What is Kinship?What’s it got to do with Reproduction and Religion?

The concept of kinship is paradoxical in its relative simplicity and ambiguity. This is likely due to the etymology of the word. From Old English, “cynn: family; race; kind; sort; rank; nature; tribe” implicates a broad spectrum of “-schipe: conditions; relations between” (Etymology Dictionary). Entangled in its semantic roots, anthropologists and etymologists alike seek to understand what the state of kinship truly is, often through the lenses of genetics, culture, and religion. While the aforementioned takes on “kinship” are interconnected, assigning value to any one (or more) definition has critical implications; most potently for reproduction and religion.    

Dr. Susan McKinnon, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Virginia, mobilizes a cultural anthropological approach in her book “Complexities Beyond Nature & Nurture” with Dr. Sydel Silverman. Within the publication, Dr. McKinnon criticizes the theories brought forth by evolutionary psychologists, believing them to be reductive in their assertion that cultural truths are direct descendants of genetics. As detailed in the excerpt, evolutionary psychologists ultimately explain the social world as the natural product of man’s selfish genome. The “selfish” nature of the gene implies that all humans will act in self-interest; an evolutionary mechanism employed to ensure that one’s own genome will survive. This evolutionary theory clearly permeates into the construction of kinship as the state of being biologically related. Dr. McKinnon, however, does not believe there to be a simple “one-to-one” or “digital” (Pinker, 1997) relationship in deciding the in-or-out groups of kin. Rather, Dr. McKinnon argues that the emotional complexities of the human experience — desire, love, and nurturance — transcend any possible genetic blueprint of behavior and must not be reduced to an epiphenomenon. In an effort to debunk these theories, Dr. McKinnon utilized the following as evidence, 1) the multiplicity of mothers 2) systems of marriage and 3) suspicion of euro-american bias. 

The multiplicity of mothers asserts that there is no single definition of motherhood. For most Americans from heterosexual presenting and non-adoptive families, the term mother is terminologically distinguished and singular. These lines are blurred however outside American hegemony, for example in families with two moms, and especially for queer couples who utilize reciprocal IVF — in that both uterus-having partners are genetically related to the child. The semantic role of mother is also highly variable cross-culturally. In Hawaii, all women in the ascending generations are termed “mother.” For adopted children, there is a birth mother and an adoptive mother. 

Systems of marriage is used as evidence to combat the evolutionary psychology belief that marriage can be sifted down to the need to mate and therefore reproduce. Dr. McKinnon outlines that this decision — while governed by the impetus of reproduction — exists within cultural paradigms. Thus, reproduction cannot be seen as solely a genetic calculus but the product of culture making particular mates acceptable and unacceptable.

Throughout the excerpt, Dr. McKinnon hints that purposefully minimizing the variety of human systems of kinship to a universal, biological truth looks suspiciously euro-american. Specifically, the core focus on individual self-maximization and genetics in combination with evidence that pertains exclusively to heteronormative, traditional gender relations reveals that the theory may be grounded in eurocentric ideals of marriage and kinship, and therefore must not be assumed to apply universally.

The subsequent reading, “What Human Kinship is Primarily for” by Dr. Warren Shapiro is a direct response to Dr. Mckinnon’s book “Complexities Beyond Nature & Nurture.” At the root of his argument, Dr. Shapiro criticizes Dr. McKinnon’s failure to acknowledge the phenomena of “focality” and “prototype effects” in an attempt to prove that kinship is in fact innately tied to procreation and biology. The focality theory states that we first codify — make part of our meaningful experience — then lexify all things in reality: make into real worlds through our particular culture (Society for Linguistic Anthropology). As an extension, the “prototype effects” represent the semantic extension of a single word unto different entities. As the major critique to the “multiplicity of mothers,” Dr. Shapiro evidences the flexibility of the word “mother” in English alone, “ mother-in-law… grandmother… mother tongue… mother country…” (Shapiro, 2008). The sweeping notions of kin terms, he argues, must be contextualized by distinguishing the root (the focal) of the word from its diverse uses that inherently derive from the focal. Moreover, lexemes of motherhood, cross-culturally, all maintain distinctions between the genetrix — the focal — and other subclasses of “mother” and therefore are grounded in the act of procreation. Reinforcing the biological basis of kinship, Dr. Shapiro cites behavioral asymmetries in the parental care of adoptive children, “‘[they] may be disciplined more forcefully, or allocated fewer familial resources than natural children. (Silk 1987b: 46).’” While many of Dr. Shapiro’s criticisms had merit, I personally found their delivery to be too deeply saturated with disdain for Dr. McKinnon’s field — or perhaps for her; the distinction was unclear — to be as potent in academic conviction as in personal. The ademancy with which Dr. Shapiro presupposed his intellectual dominance, as well as his perception of her theories as containing “remarkable hostility to the traditional family” and a “familiar target for feminists and Marxists” came across as disconcertingly contemptuous and faintly misogynistic.

