

*The Moral Status of Apartheid:
Can the Presence of Foreign Corporations
in South Africa Be Morally Justified?**

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Since the international community has offered their nearly unanimous condemnation of the system of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa, the topic of this essay might seem moot. However, the involvement and cooperation with the South African government of numerous governments, businesses, and other institutions suggest that those condemnations do not constitute the final word – certainly not politically, nor, perhaps, morally.

* Of the many persons who have offered critical comments on this paper, I am particularly indebted to Marshall Gregory, William Bechtel, Charles Guthrie, and Errol Harris.

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That apartheid involves some evil is virtually a noncontroversial claim outside of white enclaves in southern Africa and their few supporters in the West. Even the governments and foreign corporations most involved in South Africa routinely criticize the South African system. These paradoxical trends have come into particular focus in discussions about the role of foreign corporations in South Africa. These discussions have, for the most part, addressed the question of corporate practices, concerning what will, on balance, produce the best consequences for the various concerned parties in South Africa.

Such discussions, however, overlook a more central question, concerning the evils and the ultimate moral status of apartheid itself. In fact, most anti-apartheid activists (at least outside of South Africa) have chosen to address the question concerning corporate practices at the expense of this question concerning the moral status of apartheid. Generally, those who press for the withdrawal of foreign corporations have offered arguments in which they conclude that immediate withdrawal would most efficiently undermine apartheid (and benefit black people living in South Africa) in the long run, the short term consequences notwithstanding. However, from the standpoint of *any*¹ major contemporary moral theory, the question of corporate practices is at least potentially secondary to the question of the moral status of apartheid. The point is that if the evils of apartheid are sufficiently severe, then corporations may not be able to morally justify even their *presence* in South Africa, the consequences of alternative business practices there notwithstanding.

It is difficult to determine when actions are so objectionable that they preclude serious contact with the perpetrator. The following arguments will offer considerable evidence that the actions of the South African government almost certainly qualify, but I will neither attempt to formulate nor apply a general criterion for ostracism, because, ultimately, I will not make my case on this ground alone. A more precise account of both the evils *and the intricacies* of apartheid will contribute to an argument which counsels corporations either to withdraw from South Africa

¹ If, as I suspect some might, consequentialists deny my claim that according to *their own positions* the question of the evils of apartheid should be prior to the question of corporate practices, then this entire paper might be taken as an attack of their views about the relation of these moral questions surrounding the role of foreign corporations in South Africa.

or to radically alter their practices there.² However, abiding by even the minimal constraints to be proposed would, under South African law, insure that the concerned corporations cease functioning. Thus it is not at all clear if there is any viable option short of withdrawal that is both morally acceptable and financially prudent.

Corporate involvement in South Africa takes a number of forms, *from* such controversial practices as selling products to the South African security police *to* the apparently innocuous practice of maintaining a few sales representatives for marketing consumer goods. In and of themselves these activities may be differentially objectionable. Nonetheless, since the question regarding the evils of apartheid is potentially prior to questions about particular corporate practices, I will focus on that issue first, and only then turn to questions about corporate practices. If the evils of apartheid are as severe as I will argue, though, such questions about corporate practices will, indeed, prove to be a secondary consideration.

The crucial premise in the argument which follows is the claim that *as a group* black people living in South Africa and their labor in particular are the public property of white South Africa as a group or, in short, that apartheid is a system of group slavery. I will establish this claim without the ideological posturing that has often accompanied claims like it. The examination of apartheid necessary to defend this claim will clarify both the nature and extent of its evils and, hence, aid in the assessment of the moral status of various corporate policies.

Historically, apartheid is rooted in the system of impressed labor employed in the gold mines of South Africa in the first half of this century.³ This system was in turn the 'adaption to industry of the traditional pattern of coercing black labor that had its ultimate roots in [individual] slavery . . . the South African context made possible a kind of ultra-exploitation of labor that would have been foreclosed in other industrializing nations.'⁴ Arguably, apartheid is the most effective of such systems. It not only completely controls the labor of blacks, it also ar-

2 If my characterization of apartheid is sound, though, almost any corporate activity will prove morally problematic eventually.

3 See Francis Wilson, *Labor in South African Gold Mines 1911-1969* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1972), 13.

4 George Fredrickson, *White Supremacy* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press 1981), 220

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tificially diminishes its value as a means for coercing that labor, and it provides an (allegedly) legal veneer for this exploitation which has relieved the majority of white South Africans of any sense of *personal* culpability.

