Cutler Cannon: Module 3, Natural Law and Reproductive Ethics

Introduction: A Preliminary Discussion of Reproductive Bioethics

As I have concluded from the introductory weeks of this class – and from our first few readings on the religious implications of procreation –, the ethics of reproduction are multi-faceted, non-universalizable, and greatly dependent on culture. In this blog entree, I will first explore the coming of man through a biblical lens, exploring the first allusions to marriage by analyzing the Hebrew origins of English scripture.  I will then, tying back to what is learned from scripture, discuss the meaning of bioethics and, in particular, what they entail for Jewish conception in Israel. Expounding on what is discussed, I will explore another perspective, taken from Susan Kahn’s Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel and then juxtapose its conclusions with the positions of the Catholic Church within Thomas Shannon and Lisa Cahill’s “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation.” By doing so, I hope to portray the complexity of ethical procreation while also imposing my own questions regarding such bioethics.

In the Beginning

The first chapters of Genesis undeniably reflect the creation story of not only man, but of the world that humans will have dominion over. However,  I would like to hone in on two particular verses that seem to directly set up the religious regulations for not only marriage and union, but of reproduction. The verses are as follows: “This [the creation of woman] explains why a man leaves his father and mother and is joined to his wife (/woman), and the two are united into one flesh. Now the man and his wife (/woman) were both naked, but they felt no shame” (Gen. 2:24-25).

Now, having read this verse from several sources, I found discrepancies between the usage of words. For example, in some translations, the word “wife” was used, but in others “woman.” It was at this moment that I decided to consult the original Hebrew text (my family is Jewish and Hebrew lexicons literally litter my house, haha).

The Hebrew word used here is אִשָּׁה, or ishah (as “taken” from man: ish), and there is no differentiation between “wife” and “woman” in Hebrew; there only exists difference contextually. I had not previously realized this, but it is interesting to know that “woman” – when in regard to a man – can be interchangeable with “wife” when interpreting Hebraic texts.

Additionally, the Hebrew shows that the word וְדָבַ֣ק, or vedavak (cling, cleave, keep close), is used in verse 2:24 instead of the word that is traditionally used for marriage (marriage from kichah, which involves a “taking” or “claim,” as in used in “taking a wife” within Jewish Law). However, in terms of the creation story, there was not yet a form of social practice – or contract – of “taking” a wife. Instead, there was merely cohabitation. I found this profoundly interesting and coincidental considering that we have been discussing in class that kinship has become increasingly contingent on contract. For this is even shown within the Hebrew of biblical text, showing that the primitive origins of marriage lie within cohabitation and union, while the modern interpretations of marriage come later within scripture (after the establishment of the social practice of marriage).

According to Genesis, woman was made from man; thus, a man restores a missing part of himself through the acquirement of a woman and again becomes whole (one flesh). This “one “flesh,” however, is also resemblant of a union, and is something that becomes important to consider in the conversation concerning assisted and artificial reproduction.

A Bioethical Dilemma: Who Dictates What is Right?

Having established the first allusions to marriage within the book of Genesis, it can be assumed that reproduction shall arise between a man and woman who are united together. However, as we have begun to witness in the contemporary world, reproduction has strayed from traditional practices and from such pre-established “union.”

And this leads us into the world of bioethics. What is legitimate reproduction? Must a [physical] “union” between man and wife exist? What are the bioethical implications of such beliefs (whatever they may be), and do they vary interculturally?

Don Seeman, an anthropologist and professor of Jewish studies, in his essay “Ethnography, Exegesis, and Jewish Ethical Reflection: The New Reproductive Technologies in Israel,” explored such arguments. It was concluded that bioethics – the ethics that govern biological practices (such as reproduction) – do not vary on the basis of technological accessibly, but rather on the culture in which the technology is present. Seeman displayed this idea by comparing the cultural beliefs of Japanese and Israeli origin, stating that they “… clearly involve ethical and social tradeoffs that are cultural rather than technological in origin” (Seeman 353). The division between “techno-pessimists,” “techno-skeptics,” and “techno-optimists” was also analyzed, and it was interesting to see how the perspectives of each differed in terms of reproductive bioethics (Seeman 351).

