This brief blog post is unrelated to this week’s readings and the immediate ethical issues we discussed in class, but I thought it would be interesting to hear some feedback on this topic. While reading the Well & Good Case 6.3 “Tracy and Robert Latimer” and wrapping my mind around the pertinent ethical issues in the case, I couldn’t help but think about the sentence Mr. Latimer received for killing Tracy – a few years in prison and then parole – and the precedent it would set for future generations and trials. I understand that this specific case is filled with questions surrounding the principles of nonmaleficence, killing versus letting die, and the Mr. Latimer’s general intentions, but how does it look if this is his sentence for admitting to taking a human life? I feel as if the court must be conscious of this and provide some explanation or exception to prevent murderers from receiving lesser sentences on the basis of their personal, “untouchable” morals and beliefs. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states that present generations “are obliged not to violate the rights of future generations.” Does Mr. Latimer’s short sentence compromise the security or rights of future victims or the accused in the legal system? Do we have a right to protect future people under this concept of “intergenerational justice”? I’d love to hear your thoughts.
Thanks!
Elisabeth Crusey
Sources:
Meyer, Lukas. “Intergenerational Justice.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 03 Apr. 2003. Web. 27 Feb. 2017. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-intergenerational/#Bib>.
Image Credit:
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01667
Hi Elisabeth!
I’m really glad you posted this because it is something I’ve been struggling with since the case was first presented. As it was said in the case, although all of the jurors sympathized and understood why Mr. Latimer killed his daughter, they could not look past the fact that he had killed her and repercussions were necessary. Upon first reading, I too believed that he should have a shorter sentence and agreed with many critics of the case that “he did not warrant a sentence comparable to those often imposed on cold-blooded killers”, but I struggle to decide where exactly to draw the line (Thomas, Waluchow, Gedge 227). Looking at the facts presented in the case, I do not believe that Mr. Latimer killed his daughter with malicious intent, but rather it was an act of compassion. However, even if he had the best of intentions, as we discussed in class today there are many times were people have good intentions that amount to catastrophic results and when that happens, the only thing people seem to care about are the results. The result of these “good intentions” was the death of a non-consenting young girl, something that typically should be met with severe consequences.
Although the true intentions of Mr. Latimer’s actions are an interesting debate, we will never truly know an individual’s real intentions. However, as you addressed in your blog post, I think the biggest issue with the outcome of this case is the implications and precedent it leaves for future cases. It is definitely a slippery slope to define this case a “compassionate homicide” and give Mr. Latimer a lesser sentence because it sets the tone that if you believe that you are killing someone with good intentions, you will have less consequences. In that regard, someone could hypothetically kill an individual with any type of disability, depression or have some facet of life that makes their living conditions less than ideal, and argue that it was simply an act of compassion. This argument does not sit well with me, but I fear that the implications of this case would justify such an argument.
In order to combat any further immoral acts that use this case as a justification, I would argue that Mr. Latimer’s sentence could have been the same amount as the minimum for a homicide; however he could serve most of it on parole or house arrest if he is not deemed a threat to others. In this case, he would still suffer the same time punishment for killing someone, but he would not have to serve out his entire sentence in jail as if he had murdered someone in cold blood. I think it is reasonable and ethical to consider the intentions in this type of case because ultimately I do not believe that Mr. Latimer maliciously killed his daughter; however it is important not to set the precedent that you may kill someone else as long as you argue that your actions were an act of “compassion”.
Sources:
Thomas, John E., Wilfrid J. Waluchow, and Elisabeth Gedge. Well And Good: A Case Study Approach to Health Care Ethics. N.p.: Broadview, 2014. Print
Hi Elisabeth,
Right off the bat, I think Mr. Latimer’s short sentence does compromise the security and rights of future victims in the legal system. It sets a dangerous precedent, especially since it went so high up in the judicial system, for similar actions to be judged the same way – which is not okay. A murder is a murder, despite the sugar coating.