A *legal* system that thoroughly controls the economic opportunities of at least some competent adults, where those adults are either indigenous and/or forcefully restricted to a particular locale, while simultaneously denying them an equal franchise and equal access to economic opportunities (for reasons not having to do with criminality) in order to coerce their labor is sufficient (and, quite possibly, necessary) for a legalized system of slavery. If these conditions hold, yet no individual member of the enslaving group can be said legally to own individual member of the enslaved group, then that constitutes a system of *group* slavery.

It will help to specify what this claim does and does not involve. To declare that apartheid is a system of group slavery is *not* to say that any individual white owns any individual black person in South Africa, or that South African law fails to constrain whites' treatment of black people in South Africa, or that any *individual* white can dispose of any black person living in South Africa as s/he pleases, or that blacks have absolutely no opportunity for legal complaint against white South Africans. Excepting the first, however, these considerations are not inconsistent with historic systems of individual slavery.⁵

The charge that *apartheid* is a system of group slavery *does* assert that (1) it governs the relations of racially defined *groups* in South Africa (and only derivatively does it constrain the relations of individual whites and blacks), (2) it has created an unbridgeable legal gulf (with both economic and political implications of crucial proportions) between those groups, and therefore, (3) its coercion of black labor constitutes a system of slavery at least as objectionable as historic systems of individual slavery, and perhaps more so, since unlike those systems where, by a number of legally recognized means, enslaved persons could at least become 'freedmen' (if not full citizens), apartheid legally precludes such a possibility within the Republic of South Africa. Consequently, the 'marketable' labor of blacks is virtually the public property of white South Africans as a group. Many considerations collectively support this interpretation.

⁵ Ibid., Chapter 4

Apartheid severely constrains and directs every aspect of blacks' participation in the labor 'market' in order to deny them nearly every economic opportunity openly available to whites to insure a superabundant supply of undervalued black labor, in order to avoid more blatant forms of labor coercion. Hence, no amount of education, hard work, or initiative on the part of blacks as a group will produce any significant improvements in their standard of living (for example, to raise it to that of white South Africans). Prominent among the features of apartheid which insure this gross economic inequality are the legal color bar in nearly every area of employment (and the unofficial color bar in all areas), the severe restrictions on the movements and domicile of blacks, and the legal guarantee not only of separate but *unequal* facilities in the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953). While whites enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of North Americans and Western Europeans, the average income in 1981 of black workers in the eight *highest* paying sectors of the economy (these figures exclude the roughly seven million people living in the impoverished 'homelands') falls below the Household Subsistence Level in eight of the ten major population centers in South Africa.⁶ As a group, blacks receive just enough wealth to insure their survival as a huge pool of inexpensive, unskilled workers.

This restrictive legislation informs the South African government's talk of a severe labor shortage in the face of black unemployment of approximately twenty-five percent. Consequently, direct coercion of black labor is unnecessary under apartheid, since the supply of black labor substantially exceeds the demand, *given the government's artificial restrictions on entrepreneurial and employment opportunities available to blacks.*

It is *in combination* with the political consequences of apartheid that these economic constraints support the charge of slavery. By law black people living in the Republic of South Africa have virtually no political rights whatsoever and are, consequently, denied autonomy. They have no legally recognized means for political expression (let alone representation) and few legal means to express their concerns about social issues generally.

⁶ See Peter Randall, ed., *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1982* (Johannesburg: The Natal Witness 1983), 60-4. Note that this figure was computed from official statistics which have been severely criticized for *their optimism*. Other research indicates that the income of black South Africans is substantially less (see 65-9).

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Although the denial of blacks' political rights is the most crucial premise in an argument for construing apartheid as a system of group slavery, ultimately, it requires the least comment. The situation is uncontroversial. The acknowledged goal of apartheid and its 'homelands' policy is to strip from every black person any claim to South African citizenship. Blacks have never had the vote. Recent measures for establishing separate advisory parliaments for colored and Asian people living in South Africa leave blacks disenfranchised and unrepresented.⁷ Black people in South Africa have no legally recognized voice in choosing or running the government that rigidly controls every important aspect of their lives.

The homelands policy accomplishes a number of ends. It permits the white government to 'legally' deny blacks' property rights by seizing or destroying their homes and other property in the course of 'endorsing out' hundreds of thousands of blacks to their respective 'homelands'.⁸ Indeed, the 'homelands' function as 'convenient "dumping grounds" for "unproductive" and thus unwanted Africans such as the aged, infirm, and unemployed.'⁹ Their remoteness effectively removes the tremendous suffering of millions of blacks from nearly all of the white population.

