnographical study of individuals and found that men often did not even know when their wives had an abortion. The decision and moral deliberation usually fell squarely in the hands of women, and in a patriarchal society the voice of women had been disregarded in prior studies. Thus, in order to gain a true view of how bioethics are being applied in a society, it is necessary to examine the lived experiences and morals of individuals within that culture. He applauds Rayna Rapp’s ethnography, which we read earlier in this class, for doing this well.

I agree with Kleinman’s conclusion, but I would have preferred it expressed in fewer and simpler words. Of the readings for this week, Kleinman’s article was by far the most difficult to digest. There is little organization to the article and some concepts are presented in such an abstract manner as to be left ambiguous. For someone interested in pragmatism of research, Kleinmain makes surprisingly little effort to make his article approachable and to clearly communicate his views. 

Another paper Kleinman would surely applaud is Elly Teman’s “The Social Construction of surrogacy research: An anthropological critique of the psychosocial scholarship on surrogate motherhood.” This article explores ways in which past research involving the experience and psychology of surrogates has used Western assumptions surrounding motherhood to slant both their methods and conclusions. The article presents and rebuts three primary assumptions surrounding surrogacy: that surrogates have abnormal psychology, that surrogates are motivated by altruistic or reparative reasons rather than financial ones, and that surrogates are somehow avoiding or denying their grief over “losing” a child. Incredibly, Teman is able to use results and testimony from these problematic studies themselves to rebut each assumption. 

I found it interesting how in a literature review, conducted as part of her ethnographic study, Teman began analyzing the assumptions made by researchers rather than the surrogates they studied. It becomes clear that the researchers are clinging to traditional views such as a mother’s instinctive attachment to a child to which she gives birth and the nurturing/emotional nature of a woman. They justified the surrogate’s choice to gestate someone else’s baby with her trying to right past wrongs such as abortions, and assumed surrogate mothers have an experience comparable to mothers who give up their children for adoption. Instead of going into interviews with an open mind, researchers imposed their own worldview upon surrogates and did not adjust their conclusions to reflect the evidence they found. Teman managed to turn these unsuccessful studies into an insightful and compelling article. 

Kleinman would also be happy to see that Teman takes her conclusions and makes prescriptive suggestions for policy surrounding surrogacy. These recommendations include allowing surrogates to continue contact with recipient couples, to whom they’ve been shown to have more difficulty with separation than to the child. Group counseling for the couple and the surrogate together is also advisable rather than the surrogate alone, since surrogates are shown to have more issues with communication with the recipient couple than with relinquishing the baby. 

The third reading for this week is “Gestational Surrogacy in Iran” by Shirin Garamoudi Naef. This chapter utilizes primarily close readings of Islamic texts, interviews with religious scholars, and discussions with/observation of those who are receiving or have received assisted reproductive technology (ART). Naef makes the interesting distinction between Sunni and Shia views on ART when it comes to gamete donation and surrogacy. 

In the Sunni view, mixing of bodily substances is the primary concern when it comes to incest and adultery. Mixing of identical bodily fluids is the basis of incest. All biological substance is said to come from the man, so even milk is considered a male agnastic substance originating from the pregnancy. So any baby who has suckled from the same milk as oneself is covered under marriage prohibition. Because the mixing of reproductive substance is forbidden outside marriage, donor gametes are forbidden. Further, because women have no reproductive substance, gestation is the only determinant of motherhood and surrogacy would result in a child unequivocally belonging to the surrogate. Surrogacy is therefore forbidden as well. 

The Shia view is that the forbidden act in adultery and incest is the act of sex rather than combining of fluids. Further, the biological contribution of men and women is considered roughly equal and symmetrical. This means that even donor sperm or ova is permissible in that it is not adulterous, though the child is usually considered to be that of the donor. In the case of surrogacy, the gestational surrogate is usually considered to simply be nurturing the embryo. According to scholars such as Ayatollah Sane’i, it does not even break religious law to have an unmarriageable individual or sibling act as surrogate. Surrogates interviewed showed joy at being able to help others achieve parenthood and didn’t express attachment to the children they bore.

Naef goes over many different interpretations of the Qur’an and Islamic law. One of the most intriguing parts of the chapter for me was the instances in which individuals believe a gestational surrogate is also a mother. It was explained that inheritance occurs between a gestational surrogate and child, and it occurred to me that in a scientific sense this does happen to some degree. Epigenetic factors are affected to a large degree during pregnancy, and uterine hormone levels are theorized to affect aspects of children from personality to physical characteristics. Gestational surrogates do impact the attributes of the babies they bear. Whether that grants them status of mother is another question.

While Naef does speak to individuals involved in the ART process, she uses her discussions with religious scholars as a framework for her analysis. Arthur Kleinman and Elly Teman might be critical of this ethnographic approach, noting that while it conveys the official views of the community, it may not reflect the true actions and beliefs of individuals. Both the Teman article and the chapter by Naef are clearly written and nicely organized, making them accessible to the layperson. 

As the result of gamete donation myself and someone likely to use a surrogate later in life, I have been curious as to how these technologies are viewed by others. While my gut feeling is that a surrogate has little stake in a child after birth and definitely no kinship relation, it has been eye-opening to see that this is not the default view for everyone. It is a relief though to learn that surrogates across cultures seem to feel that they are not a parent. 

One question I’d pose to the class is why so many religious leaders and governments continue to impose a kinship bond between gestational surrogate and child when that relationship is wanted by neither surrogate nor intentional parents? When all stakeholders want the same thing, I’d think the solution would be obvious and uncontroversial, but it is not. Further, do you suppose surrogates are proof that the “instinctive” mother-child bond is culturally/socially-based, or is the surrogate’s lack of a bond to the children they birth due to some other factor? The same goes for other issues/assumptions brought up in Teman’s article — do you have theories for why these phenomena really occur? And for anyone in the class seeing surrogacy as wrong or exploitative, I’d be very interested in hearing your perspective and arguments in your comment or during class if you’re willing to share.

The idea of procreation has been a heavily emphasized idea among religious figures, academic scholars, politicians, as well as the general public. And, the fact that “procreation” can be carried out through advancing biotechnology furthermore adds relevance to the discussion of said topic in today’s society, as it raises important questions regarding the legitimacy of biotechnology in social, cultural, and religious contexts. That being said, motherhood, a topic linked to procreation, has been set aside, ignored as it is placed in the shadows of wedge issues like abortion. However, motherhood should not be ignored when making rational decisions regarding biotechnologies, especially surrogacy. This is due to the fact that mothers do account for half of a child’s genetic composition and the rearing of said child. Therefore, scholars are claiming their stakes in correcting thinking about motherhood, as well as its relation to surrogacy, as it provides further implications and answers to the idea of permissible procreation. “Blessing Unplanned Pregnancy: Religion and the Discourse of Women’s Agency in Public Health” provides the contexts to which we should rethink unintended pregnancies in motherhood and “New Reproductive Technologies: Protestant Modes of Thought” explores the multiple perspectives of Protestants behind these technologies in a way to rid the idea of a single story and show duality behind thoughts regarding unintended pregnancies and views on surrogacy respectively. On the other hand, “Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: A Feminist Perspective” and “Made in India” both lay claims in surrogacy, even if they do not agree with each other. 

In “Blessing Unplanned Pregnancy: Religion and the Discourse of Women’s Agency in Public Health”, written by Don Seeman, Iman Roushdy-Hammady, and Annie Hardison-Moody, the authors explore the concept of unplanned pregnancies and the tensions that emerge between the ideas of intentions and blessings in relation to these types of pregnancies. The authors of this essay are able to explore these ideas through their ethnographic study – including participant observations, focus groups, and interviews with shelter staff members and sixteen shelter residents – at Naomi’s House, a shelter for homeless mothers who are mostly African Americans. From their studies, they observed that “multiple women ended up homeless due to their unintentional pregnancies, yet they still considered their pregnancies as a blessing or a turning point in their lives” (Seeman et al. 2). By the end of the study, the authors claim that their study “suggests for better engagement with different registers and contexts of intentionality as it might contribute to more adequate accounts of women’s agency in reproduction” (Seeman et al. 46). That being said, I thought this ethnography to be successful, as it really considered all aspects of the participants’ lives. This allowed for a discussion between being religious and being spiritual among these women, as many women claimed not to be religious but constantly used the word blessing. The vernacular behind the word “blessing” in this study demonstrates an outside force that provided “an avenue to better social support or decisions to escape debilitating personal relationships” (Seeman et al. 46). And because of their study, they were able to show – through the inclusion of Ginsburg’s ethnography over abortion – that the use of the vernacular “blessing” is seen throughout the American reproductive landscape, not just that of African Americans (Seeman et al. 45). This further supports the idea that more research needs to be done, as by exploring various accounts, scholars will be able to find pieces that more accurately describe women’s agency in reproduction. With that said, these authors were able to use their interviews to pinpoint the vernacular that suggested a lack of human agency among mothers, which I believe supports their claim in suggesting for more adequate accounts outside of the ones studied.

