Religion and Healing Online Summer Class 2019

Genesis Chapter One and Two

The Book of Genesis is the opening story to the Hebrew Bible. This story explains the beginning of time and the creation of all things. There are many versions of this story with different translations and different verses. However, the story remains the same.

The first chapter of Genesis describes the creation of all things. God looked into a void of darkness and commended for light to come. For seven days, he continues to add and create things. He began with Heaven and Earth, making sure to bring light, land, seas, vegetation, and animals. Not long after, God desired a creature of his own kind. From the dirt and soil of the Earth he created, he makes a man, and from that man, he retrieves a rib to create a woman. Thus, the creation of Adam and Eve. It took a total of seven days for the Earth and Heavens to be created. When God was finished with his creation, he made sure to create a planet where humans can sustain themselves and reproduce.

At the end of the second chapter of Genesis, there were a few quotes I wanted to address, “And the rib, which the LORD God had taken from man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man. And Adam said, This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called Woman because she was taken out of Man. Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh. And they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed.” (2.22-25). These lines hold an image of a man and a woman. Concluding that Genesis believes that man and woman are to be together because a woman came from man. This concept of a perfect union plays an important role in our further readings and dictates a lot of future ideas surrounding artificial reproduction.

 

Religion and Artificial Reproduction: An Inquiry into the Vatican “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Reproduction.

This article was very difficult for me to read because it required that I come out of my comfort zone. This article gives us a perspective of the Catholic Church and consists of three main concepts: respect for embryos from the moment of fertilization, technology intervention in human procreation, and the relationship between a person and their faith and how this relationship deems what is morally right and wrong when it comes to artificially reproduce.

There is a belief within this community that embryos deserve and should be given the same respect we would give a grown human being because it is believed that humans must be respected from the first moment of their existence. This is what I consider to be a very “grey area” topic.  I personally believe that a person cannot simply be for it or against it because there are many factors involved. Initially, I believed this concept to be too strict and questioned why an embryo would hold so much precedent compared to its mother. I can understand why embryos may deserve respect because they grow and form into fetuses and grow to become humans. However, embryos are only days and weeks old, should they hold such importance compared to their mothers?

Along with this strict ideology, the article also mentions that though medicine and the abilities and opportunities to procreate are expanding, it is important to note the morality behind these acts. Before continuing with the acts of procreating with the aid of reproductive technology, it is important to initially consider how it would affect religion and how morally right it is. An example would be surrogacy. The act of creating a child through surrogacy is frowned upon because the child should be born out of wedlock, and having a surrogate involved is similar to having the surrogate involved in the marriage. Another example of procreating with the aid of reproductive technology being frowned upon is the idea of man playing the role of God. By choosing to create the life and the death of an embryo, a man is playing the role of God because he is creating and destroying.

 

Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel.

Susan Kahn shed light on the experiences of unmarried Jewish women living in Israel. I was very surprised to discover that it is better to live the life of a single mother with no other support than it is to be a single woman. Kahn brings to light how important culture plays a role in how we dictate reproducing. In Jewish culture, the women are driven by the desire to have children. However, it is not considered “natural” for women at young ages (below 30-35) to want or need artificial reproductive technology.

I found it very interesting that there does not need to be a marriage in order for a woman to reproduce. I also found it very interesting how great of an impact the Jewish religion plays on the choices of sperm donors. It is important that Jewish women choose sperm donors who are also Jewish in order to keep the Jewish lineage “pure”. This is interesting to me because to be born into the Jewish religion, the mother has to be Jewish.

Another topic that interested me is the idea that though Jewish women are encouraged to keep the lineage pure with Jewish sperm, a married Jewish woman may not accept the sperm donation from another Jewish man. In the eyes of the Mamzerut, this is considered adultery. However, if the married Jewish woman receives sperm from a man who is not Jewish it is seen as morally right because this law is only confined to the “Jewish Blood”. I found this fascinating because once again it is placing importance upon the embryo/fetus and is not taking the mother’s or father’s predicaments into consideration. I enjoyed Kahn emphasizing how big of a role culture and society plays within our decisions.