The homelands policy provides further 'legal' grounds for the enslavement of these people *in their own country*. The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (1970) gives every black living in South Africa citizenship in his/her respective 'homeland.' Once that 'homeland' is given its independence, the members of the associated group lose any legal claim, in the eyes of South African law, on citizenship in the Republic of South Africa. A final goal of apartheid is to eliminate the possibility of a black citizen of the Republic of South Africa even though the blacks continue to live within its borders and the huge majority of their labor is in the white controlled economy.

The official policy of the South African government is that the 'homelands' are independent states, and it is in their respective 'homelands' that blacks have citizenship, exercise political rights, and,

7 In 1959 the government repealed the Native Representation Act of 1936 which provided for a few *appointed white* representatives in Parliament to represent blacks' interests.

8 See Cosmas Desmond, *The Discarded People: An Account of Resettlement in South Africa* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books 1971).

9 See Gwendolen Carter, *Which Way is South Africa Going?* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1980), 29.

supposedly, separately develop. This view, however, ignores some compelling economic, social, and political facts.

Apartheid calls for nearly three quarters of South Africa's population to reside in approximately thirteen percent of the total area of South Africa; those which are generally the most undeveloped and barren parts of the country. The areas in question had a *collective* gross annual product of less than three million rand in 1980, and over 5.2 million of the approximately 6.2 million 'homelands' inhabitants in 1980 had no measurable income.¹⁰ These areas are incapable of supporting their present inhabitants, let alone the millions more slated for forced removal. Millions of the 'homelands' citizens do not (and have never) lived within their borders. Many of the 'homelands' are geographically discontinuous, and many are landlocked within the borders of South Africa.

The 'homelands' are comparably suspect politically. The majority of their 'citizens' have been resettled there against their will, and many have gone only as a result of direct force. These people have had no say in this plan for their separate development, and their overwhelming reluctance to cooperate is ample evidence of their rejection of the government's attempt to strip them of their claim to South African citizenship. The budgets of the 'governments' of the 'homelands' in *every* case rely almost totally upon aid from the South African government.¹¹ Nor are these 'governments' obviously representative, since the chief executives appoint as many as half of the members of the 'legislatures.' Ironically, even these 'governments' officially reject many of the South African government's conditions under which they were established and under which they 'rule.' Most revealing, though, is the international community's *unanimous* refusal to recognize these 'governments' diplomatically. Apartheid, generally, and the homelands policy, in particular, disenfranchises blacks legally, politically, and economically.

I have used scare quotes in the previous paragraphs to indicate the international community's rejection of the homelands policy. One consequence of this stance, however, reinforces the government's control over blacks' movement abroad. No country recognizes a 'homeland' passport, and no 'homeland citizen' can legally obtain a South African passport. As a result, they are unable to escape South Africa legally, and they are ef-

¹⁰ Randall, 409-11

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 368-70

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fectively prevented from traveling internationally or emigrating without special government permission.

The constraints on the movements of blacks abroad, though, pale in the face of the comprehensive controls on their movements *within* the country, established by the infamous (and ironically named) Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act (1952). This law requires that every black (sixteen years and older) carry a passbook at all times which includes, among other things, stipulations on where they may live, work, and travel. Those who reside illegally are either imprisoned, removed to the 'homelands,' or both. The problem which most blacks face is simple enough. In order *both* to live beyond barest subsistence and to retain familial support and intimacy, they and their families must frequently violate the pass law.

Blacks' labor, therefore, is the white public's property, because South African law, in which blacks have had no say and can have no say and from which it is virtually impossible for them to escape, completely bars blacks from all serious economic and political opportunities, while simultaneously assuring white South Africa an abundant supply of inexpensive black labor. In short, whites as a group completely control the legal disposition of black persons and their labor. In every important respect the government's control over blacks is equivalent to that of a person's over his/her property — or of a slaveholder over his/her slave.

Their political disenfranchisement notwithstanding, the *relative* prosperity (for example, in comparison to the standard of black Africans generally) of a vanishingly small percentage of blacks in South Africa¹² might suggest reducing the charge against apartheid from slavery to misguided paternalism. Further scrutiny will eliminate this temptation.