Often times, we think of single stories when we learn about certain topics, and we see that single story for all when it comes to unplanned pregnancies, often neglecting that there is more to the story. For unplanned pregnancies, we think of young, ignorant couples that we see portrayed through media as people who could not bother to use contraceptive methods. We see these couples as irresponsible, barely able to keep themselves together, and living terrible lives. Going off of this point, we – as a society – have painted these unintentional pregnancies in a negative light. In a way, this ethnography takes back this single-story, giving a voice to the mothers and showing society that unplanned pregnancies are not terrible and those that have them are not irresponsible and/or bad people. It showed that these mothers are not unknowledgeable for they had “an inability to influence their partners to use contraceptives or contribute to child rearing” (Seeman et al. 39). There are multiple reasons for unplanned pregnancies, and they can have success stories as women have “managed to reframe their lives around achievement and success rather than endless struggles and disappointment” (Seeman et al. 36). Therefore, this ethnography allowed me to rethink unintended pregnancy – and others as well – in that it gave mothers a voice in showing unintended pregnancies as not mere accidents but blessings. 

In the same way,  “New Reproductive Technologies: Protestant Modes of Thought” refutes the idea of the single-story for how Protestants view these reproductive technologies, namely surrogacy. He does this by first mentioning in the beginning that “There is no single ‘Protestantism,’ nor is it clear to what authorities all Protestants agree to bend the knee” (Meilaender 1637). He then continues to show that there is no single “Protestantism” – or way of thinking among Protestants – by invoking various theological ethicists and their viewpoints regarding reproductive technologies. For example, while McDowell turns to the Bible to understand the meaning of parenthood and finds that the first loyalty is to God through the “binding of Issac”, Fletcher “takes Jesus’ warning not to love father or mother more than God as offering a new understanding of the family, no longer grounded in ‘blood’ or genes or genital origin” (Meilaender 1637). Clearly, we have two opposing views in response to surrogacy. That being said, Meilaender fails to offer his own commentary and explanations on whether or not he supports or refutes these points. I believe that he does this to support the point that I first mentioned: the multiplicity behind Protestantism. By showing these viewpoints and not subjecting himself to agreeing on one, he is showing that Protestants have multiple viewpoints – that there are gray areas that are not rigidly defined as in other religions. 

Reading through this piece, it is easy to say that Meilaender considers multiple perspectives when thinking about Protestantism and surrogacy. However, there seems like a lack of direction because he solely focuses on these works and does not use them to support or oppose surrogacy in his own opinion. However, I did find one opinion made by the author. Meilaender “records here his judgment that the Smith/Ramsey view would prove more adequate than the Fletcher view” (Meilaender 1643). However, he does not fully comment on why he believes the views of Smith/Ramsey to be more sufficient than that of Fletcher. If anything, I think that Meilaender thinks this because he agrees with Smith/Ramsey in that reproductive technologies should not be supported. I thought that he supported Smith/Ramsey because most of the viewpoints he included were similar in that they were against surrogacy. He even includes O’Donovan to further contrast Fletcher, and therefore, refute Fletcher’s point in my opinion. But, he does not clearly state which side he is on in terms of the debate over reproductive technologies. That being said, I think he was unsuccessful in trying to get his opinion – on the matter at hand – across, as it got convoluted with the various perspectives and lack of commentary on those viewpoints. However, I do admit he was successful in showing that Protestantism has various viewpoints and cannot be diluted down to a single-story. 

While Meilaender refuses to refute or support surrogacy as he “worried less about particular conclusions than about the theological approaches at work”, Rothman in “Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: A Feminist Perspective” opposes the idea of surrogacy through a feminist’s lens (Meilaender 1646). She does so by employing ethos, in that she establishes her credibility as a sociologist and feminist within the opening of the article. By doing so, the audience feels that she is in a place that can support or refute surrogacy, as most people will not question the legitimacy of her claim because she is able to use her position as a feminist to comment on surrogacy. Furthermore, she uses linguistics to show signs of patriarchy in society, as when “Mrs. John Smit bears John Smith Jr.” (Rothman 1600). Therefore, this demonstrates the child as the man’s child and the man’s child only, where the man must plant his seed in the woman. However, this shows a loss of control of the man’s child, which is why Rothman brings to light that “to control the seed is to control the women” (Rothman 1600). Clearly, Rothman would not like this idea of patriarchy, as demonstrated in pregnancy, because she is herself feminist. Thus, she opposes the idea of surrogacy because that would imply control over women. For instance, not only would men have control over women, but “women, too, may have the use of wives” (Rothman 1602). She continues on with this argument by mentioning the moral story of Abraham, Sarah, and Haagar, as well as a modern-day case known as the Baby M case. What these examples illustrate is the idea that “Women do not have particular rights to their children” and “these rights are weakened dramatically by the position women find themselves in within our society (Rothman 1603). Furthermore, this implies that women are helpless in their position and will always lose without a doubt, which in turn makes the audience pity these women and come to terms with Rothman’s argument. That being said, I believe that Rothman also uses pathos in that we feel sympathy towards the women who are at the hands of a society dominated by men. With her employing ethos, logos, and pathos, I believe that Rothman’s argument is successful. That being said, Rothman clearly does not support surrogacy because it supports a non-feminist agenda in her viewpoint. 

However, Rothman does claim that “Religions have hesitated about any kind of “artificial” procreation at all. She includes that Jewish traditions are a part of this as well. However, based on our previous readings and class discussions, I thought that Jews did support reproductive technologies. For example, I thought that the state of Israel heavily invests in reproductive technologies, as they wanted to ensure procreation. Therefore, I think it would be important to note where she got her information regarding the views of religion in their claims to surrogacy, and I would like to know others’ stance on her inclusion of religion in her argument. If religions do not support the idea of reproductive technologies, why attack it in the first place if it, in the end, helps support Rothman’s appeal to end surrogacy. In context, I understand that she is trying to rid the ties of women as not worthy without children and to advocate feminism. I just thought it was interesting that she decided to comment on religion when it would be advancing her claim in opposing surrogacy. 

On the other hand, I feel that the film “Made in India” supports surrogacy. This ethnographic documentary by Rebecca Haimowitz and Vaishali Sinha follows an American couple, Lisa Switzer and Brian Switzer. This couple has tried fertility drugs, intra-uterine insemination, and IVF counseling over the past seven years but to no avail. Therefore, they turn to surrogacy so that Lisa can fulfill her dreams of having a child. At the beginning of the film, she states that “a woman a lot of times defines herself by her ability to have children”. Clearly, she is desperate to have her own children, and therefore, chooses to go to India for surrogacy purposes. This is due to the fact that U.S. surrogacy costs around $70,000 to $100,000 according to the film. By going to India, Lisa and Brian will be able to fulfill the dream of having a child at a much cheaper cost. Therefore, this documentary follows the couple’s adventures, which are full of obstacles nonetheless, in using surrogacy as their one last chance at parenthood. Within the film, they employ interviews with Lisa, Brian, the clinic, the surrogate, as well as others. By doing this, the audience is able to see surrogacy from multiple perspectives, especially that of the gestational carrier, which we were unable to read about. That being said, the audience did not get to hear much from the surrogate because issues related to money in personal opinion. In fact, her experiences with the emergency c-section were zero to none; I was not sure if she was able to have a say in any of these procedures as it made it sound like she had no clue what was going on in the hospital. For me at least, that could be used as a negative against surrogacy. But, the film also included at the end how she was happy and asked to be a surrogate again, so in a way, the film did try to rebuttal that one detail. In addition, Lisa and Brian state that they would go back and do it [the process of surogacy] again, despite the obstacles they faced. That being said, I believe that the film “Made in India” did paint surrogacy in a rather positive way, therefore supporting the idea of surrogacy in a successful way. They were able to rebuttal most, if not all, negative aspects of surrogacy as described above. 

