Author: Hester

Human has been and remains a topic of both scientific and political consideration. Debate over its legality and funding should be seen as important. After all, human lives lie in the balance. Furthermore, some would note that many religions and cultures stand against cloning, regardless of efficacy or safety. For example, Islam “privileges—even mandates—biological descent and inheritance. Preserving the “origins” of each child, meaning his or her relationships to a known biological mother and father, is considered not only an ideal in Islam, but a moral imperative “(Inhorn 2006: 95). Certainly, some religious or cultural groups will remain firmly against personal use of cloning technology, similarly to some technologies that are already available. But permitting limited and highly regulated cloning research does not—and should not—require a particular group to take advantage of cloning as a reproductive option or adopt any other technologies that result from cloning research.

The debate over permitting and funding human cloning technologies obviously extends far beyond individuals’ rights to choose or refuse to use human cloning for reproduction. While this discussion and ensuing recommendations places strictly personal opinion on the backburner, it still hopefully relies on logical arguments that seem reasonable. The first portion of this article focuses on scientific concerns with cloning and the second half focuses on moral and ethical concerns frequently raised in debates over cloning, which I might argue is actually at the heart of many peoples’ decisions about whether or not cloning should be allowed and funded.

A major scientific concern is the high morbidity rates of mammal clone morbidity. As noted in a publication from President Bush’s panel on bioethics, “more than 90 percent of attempts to initiate a clonal pregnancy do not result in successful live birth” (Kass 2002: xxv). Firstly, the permitting and funding of human cloning research does not have to mean that researchers are immediately able to attempt a cloned human birth, but rather that they should take as many precautions as possible when deciding how to attempt the first human clone birth. Even so, it is important to recognize that practices like IVF do not rely on a single fertilized egg cell to result in pregnancy.

In addition to the concerns with morbidity rates, there would likely be, currently, a high rate of transplant rejection once the cells are placed back into a human for fetus development. I would raise a similar counterargument to the one regarding morbidity rates. If a human is to ever be successfully cloned, then research that will focus on creating safe transplant and birth methods through new technologies tested on other animals must progress.

A final scientific issue I will discuss is the concern surrounding the fate of embryos that could be used for only research purposes. Especially for people who consider termination of a fetus of any age to be murder and sinful, the fact that “all extractions of stem cells from human embryos, cloned or not, involve the destruction of these embryos” is an obvious problem (xxvii). If this is the major concern, then legislation can be put into place that restricts the use of embryos for stem cell research and stops funds for any groups who are engaging in human embryo destruction for research purposes. It is likely possible to make major advancements in cloning technology and methods by using other animals, and there are now methods for stem cell creation that do not require the use of embryos.

As a last note on strictly scientific research regulations, I would not disagree that “The ethical and policy issues regarding cloning-for-biomedical-research deserve to be considered in the context of all human embryo research. Regulatory mechanisms… should be part of a larger regulatory program governing all research involving human embryos” and there should be “appropriate institutions to advise and shape federal policy in this arena” (222-223). It is essential to repeatedly examine institutions and their research practices to maintain safety and respect for human life. Obviously, these previous scientific arguments alone are not sufficient when addressing the larger landscape of human cloning and approval of human cloning technologies. I would propose, in fact, that the limitations on and concerns about human cloning may be more deeply rooted in protecting human and cultural identity and dignity. As an example, an Israeli committee, when faced with the potential need for legislation banning cloning, maintained that “consensus existed in the committee that cloning per se did not pose any problems; the only problem was with scientific experimentation on humans. …the committee concluded there was no need for any new law. Nevertheless, once the law had been proposed, it was not feasible to simply ignore it” (Prainsack 2006: 191). It seems that addressing issues of treatment of cloned individuals is critical and foundational in the debate over human cloning.

Lack of or confusion about individuality and identity is one major argument against human cloning. This argument can be generally summed up as “cloned children may experience serious problems of identity both because each will be genetically virtually identical to a human being … and because [their lives are] shadowed by constant comparisons to the life of the “original (Kass xxvii). Ensuring individuality and opportunity for a person, whether cloned or otherwise, is important. But what is missing in this argument is the fact that the actual physical act of cloning—the literal scientific procedure—is not actually the cause of any specific expectation on a cloned individual. Rather, a cloned child’s upbringing is what will actually determine its character and degree of individual choice. Dignified relationships with family can be maintained regardless of the method of conception in many cultures, as is evidenced by the successful implementation of IVF not only in the United States, but in many other countries such as Israel.