Dr. Marcia C. Inhorn’s issue, “He Won’t Be My Son” exemplifies the complications of the elusive definition of “kin.” The article investigates the complex interrelations between technology, religion, culture, and marriage within the highly stereotyped Sunni Muslim world. Within this world, religious mandates strictly prohibit adoption and gamete donation (Inhorn, 2008). Islamic teaching considers preservation of biological descent and inheritance to be central to maintaining moral integrity. Thus, the type of adoption practiced in America, what Dr. Inhorn dubbs “social parenthood” in which the child is raised as one’s own is forbidden in Islam. While the Qur’an supports the kind treatment and charity of orphans, biological relation is the sole basis of family. Due to the widespread cultural stigma of adoption and more so gamete donation, infertile couples are often halted at an ideological impasse. In her fieldwork in Lebanon, Dr. Inhorn scrupulously interviewed 220 men in infertile marriages, equally divided between the four major religious sects: Sunni Muslim, Shi’a Muslim, Druze, and Christian. Focusing on the two Islamic sects, Sunni and Shi’a Islam have certain structural differences. Sunni Islam issued an authoritattive fatwa on medically assisted reproduction, stating that IVF was permissible only if between the wife’s egg and husband’s sperm; any third party gametes would be akin to adultery and produce a morally tainted child. As a result, 77% of the men were completely anti-adoption, and 83% anti-gamete donation. For Shi’a muslims, in which individual reasonings of right and wrong are central, only 64% of Shi’ite men were against gamete donation. Among both groups, a few themes of kinship emerged from the mens’ narratives. Nearly every man agreed that “he won’t be my son,” and referred to a religious justification. However, certain men diverged. These “moral pioneers,” all cited their desire to make their wives happy and satisfied. Similarly, many of such men had spent considerable time out of the country, or had experiences with refugee orphans. Thus, we must construct a more depthful understanding of Muslim men, men who are altruistic and loving, and take religion as a single factor in the larger calculus of decision making: a reality clouded by xenophobia and stereotypes post 9/11.

Lastly, Sherine Hamdy’s “Does Submission to God’s Will Preclude Biotechnological Intervention?” follows a dialysis patient, Ali, on his journey to rationalize his agency within a body that belongs not to him, but to God. Dr. Hamdy argues that current narratives of Muslims being religious fatalists (fatalism denotes that humans have no control over their destiny) discourages people from seeking or receiving necessary treatment. Ali is the perfect exemplar for the dynamism of embodying religion. Ali, a young man on dialysis knows that he must eventually have a kidney transplant to survive. However, for over five years he refused. Daily, his wife would beg him to consider transplant surgery, and having served in the army, his insurance would cover the total cost of the surgery. Ali believed himself in a test of God, a test of finding value in suffering. However his devotion to God was only one of his reasons to reject surgery. Ali knew that dialysis was working for him, and he could possibly die in surgery. Further, he feared for his wife, and the thought of taking a kidney from her was unconscionable. After meeting a doctor who had undergone a kidney transplant himself, and hearing that it was haram to let your body deteriorate, Ali temporarily was convinced that it was his duty to pursue transplantation. Ali’s change of heart was soon reversed, when his wife was not a tissue match; and here again Ali thanked God for saving him from the dangerous potential of surgery. The evolution of Ali’s perspectives on transplantation being haram or halal was not a manipulation of religious doctrine. Rather, his struggle reflects the ways in which people embody and experience religion. Only once convinced that transplantation would work, his very same devotion to God that once led him away from surgery now pointed him directly toward it. Thus, the narrative that religion is diametrically opposed to scientific progress or intervention proved to be nothing but a heuristic. One must not conflate religious sentiments of steadfastness in struggle as an obstruction of science. 