All in all, these readings and the film gave insight into motherhood and surrogacy through various perspectives. It is clear that some of the readings and film employed ethnographies, as well as rhetorical strategies, to either support or refute surrogacy. That being said, I was able to come to the conclusion that everyone has different opinions in trying to advance their motives like with Rothman denying surrogacy because it allows not only men to have control over women/surrogates but women as well. Therefore, in order to accurately come to conclusions regarding surrogacy and reproductive technologies, one must actively pursue various viewpoints in order to fully understand the complexity behind surrogacy and its relationships just as “Blessing Unplanned Pregnancy: Religion and the Discourse of Women’s Agency in Public Health” calls for more adequate accounts.

Discussion Points: 

• Do you think the inclusion of religion was necessary for Rothman’s claim? Why or why not? 
• Do you think surrogacy is an attack on feminism? Why or why not? 
• If Meilaender were to have a view on surrogacy, do you think the author would support it or oppose it, and why or why not? 
• What would agency look like in terms of a surrogate? Do surrogates even have agency? How does one decide to become a surrogate? To clarify, do you think it is more of a relationship between different reasons, and if so, which ones? We read a lot of readings and watched a film regarding using surrogates but none from the perspective of one. 
• Should we even offer the option of surrogacy, and why or why not? For instance, there is the option of adoption. It may seem a little extreme to travel to a country on the opposite side of the world to have a child when there are plenty within our country who do not have homes. 

The movie and readings for this week focused on themes related to motherhood, including how it is defined with regards to surrogacy, religion, and women’s agency. Two of the readings, both published in 1991, “Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: A Feminist Perspective” and “New Reproductive Technologies: Protestant Modes of Thought”, focus on theories posed by a feminist and Protestant ethicists, respectively. In contrast, we looked at two ethnographic approaches completed in the past 10 years, “Made in India” documentary and “Blessing Unplanned Pregnancy: Religion and the Discourse of Women’s Agency in Public Health”, which observe various women’s experiences with pregnancy, whether unplanned or via reproductive technology. These methodologies allow us to take the issues with motherhood posed 20 years prior and apply it to the life experiences of women observed today.   

Barbara Katz Rothman’s paper, “Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: A Feminist Perspective”, details her perspective as a feminist, sociologist, and surrogate mediator. She details her opposition to surrogacy due to its “underlying ideology of patriarchy” (Rothman, p 1599) and employs a feminist perspective to argue against the support of surrogacy. Rothman uses the example of Baby M to demonstrate surrogacy results in issues regarding custody of the child. We see similar complications of this nature arise when Lisa and Brian Swtizer of “Made in India” encounter legal obstacles taking their twins from the Indian hospital. She claims the ambiguous and complicated genetic relationship, which is forged by the existing patriarchy for their ultimate benefit, demonstrates that women are “just the flowerpot in which men plant it…mommy is simply dirt” (Rothman, p 1603). Rothman also argues women’s gestational process allows them to earn motherhood, stating that “her nurturing of that child with the blood and nutrients of her body establishes her parenthood of that child” (Rothman, p 1607). She argues that the patriarchal system fails to recognize the intimate social relationship women have with the children they carry and allows for the commodification and subsequent purchasing of a woman’s parenthood.

 I’m curious as to how Rothman would presently view medical tourism for surrogacy and if she would attribute this to an extension of colonialism and the patriarchy. India is just one of many countries with a long, brutal history of colonialism that find themselves hotspots for medical tourism companies such as Planet Hospital, which is featured in “Made in India”. I would be interested to hear Rothman’s thoughts with regards to the extension of means and privilege beyond domestic borders in pursuit of cheaper reproductive technology.

While Rothman states her opposition is separate from religious institutions, Gilbert Meilaender writes about surrogacy through various Protestant viewpoints in “New Reproductive Technologies: Protestant Modes of Thought”. His paper displays prominent Protestant theological ethicists interpretations of surrogacy through a Protestant lens. Meilaender identifies the differences in their arguments and attributes them to various interpretations of religious texts, a point he attributes to the diverse thinking of Protestantism, compared to the reliance of religious institutions, such as  Catholicism. 

Meilaender begins by looking at the meaning of parenthood, in which ethicist Janet Dickey McDowell sources the Biblical story of Abram, Sarah, and Hagar to suggest “there is a high value on procreation”. We’ve seen this scripture used in other arguments regarding reproductive technology, including Rothman’s use of the text to suggest the fundamental message in the story of Haagar because mothers do not define the relationship. The father defines the relationship.” (Rothman, p 1601). Meilaender demonstrates the variability among Protestant ethicists by referencing  Paul Simmons contrasting argument that “these are parents by design, intention, and purpose”, reinforcing the commitment one endures through reproductive technology reassures love for their children and should we welcomed (Meilaender, p 1639). Overall, Meilaender’s use of multiple Protestant ethicists interpretations of surrogacy reinforces the idea that religious associations with surrogacy and reproductive technology are not black and white, especially within the Proestant Church. 

The documentary by Rebecca Haimowitz and Vaishali Sinha, “Made in India”, follows American couple Lisa and Brian Switzer as they travel to India to seek reproductive technology. After 7 years of infertility, the couple uses the aid of a medical tourism company to hire a surrogate, Aasia, for a substantially lower cost than in the US. This ethnographic film documents outsourced surrogacy and motherhood from the perspective of both the biological mother and gestational carrier.  

Personally, two of the main questions raised by the documentary are the limitations of agency and the morality of medical tourism. The documentary draws upon the fact that medical tourism often results in individuals with different economic means and cultures. For example, Lisa is an educated, employed Texas woman who hires Aasia, an Indian mother of three who is unable to read or write. Due to this class dichotomy, my question centers around whether surrogates in the medical tourism industry are subjected to a lack of agency, including education and influence, over their health. For example, Lisa and Aasia’s doctor in India noted they would implement 4 embryos in the single transfer, which is known to pose a significantly increased risk to both the fetuses and mother, but (falsely) increases the success one will stick. While I’m unsure if Aasia was made aware of the risks associated with a multiple transfer, she does note she was initially scared to hear she was carrying twins. The dangers become a reality when Aasia begins hemorrhaging, which forces her to give birth and leaves her in the hospital for 12 days and the children in the NICU. In my opinion, the documentary highlights and calls into question whether medical tourism companies prioritize the agency and health of the surrogates.

In the paper, “Blessing Unplanned Pregnancy: Religion and the Discourse of Women’s Agency in Public Health”, written by Don Seeman, Iman Roushdy-Hammady, and Annie Hardison-Moody, an ethnographic study is conducted at Naomi’s House, a women’s homeless shelter in the southeastern United States from 2007-2008. The study focuses on predominantly African American women who had unplanned/unintended pregnancies and how these pregnancies are viewed as religious/spiritual “blessings” in their lives. It also reframes the negative connotations associated with unplanned pregnancies, and instead shift the focus of such pregnancies to rational decisions with positive community and personal outcomes. The ethnography identifies  “agentive capacities”, such as divine agency, as a pivotal role in the pregnancies of mothers at Naomi’s House (Seeman et. al 2016). Seeman et al. (2016) notes “Naomi’s House residents frequently described pregnancy or motherhood as effectively beyond their control yet simultaneously emphasized that motherhood provided the context for them to start over…triumph over adversity.”(Seeman et. al 2016).

I think the ethnography demonstrates that desire to create a better life for their children is a key element of motherhood, specifically for women with less economic resources.  I was especially focused on that fact that both women in Naomi’s House and Aasia are willing to forgo current comfort for the betterment of their children’s future. Aasia, rather than use the money as a surrogate now, chose to put it in accounts for her children – a decision that will allow her children the possibility to marry into a higher economic class. One women in Naomi’s House, Tiffany, stated “I could have … stayed with family and with friends, but I needed to start over; I needed to better myself for my children. I needed to stop and break the pattern” (Seeman et. al 2016). To me, the experiences of these women exemplifies a distinct application of personal agency that puts the needs of one’s children over their own, a true demonstration of motherhood.

A common question I reached in each of the sources is: can you buy motherhood – whether through privilege and/or monetary means? “Made in India” demonstrates lower costs as a key element of why people are exporting surrogacy, why women are choosing to be surrogates, and the complications that arise when paying through third party medical tourism companies.  Rothman and Meilaender discuss oppositions to surrogacy based on class complications. Rothman states it is another way for the men to “buy themselves privileges [of patriarchy]” (Rothman, p 1602), while Protestant ethicist David H. Smith opposes surrogacy since “the fertile partner is purchasing authentic parenthood” (Meilaender, p 1640). However, Seeman et al. demonstrates that while women at Naomi’s House lack many economic resources, they view motherhood as a rational, positive choice (Seeman et al. 2016). Therefore, I would argue that while money/privilege often form the basis of many structural beliefs, it can’t be reduced to a single standard of agency. I think what constitutes experience of motherhood is constantly changing across communities and cultures as reproductive technology and public health evolves.   

