Utilitarianism In Nozick’s “The Experience Machine”

What is the meaning of life? It is a question that theologians and philosophers alike have tried to tackle. The proposed answers frequently relate to morality: “To help others” or “To make a difference.” If we follow in this line of thought, utilitarianism might say that the meaning of life is to maximize utility and minimize pain (Bennet 55). However, Robert Nozick calls this idea into question in “The Experience Machine,” proposing that maybe there is something more to life than happiness.

Many philosophers have long regarded happiness as the ultimate goal in life. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes happiness as “something complete and self-sufficient, it being an end of our actions” (Aristotle 12). Here Aristotle seems to state that happiness is the ultimate end to the means of living— the meaning of life, even. This is something that the hedonist would likely agree with. However Nozick seems to question the truth of that idea. In “The Experience Machine,” he proposes a hypothetical situation in which humans have the option to plug into a machine that would give you any experience you wanted. While in it, you would have no idea that what was happening wasn’t real. At the surface, this seems to be an ideal scenario. You can do, feel, and experience anything you want to; you can achieve a state of total bliss by handpicking the way your life will go. But Nozick argues that most people would not choose to plug into the machine. He states that there are more things that matter to us than just the way that we feel; if our internal emotional state is all that matters, why not plug in? Nozick says that we want to do things, and not just to experience doing them (Nozick 43). He says that what we are matters, not just what we do. And he argues that humans crave contact with a “deeper reality” (Nozick 43). All of these aspects of living are stripped away when you plug into the machine. And these parts of living seem to be ignored by utilitarianism, by just focusing on what causes you or others pleasure. Nozick states that “what we desire is to live ourselves, in contact with reality” (Nozick 45). This emphasis on wanting to stay in touch with reality implies that we want more than just the happiness that the machine would be able to supply. We crave the fabric of reality, including the hardships and the struggles that make happiness distinct. This mentality is echoed by other philosophers, such as Peter Singer. In his video “Let’s Talk About Your Hedonism,” he argues that we achieve meaning in our life through something deeper than just pursuing happiness. He says that “people that don’t aim at pleasure, but aim at something else, some activity that’s worthwhile in itself, and they get absorbed in the moment of doing what they’re doing… they actually get enjoyment and fulfillment out of it.” This idea directly supports Nozick’s argument that humans crave more than just pleasure in life, but something deeper and more personal.

While aiming to do what will make others happy is certainly noble, looking at it through the lens of Nozick’s article and supporting points of view, it just does not seem like enough to encompass all of it what is moral and all of what is important in life. Utilitarianism seems to miss out on a big part of life that Nozick seems to pick up on. What is just as important as happiness is the person, with the motivations and intentions that utilitarianism dubs as meaningless. What is important is a deeper reality that we can discover and get in touch with, which utilitarianism never addresses. What makes human life what it is is how we live in reality, with all of the different emotions beyond just happiness. All of these things are vital parts of the human experience, vital parts of the meaning of life.

While Nozick’s article never directly addresses utilitarianism, it seems to provide sufficient evidence to question the simplicity of the theory. He seems to argue that happiness is not all there is to be had. We cannot ignore the people we are, our motivations and intentions, or the importance of seeking a deeper reality than the surface on which hedonism and utilitarianism operate. The point of life, and the meaning of morality, are deeper and more complex than utilitarianism would suggest.

 

Works Cited

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011. Print.

Bennett, Christopher. “Chapter 4: Utilitarianism.” What Is This Thing Called Ethics? London: Routledge, 2010. Print.

Nozick, Robert. “The Experience Machine.” Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974. Print.

Let’s Talk About Your Hedonism. Prod. Big Think. Perf. Peter Singer. YouTube/Let’s Talk About Your Hedonism. Big Think, 16 Mar. 2009. Web. 3 Oct. 2014. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vfkcg05_uUg>.

