In the case of Stephen Dawson, I agree that Justice Lloyd McKenzie of the Supreme Court was correct in assigning the Superintendent of Family and Child Services the responsibility of making the medical decisions for Stephen. My reason for agreeing is based on the determination of quality of life.
The concept of quality of life can be interpreted in many different ways but overall, the term generates the idea that the patient should always be considered to have a standard of health, comfort, and happiness. With this in mind, according to the medical professionals at the Sunny Hill facility, Stephen seemed to show a quality of life since he engaged with others through laughter as well as demonstrated potential for advancement. Because Stephen has shown signs of quality of life, just a different interpretation of what is normally the case, then it should only be morally fair for Stephen to receive this surgery that way his personal quality of life has the chance to be prolonged.
At the same time, however, Stephen’s parents believe this should not be the case, and he “should be allowed to die with dignity rather than continue to endure a life of suffering,” (Thomas, Waluchow, and Gedge 231) which rejects the performance of the surgery. According to their wishes, it seems as though Stephen’s parents believe Stephen lacks a quality of life and should not continue living in this state. However, I believe though that this assumption is lacking in support since the parents are judging Stephen’s quality of life or rather lack of on the premise of what they knew to be true when they were caring for him and not of how he actually exists in his current state at Sunny Hill. Additionally, Stephen’s parents could also be adopting the idea of considering their own quality of life because as much as parents have unconditional love for their children, sometimes in dire situations such as this case, if Stephen were no longer alive, then that would ease the parents’ emotional burden. Yet, this idea of imposing what is best for the family’s life against the patient’s medical best interest is in a sense improper (Beauchamp and Childress).
Additionally, when dealing with the quality of life of disabled people whether mentally, physically, or both, it is often seen that the quality of life can sometimes in a unique way be more rewarding than that of a person without disabilities. When it comes to having disabilities, many times the smaller things that non-disabled people take for granted are noticed and more appreciated. This idea of a greater sense of quality of life is explained more in the BBC News Magazine article “A Point of View: Happiness and Disability,” which states that “sometimes, the part of life that is difficult brings other benefits, such as a sense of perspective or true value that people who lead easier lives can miss out on. If we always remembered this, perhaps we would turn out to be more accepting of disability and less prejudiced against disabled people.” Thus, even though Stephen’s medical state and legal state as a whole are very serious, complex as well as far from “normal,” there is some evidence that his quality of life that exists within Sunny Hill, even as small as it may be, provides something better than the alternative of death.
Work Cited:
“A Point of View: Happiness and Disability,” BBC News Magazine, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-27554754
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Thomas, John E., and Wilfrid J. Waluchow. Well and Good: Case Studies in Biomedical Ethics. Ontario: Broadview Press, 1987.