Sejal Waghray 2

Michael J. Broyde and Swasti Bhattacharyya observe reproductive technology under two very different religions: Judaism and Hinduism respectively. The fundamental difference to each author’s approach goes beyond religion. Broyde evaluates reproductive technologies through Jewish law (Halakhah) with regards with kinship. On the other hand, Bhattacharyya analyzes modern reproductive technologies through oral tradition (Mahabharata) with regards to society.

Broyde’s understanding of cloning seems to be strictly based on what is stated under Jewish law. He continues to the “analysis of implications of cloning found under Jewish law” and debates if cloning classifies as “permissible (mutar), prohibited (asur), of a good deed (mitzvah)” (Broyde 296). The ultimate conclusion is the Jewish law does not encourage cloning as a means of reproduction due to the confusion that arises in recognizing one’s kin. However, when left with no other choice, “Jewish law accepts having children through cloning [as] a mitzvah” and ensures that a child through cloning is not considered socially inferior (Broyde 315). Overall, Broyde’s analysis of cloning was analyzed through how Jewish law identifies kin. He identified in which individual situations a birth mother or father versus the cloner would be recognized as the true parent of the child. The identification of such relationships was based on what is outlined under Judaism.

On the contrary, because Hinduism has no formal law, Bhattacharyya used the story of three women (Kunti, Madri, and Gandhari) and their efforts to bear children. Her application was not based on what is right or wrong under her religion, but rather, on what important religious figures had done historically. According to the Mahabharata, Kunti and Madri use different offerings and prayers to remove a curse placed on their husband, Pandu, so that the gods would bless them with a child. Moreover, Gandhari ensures an heir for her husband, Dhartrastra, with one hundred sons and one daughter by splitting the flesh of her unborn child in one-hundred jars with oil (ghee). Bhattacharyya uses such stories to emphasize how important it is for a Hindu woman to have children for the reputation of her family, for the status of her husband, and for social acceptance in general. The faith of different offerings and prayers to god or the act of splitting flesh into jars was extrapolated into modern reproductive techniques being accepted so that a woman can have children. Essentially, Bhattacharyya seems to argue that the faith and magic that targeted infertility in the past can be replaced by the science targeting infertility today (and in the future).

Overall, Broyde based his conclusions on what seemed right or wrong under religious laws regarding kinship. On the contrary, Bhattacharyya seems to base her conclusions on what has been done by women to meet social expectations and how women today can meet those same social expectations with the help of technology.

While independent religions play a large role in the differences between both works evaluated, it is imperative the many variations in each religion. Foremost, Hinduism was founded on a geographical basis while Judaism was founded on a religious basis. In other words, people geographically located in India who were found to be practicing a similar religion were grouped together and their practices were titled Hinduism. On the other hand, people across different nations practicing a specific religion, in a much more unified manner, were titled as practicing Judaism. As discussed in class, this concept is found in the name of the religions as well. Hindustan is the name of India in Hindi and the religion practiced by a large majority of the nation is Hinduism. The root of all three words is one. On the other hand, Judaism has no root word in relation to a specific country or geographic location. It was founded when it was widespread.

Along with differences in geographical founding, both authors conceded to variations in interpretation and application of their respective religions. In his writing, Broyde explains that the use of reproductive technology is “subject to a case-by-case analysis” under Jewish law. He furthers that the Halakhah is not the sole determining set of guidelines but serves “as an attempt to outline some of the issues … [to] sharpen or correct those [case-by-case] evaluations” (Broyde 295). In her Introduction, Bhattacharyya also clarifies that the Mahabharata is “not utilized to find ‘the answer’, or to eliminate options”; instead, myths are employed for their “alternative options and applications” (Bhattacharyya 14). Because both authors agreed that their respective religions have room for variation in understanding and interpretation, each author’s personal interpretation of their religion must derive from a place outside of religion.

The backgrounds of both authors are essential to their understanding, and personal application, of religion. Broyde has a background in law while Bhattacharyya as a background in nursing. From his background, it makes sense that Broyde employs strict Jewish legal interpretation for his analysis. Bhattacharyya does not have a legal background and Hinduism does not have a strict set of laws, thus, she chooses to evaluate a sacred text that is known by most, if not all, practicing Hindus. As a female and as a practicing Hindu, her application of the text is much different than what it would be had Broyde been evaluating it. In my opinion, Bhattacharyya extrapolates religious texts more than Broyde. Broyde seemed to look at what was given and apply it to modern times while Bhattacharyya used a story, and ongoing social pressures that women face to have children, in order to come to her conclusion.

When considering new topics, such as prenatal testing, I believe that Broyde would evaluate prenatal testing independently to define it (similar to his structure with cloning). He would then evaluate prenatal testing based on its impact on kin. Broyde would emphasize the value of how that child would identify with its kin because Jewish law tends to emphasize the value of kin. On the other hand, Bhattacharyya would likely reflect on how the three queens in Mahabharata acted to determine if prenatal testing is justified by women today. Moreover, she would likely emphasize concepts like Dharma, Karma, and Ahimsa to ensure that anyone who engages in prenatal testing is still following the path of a true Hindu.

In terms of the influence of Jewish and Christian bioethics on Bhattacharyya, it seems that she generalizes western bioethics overall. Bhattacharyya consistently clarifies that Hinduism is practiced differently across different parts of India. However, when comparing her conclusions on Hinduism to western religions, she fails to acknowledge that even Judaism and Christianity face diversity in interpretation. In fact, throughout her conclusion section, Bhattacharyya specifically focuses on Roman Catholic practices. More specifically, when discussing family planning services and contraception, Bhattacharyya explicitly states that the Church finds that “distributing condoms and other forms of contraception threaten the development of, or life of the fetus and thereby threaten the sanctity of of life”. However, when discuss the same topic from the perspective of a Hindu, Bhattacharyya clarifies that “a full examination” would be needed “in light of various potential Hindu perspectives” (Bhattacharyya 119). Simply put, western bioethics has been limited to one idea in Bhattacharyya’s discussions where, in reality, they deserved the same clarification with regards to multiple perspectives as Hinduism.

2 Replies to “Sejal Waghray 2”

  1. Hi Sejal! I thought your post was very thoughtfully written and it brought to light some ideas I hadn’t considered! I really liked how you talked about the geographical influence on the formation and variance of both Judaism and Hinduism. I think this point nicely helps explain why Bhattacharyya describes Hinduism as a “collection of voices,” rather than Broyde who merely analyzes the constructed Jewish law. You also mention how Bhattacharyya relies heavily on the stories of three women to draw her analogies to reproductive technology. I am curious as to what your thoughts are on this. Specifically, do you feel that the analogies that she draws are sufficient enough to make abstract or generalized claims about reproductive technology use in India?

  2. Hi Sejal,

    Thank you for your post! You have some unique ideas in here that I have not read in any other blog post–so bravo! My brief suggestions are: work on a more clear introduction and thesis statement, as well as conclusion. You have great ideas in here, but I would love to see them all summed up into one clear thesis.

    Bravo! Keep up the great work!

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