Utilitarianism

 

This week we begin studying Normative Ethics, and more specifically, the theory of Utilitarianism. John Stuart Mill, a very important philosopher in the 19th century, is one of the earliest advocates of Utilitarianism. In his essay, Selections From Utilitarianism, Mill defines what the theory is and provides his responses to common misconceptions people have against it. Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, states that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (77 Mill). Utilitarianism focuses on the general good of the world over individual pleasure. Although the theory sounds nice, for we all would love world peace, there are a few issues that I have with Mill’s responses that has me questioning the legitimacy of the theory.

Mill explained in his essay that according to Utilitarianism, the moral value of an action relies solely on the outcome of the event, making the theory consequentialist (55, Bennett). Furthermore, he believes that intentions behind actions are insignificant. The only thing that is important is the good deed. The issues that I have with this particular idea is that first, how are people supposed to know what the consequences of their actions are before they do it? A lot of times it is difficult to predict what the result of an action may be, hence why I believe motive is important. I disagree with Mill’s opinion that one’s intentions have little to no importance. Throughout the text, Mill constantly said that one of the most important aspects of utilitarianism is promoting happiness and good deeds. In many cases it is indeed true that when someone sees someone else behaving virtuously, he or she is more inclined to do something good as well. However, there are may scenarios that prove otherwise. In 2008, a crazy man intentionally burned down my family-friend’s company. Instead of giving up, my family friend worked endlessly and eventually made the company better than it was before the fire. Now, just because the result was positive, does not mean that the man’s action was acceptable or moral by any means.

Something I found very interesting was Mill’s view that everyone has some innate utilitarianism sentiment that is developed once people realize that morality lies in general happiness of all people. He believes that any serious problems in society, such as disease and poverty, can be resolved if the society is educated with appropriate values and is committed to their elimination.  Mills claims that this sentiment causes social unification, and would consequently make individuals feel ashamed if they acted against utilitarianism. This whole idea behind sentiments made me wonder whether its possible for an individual to have a good reason to do something even if his beliefs don’t promote doing so?

I think that the biggest issue that I have with Utilitarianism is that it places too much focus on the general amount of happiness of the whole world, and absolutely zero importance on an individual’s happiness. Although I think it is better to help others, sometimes we need to focus on the cultivation and self improvement of ourselves in order to better the community. In my opinion, there needs to be a balance between utilitarian and ethical egoist theories in order to achieve the most utility throughout the globe.

 

 

Works Cited

Mill, John Stuart, and Oskar Piest. Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957. Print.

Bennett, Christopher. “Chapter 4: Utilitarianism.” What Is This Thing Called Ethics? London: Routledge, 2010. Print.

 

“Utilitarianism.” UTILITARIANISM by John Stuart Mill. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Sept. 2014. <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mill-john-stuart/1863/utility/ch01.htm>.

Utilitarianism

In John Stuart Mill’s essay ‘Selections from Utilitarianism’, Mill provides a compelling argument for his theory in normative ethics called Utilitarianism. Utility can be defined as pleasure itself, and the absence of pain; therefore the main principle of utilitarianism is that “actions are right if they tend to stimulate happiness (pleasure) whereas actions can be classified as wrong if they produce pain.