 

Ethnography, Exegesis and Jewish Ethical Reflection: The New Reproductive Technologies in Israel.

Similar to Susan Kahn’s point of culture playing a major role in our decisions, Dr. Don Seeman believes that culture plays an important role in how societies govern bioethics. I enjoyed reading this article because it placed an important role in the anthropological perspective of the bioethics. I agree that medical anthropology is very important and should be considered more often when evaluating situations similar to this one because many important cultural factors are oftentimes overlooked.

I also find the Natural Law of Moral Theory to be fascinating because it explains this anthropological perspective very well. The standards by which we govern our lives are tied to our societies behavior. This theory is dependent on culture and society. However, I believe culture and nature to be intertwined.

 

Sources

Donum Vitae

In Shanon, Thomas A. and Lisa Sowle Cahill, Religion and Artificial Reproduction: An Inquiry into the Vatican “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Reproduction.” (Crossroad, 1988).

 

Susan Martha Kahn

Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel (Duke University Press, 2000).

 

Don Seeman

“Ethnography, Exegesis and Jewish Ethical Reflection: The New Reproductive Technologies in Israel.” In Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli and Yoram S. Carmeli editors, Kin, Gene, Community: Reproductive Technologies Among Jewish Israelis (Berghahn Books, 2010), pp. 340-362.

 

Genesis, Chapter 1 and 2

http://knarf.english.upenn.edu/EtAlia/genes1-3.html

Introduction: A Preliminary Discussion of Reproductive Bioethics

As I have concluded from the introductory weeks of this class – and from our first few readings on the religious implications of procreation –, the ethics of reproduction are multi-faceted, non-universalizable, and greatly dependent on culture. In this blog entree, I will first explore the coming of man through a biblical lens, exploring the first allusions to marriage by analyzing the Hebrew origins of English scripture.  I will then, tying back to what is learned from scripture, discuss the meaning of bioethics and, in particular, what they entail for Jewish conception in Israel. Expounding on what is discussed, I will explore another perspective, taken from Susan Kahn’s Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel and then juxtapose its conclusions with the positions of the Catholic Church within Thomas Shannon and Lisa Cahill’s “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation.” By doing so, I hope to portray the complexity of ethical procreation while also imposing my own questions regarding such bioethics.

In the Beginning

The first chapters of Genesis undeniably reflect the creation story of not only man, but of the world that humans will have dominion over. However,  I would like to hone in on two particular verses that seem to directly set up the religious regulations for not only marriage and union, but of reproduction. The verses are as follows: “This [the creation of woman] explains why a man leaves his father and mother and is joined to his wife (/woman), and the two are united into one flesh. Now the man and his wife (/woman) were both naked, but they felt no shame” (Gen. 2:24-25).

Now, having read this verse from several sources, I found discrepancies between the usage of words. For example, in some translations, the word “wife” was used, but in others “woman.” It was at this moment that I decided to consult the original Hebrew text (my family is Jewish and Hebrew lexicons literally litter my house, haha).

The Hebrew word used here is אִשָּׁה, or ishah (as “taken” from man: ish), and there is no differentiation between “wife” and “woman” in Hebrew; there only exists difference contextually. I had not previously realized this, but it is interesting to know that “woman” – when in regard to a man – can be interchangeable with “wife” when interpreting Hebraic texts.

Additionally, the Hebrew shows that the word וְדָבַ֣ק, or vedavak (cling, cleave, keep close), is used in verse 2:24 instead of the word that is traditionally used for marriage (marriage from kichah, which involves a “taking” or “claim,” as in used in “taking a wife” within Jewish Law). However, in terms of the creation story, there was not yet a form of social practice – or contract – of “taking” a wife. Instead, there was merely cohabitation. I found this profoundly interesting and coincidental considering that we have been discussing in class that kinship has become increasingly contingent on contract. For this is even shown within the Hebrew of biblical text, showing that the primitive origins of marriage lie within cohabitation and union, while the modern interpretations of marriage come later within scripture (after the establishment of the social practice of marriage).