The questions I pose to the class are: 

• Are there limited ways women can express agency? If so, who decides how agency is or isn’t expressed? 
• How can public health and legal measures extend agency to surrogates in medical tourism? What about women like those in Naomi’s House whose ideas surrounding divine agency don’t fit the rationale of many public health efforts? 

The theme of this week’s readings and film was the topic of motherhood and what motherhood may mean in different contexts. “Blessing Unintended Pregnancy: Religion and the Discourse of Women’s Agency in Public Health” showed how motherhood can motivate individuals to make a change in their lives. Outside of natural pregnancy, surrogacy, and more broadly reproductive technology, is a well debated topic with some individuals holding the position that surrogacy should exist, whereas others strongly oppose the idea of a woman bearing another woman’s child. The readings “Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: A Feminist Perspective” and “New Reproductive Technologies: Protestant Modes of Thought” as well as the film Made in India brought in different types of arguments either for or against surrogacy and reproductive technology and how religion, feminism and personal circumstance go into different understandings of what motherhood is.

Although pregnancy is something that can be planned, as many individuals ‘try for a baby’ or time procreation in order to become pregnant, it often takes time and there is a risk for becoming pregnant when you do not want to. Unplanned or unintentional pregnancy is thought to be a negative, and is subsequently correlated with things such as a poorer mental state, a bad prenatal environment, and an abusive environment for the child. The reading “Blessing Unintended Pregnancy: Religion and the Discourse of Women’s Agency in Public Health” displays the opposite and described how pregnancy is more than being either “intended or unintended,” but rather a combination of other things that have to be at work in order to “accommodate the mixed intentions and ambivalence, contingency, and sociocultural or religious constraints that characterize many women’s reproductive experiences” (Seeman, Roushdy-Hammady, Hardison-Moody, Thompson, Gaydos & Hogue, 2016). In addition, Seeman et al. (2016) aim to describe the influence of religion and spirituality on decision-making and planning as it relates to reproduction in low-income women, as well as describe the difference between religion and spirituality. This ethnographic study followed residents of Naomi’s House, an “urban shelter specializing in care for families with young children” (Seeman et al., 2016) over the course of fourteen months. The research was looking to “explore the everyday ways that women navigated and talked about their experiences of pregnancy, childbirth, and the challenges of homelessness” (Seeman et al., 2016). The women in the current study “expressed ambivalence with respect to the very notion of human control over reproductive contexts” (Seeman et al., 2016). This was demonstrated by one of the women in the shelter who, despite her hesitation to do so, received a tubal ligation. Her hesitation was not due to the fact that the procedure was ‘unbiblical’, but rather because it “represented […] an arrogation of the divine prerogative to send children into the world” (Seeman et al., 2016). This means that the tubal ligation goes against a woman’s given ability to have children. When the women became pregnant, despite their use of contraceptives, many of them ultimately determined that their unplanned pregnancies were ‘meant to be’ or ‘a blessing’ because it signified ‘God’s plan’ and “respect for divine initiative in creating life” (Seeman et al., 2016).

A lot of the women described using this shelter or their developing children as a ‘fresh start’ for themselves and their building family. The women did not “minimize the problems associated with homelessness,” but they were continuously able to “look back on their pregnancies as blessings rather than failures or catastrophes” (Seeman et al., 2016). The few women that planned their pregnancies, “despite their youth, socioeconomic hardship and overall lack of stability — challenge the common use of planning discourse by defining pregnancy in those challenging circumstances as an empowering realignment of the social world” (Seeman et al., 2016). In other words, although these women were in tough situations, they thought of their children as a way to get out of whatever situation they had previously been in and build a better one.

Another aim of the study was to describe the difference between being spiritual and being religious. Some of the women considered themselves as spiritual, but not religious. One woman described being spiritual as having a relationship with God whereas religion is “ritual practice and disdain for sinners” (Seeman et al., 2016) In other words, being spiritual is the physical relationship one shares with God while religion is a set of rules and practices that are adhered to by a group of people. The article concludes by comparing the terminology used to describe reproduction in the midst of unfortunate circumstances (i.e. violence) and the word most prominently used by these women: ‘blessing’. The article states that “blessing is […] comparable (though it is by no means identical) to tropes of ‘luck’ and ‘destiny’ that are central to women’s narratives about reproductive agency in other settings” (Seeman et al., 2016). This means that although the word blessing is different than the words luck and destiny, they all represent some outside agency, or something beyond human control, at work. To these women, motherhood was the reason for them to change the situation they were in to build a life for their child.

Motherhood is not always defined by a drive to change one’s unfortunate situation. “Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: A Feminist Perspective” by Barbara Rothman argues that surrogacy goes against her ideas of feminism and motherhood. She begins by defining patriarchy as a “system in which men rule as fathers,” which means that “the relationship between a father and his son is the defining social relationship” (Rothman, 2016). As a result of this, “women [are considered to] bear the children of men” (Rothman, 2016) This implies that children are solely a product of their father’s sperm or ‘seed’, and are not a product of their mother. She moves on by stating that “reproductive technologists were forced to confront the fact of women’s seed” (Rothman, 1991). In other words, in order to develop reproductive technology, technologists had to accept that women provide half of the genetic material to the child and that the child is not solely a product of their father. Since women have some of the “privileges of patriarchy,” through having ‘seed’ in their children like men, then the possibility exists for women to “have the use of wives” (Rothman, 1991) like men, and describes having a surrogate as the same as having a ‘wife’ and ‘buying’ patriarchal privileges which “does not work in the interests of women as a whole” (Rothman, 1991). Not only do women have at most fifty percent of the rights to her child, men hold the power, as men “repeatedly win custody battles at much higher rates than women,” and are more likely to remarry than women are after a divorce (Rothman, 1991). This reinforces the idea that the father is the ‘seed’ and the mother is the ‘dirt’ in which the seed grows.

Society responds to needing more children through “[preventing women] from avoiding pregnancy,” which “leads to the control of women’s bodies” (Rothman, 1991). This idea leaves surrogacy as the using of women’s bodies in order to fit the needs of society. Here, she is saying that society is looking out for its own best interest, not the woman’s. Rothman concludes by saying that “parenthood itself is an intimate social relationship wherever it develops and between whomever it develops,” and surrogacy should be rejected because the surrogate’s “nurturing of that child with the blood and nutrients of her body established her parenthood of that child” (Rothman, 1991). Motherhood to Rothman is the physical nurturing of the child as it develops in the womb. Therefore, the woman who bears the child is the mother and to hire a surrogate is to purchase a child through buying patriarchal privilege.

Surrogacy and other reproductive technologies have been considered through the writings in the Bible, and there continues to be disagreement on whether reproductive technology is acceptable. In Gilbert Meilaender’s “New Reproductive Technologies: Protestant Modes of Thought,” Meilaender analyzes multiple theological considerations from protestant thinkers. The reading begins with the writings of McDowell. She believes that the Bible “places high value upon procreation,” in the sense that “children [are] our primary link to the future and as a fulfillment of God’s promised blessing upon humankind” (Meilaender, 1991). However, despite the importance of children, they, as well as family, are not to be of highest importance. This is due to the fact that the “first and greatest command is not to have a family but to love God” (Meilaender, 1991). This does not mean that family should not be highly regarded, but instead means that although family should besought after, one’s love for their family should not surpass one’s love and devotion towards God. Surrogacy, to McDowell, is a child being seen as “an entity created in order to be given to others” (Meilaender, 1991) and should be seen as inappropriate. In contrast, Simmons writes that “biotechnical parenting” allows parents to be solid in their decision of having a child and that allows them to see their child as a ‘gift’ because the child’s birth was intentional (Meilaender, 1991). The reading continues with Smith, who argues two things: 1.) that surrogacy separates biology from familial sexual love and 2.) that the use of reproductive technology closes reproduction off from one partner. His first argument is saying that the child is intentionally being placed in a situation where their biological origins (developing in a surrogate, sperm/egg donation, or another use of reproductive technology) is different than the family in which they grow, and this makes his world “fractured” (Meilaender, 1991). Smith’s second argument explains that in using different types of reproductive technology, specifically with the use of gamete donation, one partner is excluded from the production of the child, making the partners unequal. Ramsey argues against surrogacy because humans are limited, yet have become “self-creators,” which makes us “free … [but] at the same time limitlessly used” (Meilaender, 1991). Here, Ramsey is saying that although humans have the freedom to create beings through reproductive technology, humans become ‘slaves’ to the technology that is available. In contrast, Fletcher is in support of reproductive technology because “kinship is essentially a matter of human interaction and will, of love and not of blood” (Meilaender, 1991). Here, Fletcher is saying that biology is not the sole determining factor for kinship, but is rather the created bond between a group of people. The reading continues with O’Donovan who believes that reproductive technology is ‘making’ humans which leaves the child a product of doctor’s creation. In O’Donovan’s opinion, the creation of children via reproductive technology deems humans as creators, which is a problem because only God is the creator. Meilaender summarized the thoughts of a few protestant thinkers. However, different from the other readings, Meilaender did not come to any conclusions about parenthood or formulate any opinions about reproductive technology, but instead provided readers with an overview of varying works.

