In this case, a woman “G” is pregnant with a child but is also battling an addiction to glue-sniffing. Because of her addiction, she was remanded to a treatment facility against her will by Child and Family Services due to her addiction causing physical and mental disabilities to her children born from prior pregnancies. However, Manitoba Court of Appeals overrules the decision of the lower court. G is allowed out of the facility and gives birth to a healthy baby. It was also noted that she has control over her addiction ad is expecting another child.
The issue that arises here is if G should have been sent to the treatment facility against her will due to the potential harm to the fetus due to her addiction. I personally believed that G, being a competent adult, should not have been put into the facility due to her addiction. Unless she was arrested for a crime and her sentence was to be served at the treatment facility, it was unlawful to commit her to the facility. The reason behind this is that the “harm” is hypothetical at this point. Sending G to the treatment facility, although preventative, was against her rights as an able-bodied and mind woman. As the book notes, this case opens the door for a “slippery slope” effect where the line of rights for an unborn child and rights for the living-woman is blurred. (p. 203) The book also points out, what would be the case for women that smoke or drink during pregnancies? Although those actions are not illegal they also prove to cause potential problems for a fetus. Would those actions also constitute a woman’s involuntary admission to a treatment facility? Since that is not the case, it should not be the case for G as well.
Another issue that comes about in this case, is whose rights is to be protected in this situation. Although protecting fetus is important, it must be considered that the fetus is not a living person, in the sense that it is existing in the world without biologically depending on its mother. Because of this, can we assume that it should have the same rights as its mother? I think not. G is the only living person in this case and therefore her rights should be the ones enforced. The state is supposed to enforce the rights of its inhabitants, and prior to giving birth G is the only one who is a citizen in this case. Treating her fetus as a living child, whose rights are to be enforced would be an over-reach. In Canada, abortion is legal at all stages of pregnancies, and there are no legal obstacles in getting an abortion. But if the life of G’s fetus is recognized and her addiction is seen as endangerment, why is abortion not considered a homicide or even a manslaughter? The stipulated definition of life should be carried out throughout all legal situations.
First, regarding the fetus as a potential person, the loss the fetus would suffer by her life being ended is far greater than the loss a pregnant woman would suffer were she not permitted to procure an abortion. These considerations, plus the duty to minimize harm, imply that abortion is wrong (Arp & Caplan 127).
Second, because the potential person is “biologically dependent” upon the mother, she is obligated to support her. In “Contemporary Debates in Bioethics,” Arp and Caplan present a case similar to this one: “Suppose you are driving your car. You are negligent. You cause an accident in which another human being is harmed. Suppose this human being requires, as a consequence, expensive life-saving medical care for which he is unable to pay without going bankrupt. Do you have a moral obligation to pay his medical expenses, if you can? The answer is clearly yes.” This suggests that we have special, serious obligations to another human for whose plight we are responsible when she would suffer a serious loss unless we aid her. Hence, a person who is pregnant also has special, serious obligations to the dependent human being whose dependent existence is caused by her and whose continues existence is entirely dependent upon her (Arp & Caplan 127).
Arp, Robert, and Arthur L. Caplan. Contemporary Debates in Bioethics. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2014. Print.
Hello Arianna,
I think that this is a very complicated case. First, as you pointed out, they are dealing with balancing the rights of an unborn fetus versus the rights of a fully abled and competent adult woman. I do believe that since the mother has gained control over her addiction, they do not have the right to force her into a facility against her will. I think you bring up an excellent point about how forcing this woman into the facility based on a hypothetical situation is unethical. If it is fair to force her into a facility because of the possibility of her reverting back to her addiction, would it not be fair to force pregnant women into facilities to prevent consuming wine or high levels of caffeine? It is not (“Forcing Pregnant Women To Do As They’re Told – Resources – Bioethics – Focus Areas – Markkula Center for Applied Ethics”). So, I believe that it is not ethical or fair to force her into this facility.
“Forcing Pregnant Women To Do As They’re Told – Resources – Bioethics – Focus Areas – Markkula Center for Applied Ethics.” Santa Clara University, http://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/bioethics/resources/forcing-pregnant-women-to-do-as-theyre-told/.
Hi Arianna,
Like you, I believe that G’s right to autonomy should be respected and that she, being a physically competent individual, should not be taken to a treatment facility. In your discussion, you mentioned that G’s fetus lacks all moral rights and that G’s wellbeing is the only factor that should be considered when making a decision. According to their five theories presented by Beauchamp, G’s fetus possesses moral rights. The first theory, the theory based on human properties, states that “human properties, those of Homo Sapiens, confer moral status.” Human embryos are destined for adulthood and to deny that an embryo possesses moral rights is the equivalent of stating that not every human being is deserving of human and moral rights. In addition, the theory based on sentience states that “all entities that experience pain and suffering have moral status and can be morally wronged when others cause them pain and suffering.” Given the evidence suggesting that a fetus can experience sentience, it seems immoral to deny a fetus of its moral rights. Finally, the theory based on relationships argues that “relationships between parties account for moral status.” When a fetus can be detract on a sonogram, the fetus has entered the social matrix and therefore possesses moral rights. According to the evidence presented above, do you still feel that the mother possess greater moral rights than the fetus? Is there such a thing as greater moral rights and who determines/measures this notion?
Noa
Works Cited:
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. New York: Oxford UP, 2009, 2013. Print.
Hi Arianna,
Upon reading this case I came to the same conclusion that G should not have been forced into the facility against her wishes. Reading this case and your post reminded me of a law passed, and since revoked, in Tennessee in 2014. In recent years there has been a huge spike in cases of NAS (neonatal abstinence syndrome), which is the withdrawal newborns experience when born to drug-addicted mothers. In order to try and combat this issue, Tennessee passed a law in which mothers could be prosecuted if they gave birth to NAS babies or took any type of drugs, prescription or recreational, during their pregnancy. The state believed that charging mothers with “fetal assault” would scare mothers into staying clean throughout their pregnancy and decrease Tennessee’s rate of babies born with NAS (“In Tennessee, Giving Birth To A Drug-Dependent Baby Can Be A Crime”).
However, rather than protecting the “unborn child”, many mothers instead opted to lie to physicians, avoid going to the hospital or consider abortion. Rather than saving the fetus and teaching the new mothers a lesson, as I imagine the law intended to do, it arguably caused more harm to both parties involved by preventing both the mother and her fetus the proper care necessary to combat the addiction/withdrawal. One mother in particular, Brittany Crowe, stated that, “I could have gone [to] a baby doctor at first, but I was scared because of the new law” (“In Tennessee, Giving Birth To A Drug-Dependent Baby Can Be A Crime”). Crowe had no prenatal care and considered having the child in the “safety” of her home in order to prevent the prosecution she would face if she gave birth to a NAS baby at the hospital.
I know the case in Tennessee is not exactly the same as case 5.4; however there are definitely parallels in terms of when the law can dictate what women do with their bodies and where the line is drawn between protecting the mother and the unborn fetus. In response to both the law in Tennessee as well as G’s forced admittance into a facility in case 5.4, I believe that both are unethical and open doors for more potential harm for both parties than good for the unborn child. Forced admittance and/or prosecution may scare mothers away from seeking proper treatment or scare into getting an abortion, both of which will cause more harm to the fetus.
“In Tennessee, Giving Birth To A Drug-Dependent Baby Can Be A Crime”
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/11/18/455924258/in-tennessee-giving-birth-to-a-drug-addicted-baby-can-be-a-crime