According to Beauchamp and Childress, “An individual acts conscientiously if he or she is motivated to do what is right because it is right, has tried with due diligence to determine what is right, intends to do what is right, and exerts appropriate effort to do so” (42). Prior to reading the second chapter of the aforementioned authors’ bioethics guide, I had known conscientious as only to mean one was aware of something. For instance, a nurse informs you that giving blood might make you lightheaded. You acknowledge this fact and still consent to donating; you conscientiously gave permission to have your blood drawn. However, in the case of ethics, I am learning commonplace words, such as rules or principles, can take on new meanings. Conscientious will now be added to my ever-growing mental list of words that do not mean what they should in ethics. All jokes aside, the above definition of conscientiousness has sparked questions about how moral conscientious refusal has a space in the field of healthcare.
In the introductory chapter of Beauchamp and Childress’s book, the notions of common and particular moralities are of focus. One such particular morality is that of a professional morality. The professional morality is non-universal and dictates moral codes and standards that are particular to a certain profession (Beauchamp 6). When you become a professional, you are ascribing to the moral codes that come with that profession. Ethically speaking, as a nurse or physician it is your duty to act in the best interest of your patient regardless of your own separate moral obligations. So how can one claim a conscientious objection to a medical procedure that aligns with the patient’s morals but not their own? In the example Beauchamp and Childress give, a nurse can conscientiously object to having any part in an abortion procedure if that decision does not follow what she thinks is right (Beauchamp 43). This refusal is fine if there are other nurses around; the nurse is not interfering with the patient’s autonomy by not allowing the procedure to take place. There is also no malevolence because there is someone to aid the patient in the procedure. However, if there was only one nurse available and she conscientiously objected thus forcing the patient away would be immoral. The nurse is no longer doing what is right; yes it may be right in their mind but as a care provider it is not right. The patient’s autonomy has been taken away for an unjust reason. One cannot both be conscientious and refusing to provide care, which is not right and contradicts the nurse’s obligation to his or her patient.
The problem with conscientious objection in healthcare lies within the definition. Several times in the definition of conscientious, the idea of what one thinks is right is used. One’s personal morality does not have room in professional morality because one’s definition of right is subjective and falls outside the particular morality. In accepting a job in healthcare you should be conscious of the fact that you may encounter patients that will have medical views that they are entitled to that do not align with your own.
Works Cited
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. New York: Oxford UP, 2009. Print.
Ugochi, I think you make a fair argument! Here is where I believe we can draw a line: If the patient is solely under one particular nurse’s care, then that nurse is obligated to fulfill her professional requirements before she fulfills her personal moral ones. If the patient may be transferred to the care of a second nurse, then the first nurse is absolved of committing an action that would be morally reprehensible by her personal beliefs. However, she should be made well aware that by committing to the nursing profession, the best interests of her patients must be placed before her own (except in a case where the nurse’s own life or livelihood would be jeopardized).