Works Cited:

Inhorn, Marcia C. “‘He Won’t Be My Son.’” AnthroSource, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 8 Jan. 2008.

McKinnon, S., & Silverman, S. (Eds.). (2005). Complexities: Beyond nature & nurture. University of Chicago Press.

Shapiro, Warren. “What Human Kinship Is Primarily about: toward a Critique of the New Kinship Studies.” Wiley Online Library, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 25 July 2008.

“Society of Linguistic Anthropology.” Society for Linguistic Anthropology, 8 July 2019.Stolow, Jeremy. Deus in Machina: Religion, Technology, and the Things in Between . Text ed. Fordham University Press, 2012. Project MUSE

5 comments

  1. Jack provided an excellent summary of this week’s texts and I heavily agree with his analysis on Dr. Shapiro’s response to Dr. McKinnon. I found Dr. McKinnon’s argument that evolutionary psychologists failed to account for the cultural aspect among humans and that they are biased towards euro-americans to be extremely convincing. If social and kinship differences between cultures are present, doesn’t this indicate genetics themselves aren’t enough to determine kinship? If there is this much room for differing interpretations of genetics, there is undoubtedly a huge cultural component or influence. Perhaps, the ethical diversity among humans is present here and an explanation for the differing opinions: McKinnon may have a desire to help others (altruistically) whereas Shapiro has the euro-american self-interested values that prevent him from interpreting kinship differently and therefore explain his passion. I agree with Jack that Shapiro appears misogynistic for many reasons, one of them being Shapiro’s repeated use of referring to McKinnon as “her”. Rather than addressing McKinnon by her name, Shapiro’s language appears to use the pronoun as a lack of respect when discussing her ideas. “Her” seems to be substituted too often whereas the proper name is typically used when an author is a man. Another question to discuss may be: who has a better argument related to the ‘multiplicity of mothers’? McKinnon includes examples of several cultures that use the ‘multiplicity of mothers’ in a strikingly different context than the examples Shapiro provides to counteract the role of ‘multiplicity of mothers’ in his own culture. Do we think these uses of the ‘multiplicity of mothers’ are comparable among cultures?
    The text, “He Won’t Be My Son” was closely related to an ethical debate I led on campus regarding whether the desire to have children genetically related to ourselves was a biological urge or social construct. Now, I realize the definition of kinship as discussed by McKinnon and Shapiro plays a large role in this debate. Due to the religious differences among the groups discussed in Inhorn’s text, do you believe the desire is biological or originating somewhere else?
    Hamdy’s chapter, “Does Submission to God’s Will Prevent Biotechnological Intervention?” analyzed the factors considered by the patients that denied kidney transplants. Is there a negative connotation or lack of respect when a physician labels a patient as a “fatalist”? What do you think Ali’s beliefs say about his relationship with ethical responsibility? If ethical responsibility exists without religion (or is present in those who do not practice), what determines its role?

  2. I think Jack concisely and accurately summarized the four articles assigned this week. He disagrees with Dr. Shapiro’s criticism of Dr. McKinnon’s arguments in her book “Complexities Beyond Nature & Nurture.” Dr. Shapiro suggests that Dr. McKinnon fails to consider the phenomenon of focality when criticizing evolutionary psychologists for ignoring how diverse cultures could impact human behaviors and reducing socio-cultural processes to biology or genetics.

