Known for his contributions in Metaphysics, Ethics and the Philosophy of Mind, Smart presents very discerning and interesting arguments in the article distinguishing the “act” and “rule” of utilitarianism. Though there may be benefits in complying with either doctrines, the core tenets of both beliefs seem to be morally conflicted after we review Smart’s scenarios and examples.
He opens by stating that, to fundamentally separate extreme utilitarianism from restricted utilitarianism, is to differentiate our interpretation of the word “actions”. Let us first examine individual actions. According to extreme utilitarianism, rules are not rules; they are merely guidelines or in Smart’s words – “rules of thumb”. And so when we face a rule like keeping promises, an extreme utilitarianism could render it obsolete if the goodness of the consequences of breaking the promise exceeds that of keeping it. Here, we come across the first flaw of extreme utilitarianism; in abiding to its doctrines, a society of mistrust would be inevitably created. In this case, would the consequences of breaking promises benefit society as a whole? The single action of breaking a promise may prove beneficial because of its “good” consequences but collectively, it shakes our individual moral guidelines and puts our moral integrity in a precarious position.
Smart went on to give an example of how a class of actions could be justified on the grounds of extreme utilitarianism. He supposed that a man was drowning in a river near Berchtesgaden in 1938 and he had a high resemblance of the villainous dictator Adolf Hitler, the rescuer, with no time to spare, trusted his instincts and saved him. An extreme utilitarian who knew that the drowning man was Adolf Hitler would nevertheless praise the rescuer because the man showed courage, strength and benevolence, all of which are dispositions of “great positive utility”. Yet ultimately, the extreme utilitarian praised an action that he knew was wrong. Suppose we all adopted the same beliefs, we would then be constantly wearing a facade and living in a society of deception as our words contradict our self-acknowledged truths. Thus, another flaw of extreme utilitarianism surfaces. To be a believer, we not only have to abandon our integrity but also forego our honesty. Perhaps the more rational method would be to praise the rescuer for the act but reprimand him for rescuing Adolf Hitler. But then another question would follow; how can we justify this punishment for the dictator? One of the key principles of utilitarianism is equality. If every individual is to be treated without prejudice, then shouldn’t Hitler also face the Justice system instead of dying without a trial? As we see, many moral dilemmas appear if we try to reason scenarios like this with extreme utilitarianism principles.
For restricted utilitarianism, we need only look at the “defense” that Smart made at the end; what if one of the rules is “act optimifically”? According to Stephen Toulmin, if “keep promises” conflicts with another rule, we are allowed to argue the case based on its merits but if “act optimifically” is itself a rule then there will always be a conflict of rules. Therefore, restricted utilitarianism, in theory, cannot substantiate its tenets with enough credibility and logic that it ultimately “collapses” into extreme utilitarianism. And so it follows that both doctrines are morally conflicted.
According to Professor Millson, a good normative ethical theory is one that “preserves core tenets and as many intuitions without changing the other”. After reading Smart’s article, we see frequent infringements between tenet and intuition and so it makes us question whether extreme and restricted utilitarianism should be appellated as good theories. Indeed, they offer scientific explanations of how things are but they don’t provide moral guidelines of which we can abide to in every scenario.
Citations
The Place of reason in Ethics Pg 146-8 http://www.enotes.com/topics/an-examination-place-reason-ethics