First, this consideration is not inconsistent with a system of slavery. Some slaves received humane treatment and were comfortable materially under earlier systems of slavery. These amenities, however, did not abrogate those slaves' legal status, nor would they even if they had been universally available. But, of course, such amenities were not frequent nor are the *vast* majority of blacks in South Africa well off. In fact, the material conditions of most blacks in the rural 'homelands' in particular do not substantially differ from the poorest of black Africans, and those conditions (and even the conditions of the most prosperous blacks in

12 Carter, 132-3

South Africa) contrast strikingly with those of virtually *all* white South Africans.

Although superficially the South African situation seems to lack various evils of historic systems of slavery, closer inspection reveals that these are appearances only, and in no way diminish the exploitation of blacks in South Africa. Indeed, they fully cohere with a notion of *group* ownership where the administration and supervision of group holdings are delegated (in this case) to functionaries of the government.

The law severely restricts what blacks can own and where they can live. These restrictions perpetuate that peculiar set of living arrangements which, in part, define apartheid. Crucially, the law declares the 'homelands' as the only permissible areas for land ownership and permanent domicile for blacks in the entire country. The Group Areas Act (1950) established racially restricted townships in the urban areas (which were otherwise reserved for whites) where only legally employed black workers, who are officially regarded as 'temporary sojourners,' can lodge while working in the cities. Household servants can dwell 'temporarily' in the homes of the whites they serve. (Families accompany them only if workers satisfy criteria so stringent that the majority cannot meet them without superhuman sacrifices.¹³) Almost all other blacks reside either in the 'homelands' or illegally.

Regarding South Africa's international borders as the boundaries of a group owned plantation makes construing the townships and the 'homelands' as slaves' quarters less difficult. The distance of those quarters from employment centers, the labor bureaus in the 'homelands' which strictly control the hiring of blacks, the pass law, and the constraints in most labor contracts collectively insure the thorough control of blacks' daily movements from those quarters to the work place. One consequence, functionally equivalent with one of the heinous features of historic systems of slavery, is the separation and dismemberment of black families. For black workers to remain law abiding, they must often leave their families for the duration of their contracts (usually eleven months or more of the year). Typically, if he lives near enough, a husband of a female domestic servant living in a white household may visit her weekly. Both are often many miles from children and other family,

13 Other than short annual visits, most must remain apart from families for ten or more years, since technically (and with the least skilled, really) they lose their jobs each time they return to the 'homelands' to visit their families. See Carter, 34.

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who must remain in the 'homelands,' because they cannot readily contribute to white prosperity. Consequently, workers rely on other family members to rear their children in the 'homelands.' Because many blacks comply with the laws and the government so rigorously punishes those who do not, the dismemberment of black families is a cruel but common phenomenon.

Physical abuse of slaves most poignantly epitomized the evil of slavery in the nineteenth century and before. Since apartheid is a system of *group* slavery, agents of the white government replace the overseers in the administering of abuse. It is, after all, unlawful in any society for individual citizens to abuse public property. The law permits ruthless repression of blacks but only by the government. This requirement preserves (1) a legal veneer for such repression, (2) its efficient dispensation, and (3) in conjunction with rigid censorship, the ignorance of many whites who seem happy to look the other way. Any suspicion is sufficient for incarcerating a person under the Terrorism Act (1967) which provides for *indefinite* detention without charges and without contact with either family or legal representatives. Also, torture of political prisoners is widely reported. Amnesty International claims that 'all the evidence indicates that torture is extensively inflicted on political detainees, and that the Government sanctions its use.'¹⁴

Sheer economic considerations set constraints on such abuse by individual slaveholders, since interruption of the victim's work was not profitable. Unfortunately, in a system of *group* slavery with an abundant supply of cheap labor, the constraints that once curtailed such abuse do not apply in contemporary South Africa. Unexplained violent deaths of numerous prisoners in police custody have occurred. The police have shot hundreds of unarmed civilians in various incidents over the past twenty years. Such wanton disregard for the lives of black people has provoked claims that the authorities are pursuing a policy of genocide. Such claims, technically, are not correct. Short of mass, armed insurrection by blacks, the interests of the white community are best served by maintaining a steady, abundant supply of cheap black labor rather than the extermination of black people living in South Africa. Although any individual black worker *is* dispensable, blacks as a *group* are not, except under the most extreme circumstances.

