Unit 11: Human Cloning -Grace Chung

This week’s readings focus on the ethics surrounding human cloning and the possibilities for human dignity—who (or what) qualifies to be treated and considered as human. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: The Report of the President’s Council on Bioethics is written within an American context and meant to provide George W. Bush a “…fundamental inquiry into the human and moral significance of developments in biomedical and behavioral science and technology…” (The President’s Council on Bioethics, 2002: xvii-xviii). The report does not necessarily offer a religious perspective. The next two pieces, “Negotiating Life: The Regulation of Human Cloning and Embryonic Stem Cell Research” by Barbara Prainsack and “Cloning People: A Jewish Law Analysis of the Issues” by Michael Broyde are written utilizing Jewish law. Prainsack focuses specifically within the Jewish-Israeli context where she discusses Western ethical and moral concerns within Israel. Broyde offers a short discussion juxtaposing the American legal system with Jewish law regarding cloning before delving into his analysis that touches upon the possibilities of humanness.

The first reading, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: The Report of the President’s Council on Bioethics is an official report for the President of the United States. After the successful, but controversial cloning of Dolly the Sheep in 1997 and the isolation of human embryonic stem cells in 1998, President George W. Bush created the President’s Council on Bioethics to discuss and address the “…the ethical and policy ramifications of biomedical innovation” (2002: xv). The goal of the seventeen-member council that was headed by Leon Kass was to provide a concrete policy recommendation for President Bush. The result was the Council’s unanimous recommendation to ban cloning-to-produce-children and a four-year suspension on cloning-for-biomedical research. In this report, the Council distinguished between two types of cloning, cloning-to-produce children and cloning-for-biomedical research. When discussing the Prainsack reading, I will delve more into this distinction. I thought the document brought to light a lot of interesting questions in its discussion on cloning-for-research such as the potential exploitation of women to supply a large and indefinite amount of eggs, the questions of what we owe to the suffering of the embryo and to greater society, and the repeated warning of the crossing of a moral line.

In connecting this reading to the last lecture about surrogacy and the reality that women of lower socioeconomic status are more likely to surrogates to those of higher socioeconomic status, the exploitation of women of lower socioeconomic statuses is a realistic possibility. The Council writes, “The removal of eggs remains an unpleasant and (owing to the hormone treatments needed to hyperstimulate the ovaries) a risky medical procedure for women” (2002: 163). While it is not stated explicitly, one can assume that in order to get women to donate their eggs and undergo a risky procedure, a monetary incentive will most likely be offered. Even in regards to egg donation in America, women donating their eggs on average make around $8,000 and can earn up to $14,000 depending on the individual’s qualifications and the number of eggs produced (Center for Human Reproduction, 2018). Thus, women who are more likely to need the money will most likely be donors. Also thinking through the power dynamics at play where the destruction of those women’s embryonic cells would potentially allow for the creation of life-saving procedures for patients of higher socioeconomic status—as the privatized American healthcare system offers top-notch quality care and services often only to those who can afford it.

The second reading, ‘Negotiating Life: The Regulation of Human Cloning and Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Israel” by Barbara Prainsack is an article written in the Social Studies of Science, a multi-disciplinary journal aimed at an academic global audience. Prainsack begins by providing a brief historical narrative where she writes about two incidents regarding embryonic stem cell research. The first one being the controversial visit of German Prime Minister Wolfgang Clement to Israel inquiring about the potential collaboration in embryonic stem cell research. In response to the Prime Minister’s visit and Israel’s response, the German public expressed outrage and incredulousness at Israel’s “…[capability] of ‘disregarding human dignity’ by allowing almost unrestricted research on human embryos’ (2006: 174). The second scenario happening ten years prior in 1990 where a Jewish woman wanted a child via cloning. The woman’s desire stemming from the conflict between not being able to produce eggs on her own and the potential halachic (Jewish Law) conflict relating to IVF. Within Jewish tradition, one’s “…personal and halachic status of a person is derived from the mother…” (2006: 174). Thus, in the woman’s case, her child could be considered illegitimate and “…the product of a sexual relationship between a man and a ‘forbidden’ woman” (2006: 174). To further complicate things, it would be unclear if the intended mother would be granted parenthood of the child as Jewish law recognizes the gestational mother as the legal parent.

Prainsack’s focuses on answering the question, “Why do Israelis seem to embrace these kinds of newly emerging medical technologies, whereas the mere thought of it gives people shivers in many other parts of the world?” (2006: 175). Her main arguments surround Israel’s demographic problem in order to maintain a Jewish majority and the pro-natalist Israeli culture that enables the state’s biopower to reproduce the nation at the individual level. To give a quick explanation of what biopower is, biopower is a concept developed by Foucault that allows for the power over individual bodies to control populations. Israel identifies itself as a Jewish state. In order to maintain a Jewish identity, Israel has developed a specific terminology that centers an Us vs. Them narrative—where the Jewish population must fight to protect future generations of the ‘demographic threat’ of non-Jews residing in Israel.