Beyond religion, circumstance guides much of what people view as right or wrong or pushes them to do things despite what they may believe. The film Made in India tracks an American couple, Lisa and Brian, who could not naturally have a child. They were unable to afford surrogacy in the US, so instead went through a business to hire a surrogate, at a lower price, in India. The surrogate they hire, Aasia, is illiterate, uneducated, and trying to find money to support her children because her husband’s job was not bringing in the money it used to. The film shows Lisa and Brian travelling to India and the surprise of the different environment they experienced in the impoverished region of India Aasia lived in. A key facet of the movie was the confusion expressed by both Aasia and her husband about the procedure of surrogacy. The main focus of the company that Lisa and Brian used is to keep surrogacy as affordable as possible to Americans, and at the time that this film was created, this type of ‘outsourced’ surrogacy was becoming popular and had little regulations. The film was powerful in that watchers got a very detailed picture of the American couple and their surrogate. Watchers could see each step of everything that was happening and hear the thoughts of the couple as well as the surrogate through interviews. Lisa and Brian were willing to do whatever it took in order to have a child, despite not being about to talk to or oversee Aasia throughout the whole time she was pregnant.

            This week’s works were very diverse, but were able to paint a strong picture of differing views of motherhood and what that means, the lengths people are willing to take in order to have a child through reproductive technology, and the implications of those actions. I believe that “Blessing Unintended Pregnancy: Religion and the Discourse of Women’s Agency in Public Health” was a strong study showing an unexpected view of unplanned pregnancy. It was nice to read about how a child was such a strong turning point for a group of women. I think it would be interesting to see a similar study in different groups of people with differing religious beliefs to see how differing religion beliefs and differing situational factors influence women’s thoughts on unplanned pregnancy. With regards to Rothman’s “Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: A Feminist Perspective,” I believe that she wrote a lot about her beliefs about patriarchy in order to come to her conclusion that motherhood is whoever nurtured the child, which, in the case of surrogacy, would be the surrogate. I had a hard time understanding how the rest of her writing was related to her conclusion. Meilaender’s “New Reproductive Technologies: Protestant Modes of Thought” was an interesting read because it brought a plethora of readings that did not share the same thoughts. It was interesting to read about the theme throughout the reading of being both finite and free in the sense that we were created to have a free will, however we are limited as humans and how that related to reproductive technology. Although it was a good read, it was harder to comprehend because it was a summary of multiple works and I did not read the original works. The viewpoints of the different writers were harder to understand because I did not get that full picture of what each person was saying, and instead only saw what Meilaender pointed out. In addition, I have a rather limited view of the Bible. I am newly finding my own understanding of Christianity, so I do not have the strongest foundation of the concepts that based the theological thought shown throughout the reading. I continue to have the same question for the argument against reproductive technology in religion especially. How are things such as sperm and egg donation different from adoption? This reading talked about intentionality, and stated that reproductive technology is intentionally creating a child from sperm or eggs outside of marriage. Another argument was that adoption makes the couples ‘equal’ whereas with sperm and egg donation the partners are ‘unequal’. However, these arguments have not persuaded me. Lastly, the film Made in India was extremely strong, I think, because we could follow the couple and follow the surrogate. I have mixed feelings about whether or not I felt what the couple did was okay. It is hard because Aasia did get money and medical treatment and Lisa and Brian were just doing what they had to do in order to have a child, but is it okay for Lisa and Brian to ‘outsource’ and pay less to someone in a different country for the same services that would cost substantially more in the US? If that is exploitation, how do we begin to think about all of the medical procedures outside of reproduction that Americans seek outside of the country? Is that also exploitation even though the individual we are paying gets the money that they asked for?

This week’s texts examine the role of religion in shaping the medical ethics of reproductive technology from perspectives other than that of an Abrahamic faith tradition, namely Hinduism and Buddhism. Whereas Bhattacharyya’s Magical Progeny and Technology applies an interfaith discussion of ethics and integrates such principles to real life cases, Simpson’s Impossible Gifts: Bodies, Buddhism, Bioethics in Contemporary Sri Lanka has an intrafaith comparison of the methodology of mobilizing the Sri Lankan public through Buddhist principles to participate in tissue and gamete donation, or the act of symbolic “gift giving”. Both texts grapple with how to interpret and apply medical ethics derived from a religious order in a religiously pluralistic world. 

Bhattacharyya’s Magical Progeny and Technology effectively strives to determine the way religion informs ethics in a clinical setting by using a comparative approach between Hinduism and Christianity. She first examines the relationship between religion, medicine, and medical ethics using a historical lens to educate the reader as to how Chrisitianity informed much of the ethical principles and laws in the US until the rise of secularism and religious plurality. Simultaneously, the author compares this to the history of medicine in Hinduism by describing principles in the Ayurvedas, a religious script entailing ancient Indian medical practices and ethics. This is followed by the author providing a thorough recall of some of the key takeaways from one of the most referenced works in shaping Hindu philosophy: the Mahabharata. Doing so introduces the reader to the context in which Hindu ethics originates from and highlights parts of the stories that are relevant to discussions on reproductive rights. Once again the author compares topics like the desire to have offspring, women’s autonomy in procreation, and the creative means taken to  bring forth a child to the explicit rules of the Catholic church. Bhattacharyya boils down the story to uncover six characteristics of Hindu thought. I was especially impressed with the way the author used the next chapter to explain and apply Hindu thought and principles in assessing the case of Jaycee Buzzanca. This methodology is effective in showing Hindu principles in action. 

I was particularly interested by the birth narratives in the Mahabharata. Often times when Hindus in my personal experience have discussed this epic, the focus is on the conversation between Krishna and Arjuna, in which they discuss the path of righteousness and inform Hindu ethics and philosophy seen today. The author does an outstanding job summarizing the key takeaways from this conversation which outline the aims of a Hindu’s life. The birth narratives focus on the women in the Mahabharata as they face and overcome issues with infertility using innovative measures. Bhattacharyya then connects the attitudes reflected in their attempts as using divine intervention is brought about through modern medicine today. For example, Gandhari’s usage of clay pots to “grow” her children mimics the process of IVF. Another topic discussed is the usage of sperm donation, niyoga, in which Pandu permits his wife Kunti to become inseminated by another man if he himself is infertile. However, she opts to not go through this route even though this act is clearly delineated from “adultery” and chooses a divine intervention where she can have a say in which deity will father her child. I am intrigued by the duality that exists in which a woman is powerful enough to choose her method of reproductive technology while another text “utilizes a metaphor likening the woman’s womb to a field” (Bhattacharyya 40) and a man’s sperm is seen as “seed” that is on the field and can be shared for the purpose of having a child. 

As a practicing Hindu, I was particularly interested as to why the author chose to compare Hinduism, a multifaceted religion with no founder or hierarchy, but a multitude or interpretations, sacred texts, and deities to a mostly uniform, monotheistic, hierarchical, and structured sect of Christianity like Catholicism. I was curious to see how the author would draw comparisons given the multitude of texts and mythological stories available in Hinduism and the main sacred text of Christianity. While the author acknowledges the diversity and complexity of Hinduism especially as it is practiced today, she makes clear that this comparison was necessary due to the prevalence of Christian principles in not just national law-making in the United States, but also internationally given the political influence of the Vatican on limiting the access to reproductive technology research.