¹⁴ Amnesty International, *Political Imprisonment in South Africa* (London: Amnesty International Publications 1978), 56

Thus, support for the crucial premise in the argument which follows abound. Apartheid is a system of group slavery (established and administered by the white government) in which black people and their labor are the public property of white South Africa. The South African government completely denies black people any genuine political or economic¹⁵ opportunities as it also constrains the disposition and treatment of blacks by individual whites. Like historic systems of individual slavery, the enforcement of apartheid legislation also dismembers blacks' families, controls their movements, insures their impoverishment, and leads to their abuse and death. This system of group slavery has all (save two) of the worst accoutrements of historic systems of individual slavery. It eliminates the need for a slave trade and the direct coercion of labor by force (at least most of the time). It does so, however, by enslaving an entire indigenous group and, thus, eliminating the need for individual ownership of slaves, while severely restricting their opportunities in order to insure tremendous competition for the jobs that they are permitted to hold — jobs which are necessary, though usually not sufficient, for *any* improvement of their lot. In light of these considerations, the charge that black people living in South Africa are enslaved public property does seem the most apt conclusion.

Other governments (including black African ones) *in fact* disqualify certain indigenous groups to some extent both politically and economically on the basis of ethnicity. Some countries comparably restrict both the domestic and international movements of some of their citizens as well. However, South Africa is the *only* country that *by law* *unequally and completely* disqualifies certain indigenous groups on the basis of ethnicity (while retaining nearly complete control of their lives). It is also the *only* country that as a matter of explicit policy does so so systematically. To the extent that other regimes approximate the South African situation, approximately similar constraints to those developed

¹⁵ Black unions in South Africa might constitute a partial exception. However, it was only the Industrial Counciling Amendment Act (1979) that offered black unions even the *possibility* of legal recognition and operation. This law prohibits strikes except after the union has pursued a complex conciliation procedure, not applicable to white unions, which takes up to eighteen months. Three points put the situation in some perspective: (1) by 1982 the government had permitted only two unions to register; (2) a legal strike by a black union has yet to occur in South Africa; and (3) government harrassment (as measured, for example, by numbers of detentions) of black unions and their leadership has dramatically *increased* since this law was passed.

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below should apply to foreign corporate activity there. (See footnote 21 below.)

In the face of criticism, *some* corporations have taken steps to improve the lot of their black laborers in South Africa. Less than half of the American corporations in South Africa have agreed to comply with the Sullivan Principles,¹⁶ which call for equal employment opportunities, elimination of racially segregated facilities in the work place, and equal pay for equal work. These companies have been only partially effective *at best*, however, in alleviating even the most superficial forms of discrimination in the work place, because of government and (white) union resistance and their own failure to pursue these changes with any vigor. (Since blacks who labor for American corporations in South Africa constitute approximately seven tenths of one percent of the total South Africa work force, these ameliorative measures, even if fully realized, could have little effect on the overall standard of living of black people.) The Sullivan Principles, however, fail to (1) address forms of corporate support for the government, (2) attend to the wishes of the black workers concerned, and most crucially, (3) address the issue of blacks' political rights. In fact, the Sullivan Principles (and comparable programs for Canadian corporations and for those from countries in the European Economic Community) completely ignore the question of blacks' political rights. Essentially, some businesses have sought to treat their black laborers somewhat better, while simultaneously continuing to participate in and profit from the system which enslaves them.¹⁷

If this analysis is sound, though, it is surely immoral for foreign corporations in South Africa to profit from the labor of black people there. The argument is straightforward. It is certainly immoral to profit from slave labor, and apartheid renders blacks in South Africa slaves in their own country. Therefore, it is immoral to profit from their labor. This argument surely justifies the condemnation of foreign corporations *presently* operating in South Africa, since, at least in part, their profits must inevitably arise, either directly or indirectly, from the labor of blacks in South Africa. Such profits are the result of what Julius Nyerere has called 'organized theft,' and are as illgotten as any gains could be.

I am not claiming that the foreign corporations involved in South

16 The Sullivan principles appear in Desaix Myers III, *Business and Labor in South Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1980), 137-43.

17 Carter, 92

Africa themselves enslave, but it is the case that their very presence, inevitably, requires their complicity. Any corporate activity in South Africa will eventually involve cooperating with and abetting the government's policies, either directly, by participating in the labor bureau system, observing the color bar in employment, or simply paying taxes, or indirectly, by selling to government agencies or simply contributing to the overall vigor of the economy that sustains the South African regime.

