In this blog post, I intend to bring the more specific principle of justice into the discussion of W&G Case 6.3 “Tracy and Robert Latimer: ‘It Was Right to Kill My Daughter.’” When reflecting on this specific case, it is hard to ignore the blatant moral problems in Mr. Latimer’s intentional actions. However, the mention of the “Capabilities Theories” (Beauchamp and Childress 259-60) raise aspects relevant to the case surrounding Tracy’s quality of life that could support and undermine her father’s decision to kill her, as well as the court’s responsibility in ruling about such actions.
The quality of a person’s life is “contingent on what they are able to achieve, and a life well lived is one in which individuals sustain and exercise a group of core capabilities” (Beauchamp and Childress 259). In Tracy’s case, she inherently cannot fulfill the ten core capabilities listed, most applicably “affiliation” and “control over one’s environment.” Tracy has no control over her environment or ability to participate in decisions over her future, and assumingly has a more difficult time than others developing bonds and acting independently. For these main reasons, her capabilities do not match those of a typical person’s. In reference to the principle of justice as laid forth by Beauchamp and Childress, “[…] we, as a society, ensure that the world does not interfere with individual’s development of their core capabilities […]” (260). Tracy is vulnerable and subject to the decisions others make on her behalf. Acting justly it is the responsibility of society (not just Mr. Latimer) to protect Tracy’s best interests. If those are along the lines of PAS, it is necessary that correct procedures are followed and honored. Mr. Latimer could argue that Tracy’s disabilities qualify her for living in a “reduced state” and not fulfilling the capability of life, Tracy possesses many other capabilities. To possess and express these, however, may indicate different things.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy makes a distinction between “functionings and capabilities”, or the “opportunity versus the ability” to do something. In terms of core capabilities, should there be a distinction between having the opportunity to partake in emotions, love, political opinions and discussions, and being physically and mentally able to do so? Tracy, as a human being, certainly had the opportunity to fulfill the core capabilities outlined for social justice, but physically and mentally could not. An important distinction must be considered on a case-by-case basis to provide adequate justice. To create a just world and society, we must think and act in accordance with what is best and considered just individually and not always necessarily what is better for the common good. Was there, or could there have been, a duty of justice to the public and good in Tracy’s case? It is a mistake to generalize justice to one specific concept and attempt to encompass all cases, and it is important to realize that, like almost all principles in bioethics, justice is relative.
Sources
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. New York: Oxford UP, 2009, 2013. Print.
Robeyns, Ingrid. “The Capability Approach.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 14 Apr. 2011. Web. 31 Mar. 2017.
Thomas, John, Wilfrid J. Waluchow, and Elisabeth Gedge. “Case 6.3: Tracy and Robert Latimer: ‘It Was Right to Kill My Daughter’.” Well and Good: A Case Study Approach to Health Care Ethics. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview, 2014. 222-28. Print.
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Hi Elisabeth!
I really enjoyed reading your blog post and how you incorporated the Tracy and Robert Latimer case into the new principle of justice. I agree with your argument in that by acting justly, one must protect Tracy’s best interests. As Beauchamp and Childress explain, “Treating an individual justly requires, negatively, not obstructing the individual’s attempts at flourishing through acts of coercion, violence, or cruelty and also requires, positively, support of efforts to flourish” (260). By this statement, isn’t Mr. Latimer preventing Tracy the opportunity to “flourish” by not proceeding with another surgery or do you believe that Mr. Latimer has already given Tracy the chance to live her life to the fullest? Beauchamp and Childress clarify that this in is fact an “extremely demanding theory of justice”, but then when is the appropriate time to use this model of the principle of justice?
You ask if there could have been “a duty of justice to the public” in Tracy’s case and besides her family, I do not really see who else would have benefitted from Mr. Latimer’s actions. The doctor’s might have one less patient to see, but other than that, this “compassionate killing” only lessens the burden on Tracy’s family. Is the family considered the public and if so is this enough for his actions to be considered just?
Works Cited:
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. New York: Oxford UP, 2009, 2013. Print.
Thomas, John, Wilfrid J. Waluchow, and Elisabeth Gedge. “Case 6.3: Tracy and Robert Latimer: ‘It Was Right to Kill My Daughter’.” Well and Good: A Case Study Approach to Health Care Ethics. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview, 2014. 222-28. Print.
Thanks for your reply! In “duty of justice to the public,” I was referring to the impact of the court’s ruling that was made at the end of the case and the sequential rulings it would cause, or the precedent it would set for the future. If we are just referring to the public, however, I think that there is a public duty to protect those who are vulnerable. I consider the minimal sentencing of Mr. Latimer as an act against the public’s duty to protect Tracy and future generations from further discrimination and violations of autonomy.
Thanks!
Elisabeth Crusey
Hi Elisabeth!
Thanks for a great and diligent post. Bringing up this case study was a great addition to your discussion and brought up some ideas I had not considered before. Aside from Tracy’s suffering, she was not fully capable of doing or experiencing the things that allow a person to fully live their life.
This particular discussion also made me think about the case study concerning Stephen Dawson, who had severe mental and physical capabilities. The ethical question was whether or not he should receive more surgery to elongate his life or if he should simply be allowed to die (Thomas et al. 229-235). Much like Tracy, Stephen had limited abilities and could not meet most of the ten core capabilities that you mentioned.
I think that in cases such as these, it is important to consider their quality of life. I think about applying QALYs to these cases (Harris 1987). In Tracy’s case, she would live, however, she would not be able to fulfill much of a role in society. In Stephen’s case, the surgery would allow him to live longer, however he would also not be able to fulfill much of a role. In regards to your statement about “the common good”, I do not believe that their deaths would serve to benefit society; however, their suffering would end.
References
Harris, J. (1987). QALYfying the value of life. Journal of Medical Ethics, 13(3), 117-123. Doi:
10.1136/jme.13.3.117
Thomas, John E, et al. “Case 6.4 Stephen Dawson: Should Severely Mentally Challenged Patients Be Treated?” Well and Good: A Case Study Approach to Health Care Ethics, 4th ed., Broadview P, 2014, pp. 229-235.
Hi Kianna,
Thank you for commenting — you brought up some new aspects I had not thought about. Fundamentally, I don’t agree with the concept of QALYs but acknowledge that sometimes there is no better alternative to determining the allocation of resources or other procedures and treatments important to others. In this sense, could one consider their deaths a benefit to society, if we deem society as those individuals in the population who could get more use out of the treatments? Let me know what you think about this viewpoint!
Thanks,
Elisabeth Crusey
Hello Elizabeth,
I enjoyed reading your blog, I felt it brought up some interesting points. For instance, I would say justice is relative. Sometimes, people’s definitions of justice or their opinions for what is just will not be the same. Many times, a definition of justice cannot be agreed upon by multiple scholars. There can be several accepted forms of justice. “Justice is a complex ethical principle, with meanings that range from the fair treatment of individuals to the equitable allocation of healthcare dollars and resources.” (Feinsod and Wagner) I do not believe there can be one single definition or description of justice. The very idea of justice differs from culture to culture.
References
Feinsod, Fred M., and Cathy Wagner. “The Ethical Principle of Justice: The Purveyor of Equality.” The Ethical Principle of Justice: The Purveyor of Equality | Managed Health Care Connect. N.p., 5 Sept. 2008. Web. 07 Apr. 2017.