According to Genesis, woman was made from man; thus, a man restores a missing part of himself through the acquirement of a woman and again becomes whole (one flesh). This “one “flesh,” however, is also resemblant of a union, and is something that becomes important to consider in the conversation concerning assisted and artificial reproduction.

A Bioethical Dilemma: Who Dictates What is Right?

Having established the first allusions to marriage within the book of Genesis, it can be assumed that reproduction shall arise between a man and woman who are united together. However, as we have begun to witness in the contemporary world, reproduction has strayed from traditional practices and from such pre-established “union.”

And this leads us into the world of bioethics. What is legitimate reproduction? Must a [physical] “union” between man and wife exist? What are the bioethical implications of such beliefs (whatever they may be), and do they vary interculturally?

Don Seeman, an anthropologist and professor of Jewish studies, in his essay “Ethnography, Exegesis, and Jewish Ethical Reflection: The New Reproductive Technologies in Israel,” explored such arguments. It was concluded that bioethics – the ethics that govern biological practices (such as reproduction) – do not vary on the basis of technological accessibly, but rather on the culture in which the technology is present. Seeman displayed this idea by comparing the cultural beliefs of Japanese and Israeli origin, stating that they “… clearly involve ethical and social tradeoffs that are cultural rather than technological in origin” (Seeman 353). The division between “techno-pessimists,” “techno-skeptics,” and “techno-optimists” was also analyzed, and it was interesting to see how the perspectives of each differed in terms of reproductive bioethics (Seeman 351).

I had a question in Seeman’s discussion vis-à-vis what is natural and the different “raptures” present between multiple cultural and biological accounts. My question pertains to what Seeman meant by his mentioning of Natural Law Theory: how does it fluctuate between cultures, and from what “original” source are these interpretations drawn? I ask this because my mind instantaneously went to Aquinas’ perception of Natural Law, that of which made it difficult for me to know what was meant when Seeman states that Natural Law is foreign to the Halachah. I say this because, according to Aquinas, Natural Law is innate and known to us all, and it is of divine distribution. Therefore, I would like to explore further what exactly was meant by the reference to Natural Law, and by what origin its use was derived from; was is from Aquinas, or from some other theological or rabbinic source?

However, that is beside the point. Seeman’s conclusion that culture defines nature is something that must be consciously considered when arriving at a dispute about reproductive bioethics.

An Obligation to Reproduce

Focusing more on Jewish reproductive discourse, Susan Kahn’s ethnographic data within Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel articulated an insightful display into what it meant to be an unmarried Jewish woman in Israel. Kahn – by first instilling an ethical equality among unmarried, childless, Jewish women – was able to derive the conclusion from multiple women that the pressure to reproduce was great. In fact, it was said that in Israel, it is better to be a single mother than it is to be a childless wife (Kahn 16). However, Kahn showed within the first chapters of her book that the want to have children not only originates from this “pressure,” but also from the genuine want to be a mother.

While pursuits of artificial conception are fully funded by the Israeli government, artificial reproductive technology is targeted for women over age 30; the choice to pursue artificial insemination is not a choice of having a child within or out of marriage, but rather the choice to have a child at all – it is, in Israeli culture, seen as a last resort.

One of the main topics of this book, though, is that reproduction is no longer monopolized by heterosexual intercourse, nor is it still contingent on [direct] male participation. While this goes against the stigma of the “nuclear family,” it shows that marriage is not a prerequisite for legitimate reproduction. I found this interesting, though, as it seems that – while kinship is often contractual and behavioral in many other cultures – biology is still a very important factor in designating what is legitimate reproduction and what is not within Jewish law. For the pressure of Jewish women to reproduce is not concerned solely with reproduction as such, but with the procreation of pure Jewish offspring. This is why the want for Jewish sperm donors is so great within Israel; it is important for Jewish lineage to not be “contaminated.”