Issues of kinship and family relations are also frequently cited by those opposing cloning research. Kinship is no doubt important to discuss, both because of the importance of strong and supportive relationships between the cloned person and others, as well as the necessity of understanding citizens’ cultural beliefs. Discussions of reproduction are frequently “intimately linked” with those of culture and production of culture (Kahn 2000: 88). If the dominant cultural groups feel that permitting research into human cloning is inconsistent with their beliefs about reproduction of family, then there may be massive public pushback that is damaging towards future research opportunities. Having said that, a slow rollout of policies permitting more and more direct human cloning is likely to mitigate much of this risk, especially since many people with diverse cultural backgrounds, including Jewish individuals with strong emphasis on the role of family and motherhood, believe that family and kinship roles can be preserved even while cloning humans (Broyde 2005: 299). It seems possible to slowly begin approving and funding groups with the goal of eventual human reproduction through cloning without destroying the public’s diverse ideas of kinship.

Furthermore, on a less obvious level, parents can already select sperm and egg donors for children. Not only can future parents select donors with obviously attractive characteristics, (physical or otherwise), but they can also pre-screen the embryos before implantation or perform genetic tests on the donors to select for or against certain traits in their children. Other advancements in genetic screening and editing are beginning to provide even more control over traits and genes in future children. If this is permitted, then it seems logical that cloning should not be prevented due to fears of genetic selection.

Now that many of the main debates surrounding cloning have been analyzed in depth, it is possible to make policy and funding recommendations. It should be permissible to study human cloning. It would seem to me that, in general, moral qualms with reproductive cloning are not substantially backed with strong and deep arguments, so long as individuals are able to choose whether or not to use cloning, and scientific advancements through non-human studies will likely facilitate safe human clone births. Furthermore, funding from the United States government will allow the government to hold recipients of grants and other money highly accountable in ensuring safe cloning studies and practices.

In addition to the previous discussions about scientific and ethical concerns, there are other reasons that regulated cloning research is not merely “allowable” but also potentially beneficial. By understanding more about cloning cells, future technologies such as well-adapted, personalized organs may become a reality, even without the sacrificing of a human life to attain them. These recommendations, however, come with warnings and important future examinations. For example, once scientific progress is sufficient to actually produce a human safely, there will need to be careful consideration including policy in place to protect cloned individuals, even before they’re actually reproduced. There is no room for a “guinea pig” human that is likely to be born with significant defects or to be unnecessarily seen as an anomaly in society and not respected. The first humans born through cloning must not only be treated with as much respect as another human, but it is imperative that they are born into a supportive family and community that will provide a sense of kinship: “The human mind operates through a few general mechanisms that give humans the flexibility to create and learn a wide array of behaviors and to shape their behavior by reference to diverse cultural ideas, beliefs, and values (not just a cost-benefit utilitarian logic focused only on reproductive maximization)” (McKinnon and Silverman 2005: 127). Kinship is important in not only fostering a sense of belonging, but also shapes an individual’s perspective and beliefs. This is critical for an individual born out of cloning reproduction. Furthermore, while seemingly unlikely in large countries like the United States, it is worth ensuring that genetic diversity remains high and incestuous relationships are prevented. Questions of access to cloning technology will need to be considered, and human cloning should not be seen as a luxury only available to the most affluent.

By no means am I suggesting that labs should be permitted to create a human clone immediately after legislative and funding adjustments. Rather, legislation should continue to change in small increments and adapt as research progresses. In addition, the state of cloning must be continually audited, and legislators should be ready to adapt laws to potentially unforeseen consequences of the research, (something that will likely prove very difficult). Throughout this entire process, the public must be educated about cloning and dignified treatment of cloned individuals. They must be reminded that just because a child looks the same as a donor does not mean that it will or should behave like the donor. Stigma must be mitigated wherever possible in an effort to reduce maltreatment of cloned individuals.

 

Citations:

Barbara Prainsack, “Negotiating Life: The Regulation of Human Cloning and Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Israel.” Social Studies of Science 2006: 173-205.

Leon R. Kass, Human Cloning and Human Dignity (President’s Council on Bioethics, 2002).

Marcia Inhorn, He Won’t Be My Son: Middle Eastern Men’s Discourses of Gamete Donation.” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 20 (2006): 94-120.

Michael Broyde, “Cloning People: A Jewish View.” Connecticut Law Review 30: 2503-2535.

Susan Martha Kahn, Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel (Duke University Press, 2000).

Susan McKinnon, “On Kinship and Marriage: A Critique of the Genetic and Gender Calculus of Evolutionary Psychology,” In S. McKinnon and S. Silverman editors, Complexities: Beyond Nature and Nurture, 106-131 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

 

In addition to participant observation, there are other methods of understanding a religion or culture’s guiding principles for life and decision making. This extends into bioethics. Both Bhattacharya and Broyde use texts traditional and central to the religion to guide their discussions of bioethics. Though there are several obvious differences between the structure of Hindu narratives and the Bible, it is important to note that “Though the Mahabharata does not share the canonical status of the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament… it is a formative text for India and many within Hinduism” (56). More specifically, Bhattacharya largely focuses on stories and narratives from the documents, while Broyde incorporates more specific laws and highly scientific descriptions of fertility treatments and technologies that are prevalent in bioethics conversations.

