Case 6.3 Tracy and Robert Latimer: “It Was Right to Kill My Daughter”
Background:
This case deals with two main discussions: 1) the decision Robert Latimer made to take his daughter, Tracy’s life and 2) the appropriate sentence for Robert Latimer’s crime. Robert admitted to taking Tracy’s life by leaving her in the cab of his truck and closing in the exhaust fumes to let her pass from carbon-monoxide poisoning. “Tracy had suffered from cerebral palsy and had been both physically and mentally disabled since the time of her birth. At the time of her death [12 years old], she weighed no more than 38 pounds. She had never been able to walk, sit up, talk, feed herself, or express her thoughts or wishes. She had suffered a great deal of pain throughout her life and had undergone numerous surgeries to correct orthopaedic and musculoskeletal difficulties,” (Thomas, Waluchow, Gedge, 222). Robert’s reason of committing the act was that to be phrased as “mercy killing.” Robert was found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison with a possibility of parole after 10 years. After a failed appeal, he appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada and resulted with a new trial on the grounds that the previous sentence was “cruel and unusual punishment.” The new trial resulted with a sentence of one year in prison followed up by one year of house arrest.
Dilemma:
Was it appropriate for Robert Latimer to take responsibility of his daughter’s life under his hands (with respect to the principles of nonmaleficence and autonomy), ultimately with the decision to end it? Also, is the heavily reduced sentence justified?/Was the original sentence too harsh? What are the implications of the reduction in sentence?
Discussion:
The first discussion regards Robert’s decision to end Tracy’s life. Obviously in almost every case, it would be fair to say that any man who would take his 12 year old daughter’s life is sinister, ill, a threat to society, unholy, overall a disaster of a human being. However, in this case, all evidence has been shown – with acceptance by the Judge in the second trial – that Robert was not a threat to society, quoted by his family and Tracy’s doctors as being very loving, supportive father, and was very close to his daughter. He was born and raised in the same town and is known throughout the community as being a responsible and hardworking farmer who never does anything unkind towards others. The method of choice to end Tracy’s life was of the least harmful to Tracy and made the process easy and unnoticed. Carbon monoxide poisoning causes no pain and is odorless. Also, from the day Tracy was born, she had been feeling much pain her entire life. She has had countless surgeries to cut her muscles in order to reduce pain, leaving her with limp limbs. She only had control of her head and one arm. Her body was so distorted she needed a steel rod down her spine to partially correct the shape. She has never lived a normal day in her life, and was under total care. Her quality of life was non-existent. Every act of treatment was to reduce pain, not to treat the problem. So was this an act of maleficence? I don’t think so, after watching his daughter go through so much pain for so many years, knowing no amount of treatment would better her quality of life, it was possibly the responsible thing to do. Regarding the principle of autonomy, she had never voiced her opinion in her entire life. One of the great debates in this case was whether Robert and his wife should make the decision or should Tracy. The decision of non-voluntary euthanasia made by Robert is justified because Tracy has never voiced her wishes or expressions at any point in her life. Robert and his wife had always made decisions for Tracy in her best interest, not in her best wishes. For all we know, Tracy could have rejected the idea of every having her countless surgeries, but we would never know. At the time Robert felt it was necessary, he decided that, in her best interest, he should let her pass. The Judge ruled this as an extremely rare case of compassionate homicide. With the changing in the sentence, a question arises in a quote made by Aristotle: “once we disturb our disposition to fight death at all costs, it may become easier to sanction the actions of one who kills for compassionate reasons,” (227). I read a comment on another post discussing the balance between morality and practicality and how they bump heads. It is a difficult concept to wrap your head around, but with a case such as Robert and Tracy Latimers’, is our society changing its attitude and view about the withdrawal from life-support and euthanasia when it seems practical? Is the balance between morality and practicality shifting?
References:
Thomas, John E., and Wilfrid J. Waluchow. Well and Good: A Case Study Approach to Health Care Ethics. 4th ed. Toronto: Broadview, 2014. Print.