However, the use of sperm donors introduces the concern of “adultery” and the law of Mamzerut. Kahn discussed that if a married Jewish woman were to be artificially inseminated by Jewish “seed” belonging not to her husband, that the resulting child would be a mamzer and prohibited of marriage. Thus – because the law of Judaism is confined only to those of Jewish blood – a married Jewish woman may permissibly use the sperm of a non-Jewish donor to conceive a child. Could this idea of how Jewish law functions illustrate what Seeman meant by stating that Natural Law is foreign to Halachah (meaning religious ethics is “blind” – or does not consider – biology)?

Just as Seeman prescribed in his article, though, these beliefs are debatable and subject to cultural interpretation. To display this idea, Khan distinguished between Secular and Rabbinic perspectives to show how the abiding of Jewish law can differ between individuals of the “same” principle heritage [Judaism]. An example of this is when Kahn insinuates that kinship is established through gestation and parturition rather than genetics (and is hence why Jewish surrogates are desired); I found it especially flummoxing when Kahn utilized this belief to display how “loopholes” – for lack of better word – exist in Kosher law (i.e., an unkosher body, if gestated in a kosher mother, thus becomes kosher itself).

The concern of pure Jewish lineage fascinated me, and I decided to explore what that could mean in other cultures. As brought up in our last class, I did reach out to my friend in Jordan concerning his cultural doctrines [Muslim] on things such as surrogacy. He directed me to a study that showed that genes could be passed to an embryo from the uterus in which it is gestated (also supporting the Jewish idea that kinship is associated with the gestational mother). Thus – not only speaking of kinship –, the biological “purity” of the embryo is corrupted and thus invalidates the practice of surrogacy in Muslim culture. Additionally (just a fun fact), he went on to explain how when a child nurses from a mother that is not his own, they are also receiving genes from the breast milk (not as substantially as with uterine development, however); thus, the biological children of the nursing mother then become “nursing” brothers and sisters to the non-biologically related child receiving breastmilk, and they are prohibited from being wed. This goes to show how important the preservation of heritage can be in differing cultures, and further emphasized the variability of reproductive bioethics.

A Cultural Severity

“Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation,” by Thomas Shannon and Lisa Cahill, further instills this presence of cultural difference; the Catholic perspective of artificial conception clearly juxtaposes the standpoint of the Jews. Within this literature, it seems that a stricter ideology is followed, as the rights of humans cause for artificial reproduction to be discussed in different ways.

However, I will not lie – I did have a few problems with this argument; for the reader must agree with the teaching of the Magisterium (and the Catholic church as a whole) for the argument to be applicable, as many of the claims made in the passage are stated as irrefutable fact. While Kahn was careful to stress that the perspectives within her book were rooted in Judaism, the ideas within this particular article (Shannon, Cahill) were presented in such a way that it seemed they should be universalized as a maxim within all societies. This, however – according to cultural relativism – cannot be the case. While this, I suppose, is a minor problem, it was a problem I had with the essay nonetheless.

However, I did find the claim concerning man’s predominance over technology to be fascinating: while technology can be used as a valuable tool to humans, it cannot in itself bring the existence of human life to fruition; this would instill a predominance of technology over humans and be contrary to God’s intention, according to the essay.

While this article focused greatly on respect for embryonic bodies, it failed to touch on respect for the mother (who is also a human with rights). While a therapeutic procedure, for example, may be in the best interest of the embryo – where the risk does not outweigh the intended good outcome (a utilitarian approach) – would surgical intervention disrespect the mother? I ask this having in mind women in religions that forbid modern medical intervention. For me, this raised the question: which is more important to uphold, respect for the embryo (by bettering quality of life) or for the mother (by not disregarding respect for her body through medical intervention), in terms of prenatal diagnosis?

Another concern that arose: this article seemed to emphasize the union between body and spirit, as they work in collaboration. However, who dictates what is respectful to a corpse after life is lost? Shouldn’t the body, even when absent of spirit, be held to the same standards of respect as to when it was living (in the article, it was not)? I wish to explore this further to see exactly how practices like embryonic autopsies (after death is verified and parental consent is given) are deemed morally permissible.