What I found most interesting in Mill’s passage in chapter 2 was the discussion of the higher and lower pleasures. Mill argues that there are different qualities of pleasure, and only agents that have a wide array of experiences are able to dictate which pleasure are of a higher quality and which are not. However, what I didn’t really agree with was how someone’s experiences should have an affect on what consists of pleasure.  For example, if someone with a vast range experience carries out an action of what I would define as low quality pleasure such as washing cars free of charge and then told me he committing a high quality pleasure action I would disagree. Secondly, at what point in their life is someone considered having a wide range of experiences, therefore I find the whole technique of measuring pleasure and pain with utility implausible as I feel utility can be thought of as quite a subjective term in that quality of pleasure differs from individual to individual. Additionally, another flaw with measuring by utility is that what actually consists of higher quality pleasure. Does higher quality pleasure mean that it is more educationally beneficial or does it mean that it is more beneficial to someone other than the individual, such as an altruistic action? In chapter 2, Mill addresses the thought that the most righteous agents are those give up their own happiness to provide happiness for other people, however I feel that if this is true someone has to lose pleasure for others to gain pleasure and that in net effect there may not always be an increase in pleasure. For example if someone has to go through pain without any monetary reward in order to make someone else have increased pleasure should that still be considered as an increase in pleasure? Therefore I agree that people who sacrifice in order to make others happy can be considered as an increase in pleasure but only if the person going through the pain feels a form of reward from the recipient’s increase in pleasure.  If going by the theory of utilitarianism, should morals play a part in deciding ones actions or should it only be on whether the action creates high quality pleasure. For example, drugs such as cocaine increases the ability for the brain to reuptake dopamine, a neurotransmitter that increases pleasure and reward, but is highly illegal and not deemed morally permissible in various cultures, but by the law of utilitarianism the use of cocaine promotes pleasure so by that definition there should be nothing wrong with it. So I feel that utilitarianism doesn’t really look at the morals behind the action just the reward that comes with the action, which I feel wrong because many negative actions have positive rewards, a lot of them associated with crime and corruptions.

To conclude, I feel that utilitarianism can be quite a plausible normative ethical and I personally feel that positive outcomes from actions should be the mindset one has before committing an action however there are some criticism of utilitarianism that also makes me think twice about fully believing that this framework is completely sound.

Bibliography

Bennet, C. (2010). What is this thing called Ethics? NY: Saxon Graphics.

Mill. (1869). Utilitarianism. Mill.

 

Utility – The Greatest Happiness Principle

Mill

John Stuart Mill was one of the most crucial thinkers of the 19th century. He wrote on logic, economics, political philosophy, and religion. His work, Utilitarianism, provides a way of thinking that promised those who employ it to maximize their happiness. Mill’s text is well paired with the reading, Chapter 4: Utilitarianism, from What is this Thing Called Ethics.

Mill establishes the principle of utility by stating that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. (Mill 77). Simply, acts that produce pleasure or prevent pain are the most desirable. Is it right, however, to streamline life’s purpose to whether or not an action gives pain or pleasure? The quality of different pleasures tells one how to choose between two courses of action.

The utilitarian will perform actions based upon their benefit to mankind. If X and Y are two actions or decisions, and Y produces more happiness for mankind, then utilitarians will concur that Y is to be performed regardless of most other circumstances. This can be beneficial, as utilitarianism seems to appeal to a broad spectrum of people due to the fact it prioritizes the interests of the many (Bennett 56). It promotes impartiality and equality by saying that the happiness of one person is just as valuable as that of any other. By weighing each person’s happiness as a value of one, no less and no more, utilitarianism helps address moral questions and remove prejudices based in birth, sex, race, and social rank. Utilitarianism does not set moral limits on what we can do, it only says to maximize the social good by performing cost benefit analyses on decisions (Bennett 58). During my initial reading, I easily agreed with this view. Like subjectivism initially seemed good until Hitler was mentioned, I knew I needed to view both extremes before deciding whether I act as a utilitarian.

As I quickly discovered, utilitarianism can lead to disturbing consequences in certain situations. Bennett writes about a situation in which a person or party who is universally believed to be guilty but is actually innocent does not benefit from utilitarianism. Assuming that the true perpetrator of the crime died, how should a utilitarian police chief act in the best interest of the society? According to utilitarianism, the two possible actions would be either doing nothing or punishing the innocent party. Assuming there was no danger of the party’s innocence ever coming to light, and if nothing is X and punishing is Y, X = no effect and Y = some positive outcome – such as the “rallying” of a community or the beginning of a healing process after a shooting spree or mass murder. Then, Y will be employed because it is more beneficial for the community as a whole. Although the example is quite specific, this still leads to the conviction of an innocent party. Therefore, utilitarianism leads to immoral outcomes. Due to this lack of moral outcomes, I cannot consider myself a true, pure utilitarian.