I had a question in Seeman’s discussion vis-à-vis what is natural and the different “raptures” present between multiple cultural and biological accounts. My question pertains to what Seeman meant by his mentioning of Natural Law Theory: how does it fluctuate between cultures, and from what “original” source are these interpretations drawn? I ask this because my mind instantaneously went to Aquinas’ perception of Natural Law, that of which made it difficult for me to know what was meant when Seeman states that Natural Law is foreign to the Halachah. I say this because, according to Aquinas, Natural Law is innate and known to us all, and it is of divine distribution. Therefore, I would like to explore further what exactly was meant by the reference to Natural Law, and by what origin its use was derived from; was is from Aquinas, or from some other theological or rabbinic source?

However, that is beside the point. Seeman’s conclusion that culture defines nature is something that must be consciously considered when arriving at a dispute about reproductive bioethics.

An Obligation to Reproduce

Focusing more on Jewish reproductive discourse, Susan Kahn’s ethnographic data within Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel articulated an insightful display into what it meant to be an unmarried Jewish woman in Israel. Kahn – by first instilling an ethical equality among unmarried, childless, Jewish women – was able to derive the conclusion from multiple women that the pressure to reproduce was great. In fact, it was said that in Israel, it is better to be a single mother than it is to be a childless wife (Kahn 16). However, Kahn showed within the first chapters of her book that the want to have children not only originates from this “pressure,” but also from the genuine want to be a mother.

While pursuits of artificial conception are fully funded by the Israeli government, artificial reproductive technology is targeted for women over age 30; the choice to pursue artificial insemination is not a choice of having a child within or out of marriage, but rather the choice to have a child at all – it is, in Israeli culture, seen as a last resort.

One of the main topics of this book, though, is that reproduction is no longer monopolized by heterosexual intercourse, nor is it still contingent on [direct] male participation. While this goes against the stigma of the “nuclear family,” it shows that marriage is not a prerequisite for legitimate reproduction. I found this interesting, though, as it seems that – while kinship is often contractual and behavioral in many other cultures – biology is still a very important factor in designating what is legitimate reproduction and what is not within Jewish law. For the pressure of Jewish women to reproduce is not concerned solely with reproduction as such, but with the procreation of pure Jewish offspring. This is why the want for Jewish sperm donors is so great within Israel; it is important for Jewish lineage to not be “contaminated.”

However, the use of sperm donors introduces the concern of “adultery” and the law of Mamzerut. Kahn discussed that if a married Jewish woman were to be artificially inseminated by Jewish “seed” belonging not to her husband, that the resulting child would be a mamzer and prohibited of marriage. Thus – because the law of Judaism is confined only to those of Jewish blood – a married Jewish woman may permissibly use the sperm of a non-Jewish donor to conceive a child. Could this idea of how Jewish law functions illustrate what Seeman meant by stating that Natural Law is foreign to Halachah (meaning religious ethics is “blind” – or does not consider – biology)?

Just as Seeman prescribed in his article, though, these beliefs are debatable and subject to cultural interpretation. To display this idea, Khan distinguished between Secular and Rabbinic perspectives to show how the abiding of Jewish law can differ between individuals of the “same” principle heritage [Judaism]. An example of this is when Kahn insinuates that kinship is established through gestation and parturition rather than genetics (and is hence why Jewish surrogates are desired); I found it especially flummoxing when Kahn utilized this belief to display how “loopholes” – for lack of better word – exist in Kosher law (i.e., an unkosher body, if gestated in a kosher mother, thus becomes kosher itself).

The concern of pure Jewish lineage fascinated me, and I decided to explore what that could mean in other cultures. As brought up in our last class, I did reach out to my friend in Jordan concerning his cultural doctrines [Muslim] on things such as surrogacy. He directed me to a study that showed that genes could be passed to an embryo from the uterus in which it is gestated (also supporting the Jewish idea that kinship is associated with the gestational mother). Thus – not only speaking of kinship –, the biological “purity” of the embryo is corrupted and thus invalidates the practice of surrogacy in Muslim culture. Additionally (just a fun fact), he went on to explain how when a child nurses from a mother that is not his own, they are also receiving genes from the breast milk (not as substantially as with uterine development, however); thus, the biological children of the nursing mother then become “nursing” brothers and sisters to the non-biologically related child receiving breastmilk, and they are prohibited from being wed. This goes to show how important the preservation of heritage can be in differing cultures, and further emphasized the variability of reproductive bioethics.