According to this article, artificial reproductive technology is deemed as man’s attempt (even unintentionally) at fulfilling the roles of God – causing life and causing death (the death of embryos through things such as IVF). Thus – because man should not “play God” – this is viewed as a violation of the moral law. It is made very clear the importance of the conjugal act, saying that it is the right of a child to be the fruit of such a union between husband and wife. Technology cannot have dominion over man; thus, according to the specifications within “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation,” artificial reproduction is not permissible, as it – in some way – disrespects either the intended mother, intended father, or unborn child.

Conclusion: Sight into the Variability of Reproductive Bioethics

Through reading the assigned literature, the all-important conclusion I have seen is that, while the field of bioethics is definitely developing – especially within the realm of emergent technology – its development is going to differ among contrasting cultural societies. For while individuals may feel the pressure to “be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it,” the permissible means of doing so are going to vary among cultures.

I found these readings interesting, and it was stimulating to see the multiple perspectives in the discussion of reproductive ethics; I look forward to further deciphering the implications of such perspectives as we delve further into this course.

 

Sources:

The Bible. The New Oxford Annotated Version, 3^rd ed., Oxford UP, 2001. Print.

Kahn, Susan. Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000. Print.

Shanon, Thomas A. and Lisa Sowle Cahill. Religion and Artificial Reproduction: An Inquiry into the Vatican, “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Reproduction. New York: Crossroad, 1988. pp. 141-174. Print.

Seeman, Don. “Ethnography, Exegesis, and Jewish Ethical Reflection: The New Reproductive Technologie in Israel.” Kin, Gene, Community: Reproductive Technologies Among Jewish Israelis, edited by Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli and Yoram S. Carmeli, Berghahn Books, 2010, pp. 340-362.

Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274. The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas … London: Burns, Oates & Washburne, ltd., 192042.

 

Kinship can be difficult to understand when considering the many different relationships, cultures, religions etc. that people have. The readings for this module all demonstrated that defining kinship can be difficult and complicated, especially with new and emerging reproductive technologies. In class we discussed that there are two distinct branches when it comes to kinship. One is concerned with descent, genealogy, genetics and evolution, while the other is concerned more with social and legal relations. Anthropologist break down kinship by consanguineal, affinal, and fictive kinships. All of these components, definitions, and takes on kinship make its study even more challenging.

In the article “Complexities: Beyond Nature and Nurture”, Susan McKinnon challenges “both the presuppositions about genetics and gender that underlie the narratives of evolutionary psychologists and the theories of mind and culture that inform these presuppositions” through the anthropological lens. She argues that evolutionary psychologists often focus solely on genetics, natural selection, investment in sexual relations, among other biological based presuppositions without considering the variation of cultures and kinship relationships around the globe.

On the other hand, Warren Shapiro challenges McKinnon’s views in the article “What human kinship is primarily about: toward a critique of the new kinship studies”. He focuses on focality theory to argue against McKinnon’s claims positing that when thinking carefully people do consider “closer” genetic kin and that there is a focalization about it. He seems to side with evolutionary psychologists and claims that they do acknowledge that they do not know the intricacy of social and cultural contexts.

In “He Won’t Be My Son” by Marcia Inhorn, we learn about the attitudes towards adoption and gamete donation among the Lebanese Muslim families who undergo IVF. We also gain more perspective on the intricate complexities of the intersections of religion, science, kinship, parenthood etc. Fathers of children who are adopted or conceived by gamete donation hold this notion that the child “won’t be my son” due to the many cultural and religious views the community has. Yet there are those who consider these methods to create a family.

Personally, it came to no surprise to read about the complexities of kinship and about reproductive technologies with different religious and cultural contexts. One of the reasons why I decided to double major, exploring both the hard sciences and social sciences, was because I often saw this clash between biological aspects and cultural ones. Though I was not surprised about it, I did learn more about the different aspects that evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists consider with kinship.

Possible discussion questions we should consider in class are:

• What factors aside from genetics and social systems, are we not considering when studying kinship?
• Are McKinnon’s claims that evolutionary psychologists ignore the historical and anthropological record fair?
• Do you agree with the “collectivist” label Shapiro places on McKinnon’s argument and his argument for “focality”?