An answer to the criticisms of utilitarianism, I thought, could be rule-utilitarianism. Rule-utilitarians agree that an action is right if and only if it falls under a rule, the general following of which would result in greater utility than an alternative available rule (Bennett 64). In reality, humans do not calculate every single decision they make. Humans use patterns (Bennett 63) of behavior, called habits, to help do most of the “calculations” instead of starting from the beginning each time. The idea is to “always assess the consequences of your actions and try to act optimally” (Bennett 65). However, rule-utilitarianism has been called too contingent or accidental in the way it determines what is moral and what is not.

A current example of utilitarian ethics is the push human cloning. Judith Daar, the author of the article The Prospect of Human Cloning, uses an example in which a family that suffered the loss of a child would benefit from cloning. The genetic similarities between the child who passed and the new child would be impeccable, and this may begin to mend the families’ hearts. Daar cites studies that show there is traction for a human cloning movement, underscored by parents and families that have lost young ones in child birth or at young ages (Daar 16). A utilitarian would have to weigh the difference between the utility received by the family for having a similar child versus the unhappiness or discrimination that may come about from a whole new race (clones).

Works Cited

Mill, John Stuart, and Oskar Piest. Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957. Print.

Bennett, Christopher. “Chapter 4: Utilitarianism.” What Is This Thing Called Ethics? London: Routledge, 2010. Print.

Daar, Judith F. “The Prospect of Human Cloning: Improving Nature or Dooming the Species?” Seton Hall Law Review 33 (2003): pp. 1-90. Web.

Utilitarianism in Practice

In our first week of studying Normative Ethics, we come to one of the “big three” topics, Utilitarianism. This week, we read two texts, one by Christopher Bennett and one by John Stuart Mills about their viewpoints on the topic. Utilitarianism is “the belief that a morally good action is one that helps the greatest number of people” (Merriam-Webster.com). In other words, when choosing what to do, a person living by the standards set forth by utilitarianism will choose the option that promotes the happiness and well being of the most people.

This concept is one that sounds great in theory and sounds like an awesome way to promote a happy existence on Earth. When digging deeper into utilitarianism, there are ways to refute that it is the best way to act. Many state the claim that it is a very difficult and arduous way to live. Under utilitarianism, one will calculate the costs and benefits of every action taken in order to determine the best choice for the individual. This sounds like a difficult process, but the true way the utilitarian will act is based off of patterns of behavior formed by the human race over time in order to prevent the need to calculate everything at every moment (Mill).

Another argument against utilitarianism is that in order to act in this way, promising something to another person is impossible as when the promise is to be enacted, the utilitarian might decide that it would be beneficial to instead do another act for the good of all sentient beings. The utilitarian would refute this claim by stating that breaking the promise with one person is okay as long as your new action would benefit more than the one. This still could create a society in which there is distrust among all people (Bennett).

These problems can also be solved by a sub-division of utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism. This states that utilitarians should follow socially beneficial rules rather than attempt to assess each and every consequence for ourselves. Basically, it states that we should always act in ways that are beneficial for society as a whole.

A utilitarian’s view on global poverty is as follows. Peter Singer, a utilitarian, believes that every person should be taking one percent of their income and donating it to eradicating poverty and helping those in need. Ideally, he states, that people should be donating more, but one percent is a small amount that he could ask from everyone (Schweickart, 3-4) This view that people should have it within their nature to donate to others and help support happiness and well being in the world is one that utilitarians try to promote.

Though criticized, I tend to think that I have the beliefs of a utilitarian. I believe that positive intentions are definitely there and I try to live my life so that I am helping the most people through my actions. There will always be those who state that the utilitarian is acting selfishly through his or her actions and that the benefit of others really means that of ones self, but I truly believe that after reading both Bennett and Mills that the mindset of a utilitarian, if truly abiding by the principles, is one that can benefit society as a whole and make it so the world could be a better place.

Works Cited

Bennett, Christopher. “4 Utilitarianism.” What Is This Thing Called Ethics? London: Routledge, 2010. Print.