    I generally agree with Dr. McKinnon and Jack that evolutionary psychology is overly focused on the so-called biology and physiological mechanisms. However, I don’t think the evidence that she cited is convincing. I also agree with Dr. Shapiro that Dr. McKinnon confuses kinship in general with kinship terminologies. Dr. McKinnon used the example that in China “who is the mother” is determined by marital status and rank as evidence to support her claim. As a Chinese myself, I think she does not fully understand the cultural context. It is true that children of a concubine may call their father’s legal wife “mother,” but this does not mean that these children will consider their father’s legal wife as their “real mother.” In fact, many ancient Chinese folktales talk about how children of a concubine were mistreated by their father’s legal wife who only favors her own biological children. Personally speaking, I don’t think there is much difference between the U.S. and Chinese culture in how people view or define motherhood. “The multiplicity of mothers” indeed is observed in diverse cultural and linguistic groups, including the U.S. However, calling someone a “mother” does not equal considering her/him/them as “real mother.”

    Moreover, I also do not like how Dr. McKinnon juxtaposes non-Western and Western (U.S. or European) views to illustrate her points. As I stated previously, I personally do not think there is THAT MUCH of a difference between Chinese and Euro-American cultures. Sometimes we are blinded by exaggerated stereotypic cultural generalizations. I think Dr. McKinnon, just like the evolutionary psychologist she criticized, biasedly chose some aspects of certain non-Western cultures to support her claims, ignoring others that may not fit well. In addition, Jack states that Dr. Shapiro criticizes Dr. McKinnon because he wants to prove that kinship is determined by procreation and biology. I do not quite see this point in Dr. Shapiro’s “What human kinship is primarily about.” I think he only points out some flaws in Dr. McKinnon’s choice of evidence while he did not clearly state how he views kinship, at least in this article.

    In “Does Submission to God’s Will Preclude Biotechnological Intervention?,” Dr. Sherine Hamdy suggests that we should not “conflate poverty and structural violence with fatalism.” I readily agree with this idea. Just like Ali’s case, sometimes people decide to adopt or refuse certain medical interventions, not solely because of religious beliefs. There are other considerations like “concerns about his wife’s health” that may have an impact on the decision.

    I actually didn’t quite understand or conceptualize what Dr. Hamdy means by “… religious reasoning and sentiment are not understood as external to the self, but as central to it …” Does it mean that religion should be considered as integral to the self?

  3. Jack’s summary of this week’s articles was concise and provided great insight into what kinship is and how it relates to reproduction and religion. For the first article summary, Jack disagrees with Dr. Shapiro’s criticism of Dr. McKinnon’s thoughts. This is because Dr. McKinnon and Jack believe that, in general, evolutionary psychology takes physiological mechanisms into account too much and focuses less on finding accurate evidence. I partially agree with Jack and Dr. McKinnon on this matter because many evolutionary psychologists frequently fail to include studies of the influence that culture has on humans. But I could also understand where Dr. Shapiro is coming from when discussing how Dr. McKinnon misuses kinship terminologies and the idea of kinship. This has an impact on Dr. McKinnon’s inability to recognize how different cultures across the globe impact how humans behave. Dr. Shapiro points out that Dr. McKinnon appears to treat diverse cultures and differences in genealogy.

    For the article, “Does Submission to God’s Will Preclude Biotechnological Intervention?,” Dr. Sherine Hamdy proposes the idea that humans shouldn’t consider fatalists to be impoverished and a product of structural violence. Dr. Hamdy uses specific examples including a man named Ali who refused a kidney transplant because he believed that it was Gods’ will to let Ali suffer. I agree with Dr. Hamdy’s argument because someone’s religious beliefs shouldn’t give a doctor or healthcare system permission to force them into treatment or treat them as lesser. There were many factors to be taken into account for as to why Ali was refusing surgery.

    The reading, “He Won’t Be My Son,” is a widely argued debate across many different cultures. Jack summarized the text well by stating that religious beliefs are more often than not the driving factor for why certain people refuse to adopt children. What I found interesting but not necessarily surprising was the idea that men who had worked at orphanages or traveled outside of the country were much more likely to be open to the idea of adoption if they were infertile. This goes to show that lack of exposure to other cultures, religions, and people can inhibit people from being open to the idea of adoption. The debate for whether or not having children genetically related to us is a social construct or biological need is a great topic that I would enjoy covering at greater length in our class.

  4. Jack’s summary of this week’s articles was very detailed and thorough. I found that Jack’s blog included important information for all the assigned articles, but I especially like his description and analysis of Dr. McKinnon’s article and Dr. Inhorn’s article and research. His description of these two specific readings further solidified my fascination with each.

