Some regard paternalism to always be a negative presence because it’s nature of being something that takes away autonomy. However, paternalism is not a morally wrong because it takes away autonomy away; some situations, as shown by Thaler and Sunstein benefit the individual thus making the presence of paternalism morally defensible. Thaler and Sunstein propose a different kind of paternalism, which they call libertarian paternalism that encompasses a libertarian approach to paternalism. In order to showcase why libertarian paternalism works, there must be some discussion of autonomy.
As Beauchamp and Childress have stated, autonomy is about someone being able to govern their own actions free of impediments like illness, coercion, or misinformation (101). A key phrasing in the definition is that autonomy is ones “own actions”, meaning they do not come from elsewhere, even if the intentions are good. With that stated, not every violation of autonomy is a bad thing, and can garner positive results. In libertarian paternalism it signifies having paternalistic interventions that even the most fervent libertarian would accept (Thaler 386). Thaler and Sunstein laid out their reasoning and examples of why this paternalism is acceptable. For this discussion I want to focus on the aspect of autonomy being taken from a person and how that is not always immoral.
People may argue that autonomy being a very basal common morality that any violation of it is automatically harmful. This assumption is not true when regarding autonomy. For instance, if an employment agency forces their employees to get yearly check-ups in order to keep their jobs that is an exercise of paternalism. However, if as a result of this check up employees were seen to be healthier on average, the paternalistic approach had positive result and would be justifiable. Another example, given by Thaler and Sunstein is when employees are “forcibly enrolled in 401K programs, something that is beneficial a majority of the time (388). Although autonomy is violated it was violated with the employees benefit in mind and does favor them in the end.
I agree heavily with the notion that people are not always making choices in their best interest. One would assumed that someone who is of sound mind and body would theoretically always be making the choice that benefits them; but as Thaler and Sunstein point out this is not the case (387). Now this is not to say that people purposefully make the wrong choice and therefore they cannot be trusted to make their own decisions ever. Sometimes someone may make a choice that they anticipated to be best for them at the moment and it turned out it really set them back. The aforementioned individuals decision was certainly autonomous but it ended up being harmful to them. If a libertarian paternal decision had been made for the individual in their choices stead that had a positive impact is that not morally acceptable? If a paternalistic decision is made with the goal of avoidance of harm or bringing of benefit to the individual there is not wrong being done. Both those distinctions go along with principles of non- maleficence and beneficence. It is the default for everyone autonomous wants to be respected, but sometimes that should be disregarded. The reason being, that people are not always making the best choices.
There is room for a slippery slope rebuttal, in that in justifying libertarian paternalism, we may end up having all of our autonomous choice taken from us. With that fear, Liberian paternalism is not a pass for all free choice to gone from the individual; it merely is an indication that autonomy can be violated with non-malicious intentions that supply a better result than autonomous choice. That stated, libertarian paternalism should never be carried out with coercion or malicious intention.
Works Cited
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. New
York: Oxford UP, 2009. Print.
Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. “BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND PATERNALISM: LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM.” Arguing about Bioethics. New York: Routeledge, 2012. 386-391. Web.