Mill, John Stuart, and Oskar Piest. “Chapter 2 What Utilitarianism Is.” Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957. Print.

Mill, John Stuart, and Oskar Piest. “Chapter 4 Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility Is Susceptible.” Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957. Print.

Schweickart, David. “Global Poverty: Alternative Perspectives on What We Should Do- and Why.” Journal of Social Philosophy (2008): Carnegie Mellon University. Web. 27 Sept. 2014.

“Utilitarianism.” Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 27 Sept. 2014. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/utilitarianism>.

God and Morality

As we commence our final week in meta-ethics, we are confronted with a problem that philosophers have struggled with since at least the time of Socrates- the muddled relationship between religion and ethics. Are they inextricable from each other, or can they be two independent concepts? And if ethics is independent of religion, then is our moral code a manmade concept, and as William Lane Craig declared, only “an aid to survival and reproduction,” but otherwise illusory? (Bennett 113) Should we adhere to any moral code if an omnipotent Being does not impose it upon us? These are only a few of the question, which I have pondered while reading Bennett’s What is This Thing Called Ethics, Plato’s Euthyphro, and Rachels’ God and Moral Autonomy.

Plato’s dialog Euthyphro describes an encounter between Socrates, the great Athenian philosopher, and a man named Euthyphro, a self-declared expert on all things religion. During their conversation, Euthyphro attempts to define piety three different times, and each definition proves to be fallacious.

Euthyphro’s three attempts at providing a universal definition of piety fail to please Socrates, after discovering flaws in each of them. Euthyphro’s first definition of piety is as follows: “The piety is doing as I do,” (Plato 1) as in charging his father in manslaughter, which he is about to go to trial for. However, this definition does not suit Socrates, because it is not a definition- it is merely an example of piety. Euthyphro’s second attempt at defining piety is actually a definition, though an erroneous one. Euthyphro defines piety as what is pleasing to the gods. This is not a sound definition, as Socreates points out that the quarrelsome Greek gods would be likely to argue over what each one thought of as piety. And the third definition is that the pious is what all gods love, which Socrates proves to be a cyclical argument.

Socrates offers no explanation of what he himself believes to be the universal definition of piety, and Plato’s dialog ends with Euthyphro leaving in a huff, frustrated by Socrates outwitting him. So what happens next? We as readers are left unfulfilled without a universal definition of piety. So then I wonder: could Euthyphro have reversed his words, and would an altered form of his third definition of piety prove to be suitable for Socrates? Euthyphro attempted to say that piety is what all gods love, which Socrates deemed a futile definition. But could one declare that acts are pious because gods love them? This definition still leaves us with a conundrum- what acts are pious? Perhaps acts are pious because gods love them, and perhaps we cannot venture further than that. Does God not work in mysterious ways? Could a God/Gods not choose to favor certain acts without explaining His/ Their ways? After investigating Bennett, Plato, and Rachels’ arguments, it seems that all of them seem to point to one conclusion: that a God/Gods’ deeds are arbitrary and not based a moral code. If there is a God, or Gods, who has or have created the moral standard which we today adhere to, it seems His/Their moral standards are capricious. This may be a hard morality to view, but is it not plausible?

If there is an all-powerful and all-knowing Being, it seems that the moral code he has given us is erratic. How else could we explain why God says he wants us to love, but disapproves of love between homosexuals? If there is a Creator, then I think it is best to accept his moral code unquestioningly. And if there is not a God, then we should question every moral that we have followed thus far.

 

Bibliography

Bennett, Christopher. What is This Thing Called Ethics?. London: Routledge, 2010. Print.

“Euthyphro by Plato.” Project Gutenberg. Project Gutenberg, n.d. Web. 22 Sept. 2014. <http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1642>.

“Plato’s Euthyphro.” PHIL 111: introduction to Philosophy. Southern Illinois University, n.d. Web. 22 Sept. 2014. <http://www.siue.edu/~wlarkin/teaching/PHIL111/euthyphro.html>.