Your other idea, Intergenerational justice, is a very cool. It never occurred to me that justice could be extended into the future. My gut answer: I think we do have a right to protect future generations. This idea extends into economic, environmental psychological, and sociological contexts. I believe from instinct, we preform a type of altruism –kin selection– where we tend to try to make life choices to promote the continuation of our genes. This is seen in people obtaining secure jobs, keeping the environment clean, finding a good school zone to live in.. etc. I want to say that intergenerational justice should be a thing and a viable argument in court, as it logically makes sense, but it presumes a lot…
– does Tracy have good genes (Gene pool agreement – Darwin’s survival of the fittest )? Sorry that ^ one was kind of dark.
– would there be future generation from Tracy?
– The quality of life of Tracy’s future generation?
– is there a limit to the amount of generations?
– … etc.
In the end, this idea of intergenerational justice makes it seem like everyone will be held responsible constantly for any action taken, even the unforeseeable in the far, far future. Sorta like the butterfly effect (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butterfly_effect). Should the great, great, great grandmother be responsible for Hitler’s actions? I say its a interesting idea, but it is very hard to implement / bring into court; especially the Tracy and Robert Latimer case. On the other hand, I would passionately argue the opposite if it were about the environment.
Thank you for posting this topic, it was enjoyable to write about!
Alex
Hi Elisabeth, Gabby, and Alex! I read each of your comments and I am really interested in this discussion, so I decided to chime in!
First, to Elisabeth, thanks for bringing up this topic! I, too, have wondered about the greater, societal implications of Robert Latimer’s sentence. I agree that it can set a dangerous precedent for future murders to be justified in court. While I understand that his intentions were supposedly based in compassion, it is still murder and he needs to be reprimanded for this.
When reading about this case for my own blog post a few weeks ago, I read multiple articles that explained certain facts that were not mentioned in Well & Good. For example, Robert, after killing Tracy in the truck, actually put her back in her bed and told his wife and the authorities that she had died of natural causes. It was not until the autopsy revealed the presence of carbon monoxide that he admitted to the murder. While he justifies this secrecy as a means to protect his family from being “associates” in the murder, the fact that he had to hide it shows that he knew deep down that something about this was morally wrong. This is even more justification for the argument that he should serve a longer sentence. I personally like Gabby’s idea of giving him the same time but perhaps not directly in jail.
In terms of intergenerational justice, can you clarify what you mean by intergenerational justice? It seems like Alex views it as the implications of Tracy’s potential future offspring; however, I see it more as our duty to protect against future justifications of “compassionate homicide”. The Council of Canadians with Disabilities actually published an article about these specific implications, claiming that the media’s response to this case, largely in support of Robert at the time, “not only trivializes the murder of one child with a disability, it also accelerates the forces that ensure future violence and more deaths.” They continue, discussing the negative implications of diluting the word “murder” to “mercy killing” not only for Tracy but for society as a whole. They point out that the negative implications of this language are not just for the disabled population. They compare Tracy’s inability to consent to her father’s actions to an unconscious person’s inability to consent to gang rape.
In the same article, the author actually compares Robert Latimer’s case to other cases of parents who killed their children. I had no idea, but according to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 2/3 of all murdered children are killed by their parents. Further, the majority of these parents claim that they love their children. The article goes on to quote Susan Smith, a South Carolinan mother who drowned her two, able-bodied sons, which was also labeled as a “mercy killing” in the news. She states, “I don’t think any parent could love their children more than I do, and I would never even think about doing anything that would harm them.” Are you kidding me?! To bring this all back to intergenerational justice, we can not accept the justifications of people like Latimer and Smith. I could go on, but I instead encourage you all to continue reading the thought-provoking discussion cited below by Dick Sobsey. I look forward to hearing your thoughts!
REFERENCES
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. (1995). R. v. Latimer. http://www.spmlaw.ca/scdla/latimer4.htm
Sobsey, Dick. (1995). The Latimer Case: The Reflections of People with Disabilities – Media. Council of Canadians with Disabilities. http://www.ccdonline.ca/en/humanrights/endoflife/latimer/reflections/media
Hi Julia,
When I mentioned “intergenerational justice” in the post, I was referring more specifically to the article from Stanford and, in your words, ‘protecting future generations against “compassionate homicide.”‘ Alex brings up a different fascinating aspect, however, of the duty owed to Tracy’s offspring, and the point it plays in the case. Can Mr. Latimer center an argument for killing Tracy around his duty to prevent future generations from possibly living with her condition? I think not, but could see how an argument could develop from this idea. The Sobsey article you attached containing the extra information about the case that simply solidified my dissatisfaction with Mr. Latimer’s case. The term “compassionate homicide” is disturbing, and however the media portrays it, I can’t help but imagine in the case that Mr. Latimer viewed killing his daughter almost as equivalent as putting a dog out of its suffering. Thanks for the awesome articles!
