I found one of Tweed’s most useful insights to be the idea that there is an “American way of being religious,” or rather that the complexity and uniqueness of religion in America has led to modes of religious practice that feel distinctly American (191). His example, of course, is the building of national religious centers in the nation’s capital as religious practice. This form of religious practice has been accomplished by, to name a few, Catholics, Christians, Jews, Hindus, Jains, Muslims, and resulted in “Religion Row”—a ten-mile stretch on New Hampshire Avenue with dozens of religious centers. His explanation for this type of religious practice proceeds as follows: The first amendment religion clauses function as a legal sanction for religious diversity, which in turn has motivated faith communities to negotiate political power, construct denominational identity, and secure public visibility by building national churches in the Washington, D.C.

In thinking though my own work on religious arbitration, I find the identification of the negotiation of public space as religious practice to be particularly helpful. Just as the nation’s capital is a civic space being negotiated as religious practice, in the course of religious arbitration the civic space of the American courtroom is transformed, at least partially, into a space for religious practice. As I have mentioned before, religious arbitration is a growing trend in American religion where private religious tribunals adjudicate a dispute according to religious principles and then petition secular courts to enforce the decision. Scholars have struggled to categorize the nature of religious arbitration. On the one hand, arbitration is a civil mechanism used by secular and religious communities alike (similar to building public monuments). On the other hand, records of those who seek out religious arbitration seem to understand at least part of what they are doing as practicing religion, even though such practice eventually intersects with the courtroom.

However, following Tweed’s analysis of religious architecture in the capital, I think it is more productive to categorize religious arbitration as a distinctly American religious practice, required by a constitutional scheme whose claim of disestablishment requires faith traditions to compete with each other to assert religious identity in civic forums, albeit in creative, public ways.