Rachels, James. God and Moral Autonomy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. Print.

“Socratic Irony.” Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com, n.d. Web. 22 Sept. 2014. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/socratic.com>.

“piety.” Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 22 Sept. 2014. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/piety>.

Worship and Moral Autonomy

In “God and Moral Autonomy,” James Rachel argues that God cannot exist based on the following argument:

  1. “If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship.
  2. No being could possibly be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one’s role as an autonomous moral agent.
  3. Therefore, there cannot be any being who is God.” (Rachel 119)

Moral autonomy is the ability to choose what is right or wrong by oneself. Rachel claims that since worship requires abandoning autonomous moral agency, God cannot exist. But what if a person willingly wants to worship God and follow His commands? What Rachel failed to realize was that worshipping God is the choice of the autonomous moral agent and can decide to follow morals out of respect for moral duty. They may try to align their morals with the morals of a higher being (God) which there bases on what is right or wrong. They are not abandoning their moral agency; instead, they are basing their moral beliefs on the morals of God, which is a decision that they made for themselves. Rachel assumes that if a person worships God, then he or she is abandoning their freedom to make their own set of morals, but he did not realize that many moral autonomists who worship God as a moral duty chose to follow his commands on their own.

It can be argued that “the more people decide to integrate the duties of God into their moral beliefs, the freer, and more autonomous they become” (“James Rachels Argument From Moral Autonomy”). The duties of God are not meant to oppress or take away a person’s autonomy. A person controls whether or not they want to take part in the religion and if they want to obey the commands. When people follow their integrate the teaching of a religion to their own morals, they will not feel like they are doing wrong and it will not go agains their morals or the moral law of God.

For example, imagine that someone joins the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). They voluntarily align their morals with that of the group. They do not abandon their morals; they voluntarily base their morals more with what the group’s morals are. An autonomous moral agent who chooses to worship does not abandon his or her moral autonomy; instead, he/she freely chooses to adopt the group’s morals and now decide on what is morally right or wrong based on the alignment with their beliefs and the group’s beliefs.

Rachel’s claim that worshipping God requires for a person to abandon their autonomous moral agency is not true, therefore, it cannot be used in the argument to conclude that God is not real. The claim that God does not exist because Worship requires abandoning autonomous moral agency does not hold true, therefore making the conclusion invalid.

Works Cited

“James Rachels Argument From Moral Autonomy.” Philosophy, Theology, History, Science, Big Questions. 22 Nov. 2011. Web. 20 Sept. 2014. <http://www.apologeticsinthechurch.com/27/post/2011/11/james-rachels-argument-from-moral-autonomy.html#comments>.

Rachels, James. “God and Moral Autonomy.” Can Ethics Provide Answers? (1997): 109-123. Blackboard. Web. 20 Sept. 2014.

 

Rachels God and Moral Autonomy

Rachels’ God and Moral Autonomy makes several arguments about how God cannot exist by connecting it to one’s moral autonomy. He mentions the impossibility of God’s existence because God, by definition, must be an appropriate being of worship. However, he further explains how no being can be suited for worship since worship would require one to abandon their autonomous moral agent. Because the relationship between a worshipper and an object of worship is infinitely asymmetrical, the believer must seek God’s will and adapt his behavior to that will, which contradicts autonomous decision-making (Tremblay).

Rachels also analyzes the nature of worship by comparing it to the ritual of crowning a prince. The kneeling of the prince symbolizes his subordinate status to the queen. However, only someone who is educated in the meaning of this ritual will understand this act of kneeling as a way of submitting. Similarly, only one who is familiar with the act of worship will recognize the rituals as ways to praise God rather than simple mundane procedures. For example, in many churches, eating bread and drinking grape juice or wine symbolizes the acceptance of Jesus’ body and blood. However, someone from the outside would not recognize this ritual and perhaps interpret it as satisfying one’s hunger and thirst.