When it comes to McKinnon, I very much agree that genetics and evolution alone cannot give us the entire picture of what kinship is. There are complexities about culture, kinship is relativistic on culture, and not reducible to genetics. There are nuances such as people that you would consider kin, adopted children etc. However, I do not think that genetic components can be ignored. Though difficult to study, there are questions we can attempt to answer, for example about gestational trauma and how that later on affects kinship relationships. Studying the genetics of these children can give us some information and requires careful analysis. Other questions require experimental design but does have many ethical implications and limitations. There are many notions that have recently come to light such as that generational trauma can be inherited that are flawed in methodology and can be improved. Genetics can give us a good idea of biological components that are influential, but they also can’t give us all of the answers.

Not only is kinship complex, but it has very important implications in our societies such as in the legal system. Kinship is the system by which we organize our relationships. Like we discussed in class, in America, kinships are established by contract. This has serious implications for example is who can make medical decisions for a spouse, child, or family member. While in other cultures and religions, this would drastically change based on the way kinship is viewed. Inhorn’s text is an example of the complexities of how kinship structures change the way we view kinship relationships.

One of the last points of contention we discussed about kinship was if we could show which was more dominant, nature or nurture? People from different fields will have their own opinions, but personally, I find that question very difficult to answer. Both have a very significant and varying degrees of influence on kinship.

In addition to trying to explore these questions, perhaps we should consider how the two can help us answer questions about kinship than solely focus on their differences. Biology and ethnography alone might not give us the answers we seek.

In our class, we have touched upon how bioethics, and within that assistive reproductive technology, inherently includes a discussion and understanding of the concept of kinship. Kinship refers to how we relate to people closest to us and has two points of focus: the first following biological descent and the second acknowledging social and legal relations. In her chapter “On Kinship and Marriage: A Critique of the Genetic and Gender Calculus of Evolutionary Psychology,” Susan McKinnon illustrates how kinship is regarded from the standpoint of a social anthropologist versus that of evolutionary psychologists. McKinnon believes that evolutionary psychologists understand kinship in a “digital” manner, a very black and white structure based off of genetics, and in this chapter she argues that this is not human reality but instead that kinship does not relate directly to biological structure given varying cross-cultural understandings and expressions (McKinnon 109). McKinnon goes on to say that there is nothing self-evident about biological kinship, and while in many cultures distinctions are made between biological and other forms of kinship who counts as “real” kin is not necessarily genetically-defined but instead could be defined for instance by social action or groupings of people who live together (McKinnon 115). Ultimately, McKinnon draws from her evidence to depict how evolutionary psychologists choose to simplify kinship systems to a view that focuses on Euro-American appreciation of genetics and gender roles which in effect develops a hierarchal system of marriage and other manners (legal, spiritual, etc.) in which kinship is recognized or developed. McKinnon brings her point home by asserting that the evolutionary psychological perspective ignores the multiplicity of human existence and fails to recognize that kinship is relativistic and defined by culture rather than nature. 

On the contrary in his article ,“What Human Kinship is Primarily About: Toward a Critique of the New Kinship Studies,” Warren Shapiro attacks what he names the “constructionist” position on kinship that McKinnon takes due its lack of attention to focality and failure to provide accurate evidence. Shapiro meticulously goes through pieces of McKinnon’s evidence to disprove their legitimacy and illustrate how her distinction of genetic calculus versus kinship via social relationships is ultimately devoid of meaning. Shapiro maintains that McKinnon’s approach does not follow focality theory appropriately resulting in a disrespectful study of other cultures; he goes on to lament that the ultimately Marxist approach McKinnon takes is far from an appropriate cultural comparison and is instead aimed at denouncing the west and its traditional family views (Shapiro 137). 

