Even in today’s world, the differences that remain apparent among people simply based on choice of religion are astounding. One’s religious identity can completely define who they are and what they believe in. Within the (very) specific lens of assisted reproductive technology, a facet of Bioethics, potential lines of thought can reflect religious roots that trace back to the very narratives that shaped religions. The modernization of these thoughts show consideration of the ancient origins throughout them. With two works on this matter in particular, both Michael J. Broyde’s Modern Reproductive Technologies and Jewish Law,and Magical Progeny, Modern Technologyby Swasti Bhattacharyya, there are differences that are quite noteworthy. While Broyde’s piece, which recognizes material from Jewish law (Halakhah), focuses more on approach to reproductive technology from the perspective of Judaism, Bhattacharyy attempts to construct a bioethical code for Hinduism, which is a field that was yet to be previously explored before her time.
Initially, Bhattacharyy and Broyde do not even attempt to pull their interpretations and bioethical conclusions from the same genres of work, as each explore essentially unrelated types of historical record. The basis for most of Bhattacharyy’s writing comes from the Mahabharata, an ancient Indian epic poem that was considered to be created after the ancient Vedascriptures. This text falls into the category of ‘traditional literature’ according to the author. She writes, “Smrti [traditional literature] literally means ‘recollection,’ but it is used practically to signify ‘tradition.’ This traditional literature ‘is the set of rules for acts of dharma[cosmic order] that are not explicitly declared by sruti[sacred texts with no orirign], but are implicitly derivable from it.’” (Bhattacharyy Location 443). Bhattacharyy is inferring that although these texts do hold weigh in Hinduism, they are more stories of recollection than they are of creation or the religion’s Cosmology. Contrarily, Broyde approaches his views by way of Halakhah, or Jewish law. This derivative of thought is more fluid in a sense, and less defined than historically recorded recollections such as the Mahabharata. Broyde notes, “… even when conduct is permissible or perhaps even a mitzvah [good deed], Jewish law recognizes that the (rabbinical) authorities of every generation have the authroity to temporarily prohibit that which is permissible based on the perception that this intrinsically permissible activity could lead to other, serious violations” (Broyde 296). By this token, Broyde is essentially quoting a source that is perpetually being updated as time progresses, and for all intents and purposes, is situational. The keen differences between these two works from which both authors derive their arguments are important when understanding their texts, both separately and in cohesion.
Although the differences in both Bhattacharyy and Broyde’s stances on bioethics are clear, the roots of those differences come from open interpretations of not only the style of texts they are drawing their conclusions from, but also the religious background of each of these religions themselves. Broyde is quick to break down acts in Judaism to three basic levels of acceptability: permissible (mutar), prohibited (asur), or a good deed (mitzvah) [Broyde 296]. Oppositely, Battacharyy focuses on storylines and six key characteristics of Hinduism: the centrality of society & underlying unity of all life, the flexibility of Dharma and multiplicity of Hindu practices, Karma, and finally Ahimsa. The very constructive frameworks through which each author writes are fundamentally different – they are essentially comparing interpretations based on two differing fields of literature. Additionally, there are key differences between Hinduism and Judaism to begin with, such as Jewish monotheistic practices versus Hindu polytheism & multiple deities, and the histories of each religion as their peoples mostly populated separate areas of the world. In addition to this, it is important to note that Battacharyy writes her work in light multiple other Judeo-Christian on the matter, acknowledging various works throughout her book, whereas Broyde is mostly using Judaism and its set of laws as the focal point for the basis of his argument.
Interestingly enough, Battacharyy and Broyde do seem to have some similar views on the prenatal stage of human life, in the sense that they both encourage respect and care for the offspring. Battacharyy, citing Hindu texts and Cambridge professor Julius Lipner, is able to draw the conclusion, “… Hindu texts reflect a respect for the developing fetal life and argue that it is deserving of protection from harm” The fetus is conscious and even has a memory of his or her previous births” (Location 1312). She is clear with her implications here – even in the prenatal stage of human life, a person deserves respect, and to be treated well, abiding by the principles of Ahimsa (non-harm). In an analogous way, words from Broyde on cloning can be interpreted in the same fashion regarding those that are birthed with defects that would be potentially uncovered prenatally. He writes, “I am hard-pressed to find any rational Jewish law argument that could justify the categorization of a person produced through cloning as not human… the absence of a human parent does not necessarily make one nonhuman – and a clone (of current technology) clearly as a mother at the very least” (Broyde 313). By this token, Broyde is inferring that having a (human) mother is a key characteristic of being human. Evidently, it could be argued that his statement can be further interpreted as saying a human with a mother, even if the human is in a prenatal state, is still is considered human. Both authors do not seem to directly respond to the concept of prenatal testing, but both have outlined clear assumptions regarding their specific interpretations of the texts they have studied, each suggesting that human life does have some value even before that human in birthed.
Sources:
Michael J. Broyde, “Modern Reproductive Technologies and Jewish Law,” In Michael J. Broyde and Michael Ausubel editors, Marriage, Sex and the Family in Judaism. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 295-328.
Swasti Bhattacharya, Magical Progeny, Modern Technology: A Hindu Bioethics of Reproductive Technology (Suny University Press, 2006).
Hi Ira! I really liked how you theorized Bhattacharya’s and Broyde’s attitudes towards the prenatal stage of life, and after reading your blog, I would have included and analyzed Bhattacharya’s and Broyde’s approaches to prenatal testing in my blog. In my opinion, I think Bhattacharya would be more accepting of prenatal testing as she seems to be reemphasizing western bioethics in her interpretation of the Mahabharata, and in western society, prenatal testing, especially ultrasounds, is widely adopted. On the other hand, I think the Jewish law would agree with the views of the Catholic Church on prenatal testing, which is that prenatal testing should not be permitted because it neglects the individual rights of the fetus or embryo.
Hey Ira, like the post. It’s interesting here how the authors while writing about two separate genres have so many similarities, which you bring to light. One of the most important similarities between Bhattacharya and Broyde is the care for the child being of the upmost importance. When discussing Hindu principles on Ashima , the concept of doing non harm then contrasting that with amniocentesis it seems as if Bhattacharya would believe that it is not right, as it can possible cause harm to the living fetus.
Hi Ira,
Thank you for your post! It is a marked improvement and I appreciate all of the clear effort you put into it. My suggestions for even more improvement are to dig even deeper into your ideas. In what other ways to Battacharya and Broyde differ besides in their religious affiliations and choice of texts? Can you tell me more about the differences of style, voice, and methods?
Keep up the great work!