    In Jack’s summary of Dr. McKinnon’s article, he includes the description of Dr. McKinnon’s nonbelief in the “one-to-one” or “digital” (Pinker, 1997) relationship in deciding the in-or-out groups of kin.” I wholly agree with this point. Like Dr. McKinnon points out, and as does Jack, the “genetic blueprint” method of labeling kinship is restricted and does not take into account the extent to which kinship and kinship terminology is a social construct.

    I can understand Dr. Shapiro’s arguments against Dr. McKinnon’s, and I acknowledge that Jack (and other’s) seem more inclined to agree with Dr. Shapiro’s thought process and points. But, as Jack states in his analysis, the “contemptuous” nature and “faintly misogynistic” tones of Dr. Shapiro’s article make me less inclined to even entertain Dr. Shapiro’s argument whole heartedly. In addition, looking at other’s comments about Dr. McKinnon’s description and analysis, my agreement with her argument becomes all the more interesting. I actually liked the juxtaposition and emphasis Dr. McKinnon was putting on the different kinds of kinship found in different places in the world. Firstly, it was the first time I found myself questioning the word “mother;” I assumed that it generally meant the same to others what it meant to me. But seeing that example used, and the different descriptions, all in one place was eye opening. Secondly, I myself come from a very unique background: I was born and raised in the United States, and I only speak English. My mother is a war refugee from Bosnia and my father an immigrant from Morocco. I was also raised as a Muslim. The many different socio-cultural backgrounds I subscribe to include many different types of kinship relationships/labels that differ quite a lot from the Euro-American idea and blueprint that Dr. Shapiro described.

    The reading, “He Won’t Be My Son,” I also found to be extremely interesting as well. I never actually find myself thinking about adoption/IVF/gamete donation, so I never thought to consider what my own religion (and the internal division there) might say about them. Jack summarized the text well and described how religious beliefs are an important factor for why certain people refuse these alternatives to creating a family. At this point, it would be important to note that I identify with the Sunni belief system in Islam. The arguments made that adoption was haram/forbidden, that IVF was allowed if only the wife and husband are involved, all struck me as new information. After reading this article, I can understand why such things are considered forbidden, or only allowed under certain circumstances. I do not necessarily think/believe/agree with the conclusions of these subjects, but it does not mean that I don’t understand the points made. I can also understand the “more lenient” arguments and reasons behind the Shia sect of Islam’s view on the topics as well. I don’t necessarily agree with the way they have decided to view/go about these issues either, but I can understand how/why these decisions were made. In short, I find myself quite literally in the middle in most cases, understanding points and arguments made, but not necessarily agreeing aggressively with one side or the other.

  5. Jack’s blogpost critically analyzes the central points of this week’s readings and composes a strong foundational understanding for the contested systems of kinship. The different ways of thought addressed in this week’s readings speak to the plastic nature of the human brain and the ways in which we attempt to rationalize the world around us. Every culture recognizes a mother and her children but how these roles are defined and conditioned varies greatly across traditions. I agree with neither McKinnon or Shaprio; who act in opposition on the polarized spectrum of kinship. I agree with Jack in that Shapiro’s tone dilutes the perceivability of his argument.
    Yet, Shapiro and McKinnon share a flawed perception on the significance of kinship as both of their arguments are ethnocentric and ignore issues of greater social obligation. Their defensiveness acts in detrimental ways and reconciliation between there arguments would be much more effective. Human beings are both cultural and biological beings. Yes, reproduction is a given of the human experience, but our traditions and cultures condition behavior. There are many ways of looking a kinship within the human experience– all which seem valid within the lens of their own respective culture and beliefs. The definition of kinship is a product of greater societal and cultural values. For example, this week’s readings demonstrated values of blood relation and shared substance/seed. “He Won’t Be My Son” is an example where individuals who you might think to be governed by religion find ways to reframe situations to meet their interests. This demonstrates how social obligation influences the definition of kinship. Each reading further reveals the contextual complexities of kinship and how individuals experience and respond to greater societal definitions.

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