There are also many objections to Rachels’ arguments, including the fact that “our responsibility as moral agents is to do right, and God’s commands are right” (Rachels). An autonomous moral agent, by definition, is the ability to independently make decisions, so if one believes that God is worth worshipping, then he/she has activated his/her moral autonomy. Gerald Dworkin supports this objection as well by questioning the definition of autonomy. Suppose a person, acting completely independently, chooses to follow what his parents tell him to do. He is indeed autonomous. But didn’t he just give up his autonomy when he decided to follow someone else’s orders? On one hand, this person is not deciding for himself because in order to predict his actions, we have to look at what his parents tell him to do. In this point of view, he is not autonomous. On the other hand, he has freely and independently decided that listening to his mother’s wishes is the kind of life he wants to lead. In this perspective, he is completely autonomous. Dworkin further mentions that the concept of autonomy that insists upon substantive independence is inconsistent with other important values such as loyalty, objectivity, commitment, benevolence, and love, thereby implying that to have such a strict definition for autonomy would contradict other moral principles.

Moreover, in order to have the title of “God,” a being must have certain qualifications: “he must be all-powerful and perfectly good in addition to being perfectly wise” (Rachels). Choosing to believe in this omnipotent being would be exercising one’s moral autonomy. Therefore, it would make sense for people to place their faith into this seemingly perfect being and consequently, deciding to activate their autonomous moral agent. Rachels also argues that “in worshiping God, one is acknowledging and accepting this role, and that is the point of the ritual of worship.” This further implies that those who decide to worship God know what they are doing, so they use their moral autonomy to follow God’s commands. Although this may seem contradictory to an autonomous moral agent, they still initially decided to freely worship God.

Rachels’ God and Moral Autonomy argues that there is a contradiction between worshipping God and exercising moral autonomy. However, to have such a rigid view on the definition of autonomy brings up other complications and conflicts with other important moral values as well.

Works Cited

Dworkin, Gerald. Cambridge Studies in Philosphy. N.p.: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Print.

Rachels, James. “God and Moral Autonomy.” Can Ethics Provide Answers? And Other Essays In Moral Philosophy. N.p.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996. N. pag. Print.

Tremblay, Francois. “Argument From Moral Autonomy.” Strong Atheism. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Sept. 2014. <http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/argument_from_moral_autonomy/>.

Evolution and God Can Coexist

In Christopher Bennett’s What is this thing called ethics?,  Bennett discusses the positions of theists, atheists, and humanists. The concept of God and morality coinciding is a difficult process to grasp because there is no tangible proof of the existence of God. Although there are aspects of each position that I agree with, I support the theist position in regards to evolution and how the world came to be. Christopher Bennett, when speaking on behalf of the theists, made the claim that “we need to explain the very existence of the universe through there being a perfectly free and powerful being” (Bennett 116).

Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution explains how organisms evolved from natural selection and the survival of the fittest. Darwin never mentioned God in his theory nor did he explain why the process of evolution originally occurred. To understand the world in which we live in, we need to “point to a Being powerful enough to start the process of the universe’s development off” (Bennett 116). Science dates back to the big bang, but what happened before it? Bennett implies that there must be a figure behind the world’s creation.

Darwin’s theory is scientifically proven as true. Just because his theory is true, does not mean the existence of God is false. Author Stefan Lovgren argues that evolution and religion can coexist. He argues that evolution could be God’s tool in the creation of humans. Lovgren states, “it would be perfectly logical to think that a divine being used evolution as a method to create the world” (Lovgren). In other words, it makes sense that God would use evolution as a method because the ones that are most adapted to the environment survive.  Evolution could be used to explain present life, but God could be the ultimate creator who used evolution as a tool (Snellenberger). If we are all God’s children, wouldn’t God want us all to be well adapted so we can survive and prosper?