After analyzing both arguments, I think that while McKinnon could have more aptly characterized the cultures from which she drew examples out of context as Shapiro suggests, Shapiro’s criticism of McKinnon’s article is unwarranted and largely unfounded. Shapiro believes that procreative kin are recognized as a near universal, and I personally disagree and think that this opinion proves McKinnon’s point that while kinship is culturally relative many of us take an ego-centric view and see the west’s biologically driven kinship system as the “real” way of categorizing these relationships.  Furthermore, Shapiro attempts to claim that developing kinship relationships is such an individual process  that it is not effective to even attempt to separate these experiences into different types of systems. I disagree and think that the sciences that describe life inevitability rely on categorization of sorts. Shapiro then goes further to take his argument against McKinnon as a crusade against anthropology denouncing the entire fielding as “a child of Enlightenment skepticism” which I think is blowing his difference of opinion far out of proportion (Shapiro 148). 

The last source in this module, “‘He Won’t Be My Son’: Middle Eastern Muslim Men’s Discourses of Adoption and Gamete Donation” by Marcia C. Inhorn discusses how in the Sunni Muslim world assistive reproductive technology has previously been vehemently prohibited by religious doctrine, but now both in vitro fertilization and gamete donation are becoming available in Middle Eastern populations. Inhorn illustrates how in the Muslim Middle East, moral reactions to the west’s infertility solutions are shaped by Islam and many muslim men cannot accept the possibility of “social parenthood via adoption or gamete donation” (Inhorn 116). However, in recent years attitudes of some Muslim men are shifting as they are beginning to accept the possibilities of assistive reproductive technology in the hopes of pursuing aspects of marriage and fatherhood otherwise unattainable. This article serves as a case study to prove McKinnon’s point that kinship systems are culturally relative and determined by more than a straight genetics tree. Contrary to the perspective of an evolutionary psychologist, Inhorn’s article exhibits how in this case the understanding of kinship is relatively fluid and changing as technology and religion transform. However, similar to Shapiro’s encouragement of accurate cultural comparisons, Inhorn’s study also determines that appropriate research and respect is due for the cultures at hand bringing up how Muslim men are so often approached with stereotypical perceptions that impedes research on their religiosity and marriage practices.

In conclusion, this module delves deeper into the idea that kinship systems are a pillar necessary to tackle the intersection of religion and assistive reproductive technology, and the reliance of the human experience upon culture—hence why it is so valuable to study this topic from an anthropological perspective. 

 

 

Sources

 Susan McKinnon, “On Kinship and Marriage: A Critique of the Genetic and Gender Calculus of Evolutionary Psychology,” In S. McKinnon and S. Silverman editors, Complexities: Beyond Nature and Nurture, 106-131 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 

Warren Shapiro, “What Human Kinship is Primarily About: Towards a Critique of the New Kinship Studies.” Social Anthropology (2008) 16: 137-153. 

Marcia Inhorn, “He Won’t Be My Son: Middle Eastern Men’s Discourses of Gamete Donation.” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 20 (2006): 94-120. 

Cultural vs. Evolutionary Kinship

 In each of their works, Shapiro and McKinnon establish a guide for the reader to understand kinship and its universal applications. The two differ on a few definitions of kinship, and more generally how kinship is determined. McKinnon, a social psychologist, attempts to create a blank slate for kinship that rejects genetic relationships and can be interpreted differently across different cultures. Shapiro, an anthropologist, casts doubt on McKinnon’s criticisms of genetic kinship and therefore confirms that genetic-based kinship is a useful guide for understanding kinship relations. When applied to the studies of Lebanese Muslim and Jewish Israeli cultural perspectives, it seems that genetics are the basis of kinship relations but there are some cross-cultural differences.

West vs. Rest Perspective

One of the main claims made by McKinnon and undermined by Shapiro is that there is a different categorization of kin in the rest of the world that does not exist in western cultures. She uses this claim to support her conclusion that evolutionary kinship or genetic kinship has developed an “idealized 1950s version of gender relations”(McKinnon, 130). McKinnon never defines the characteristics of the ideals she attempts to refute and also fails to show proof that entirely counters genetic kinship. As a reader, we can assume the ideals she describes are within her secondary conclusions on marriage and “multiplicity of motherhood”.