-Elisabeth Crusey
Hi Alex,
I completely see where the “butterfly effect” could come into play in a scenario like this. I’m responding mainly to your counterarguments regarding not necessarily the public’s quality of life set by the case, but by Tracy’s quality of life and the lives of her hypothetical offspring. I didn’t think to include the literal generational effect (good or bad) of Mr. Latimer’s actions Tracy’s children and if it would have influenced the facts of the case or not when her father killed her, but it is almost negligible in this case (that phrasing is incentive, but I am not sure how to otherwise word it). The impact of the case’s precedent on substantially more people than just Tracy herself allows us to justify forgoing an argument based on is she should or shouldn’t have offspring and, then, their quality of lives. Thanks for bringing up this aspect!
-Elisabeth Crusey
Hey sorry I just read this. I just remembered to look at this thread when it came up in class. I completely agree with what you said today and above. The impact socially is something I completely overlooked.
Hi Elisabeth!
You bring up a really intriguing proposition with the idea of intergenerational justice. I’ve heard the term limited times and it’s always been in context of environmental rights so it’s refreshing to place the term in a new realm. Looking at John Rawls’ argument, there is room to play devil’s advocate here and doubt that intergenerational justice is even plausible. He states that issues of social justice raise a distinct philosophical problem on the assumption that society is a kind of compact between generations with ongoing cooperation (Rawls, 1999). This view considers the aim of a theory of justice is to work out fair terms of distribution of benefits vs. burdens and rights vs. responsibilities among all members subscribing to that ongoing cooperation. The outcome of the hypothetical agreement must be fair to everyone, which would extend to the future as well as the present. The problem lies in the duties placed on the present generation to somehow ensure impartiality to the future generation. No living member of the cooperative scheme will interact with future members. Therefore, the present can act in ways that may improve (or reduce) the quality of life for future generations but the future generation cannot do anything in return to affect the lives of the present. They are powerless in bargaining with past generations on the sake of their own status. Reciprocity is necessary in order to abridge the drastic inequalities that are destructive of ideals of equal rights and the integrity of a truly democratic process. Since there is no comparable relational rationale for minimizing inequalities across generations there is no true interaction and therefore no intergenerational justice either.
Sources:
Rawls, John (1999) A Theory of Justice: Revised Ed.
Hi!
Thanks for this definition and view of intergenerational justice. I’m curious as to see how you would apply this to the Latimer case, would you mind elaborating on it in this context?
Thanks!
-Elisabeth Crusey
Hi Elisabeth,
I was thinking the same thing with this example. I think his sentence might serve as a precedent for future cases, but I think a reason why his sentence was so short was because the judge looked at whether or not he was capable of repeating his actions, and based on his reasoning for why he did what he did, I think the judge saw it as a one-time thing. The judge probably thought that he was not a threat to society and thus lessened his sentence. But then that makes me think that other people, who are a threat to society could potentially be released on the same precedent that this man was released on.
Hey Elizabeth,
Thank you for taking the initiative to further discuss the case. Through our conversations and observing the class sentiment, I understand that people are quite passionate about this case. Firstly, I would like to state that I mostly agree with what people in the class feel about the case regarding the short term given to Mr. Latimer for the crime. What he did was very serious and has consequences beyond this case. I agree that one year in prison does not come close to what he should have gotten. For the sake of proper discussion about moral judgement for Mr. Latimer, I think it is very important to keep in mind that it must have been really hard for him to go though with what he did. In the text, he is described as being a very loving and kind father to all his fur children. He had a reputation of being a hardworking and responsible member of the community. It is very difficult to argue that Mr. Latimer acted out of maleficence. This condition presents a very difficult problem as to whether to punish him for ten years or one year.