Simpson’s text takes place in Sri Lanka where the prevailing religion is Buddhism. A key concept of “ethical publicity” is the impact that the surrounding culture has in determining one’s motivations for gift giving. What separates Buddhist notions of giving and doing good deeds is that the apparent “benefit” of a kind action could be negated from having the wrong intention. After Simpson highlights the 10 imperfections in Buddhism and the three “donations,” a much more focused story is told. The first one is the donation of food, the second is the donation of body parts, and the third is sacrificing one’s life. Like the Hindu text, the giving of body parts is highlighted in textual mythology in Buddhism when a king is persuaded to give up his own eyesight as he gave the gift of sight to others (Bhattacharyya 844). However, the issue is slightly different with blood donation. Many people of other faiths felt excluded as such donations were “unmistakably Buddhist idioms which are often alienating to those of other faiths” (Simpson 849). Comparatively, as Hinduism is more of a pluralistic religion, Bhattacharya mentions that Hindus could generally worship and see the divine in other faiths as well. I feel that this is too much of a simplification to make, as just because a religion is polytheistic does not mean that all forms of God are worshipped.

One striking similarity I found across the texts was how the woman enacted more agency in reproduction than the man, despite the prestige, power, and value of sperm. As Spencer notes, sperm is considered the “highest of substances.” in which “one drop of [semen] is believed to be equal to sixty drops of blood” (Simpson 853). However, egg donation is more acceptable as a reproductive technology given that it is more closely aligned to the requirements of the religious principle of dana upa paramita, in that egg extraction involves pain and discomfort while semen extraction is a result of a pleasurable, therefore, self-serving extraction. In the Mahabharata, powerful female figures such as Kunti, Madri, and Gandhari make the final decisions and come up with creative methods to overcome barriers to procreation.

Questions: 

How does the concept of “ethical publicity” from the Buddhist readings compare to the importance of “centrality of societal good” in the six elements of Hindu thought.

Could Simpson have used a comparative methodology for Buddhism?

Simpson’s goal in “Impossible Gifts: Bodies, Buddhism and Bioethics in Contemporary Sri Lanka” is to examine the Theravada Buddhist narrative of gamete and embryo donation in Sri Lankan society. He does this by contextualizing Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka. Then, Simpson discusses the history of eye and blood donation and what has made each type of donation effective/ineffective in Sri Lankan society. At the very end of his article, he discusses the future of gamete and embryo donation and potential obstacles to their acceptance. 

Swasti Bhattacharyya structures her book by talking about the role of religion in bioethics from the point of view of academics, clinical situations, and public policy. Then she discusses the Mahabharata, a Hindu epic, and the passages within it that are relevant to discussions on reproduction and fertility. Next, she contrasts a variety of Hindu perspectives to those of Roman Catholicism. She pulls out six main themes in the Mahabharata that run throughout Hindu thought. Lastly, she ends the book by applying these six principles to a United States court case on the parenthood of Jaycee Buzzanca. 

Even though he details multiple points of view of organ and tissue donors, Simpson does not mention much about those on the receiving end of the donation or their attitudes about donation. While the discussion on eye and blood donation is useful for applying similar principles to gamete and embryo donation, his argument would have been more effective if he spent more time elaborating on his reasoning behind the conclusions he makes and perhaps going beyond just sperm donation being difficult and egg donation being more likely to be accepted. 

I thought it was interesting when Bhattacharyya was describing bioethicists in the United States as “operating more like philosophers, attempting to rely more on moral principles that they felt could plausibly claim to be universal, rational, and ‘secular’” (Bhattacharyya p 13). This is very reminiscent of the type of argument put forth by the Donum Vitae, as it attempted to ground itself in common human reasoning. By the end of the book, she calls for the inclusion of Hindu perspectives in bioethics in order to make the field more representative of the world it is trying to describe, instead of moving towards secular universal bioethics. She argues that the pluralistic nature of Hinduism could be applied to the field of bioethics to account for the complexities in life that academics sometimes try to minimize. It is unclear whether she means just the idea of pluralism in general that Hinduism is an example of or the specific beliefs and traditions of which Hinduism is a diverse group of. 

Both authors construct their arguments by drawing together the work of previous scholars and researchers. This is unlike some of the other readings in this class that have been more ethnographically oriented. In both authors’ arguments, they draw the reader’s attention to significant texts and narratives in each religion and use those as models with which followers of each religion weigh their bioethical decisions regarding reproductive technology. While this does make their argument much clearer, it does leave some room for wondering about the accuracy of great texts such as the Mahabharata for daily life. Sometimes one’s actual values are not reflected in those works, so Bhattacharyya may be lacking some additional insight by only relying on the Mahabharata and other scholars.

To compare the two readings’ arguments specific for reproductive technology for this week, I will focus on gamete and embryo donation as that is specifically what Simpson focused on, and Bhattacharyya mentions it as well. Simpson claims that Buddhist attitudes are mostly against sperm donation because male infertility is stigmatized against, sperm is very valuable to Ayurvedic medicine, using donor sperm can be seen as adultery, and donating would be “not of pride but of shame (laejjakama)” due to masturbation (Simpson p 854). Egg donation would be more readily accepted because it fits with the King of Sina narrative of giving despite pain. Furthermore, there is less stigma against female infertility and could be seen as adoption. Hindu attitudes are relatively more positive towards sperm donation, perhaps because the Mahabharata resolves some of these issues that Simpson brings up. The practice of niyoga is allowed and addresses the threat of adultery, but women are opposed to it (as Satyavati’s daughter in laws were). Questions of who the child’s father can remain, but moral and social fatherhood is ultimately more important than biological fatherhood. The divine sperm bank presented to Kunti in the Mahabharata also circumvents the need to masturbate in order to donate sperm. Bhattacharyya does not explicitly focus on egg donation, as that might not have been present in the Mahabharata, but she does speak of adoption positively, in the context of Kunti adopting Madri’s two sons to raise as her own. 

Questions:

Last week during class, Dr. Seeman brought up the idea of each religion having a cost to the benefits of their beliefs. Based on the texts, what might be the cost vs. benefit discussion with regards to Hindu and Buddhist bioethics?

In Simpson’s article, he mentions how Ayurvedic medicine treats sperm as a high value substance that can have devastating effects on a person if they lose too much of it. How would you reconcile this with the divine sperm donation example in the Mahabharata?

Why did Bhattacharyya choose Jaycee Buzzanca as the singular case study she looked at and applied Hindu bioethics to?

This unit’s works place an emphasis on the role of religion in reproductive technology and furthermore discusses implications of religion’s role in streamlining many bioethical decisions and ways of thinking in society when intertwined with culture, philosophy, law and literature. Through these works, we can gain insight into how religious perspectives and values guide contemporary bioethical issues, namely reproductive technology and donation. A common theme acknowledged repeatedly throughout both Swasti Bhattacharyya’s Magical Progeny, Modern Technology : A Hindu Bioethics of Assisted Reproductive Technology and Bob Simpson’s “Impossible Gifts: Bodies, Buddhism and Bioethics in Contemporary Sri Lanka” is the plurality of beliefs in modern society. We are called upon to listen to others while we speak ourselves and acknowledge different worldviews because this gives us a larger pool of information to utilize when we make important bioethical decisions in our lives. Additionally, we can even understand the plurality within our own culture and religion which isn’t always so obvious.

Bhattacharyya’s Magical Progeny, Modern Technology uses birth stories from the Mahabharata, an ancient Hindu epic, to shed light on the Hindu perspective on reproductive technology. She sets up the framework of the book in her introduction by first making some crucial points. Bhattacharyya acknowledges she is striving to find a middle ground which allows multiple perspectives to exist at once to stimulate dialogue across cultures and thus create dynamic solutions to complex bioethical issues (Bhattacharyya, 3). I really appreciated her methodology as it not only is rather unique but very applicable to many societies around the world. Too often, we try to construct some concrete principal that is very rigid in nature and cannot be flexed to incorporate any nuances. Instead of making a Hindu ethic, she “weaves” an ethic from Hindu religion, culture, and philosophy from the Mahabharata to respond to the assistive reproductive technology debate. Specifically, the stories of the Pandava children and their enemy cousins, the Kauravas are used to bring to light Hindu principles as a model for how people can navigate difficult bioethical issues. Hindu perspectives are applied to a particular case in the United States that dealt with ownership of a child, Jaycee. Bhattacharyya also draws comparisons of the Hindu approach to reproductive technology with the Roman Catholic and Hebrew perspectives towards this technology. It is here, in my opinion, where the reader really is able to comprehend the imaginative and pluralistic ways in which Hinduism approaches this bioethical debate. Overall, I thought Bhattacharyya did a fantastic job of voicing the main message of her book which is bringing attention to modern society to find ways to incorporate a variety of religious perspectives. She utilizes the Mahabharata in a way that convinces the reader Hinduism has relevant contributions to make in the ongoing global conversation surrounding reproductive technology.