Furthermore, there is overlap in the goals of the books. Bhattacharya aims to both “inform and to enrich the ongoing bioethical dialogue concerning assisted reproductive technology and to increase the cultural/religious awareness and sensitivity of the healthcare team” especially in relation to incorporating Hindu culture (2). Futhermore, Bhattacharya notes, “By utilizing [the] ancient epic as a source for ethics and exploring how it deals with issues relating to the challenges of having children, we obtain a unique and relevant entry point into the central sacred teachings of the Hindu traditions [and] by working from within the narrative, we participate in and contribute to articulating… ‘Hindu’ dialogue” (3). In addition, Bhattacharya comments on the frequent lack of consideration of Hindu principles in medical care.

Broyde similarly describes his purpose for the chapter: “This chapter is an attempt to create a preliminary and tentative analysis of the technology of cloning from a Jewish law perspective… as an attempt to outliner some of the issues in the hope that others will focus on the problems and analysis found in this chapter and will sharpen or correct those evaluations. Such is the way that Jewish law seeks truth” (Broyde 295). While the religions are very different and the documents that each author focuses on are very different, there is an overlap in desire to further analyze and contribute to bioethical discussions and add new perspectives. These additions might be useful to caregivers, academics, and policy makers (and perhaps even patients that are exposed to the literature).

Both authors list several principles they deem potentially important when creating a bioethics framework. Bhattacharya lists six key principles: “1) An emphasis on the centrality of societal good; 2) a firm belief in the underlying unity of all life (Advaita Vendanta); 3) the expectations and requirements of dharma; 4) the multivalent nature of Hindu traditions; 5) a theory of kharma; and 6) a commitment to ahimsa (no harm)” (63). While some of these principles have more obvious implications for specific bioethical decisions, the author lays out a list of key values that can slowly be incorporated in different and unique ways, and which can expose healthcare workers or ethicists to fundamental ideas patients may come in with.  Within these principles likes a general theme of duty to fulfill a role, which often includes childbearing, and kid treatment of children. Broyde also provides guidelines for making decisions on fertility and reproductive technologies such as cloning. There are five general principles to take into consideration: activity that is obligatory (mitzvah hiyyuvi), Activity that is commendable but not obligatory (mitzvah kiyumi), Activity that is permissible (mutar), ctivity that is discouraged but not prohibited (bittul mitzva), and Activity that is prohibited (asur)” (Broyde 309). These principles embody Jewish law and culture. When considering a reproductive technology in a Jewish context, it is necessary to consider Biblical or Hebrew law and the roles of the individuals involved in the creation of a new human. While these guiding rules are not quite as immediately open to new technologies as Hindu beliefs may appear based on popular narratives, there is still room to consider them as potentially legitimate, especially in special circumstances.

Even with very different texts as the backdrop for analysis, there are beliefs that are shared between the two cultures and religions. For example, even though some reproductive technologies are regarded differently in Jewish culture and occasionally not permitted, women in the Bible often adjust their situations to facilitate childbirth and having a family (Bhattacharya 57), and many technologies are allowed in both Hinduism and Judaism due to the high value on family and perhaps even duty to have children. For example, “Hindu texts reflect a respect for the developing fetal life and argue that it is deserving of protection from harm” (86). Though, as mentioned, Hindu thought is likely more immediately open to new technologies, it is still careful to actually evaluate the technology over time and both cultures emphasize the idea that “some caution is advised” no matter what the new technology is (Broyde 315).

Overall, the two books are different for two main reasons. First, they have slightly different objectives and methods; implications of widely known narratives versus dissection of strongly religious texts. Second, and more critically, they are representing different religions and cultures. In addition, the Broyde piece explained the technology of concern, mainly cloning, in great detail (297-298). This was not as prevalent in Bhattacharya’s article. But there was still a strong overlap in emphasis on consideration of children and family obligation, as well as proper treatment of all people.

Swasti Bhattacharya, Magical Progeny, Modern Technology: A Hindu Bioethics of Reproductive Technology (Suny University Press, 2006).

Michael J. Broyde, “Modern Reproductive Technologies and Jewish Law,” In Michael J. Broyde and Michael Ausubel editors, Marriage, Sex and the Family in Judaism. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 295-328

Both the Jewish and Christian (Catholic) faiths and cultures look to the Bible for guidance in nearly all walks of life. In addition, they incorporate ideas of natural law that make the case for beliefs that are both from God’s Word and rational thinking. Beliefs specifically regarding reproduction will be discussed here. Even with religious texts and cultural leaders, there are still different groups with their own interpretations and adaptations of religious and cultural ideals. Tools like ethnographies highlight some of the differences in interpretations.