In the light of these considerations, is there *any* morally acceptable posture for a foreign corporation in South Africa short of complete withdrawal? Assuming that apartheid is fairly regarded as a system of group slavery, extremely stringent moral demands certainly constrain corporations in South Africa. Alan Donagan argues that 'since it is a moral duty not to stand idly by when another human being is suffering violence or fraud and it is in your power to help, it would not be enough merely to refuse to take part in upholding slave laws; it would also be a duty, so far as it was possible, to give aid to anybody who violated those laws.'¹⁸ Since apartheid legislation controls every important dimension of the relationship between employers and black laborers, it is unclear how any corporation in South Africa can even 'refuse to take part in upholding slave laws' (let alone give aid to anti-apartheid activists) and still remain in business.

Nonetheless, the presence of a profit seeking foreign corporation in South Africa might be morally defensible, if it either had no black laborers or made no profit whatsoever from the labor of those it did have, if it regularly and forcefully petitioned the government both to abolish apartheid and to legalize the *full* participation in the political process of all the indigenous people of South Africa, if it successfully avoided paying taxes to the South African government, if it dealt only with products and services which could not be used by the government to further implement apartheid, and most importantly, because it has been so completely ignored, if it aggressively supported (peaceful) resistance (and resisters) of apartheid, at least. These requirements, no doubt, constitute only a *partial* list. Also, there is certainly some evidence that even these requirements may not be acceptable to the majority of blacks in South Africa — whose opinions surely deserve serious attention.

The point is doubly moot, though. First of all, because these re-

18 Alan Donagan, *Morality, Property and Slavery*, The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas 1981, 13

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quirements do not even remotely describe the actual situation of any foreign corporation presently operating in South Africa. Indeed, some of these measures are particularly foreign to corporate policy. For example, not only have foreign corporations completely failed to aid resistance to apartheid, evidence exists that at least one American firm has committed itself to active *cooperation* with the government in the suppression of black unrest.¹⁹ The point is moot for an even deeper reason, though. If foreign corporations were to meet even this minimal set of conditions, such South African laws as the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), the Unlawful Organization Act (1960), the Terrorism Act (1967), and the Internal Security Act (1976) would insure their wholesale suppression, including seizing their assets and confiscating their property. (It is not unreasonable to think that these and other such restrictions should frighten both foreign corporations and white South African citizens. Perhaps the intoxicating prosperity that results from apartheid for each has obscured more than their moral vision.)

The present analysis highlights a question that is different from the focus of most current discussions. The contemporary controversy concerns which steps by foreign corporations in South Africa can efficiently produce positive changes there in the long run. The more important question concerns the intrinsic evils of apartheid and whether or not foreign corporations can even justify their *presence* in South Africa, the consequences of their activities there notwithstanding.

If the foregoing arguments are sound, then business as usual in South Africa and even business according to such codes as the Sullivan Principles is morally unacceptable. Joel Feinberg has documented²⁰ the unanimity with which modern Western moral philosophers have condemned even cases of *voluntary* slavery. Among moral philosophers of all stripes, systems of involuntary servitude have not been a serious issue for the last hundred years, at least.

Since apartheid is a system of group slavery, the standard discussions are, therefore, seriously deficient. They obscure the moral demands on corporations²¹ which arise not only in virtue of this group slavery, but, derivatively, in virtue of their profiting from it, their failure to support

19 See *General Motors in South Africa: Secret Contingency Plans 'In The Event of Civil Unrest'* (New York, NY: The Africa Fund 1979).

20 Joel Feinberg, 'Legal Paternalism,' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 1 (1971) 105-24

21 ... demands which, incidentally, are an anchor point at one end of a continuum of

black resistance to apartheid, and their inevitable complicity in maintaining that system. Since, *in fact*, any corporation in South Africa *must* inevitably cooperate with and abet apartheid, and since apartheid, as a system of group slavery, is so unreservedly immoral, it is unclear how *any* corporate presence in South Africa, let alone any of their profit making activities there, can be morally justified. Donagan argues that 'actively to abet a moral wrong is itself a moral wrong, and that to take any part whatever in upholding laws maintaining slavery would actively abet a moral wrong.'²² To persist knowingly in such activity is immoral, because it is noncontroversially immoral to cooperate with and abet slavery, and particularly in such direct fashions. The unanimous condemnation of slavery in any of its forms offers considerable support to demands for South Africa's isolation. Whether the evils of apartheid suffice (according to some general criterion for ostracizing perpetrators) to justify isolating South Africa or not, a web of South African legislation absolutely guarantees that foreign corporations inevitably participate themselves in the perpetration (and perpetuation) of those evils and, thus, provides sufficient moral grounds to require their withdrawal.

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such demands which, arguably, apply to corporations involved in many other countries as well.

²² Donagan, 13