I was very excited to read this book because although I come from a fairly strong Indian and Hindu background, I wasn’t very familiar with any conversation about reproductive technology use in my culture or what ways Hinduism could approach this debate. Interestingly enough, this may be so because Bhattacharyya acknowledges that there is no specific decree or set of regulations outlined by the religion regarding this technology. She instead analyzes the birth stories to produce the perspectives Hinduism takes. That being said, Bhattacharyya’s discussion and analysis of how Hinduism and the Mahabharata approach this debate is what stuck out to me the most from the book, partly due to the fact that we have discussed other perspectives (namely Catholicism) approaches to the debate in class. Although I wasn’t familiar with Hindu perspectives on procreation before reading the book, I wasn’t too surprised about the analyses Bhattacharyya provided. Being raised Hindu, I have learned the religion permeates through all aspects of life (culture, relationships, family etc.) and thus I have found it is very important to know there is a difference in being “culturally Hindu” as opposed to “religiously Hindu.” By being religiously Hindu, I mean adhering to the strict practices of the religion where as being culturally Hindu means one could not really be aware of every minute detail of the religion, but their way of life and behavior certainly reflects the ideals. I believe it is certainly possible to be both, but I recognize myself as more well versed in the culture of Hinduism even though I do practice the religion as well. The book confirmed a lot of what I have experienced in my lifetime in regards to the plurality of the culture; there is more than one way to live and call yourself a Hindu, as “…religion, philosophy, and the conduct of daily life are all tightly interwoven” (Bhattacharyya, 27). Accordingly, we see there are multiple avenues utilized to reproduce.

Bob Simpson’s “Impossible Gifts: Bodies, Buddhism and Bioethics in Contemporary Sri Lanka” aims to find ways the donation of gametes and women’s embryos can be made sense of in Sri Lanka, a society where organ and tissue donation is already recognized as a sort of duty through the concept of “dana” in Theravada Buddhism. Simpson draws on previous work done by Parry and Laidlaw to frame the transactions, as they are called, of organ and tissue donation in Sri Lankan society. Simpson uses the observations made by Parry and Laidlaw to extend insights into the beliefs of Sri Lankan society. Before delving into the Buddhist framing of donation, Simpson discusses the concept of ethical publicity. I interpreted ethical publicity as a means to weave society’s values and principles into a vehicle that drives one to donate. Simpson discusses the many dangers that can arise from framing donation in this way, many of them unforeseen such as indebtedness or even framing donation as a ‘gift of life.’ I was especially intrigued by the notion of a ‘gift of life’ being problematic, because in Western society we often focus on just how brave or impactful life-saving donations can be and forget there could be many secondary societal consequences created by these acts. Theravada Buddhism preaches to give parts of the body to help others and to show the donor he or she is not attached and self-indulged. Several stories from Theravada Buddhism roots discuss the giving of body parts which Simpson says holds significance for modern Buddhists. Overall, it is very clear that Buddhist ideals streamline the majority of the beliefs behind the donation process and the very act of donation itself. Donation of blood and tissue (eyes) can be traced back to significant historical events/times and each have significant justification and foundation in Buddhism. One problem with this however, is that many non-Buddhist groups such as Tamils, Muslims and Christians often are alienated and cannot find their own freedom in thought to act as they would like. This made me question the fine line behind religion’s role in these practices within Sri Lankan society, and at what cost this promotes a troubling sense of homogeneity.

Whereas organ and blood donation easily finds its grounds in Sri Lankan Buddhist society through “dana upa paramita” and has grown so much there are hints of commercialization of these transactions, gamete donation results in several issues that poses problems for the Sri Lankan Buddhist people. One of the problems regarding sperm banks is the means to obtain sperm, as there is no other way to obtain it other than physical pleasure which has no grounds in Buddhism. Sperm is also seen as a powerful substance having as much value as sixty drops of blood and the loss of sperm by a man can cause much worry. Ova on the other hand align much more with dana upa paramita as its donation involves much more pain and no pleasure like sperm donation does. When reading this section of the article, it really became clear that the ‘gift of life’ is not a stand-alone concept in Buddhism. The gift of life is only valid when it is positively viewed in regards to moral terms. This is the same issue that plagues societies all around the world, and one example that we have talked about is Donum Vitae and the Catholic perspective on reproductive technology. It is crucial when thinking of the concept of ‘gift of life’ that we always understand the principles and beliefs through which ideas governing the use of the body and ways of procreation for each society. This not only allows use to gain a broader understanding of other perspectives but more importantly is a prerequisite in order for us to even beginning to think about incorporating other pieces of thought in our bioethical decisions. Both works strive to emphasize this idea in order to shape the contemporary bioethical discussions regarding reproductive assistive technology.

While reading both of these works, I could not help but constantly think of the intertwinement of religion and culture in regards to bioethical debates. As mentioned earlier, in my personal life, I understand that there is a distinction between the two; however, religion consistently seems to guide the bioethical discussions surrounding reproductive technology across societies from all over the world. After reading and thinking about these two works, I found a difference that has made me perhaps even more puzzled on how we as humans can use religion in our decisions in life. For example, Hinduism is crowned a model in Bhattacharyya’s novel for which Western Society can use to inform their decisions regarding procreation. In my opinion, Bhattacharyya does an exemplary job demonstrating how the creative ways of procreation in the Mahabharata can be framed within modern culture. Where infertility is countered with divine power in the Mahabharata, modern medicine accomplishes this through technology (Bhattacharyya, 53). Additionally, humans and gods are seen as working together to reproduce in the Mahabharata whereas in the Hebrew perspective, God seems to have the ultimate divine control (Bhattacharyya, 68). As we have discussed with Catholicism, it is a sin to separate intercourse and conception whereas Hinduism clearly separates the two. In summary, the evident “leeway” in in the Hindu approach stems from the religion’s ability to be able to stray away from a universal philosophical principle, and examine each particular situation on its own terms. For Bhattacharyya’s work, Hinduism seems to have very few pitfalls in approaching to answer to the reproductive technology debate. Yet, the difference I noted in Simpson’s work, is that Buddhism did indeed limit approaches to reproductive technology discussed in the previous paragraph. We saw earlier that living in and committing to a Hindu style of life and behavior is portrayed as having seemingly limitless options to procreate. This is great for those who are in this society. However, what happens to those committed to Sri Lankan Buddhist way of life? Will they permanently be in a limbo when it comes to taking a side on this debate? The moral and physical restrictions placed on them by their religion seems to be impossible to overcome in order to create the ‘gift of life.’

This is where I struggle. Religion is a great means of justification when it allows for increased flexibility in one’s actions, but when religion is more stringent the picture quickly becomes more bleak. For the societies such as Sri Lanka, do we just accept that since culture is so tied to religion, religion will always reign supreme and promote one way of thinking? Obviously, we know religion is one of the most influential, if not the most, influential vehicles in almost every society’s beliefs, values, and culture (way of life). Religion streamlines our daily lives. And from these two works, we see that religions offer differing amounts of autonomy and discretion when tackling certain bioethical practices such as reproductive technology. This is not to say that any religion is superior to the other, for this defeats the purpose of both works in regards to incorporating a multitude of religious perspectives in our modern society. In a hypothetical world where there is no religion, I would be curious to see the reasons and justifications people would utilize on both sides of the reproductive technology debate. Would there necessarily be more autonomy in making these decisions without religion? Or perhaps would the same societal pressures that are present today be just as influential, such as the emphasis on individual rights in Western society as opposed to the emphasis on duty as we see in Hindu societies? I do not think there is a clear cut solution to my question by any means, but I believe it is worthwhile to ponder over for societies that are very religious. It is impossible to overturn any major religion and its guiding principles, but if we are to somehow separate culture from religion, is there any promise for groups of people such as Catholics or Sri Lankan Buddhists to find ways to be free from the moral repercussions of utilizing reproductive assistive technology? And as these two works suggest, how can we actually go about incorporating different religious ideals in our lives, when it seems that religion is almost impossible to bend? Perhaps if we are indeed able to separate culture from religion, then we could fit these new perspectives into our cultures and then make more informed bioethical decisions.

Ally Brennan

The texts for week four all discuss the issue of reproductive technology for Jews, and more specifically Israeli Jews. “Ethnography Exegesis and Jewish Ethical Reflection: The New Reproductive Technologies in Israel ” by Don Seeman describes and analyzes the differing ways of interpretation that cause different perspectives on reproductive technology between Jews and Catholics, with France used as a secular comparison. “Modern Reproductive Technologies and Jewish Law” by Michael Broyde gives an outline of legal issues that may exist regarding cloning in Judaism, while Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel by Susan Kahn is an ethnographic study done in Israel on women who use reproductive technology. These three sources offer different analyses on the general topic of reproductive technology in Israel, and, when read together, offer a holistic view of the issue. This blog post will first examine each text individually. To conclude, it will synthesize the pertinent information from each source to provide a greater understanding of the use of reproductive technology in Israel.