The bible, or parts of it, provides the foundation for many beliefs in Catholicism and Judaism. Texts important to understanding reproduction can be found as early as the first chapter of the first book of the Bible. The first two chapters of the book of Genesis are texts often looked to for examples of kinship and God’s guidance on reproduction. Chapter 1 verse 27 describes mankind’s creation, specifically of two genders: “So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them.” Even in this one verse, there is a lot to unpack and opportunity for many interpretations. In the catholic faith, the description of the two genders—male and female—not only speaks to a clear set of gender identities, but also contains information about reproduction. More specifically, they use the idea of a single man and single woman being brought together to suggest that only one man and one woman should be involved in creating a child. This claim directly links with their belief that a child should only be produced out of the sperm and egg of the two future parents. They would argue that use of a sperm or egg donor, surrogate mother, or any other involvement of a third person’s body goes against God’s clear will for marriage and childbirth: “Every human being is always to be accepted as a gift and blessing of God. However, from the moral point of view a truly responsible procreation vis-a-vis the unborn child must be the fruit of marriage” (Instruction on Respect for Human Life 157). Furthermore, they make this claim in terms of the inherent rights of a child: “the child’s right to be conceived and brought into the world in marriage and from marriage” (159). In fact, much of the religious language on this subject incorporates western ideas of individual rights, including the American constitutional principle of “inalienable rights.” (143).  The Catholic church further supports the connection of God’s design and natural law with human rights, and ones that are widely accepted even outside of Catholic faith.

Much of the Jewish community is more lenient on the use of reproductive technologies. This largely stems from the emphasis on children and their importance to culture over the necessity of marriage before and during conception. Even among Rabbis, discussions of reproduction are “intimately linked” with discussions of culture and production of culture (Kahn 2000: 88). There is a well-established connection between children and continuation of culture, even more than between marriage and culture. For many in the culture, especially women, it is “much worse to be a childless woman than to be an unmarried mother” (16). These two principles are only part of the complex and evolving Jewish cultural ideas of kinship with children and between parents. As Kahn notes, there is an increasing injection of Euro-American principles (159-160), some of which are related to Old-Testament teachings, and the culture and ideas of kinship are adapting accordingly. As Jewish heritage is preserved through the maternal bloodline, it of less importance how the baby is conceived or born so long as the mother is involved. But regardless of how the child is conceived or born, “it is accepted… the child is still considered legitimate” (17). Given these cultural principles and adaptation of some liberal, western thought, as well as different interpretations of acts of adultery (96-97), there is room for several reproductive technologies in many Jewish groups. With this in mind, it is clear that there is a massive difference in views of the legitimacy of conception methods between the Jewish and Catholic cultures and religions.

Despite the drastic differences, there are many common threads between Jewish and Catholic-Christian views of birth and children as well. Both groups emphasize the importance of the children and their rights. One specific area is the protection of fetuses. The Catholic faith states that there is no room for abortion of fetuses: “The human being must be respected-as a person-from the very first instant of his existence.” (Instruction on Respect 147). In addition, fetuses must not be used for any reason other than for the birth of a child to one man and one woman. Any scientific research that requires creation or destruction of a zygote or fetus, regardless of its maturity, is strictly prohibited (148). Treating a child or fetus otherwise is not only unbiblical but against moral law: “It is therefore not in conformity with the moral law deliberately to expose to death human embryos obtained “in vitro”” (154). There is also strong emphasis on the child being a “supreme” gift from God, and therefore it must be respected as God intended it to be (168). Jewish law is strongly against abortion as well, except in specific cases such as rape, incest, or maternal risk (Kahn 197). Children are similarly a gift to be respected, and as already was discussed are to be a part of the society no matter how they were conceived.

Even with several official religious and cultural writings and laws available, individual experiences are largely left out of the picture. Ethnography plays a key role in understanding different interpretations of natural law, religion, and cultural norms. While official religious texts are often available and easily accessible, the actual way that teachings and obligations are followed is often different for different individuals or subcultures. Ethnographies can help to illuminate some of these discrepancies. It is also possible to understand why a culture, or more specifically a small subgroup of individuals, hold the values they do given their experiences. Kahn understood the changing concepts of kinship and values in childbirth of many Israeli-Jewish individuals, and other cultures and their views can similarly be understood more deeply through ethnographic work.

Citations:

Instructions on Respect for Human Life. Congregation for Doctrine of Faith, (1987):141-175.

Kahn, Susan Martha. Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.