In the readings assigned for this module, we see two varying approaches to reproductive technologies. Bhattacharya’s approach to reproductive technology in the academy, the clinical setting, and in public policy includes a reliance on the six elements of Hinduism. Bhattacharya’s ideas about the fluidity of Hindu thought and the notion that are people are interconnected translate into ideas about bioethics. Broyde’s approach to reproductive technology, then, provides an emphasis on law, which is noted with the inclusion of “Jewish Law” in the title.
As we discussed in class, there are two sides to the coin of bioethics. Modern bioethics serves as a way to make a decision, regardless of the character of the person(s) involved. Virtue ethics, then, is centered around character building to better equip the person to make those decisions instinctively. Based on the two readings, Bhattacharya’s text is reminiscent of virtue ethics, and Broyde of that of modern bioethics. Bhattacharya quotes Jonsen and Toulmin saying, “moral knowledge is essentially particular, so that sound resolutions of moral problems must always be rooted in a concrete understanding of specific cases and circumstances” (104), which leads me to associate her ideology with that of virtue ethics. Broyde’s emphasis on evaluations on a case-by-case basis stressed on the first page of his chapter (295) associates him with that of modern bioethics present today.
In terms of the differences between the approaches, many things contribute to the specific values held by a person of a particular religion or sect. Perspective is shaped by various environmental factors and obstacles faced over time. I am hesitant to state that these differences can be attributed solely to differences between religion, as variance in opinion and interpretation are present even in the same religion or sect. Even so, religion is a large part of culture, which I think does a better job of accounting for these differences in ideology. To quote Bhattacharya, “This ability to hold and be comfortable with differing accounts and interpretations of God, of Brahman, translates into different accounts and interpretations of particular situations” (102). Because of this, my belief is that the specific methodology of each author definitely plays a big role in the differences present. For example, Michael Broyde’s area of interest is law, with some religion mixed in as well. Swasti Bhattacharya, on the other hand, is a Gender and Woman Studies professor, and works with the American Academy of Religion. While these backgrounds can overlap on some concepts, such as religious law and reproductive technology, the responses will be as varied as the backgrounds of the authors.
If presented with the ethical dilemmas from last module, I believe that Broyde would stress the importance of analyzation on a case by case bias, based on his comment on the first page of his chapter (295). From a previous bioethics class, I know that this is the main methodology of many bioethicists, who are hesitant to make generalizations. For example, if a family already has a child with a genetic disorder that can be screened for and does not feel that they would be able to properly care for another, I feel that Broyde would be in favor of genetic testing, in this scenario. His answer could change, however, in others. In his section entitled “The Slippery Slope and the Denigration of Human Beings”, Broyde emphasizes the importance of each human person created “in the image of God” (312). In the conclusion section, Broyde presents the idea that a person must fully understand the consequences before committing an act, but also admits that the avoid said act “permanently” is also not ideal (316). Based on these statements, I would imagine that the author Broyde would want a couple considering genetic testing to fully educate themselves on the topic. As we watched in the film The Burden of Knowledge, many couples were not fully educated about the topic or held some misconception about the procedure and results.
Battacharya, on the other hand, might have a different response. When we discussed the Hindu value of ahimsa in class, I immediately thought of the bioethical terms beneficence and non-maleficence. Non-maleficence, specifically, means to do no harm, which can be interpreted in a multitude of ways. Is the physical process of genetic testing considered doing harm, because of the increased risk of miscarriage? Is bringing a child into this world with a disorder unknown before giving birth considered doing harm? Both of these questions depend on the interpretation of the value of ahimsa. Along with ahimsa, there are five other values that Battacharya stresses in the beginning of chapter four (63). Similar to Broyde, I also think that Battachrya would feel it necessary to examine the situation from all vantage points, based on this line from the conclusion section, “We gain a richer understanding of moral questions and a better grasp on answers when we examine bioethical issues from the vantage point of several different perspectives” (99). Because of her emphasis on the six elements of Hindu thoughts, I believe that Battacharya would emphasize the importance of the second element, or the underlying unity of all life. While these are only speculations, moral dilemmas such as these are difficult to predict.
Sources:
Michael J. Broyde, “Modern Reproductive Technologies and Jewish Law,” In Michael J. Broyde and Michael Ausubel editors, Marriage, Sex and the Family in Judaism. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 295-328.
Swasti Bhattacharya, Magical Progeny, Modern Technology: A Hindu Bioethics of Reproductive Technology (Suny University Press, 2006).