“Ethnography Exegesis and Jewish Ethical Reflection: The New Reproductive Technologies in Israel” aims to reveal the importance of how different cultures interpret things within the reproductive technology debate. France, which is used as a secular comparison in this text, makes decisions that align with what is considered “natural;” as a result, they limit IVF to heterosexual, steril married couples, as historically, and traditonally, this would be representative of a natural family. In contrast, Israel relies heavily on religious texts, which is similar to Catholics. There is a difference between where Jews and Catholics find their answers in religious texts; Catholics tend to find answers in the beginning of Genesis and use narrative to find answers, while Jews often look for legal prohibitions. Furthermore, in the debate around reproductive technology, Jews rely more on Leviticus than Genesis. This difference, in part, can explain how these two religions have very different answers for the question of when and how to use reproductive technology, despite using the same source. Donum Vitae, the accepted doctrine on reproductive technology for Catholics, states that IVF should really only be used if doing IVF with the husband’s sperm. In Israel reproductive technology is used for many different reasons and in multiple different forms; Israel, in fact, is the leading country for IVF. There is a cultural history in Israel that also helps account for this difference in perspective in addition to the legal readings of religious texts. For instance, it is a pronatalist country, and thus encourages high birth rates. Consequently, in order to understand the contrasting viewpoints that different cultures have towards reproductive technology, it is important to examine aspects beyond interpretations of texts, and consider other elements such as the experiences of individuals who live within these societies. The consideration of multiple societal components (interpretations of texts, culture, lived experience) allows for a more complete understanding of the complex arguments regarding reproductive technology.

 Broyde focuses specifically on the legal issues of cloning within Israel, and within Jewish law. He notes that “the Jewish tradition is betwixt and between two obligations:” the belief surrounding the importance of helping others, and the belief that everything may not be proper, particularly when related to intercourse (Broyde 296). These two beliefs come into direct conflict in the debate around reproductive technology. In Israel, decisions about the use of reproductive technology are handled case by case. Every couple or individual must go through a screening process, and many consult a rabbi, who may make a specific recommendation based on the circumstances of the person/people seeking out reproductive technology (Kahn). Therefore, it is logical to assume that if human cloning were to take place, it would also be handled case by case. The specifics of cloning lead to many questions, particularly in relation to kinship. Because a clone would be the exact genetic copy of another person, there is much debate over who the parents of such a child would be. Judaism is matrilineal, which complicates cloning if the genetic donor is female. In this case, there are debates on who would be considered the mother: the gestational mother, or genetic mother. If one woman was not Jewish, the status of the child would be in jeopardy, creating a situation in which the child “should be converted” (Broyde 306). On the other hand, if the donated genetic material came from a man, assigning a status to the child becomes less complex as the donor would be the father, and the woman who gestates the child the mother. If the gestational mother were Jewish, the child would be Jewish as well. One could assume that there would still be rules about what male could donate the genetic material to avoid creating a mamzer child, as explained by Kahn. 

There is also the question of whether a clone would be considered human, and if they may be used in immoral ways. Broyde references that some fear “society will mislabel cloned individuals as something other than human and use them as organ sources” (313). Broyde, by analyzing Jewish law, determines that this individual would be considered fully human and “treated with the full dignity of any human being,” nullifying the argument that clones would not be considered people (315). Finally, the issue of cloning opens up a new ethical debate over who has access to someone’s DNA, and the issues of stealing someone’s DNA. Because an individual’s DNA could be easily accessed and used for cloning, there would have to be strong legislation in place to protect people and their genetic material, though the extent of this would likely be heavily debated.

Finally, Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel by Susan Kahn offers an ethnographic account of the experience of using reproductive technology in Israel. Kahn’s research spanned two years, and she conducted interviews, attended support groups, conducted participant observation at fertility centers, and interviewed rabbis. She analyzed the decision making process that women go through before using reproductive technology, and found that there were many unmarried women who used reproductive technology in order to have a child. Because reproductive tech is subsidized by the government, Kahn found that all potential mothers have to go through a screening process, which did create some opportunity for discriminiation for lesbian couples. She also examined the relationship between rabbinic law and the secular democracy of Israel in relation to reproductive technology. The Aloni commission, which was a report created by rabbis, legislatures, and fertility experts, stated that unmarried women do have the right to have children, and that these children would exist without that stigma of being mamzer, or a bastard child. Furthermore, she expands on the idea that in Israel decisions made about reproductive tech are done on a case by case basis by examining how paternity works in these cases, as it is often up to a rabbi to decide these matters. She also examines how important purity is in fertility clinics in order to maintain Jewish identity. Surrogacy is also dealt with, which reveals the complexities involved in Jewish kinship; because it is matrilineal, deciding who the mother is in surrogacy affects the identity of the child. Overall, I thought Kahn was effective in outlying the process of seeking reproductive technology in Israel, and the complex social factors that cause each individual’s decision. Because Israel is a pronatalist, and one of the crux ideas is to “be fruitful and multiply,” many single women seek out this technology to reproduce without stigma.

I found that these three sources really complimented each other, and helped to fill in the gaps apparent in each source. For instance, I thought that while Kahn’s book gave a comprehensive description of current reproductive technologies in Israel, Broyde’s analysis on the potential of cloning added a perspective on what could develop in the future. Furthermore, I thought that the framing provided in Seeman’s piece provided context for the interpretations seen both in Broyde and Kahn’s work, while Kahn’s work in particular provided examples of the lived experiences that Seeman states are needed to understand this issue. What I found most interesting in these issues was the discussion of the complicated area of kinship. The matrilineal aspect of Judaism is particularly interesting because this increases the complex nature of kinship and reproductive technology. In paternal societies, issues of reproductive technology and kinship are still incredibly complex. However, the debate is different because the transmission of identity is not paramount when assigning the label of mother to either the gestational or genetic mother. One critique I have of Broyde and Kahn’s work is there is no cross cultural comparison; while Seeman’s article contributes this, on their own these pieces do not offer these nuanced views. I believe that a comparison would help to emphasize the different approaches to reproductive technology across cultures, ultimately generating a deeper understanding of why the decisions around reproductive technology in Israel are unique.

Finally, I found all three texts to be well organized and easy to read. In particular, I enjoyed how Kahn outlined her book as I thought it gave a logical, sequential description of the process of using reproductive technology in Israel. Furthermore, I enjoyed how each source outlined key questions that related to the issues discussed. This, I thought, was particularly important because it is essential to recognize that not all questions can be answered when dealing with such a complex issue. Because there are so many different debates that must be addressed when discussing reproductive technology, it is impossible for one source to answer every question. Therefore, I thought that both Broyde and Kahn did a good job of focusing on specific questions in order to not overwhelm the reader. Furthermore, each author recognized that there also were simply questions that are unanswerable. Kahn, for example, concludes her book by asking a series of questions revolving around changing kinship in Israel, the final being “and if the ends make means irrelevant, what will the texture of Jewish life be like?” (Kahn 171). This question reveals the depth of the questions possible to ask when dealing with reproductive technology. This question cannot be answered because, at least currently, there is no answer. This question reflects the reality that there will always be unknowns when dealing with the ethical questions surrounding biotechnology. I thought that the inclusion of unanswerable questions improved both Kahn and Broyde’s work, as it showed that both scholars acknowledged the limitations of their work. This acknowledgement, I think, made both works seem more reliable and also more engaging, as it encouraged the reader to think about how complex the topic of  reproductive technology really is.

Discussion Questions:

• There are clear issues regarding gender in the debate around reproductive technology. How might changing ideas of gender (i.e. increased gender fluidity) play out in this debate?
• Why are ideas of kinship so essential in the debate of reproductive technology in Israel? 
• How does Israel’s pronatalism influence the use of reproductive technology? How is its specific history related, and how (and why) does this contrast with views on reproductive tech seen in Catholicism? Do you think this will change over time?
• Clearly, there are issues around the general morality of cloning. Broyde mentions the idea of the “slippery slope,” which includes fears of organ harvesting, or the use of clones for experimentation (Broyde 312). Do you think that people will ever find cloning to be morally acceptable and ethical? Or will these greater fears outweigh the potential benefits human cloning could have?