Terrance Ackerman’s response to Childress and Beauchamp’s idea of autonomy attempts to address the notion a physician’s interference with a patient’s decisions that may exhibit impaired autonomy when under the effect of an illness. In my perspective, this is necessary when attempting to ascertain the level of autonomy which may influence the weight of their choice in the matter. In his essay, he highlights a quote by Childress and Beauchamp, that states, “To respect autonomous agents is to recognize with due appreciation their own considered value judgments and out- looks even when it is believed that their judgments are mistaken.” This ideology leads to the noninterference of physicians into the personal matters of the patients. While for many cases this may be viewed as morally correct, Ackerman proposes a concept that contradicts this moral answer of respecting autonomy. What if an illness eventually begins to impede the ability of the patient to competently make a decision that reflects his or her life goals? It would not seem ethical to allow a patient to cause themselves harm in due to a decision that was the consequence of the illness. For example, this situation was similarly addressed during our midterm with the case of a female not wishing to die yet refusing to consume food due to her condition of anorexia. On one hand, you could respect her autonomy and conduct noninterference policy by allowing her to waste away, yet you violate her life goals by permitting her death. On the other hand, you could overrule her autonomy by interfering with her choice of treatment, yet this view corresponds with her life goals. Since anorexia nervosa is as much as a neurological disorder as an eating disorder, allowing an incompetent decision that is dictated by the disorder could cause detrimental damage to the patient whom may not have been fully aware of the consequences in addition to contradicting their life goals. While Beauchamp and Childress’s idea of noninterference may be applicable in some instances of a competent and autonomous patient, perhaps a concept similar to Ackerman’s idea of a physician’s interference to promote return of control could be more useful in supporting patient life goals whose judgement is clouded by the illness that affects them.

Works Cited:

1. Ackerman, Terrence F. “Why Doctors Should Intervene.” The Hastings Center Report 12.4 (1982): 14-17.
2.  Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2001.
3. Thomas, John E., and Wilfrid J. Waluchow. Well and Good: Case Studies in Biomedical Ethics. Ontario: Broadview Press, 1987