Background
On October 24, 1993, Robert Latimer decided to end the life of his 12 year-old daughter, Tracy, who suffered from cerebral palsy. He placed his daughter in the back of his pick-up truck and piped in carbon monoxide, which ultimately caused her death. Robert justified his act by arguing that he committed a “mercy killing” for his daughter who was perpetually suffering despite undergoing numerous surgeries. Ultimately, the court decided to convict Robert Latimer of second-degree murder and sentenced him to one year in prison and one year of house arrest. Advocacy groups on end of the debate were outraged because they argued that court’s response is sending a message that the life of people with disabilities “is of diminished value” (Thomas & Waluchow 193). However, the court saw the Mr. Latimer’s action as one of “compassionate homicide” and that he was assuming the role of a “surrogate decision-maker”(Thomas & Waluchow 195).
Analysis
Interestingly, in this case, the court’s decision reflects more of an adherence to moral principles as opposed to judicial laws. Although his decision was in “clear conflict with the law” (Thomas & Waluchow 195), the court’s decision to give a “lighter” punishment seems to suggest otherwise. This case illustrates that illegal actions are not necessarily unethical actions. After considering how the principle of non-maleficence applies in this case, I would agree with the court’s decisions. In the “Non-maleficence” chapter, Beauchamp and Childress outline a set of qualifications of surrogate decision makers for incompetent patients (Beauchamp & Childress 190). These qualifications include:
- Ability to make reasoned judgments (competence)
- Adequate knowledge and information
- Emotional Stability
- A commitment to the incompetent patient’s interests, free of conflicts of interests and free of controlling influence by those who might not act in the patient’s best interests.
When taking these qualifications and applying it to this particular case, then Mr. Latimer’s decision seems to be morally justified. His ability to make reasonable judgments is suggested by the fact that he characterized by others as “responsible and hardworking”. It was also made clear that he was not in need of any sort of rehabilitation (Thomas & Waluchow 194). As for the second qualification, it can be assumed that as the father and primary caregiver of his daughter that he had a lot of information about his daughter’s health (past effectiveness of drugs/treatments as well as prognosis for quality of life). Opponents would most likely argue that he lacks a medical background to fully understand the impact of future surgeries on Tracy’s health. However, he is probably more likely to understand the extent of her suffering because he is around his daughter far more than any other healthcare professional. Thirdly, Mr. Latimer’s emotional stability is not completely clear; though, those around him that describe him as “responsible” does suggest that he acts according to rationale as opposed to pure emotion. The final qualification is quite evident in Mr. Latimer. The evidence showed that “his relationship with Tracy was that of a loving and protective parent” (Thomas & Waluchow 194). Thus, after evaluating Mr. Latimer’s actions on the basis of these qualifications, his actions do seem morally “right” as he claims them to be.
Much of the resistance to permitting non-voluntary euthanasia as well as aid-in-dying requests seems to stem from feelings of fear of what may happen in the future if it is widely permitted across different cases. Pat Danforth of the Council of Canadians with Disabilities, expressed his concerns that the decision made in Robert’s Latimer’s case sends a message to “every senior citizen, every quadriplegic, anyone in a car accident that their life is of diminished value” (Thomas & Waluchow 193). There is an underlying fear that if these actions and requests are permitted, that it will result in unnecessary deaths based on poor judgments and/or hasty decision-making. Moreover, there seems to be an assumption that the use of euthanasia i is also an is an indication of how an individual’s life is valued which is something I find particularly problematic. Mr. Latimer’s decision to relieve his daughter’s continuous pain does not suggest that he does not value his daughter’s life. Rather, his actions show that he values her enough to make a difficult decision and end her pain away. Fear of what may happen in the future is not adequate reasoning to prohibit aid-in-dying where it may be the sensible course of action as well and the action that the patient or surrogate decision-maker may want. With proper protocol, non-voluntary euthanasia and aid-in-dying can be implemented in a systematic manner into healthcare systems.
Work Cited
Thomas, John E., and Wilfrid J. Waluchow. “When Physicians and Family Disagree.”Well and Good: A Case Study Approach to Biomedical Ethics. 3rd ed. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview, 1998. 192-199. Print.
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. “Nonmaleficence” Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Seventh ed. New York: Oxford UP, 2013. 150-193. Print.
I think non-voluntary euthanasia and aid-in dying are two very different issues. Aid-in dying relates to a person suffering making a personal choice to die, following the principle of autonomy. Non-voluntary euthanasia, though, is not someone’s choice, it is a choice made by another person on his or her behalf. It brings into question who can make that choice: spouses, parents, children? Non-voluntary euthanasia also questions the reasoning behind the choice. Perhaps one will make the choice to euthanize another based on financial incentive instead of on the basis of concern for a patient’s well-being. Because of these sort of issues, I think that non-voluntary euthanasia is much more morally complicated and problematic than aid-in-dying.
Mekdes,
You raise some interesting points by drawing distinctions between legality and morality. In this case, there is no question that Mr. Latimer murdered his daughter. However, the morality of the situation, when evaluating the justifications behind Mr. Latimer’s actions, evokes a rather gray area. This brings into question the notion of whether the reasoning justifies the end rather than the end justifying the means.
Your discussion of the qualifications of surrogate decision makers for incompetent patients effectively analyzes Mr. Latimer’s motives. While Mr. Latimer may have been acting on behalf of his daughter’s interests and meets the qualifications for being a surrogate decision maker, I think that it is a stretch to relate his “mercy killing” to non-voluntary euthanasia or aiding-in-dying. I think we enter down a slippery slope if we begin making concessions for “compassionate homicide”, which seems like an oxymoron. Mr. Latimer obviously “valued” his daughter’s life and wanted to end her pain, but does that make his actions morally justified? At the end of the day, he made the decision to kill his daughter because he thought death was favorable to her quality of life. Maybe he could not witness her pain anymore because it brought him suffering. Were his actions purely altruistic? Can we truly judge another’s quality of life without experiencing it as that individual?
While I agree with your approval of the court’s decision in your post, I am a bit confused as to why you question the relativity of his “mercy killing” to non-voluntary euthanasia in your above comment. You clearly state in the post that his decision-making based in terms of morality are completely justified. Also, the method of his actions needs to be considered. He chose a very mild way to end Tracy’s life, the carbon monoxide poisoning is an odorless gas which causes no pain. I think it is very reasonable to relate the compassionate homicide to non-voluntary euthanasia, especially with his choice of action.