A Cultural Severity

“Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation,” by Thomas Shannon and Lisa Cahill, further instills this presence of cultural difference; the Catholic perspective of artificial conception clearly juxtaposes the standpoint of the Jews. Within this literature, it seems that a stricter ideology is followed, as the rights of humans cause for artificial reproduction to be discussed in different ways.

However, I will not lie – I did have a few problems with this argument; for the reader must agree with the teaching of the Magisterium (and the Catholic church as a whole) for the argument to be applicable, as many of the claims made in the passage are stated as irrefutable fact. While Kahn was careful to stress that the perspectives within her book were rooted in Judaism, the ideas within this particular article (Shannon, Cahill) were presented in such a way that it seemed they should be universalized as a maxim within all societies. This, however – according to cultural relativism – cannot be the case. While this, I suppose, is a minor problem, it was a problem I had with the essay nonetheless.

However, I did find the claim concerning man’s predominance over technology to be fascinating: while technology can be used as a valuable tool to humans, it cannot in itself bring the existence of human life to fruition; this would instill a predominance of technology over humans and be contrary to God’s intention, according to the essay.

While this article focused greatly on respect for embryonic bodies, it failed to touch on respect for the mother (who is also a human with rights). While a therapeutic procedure, for example, may be in the best interest of the embryo – where the risk does not outweigh the intended good outcome (a utilitarian approach) – would surgical intervention disrespect the mother? I ask this having in mind women in religions that forbid modern medical intervention. For me, this raised the question: which is more important to uphold, respect for the embryo (by bettering quality of life) or for the mother (by not disregarding respect for her body through medical intervention), in terms of prenatal diagnosis?

Another concern that arose: this article seemed to emphasize the union between body and spirit, as they work in collaboration. However, who dictates what is respectful to a corpse after life is lost? Shouldn’t the body, even when absent of spirit, be held to the same standards of respect as to when it was living (in the article, it was not)? I wish to explore this further to see exactly how practices like embryonic autopsies (after death is verified and parental consent is given) are deemed morally permissible.

According to this article, artificial reproductive technology is deemed as man’s attempt (even unintentionally) at fulfilling the roles of God – causing life and causing death (the death of embryos through things such as IVF). Thus – because man should not “play God” – this is viewed as a violation of the moral law. It is made very clear the importance of the conjugal act, saying that it is the right of a child to be the fruit of such a union between husband and wife. Technology cannot have dominion over man; thus, according to the specifications within “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation,” artificial reproduction is not permissible, as it – in some way – disrespects either the intended mother, intended father, or unborn child.

Conclusion: Sight into the Variability of Reproductive Bioethics

Through reading the assigned literature, the all-important conclusion I have seen is that, while the field of bioethics is definitely developing – especially within the realm of emergent technology – its development is going to differ among contrasting cultural societies. For while individuals may feel the pressure to “be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it,” the permissible means of doing so are going to vary among cultures.

I found these readings interesting, and it was stimulating to see the multiple perspectives in the discussion of reproductive ethics; I look forward to further deciphering the implications of such perspectives as we delve further into this course.

 

Sources:

The Bible. The New Oxford Annotated Version, 3^rd ed., Oxford UP, 2001. Print.

Kahn, Susan. Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000. Print.

Shanon, Thomas A. and Lisa Sowle Cahill. Religion and Artificial Reproduction: An Inquiry into the Vatican, “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Reproduction. New York: Crossroad, 1988. pp. 141-174. Print.

Seeman, Don. “Ethnography, Exegesis, and Jewish Ethical Reflection: The New Reproductive Technologie in Israel.” Kin, Gene, Community: Reproductive Technologies Among Jewish Israelis, edited by Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli and Yoram S. Carmeli, Berghahn Books, 2010, pp. 340-362.

Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274. The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas … London: Burns, Oates & Washburne, ltd., 192042.