Prainsack also distinguishes therapeutic or research cloning from reproductive cloning by the goals of the cloners where “In the case of research cloning, the aim is to obtain tissue that will be needed for medical research and treatment, whereas the goal for reproductive cloning is the creation of a fully fledged human being” (2006: 178). In other words, reproductive cloning involves a somatic cell nuclear transfer where the newly created embryo is placed in a uterus to develop while in research cloning, the embryo is created similarly, but is not implanted in a female’s uterus. Contrary to Prainsack, The Council on Bioethics rejects the terminology ‘reproductive cloning’ and ‘therapeutic cloning’. The rejection for the term reproductive cloning is due to ‘the argument that all cloning is considered reproductive—thus the term “…does not necessarily imply that such a being is fully human or ‘one of us,’ hence deserving of the moral and social protection accorded ‘persons’” (The Council on Bioethics, 2002: 49). The rejection of the term ‘therapeutic cloning’ is based on similar grounds where “The act of cloning embryos may be undertaken with healing motives. But it is not itself an act of healing or therapy” (2002:50). The term also neglects to imply the destruction of embryonic cells for the benefit of the hypothetical future patient. As a result, the Council utilizes the terms ‘cloning-to-produce-children’ and ‘cloning-for-biomedical-research’ in order to emphasize the same act of cloning, but undertaken with significantly different intentions—one resulting in the potential for a new human being and the other in the destruction of embryonic cells.

The last reading “Cloning People: A Jewish Law Analysis of the Issues” by Michael Broyde is an article written in the Connecticut Law Review, a journal catered to an academic audience with a specific professional legal interest. Broyde, a Jewish rabbi and senior lecturer at Emory University School of Law, argues “…that while there are a variety of technical issues related to cloning that have to be addressed, fundamentally cloning is a form of assisted reproduction—no different from artificial insemination or surrogate motherhood—which, when technologically feasible, should be made available to those individuals in need of assisted reproduction” (1998: 505). He also establishes that human beings created via cloning are to be entitled to and treated as unique human beings—separate from the humans they were originally cloned from. Broyde juxtaposes the American legal system with the Jewish one and concludes that within the American system, kinship is not necessarily tied to genetics, but one of law—where within American law, it does not necessarily matter who the parent to a child is, as the courts have the power to change kinship determinations. Contrary to American law, Jewish law places kinship as immutable and determined at birth. In short, within Jewish law, “Children cannot be adopted; they can merely be raised by someone other than their parents, and these pious wonderful people who are raising a child in need of a home are doing a great act of kindness, but are never considered the child’s parents” (Broyde, 1998: 507).

Prainsack and Broyde utilize Jewish law in formulating their arguments. Both authors write within a Jewish morality system that is contrary the Christian hegemonic discourses. Within Christianity, exists a spectrum where on one end is the conservative Catholic Church who believes that human life starts at the time of conception and thus deserves rights. As a result of this belief, the terminology surrounding the debate on embryonic research are placed within a dichotomy on the ‘life’ for the embryo or individual autonomy and consent. Divergent from Catholic doctrine, Jewish Law does not view embryos outside the uterus as human life and prioritizes human born life over developing life. Prainsack and Broyde also place their analyses within the Jewish context where “The moral and ethical assessment of ‘interference with God’s creation’ will therefore always take place on a case-by-case basis and depend on the context of the particular action and the underlying motivations and objectives” (2006: 183). Broyde immediately dismisses the common argument of ‘playing God’ as he argues that medical intervention in general is an interference to divine providence—God’s intervention in the universe (1998: 535). Prainsack uses the example of circumcision where humans are explicitly commanded by God to interfere with God’s creation—thus the interference with God’s creation is morally permissible. Contrary to Prainsack and Broyde, the Council on Bioethics appears to operate utilizing Christian hegemony, as exemplified as the unanimous recommendation to ban cloning-to-produce-children and its discussions regarding what is owed to the embryo. Where the Council cannot treat the embryo in its early stages similar to that of any other human cells as it would then “…[deny] the continuous history of human individuals from zygote to fetus to infant to child…” (2002: 175).

Some questions to consider:

1. At what point is a group of cells considered human life?
2. To what extent is terminology important in framing issues surrounding human cloning? (ie: the Council’s rejection of popular terms ‘reproductive cloning’ and ‘therapeutic cloning’)
3. Where do you draw the line in human cloning—do you consider a certain aspect or stage of human cloning to be crossing a moral line? Why so?