As to your point about intergenerational justice, I believe that judges at higher levels of court system face this issue in every case. I think that Justice Nobel was mindful of the consequences of his ruling on future cases as he clearly explains the reasons for it. The conditions of the case are such that both the rulings, ten years in prison and one year in prision, run into slippery slopes. The consequence of Justice Nobel’s ruling is potentially justifying future compassionate homicides where the intent of the perpetrator may not be genuine. Another consequence would be the acceptance in the society that the lives of the disabled could be less than others. On the other hand, not distinguishing between compassionate homicide and a normal homicide would set a precedent that the legal system does not care about the intent of the perpetrator. This could prevent medical professionals from alleviating pain in rare cases where the patient is totally incompetent in making any decision and is suffering from inescapable pain. I can’t think of a specific circumstance where this could be applicable. Looking forward to hearing back from you!
Thanks,
Mihir
Hi Mihir,
Thanks for your reply. While I absolutely see and understand your points above, I believe that Mr. Latimer should be given the full sentence typical for a crime of this nature. I’m not very familiar with how the legal system works in regards to determining the intent of a crime or the character of the accused, but I would hope it places more weight on the actions themselves. In your last few lines of your post, you mentioned the relationship between compassionate and intended homicide and how that would affect views on PAS. I had not thought of this before, and still agree that the court should be careful and conservative in setting a precedent in this case mainly because Mr. Latimer did not proceed appropriately in his concerns for Tracy. In PAS, the main distinction is between consent of the patient or person seeking PAS. Mr. Latimer did not seek Tracy’s consent (even though she was in no position to give it, which I believe warrants an even stronger argument that he had no grounds on which to kill her). I don’t think that PAS could be considered “compassionate homicide” if the patient seeks it out and truly considers it their only option. Disregarding the aspect of whether or not PAS is doctors killing patients or patients killing themselves (or the actual act of PAS, as we discussed in class), the decision on this case would not impact medical professionals’ ability to perform PAS. However, if a patient is in extreme pain and uncommunicative as you stated above, there is an entirely new issue on our hands. As of now, I don’t have a complete response to this situation. Let me think about this, read a little more, and come back to it when we begin our principle of justice in the class (that might help us understand Mr. Latimer’s situation better as well). Really great ideas! I hope this continues as a point of reference and discussion for the rest of the semester.
Thanks,
Elisabeth Crusey
Hi All,
I feel like this is a very interesting discourse as it’s definitely relevant for the future of ethics in our judicial system. I wrote my blog post on this case and as I mentioned there, I strongly believe that Robert Latimer’s actions are not justified even with his daughter’s condition. However I do feel that his sentencing was on the more justified side, although not perfect.
I agree with what many of you are saying, that courts need to make sure that cases do not have potentially damaging future implication. But, I feel like having a shorter sentence for Mr. Latimer does set an important message for the court system. Especially for this day and age.
I completely stand with the fact that Tracy’s death was wrongful, and their entire situation could have been dealt with more ethically. But, I still believe that Mr. Latimer’s case differs greatly from those who are simply murders that have no regard for human life. The fact that Mr. Latimer was sentenced sets the precedent that what he did was wrong and unjust. But the nuance of this case is an important aspect to draw out. I feel that it is the duty of the court system to look at each trial in a case by case manner. I feel that approaching this case directly as a murder case is actually quite dangerous. I don’t think that the courts should operate under schematic view where certain type of crime should always be given a specific sentencing.
From a non-bioethical standpoint, this would do injustice to crimes such a person murdering a stranger or even events of mass murder. To lose the nuance of intent, can open way to a slippery-slope. As that is the purpose of the court is to understand differences of an unethical situation and determine how is it to best handle what is at hand. If Robert Latimer was charged the same amount as a person who shoots an unarmed person would diminish the meaning of the due process. As it would be detrimental to persecute all crimes under the same “name” as the same. Because there is obvious difference between Robert Latimer outright confessing about killing his daughter and his intent. Opposed to a person claiming wrongfully not guilty, to a murder committed. As someone had mentioned that, Robert Latimer does not pose a threat to society. I don’t think this will open doors for future potential victims of this nature, as murder will still be illegal no matter how the situation occurred.
This is really an interesting discussion and I had not really thought about this aspect with regards to this case. Nice insights!
-Arianna E.