Marriage: Gender Asymmetry

 McKinnon’s conclusion and subsequent evidence that the evolutionary theory on kinship in marriage is flawed because it presupposes that men control resources is in itself flawed. Her conclusion is based on the evolutionary assumption of gender asymmetry. McKinnon concludes that this assumption means inequality between the two genders while the description by evolutionary psychologists does not show that to be true. Evolutionary psychologists describe the inequality as limitations to each gender to fulfilling their desire to reproduce successfully. This inequality is reconciled by marriage in which each gender contributes to their abilities. McKinnon focuses on the female perspective and views it as disadvantageous, however, she fails to take the male perspective that their offering of “resources” makes up for their unequal contribution to the physical reproductive process. In her multitude of examples, she fails to show an example where the woman was placed in a disadvantageous position to the man. She also does not define what resources are and, in her evidence, shows examples where women have contributed resources in marriage. As Shapiro argues, kinship has been shown to take place bilaterally, showing equal importance on the maternal and paternal sides.

Kinship and Culture in the Middle East

The application of evolutionary kinship is clear in Inhorn’s experience with Lebanese Muslim Men. In all cases, there was a clear association between one’s genetics and one’s degree of kinship. While the Sunni and Shi’a restrictions to reproductive technology differ, their interpretation of Islamic law is based on maintaining bilateral kinship. Sunni Muslim tradition does not allow for a third party in IVF at all, as it is considered a breach in the marriage contract between a man and a woman. On the other hand, some Shi’a leaders allow for a third party either through a temporary marriage contract or the infertile parents’ assertion to give up their rights to the child.

Kahn’s Method of Study

Inhorn’s use of cultural context for understanding the decisions which motivate couples seeking alternative reproductive technology is very much missing in Kahn’s “Reproducing Jews”. In establishing the methods of her study, she frames the issues for Israeli women as a conflict between political incentives and religious (halakhic) guidelines. While reading her accounts with various women in her study, the cultural gaps are evident. For example, in one of her methods, Kahn states that she will not analyze the women as Ashkenazim (Eastern European) or Sephardim (North African or Asian).

Israeli Kinship and the Kibbutz

Her choice to omit this “ethnic” distinction leaves the reader clueless as to the role the “Kibbutz” plays for the individual women, the political arena and everyday life. For some of the women of Ashkenazi descent, the kibbutz would have been a part of their upbringing or their parents. Further, the kibbutz movement and its roots in communal living meant that some women or their parents were not raised in their own homes but by the women who ran the “children’s house” on the kibbutz. For the women of Sephardi descent, the idea of the kibbutz might strike a negative feeling as immigrants from North African countries were often turned away from kibbutz communities or horribly treated within kibbutz communities. The Kibbutz movement and its memory are just one of the cultural differences that drive the women in Kahn’s book and it will be interesting to see how she develops her conclusions without them.

Culture and Genetics in Jewish Israeli Kinship

Later in her study, however, Kahn inevitably encounters the cultural impact of the two groups in the choice of sperm donor for the women in her study. The Sephardi/Ashkenazi identification was one of the few details that the women were given by the clinic. Their reaction to discovering this detail reflects Jewish Israeli kinship as both cultural and genetic. Though Kahn fails to mention this fact, a child’s Sephardi/Ashkenazi identification in the Jewish religion is patrilineal. Therefore, while both the women and clinics voiced concern for physical attributes of the child, there is an inherent consideration for mothers maintaining their own traditions on both sides.

Sources

Marcia Inhorn, He Won’t Be My Son: Middle Eastern Men’s Discourses of Gamete Donation.” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 20 (2006): 94-120.

Susan Martha Kahn, Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception in Israel, 1-87 (Duke University Press, 2000).

Susan McKinnon, “On Kinship and Marriage: A Critique of the Genetic and Gender Calculus of Evolutionary Psychology,” In S. McKinnon and S. Silverman editors, Complexities: Beyond Nature and Nurture, 106-131 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

Warren Shapiro, “What Human Kinship is Primarily About: Towards a Critique of the New Kinship Studies.” Social Anthropology (2008) 16: 137-153.

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