Bennett also discusses the fact that God is the Designer. He states, “where there is a design, there must be a designer” (Bennett 115). To support this claim, he compares a watch and a chameleon. If a person were to find a watch on a deserted island, that individual would know that someone else created the intricate clockwork and the design of the watch. A chameleon, on the other hand, does not have a known designer. Conscious design was put behind the chameleon’s ability to change color to fit its surroundings. But who gave the chameleon this ability? (Bennett 115). Science cannot answer this question; religion can. God, Almighty, could be the mastermind behind this design.

The belief in God has no genuine proof like science has, which is why many people find it hard to accept that there is a god. The existence of God is not proved by facts, but rather by beliefs and faith. Through the theist’s argument, it is clear that one can support scientific theories while also having faith in god.

 

Works Cited

Bennett, Christopher. “Ethics and Religion.” What is this thing called ethics?. London: Routledge, 2010. 111-125. Print.

Lovgren, Stefan. “Evolution and Religion Can Coexist, Scientists Say.” National Geographic. National Geographic Society, 18 Oct. 2004. Web. 21 Sept. 2014. <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/10/1018_041018_science_religion.html>

Snellenberger, Earl . “Creationism Evolving.” PBS. PBS, n.d. Web. 21 Sept. 2014. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/evolution/library/08/2/l_082_03.html>

Psychological Egoism-Rachels

Rachels’ “Egoism and Moral Skepticism” provides us with strong arguments in favor of psychological and ethical egoism, which he effectively refutes by highlighting their weaknesses. Before reading, I was naïve and therefore indifferent to these concepts of egoism; however, I now agree that psychological egoism is an invalid thesis.

Rachels defines psychological egoism as “the view that all men are selfish in everything that they do, that is, that the only motive from which anyone ever acts is self-interest” (Rachels). Contrary to ethical egoism, psychological egoism describes how we act but does not tell us how we ought to act. (Garrett)

He presents several arguments throughout the work in order to show why this idea is unjust. I believe his strongest claim is that  “Since so-called unselfish actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent, and since that sense of satisfaction is a pleasant state of consciousness, it follows that the point of the action is really to achieve a pleasant state of consciousness, rather than to bring about any good for others” (Rachels). For instance, I, like many others, often behave unselfishly for mere self-satisfaction and the avoidance of guilt. When I pass a homeless person on the streets, I give some loose change and then feel good about myself instead of feeling guilty for ignoring the beggar and continuing to walk.

The problem with this situation, Rachels points out, is that it sounds as if I am described as an unselfish person since I find pleasure from helping others. The selfish person would not have been concerned for the homeless person in the first place. “Why should we think that merely because someone derives satisfaction from helping others this makes him selfish? Isn’t the unselfish man precisely the one who does derive satisfaction from helping others, while the selfish man does not?” (Rachels). Bishop Joseph Butler answered this question in his Sermon XI:

That all particular appetites and passions are towards external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them, is manifested from hence; that there could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the passion: there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than another (Bishop).

In simpler terms, people do not decide they need to feel good and therefore find a way to help others in order to achieve that feeling of self-satisfaction. On the contrary, people help others for the sake of helping others and find the sense of satisfaction after the fact, according to Butler. Wanting to help others is unselfish, and therefore, the psychological egoist argument has a mistaken view of selfishness.

In closing, I stand by Rachels’ opposition to psychological egoism as it is entirely unjust. The theory contains numerous flaws and confounding statements including the failure to distinguish between self-interest and selfishness, as well as between self-interest and pleasure.

Works Cited

Bishop, Lloyd. In defense of altruism: inadequacies of Ayn Rand’s ethics and psychological egoism. New Orleans, LA: University Press of the South, 2000. Print.

Garrett, Aaron. “Joseph Butler’s Moral Philosophy.” Stanford University. Stanford University, 17 Oct. 2012. Web. 14 Sept. 2014. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/butler-moral/>.

Rachels, James. “Egoism and Moral Skepticism.” The University of Morality (1971): 233-239. Blackboard. Web. 14 Sept. 2014.

Rand, Ayn. “A Defense of Ethical Egoism.” 79-85. Blackboard. Web. 14 Sept. 2014.