BOOKS

McCauley, R. N.  (2011).  Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not.  New York:  Oxford University Press.  (i-xv, 326 pages plus index)

McCauley, R. N. (ed.) (1996). The Churchlands and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

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PAPERS

McCauley, R. N. (2013). “Explanatory Pluralism and the Cognitive Science of Religion: Or Why Scholars in Religious Studies Should Stop Worrying about Reductionism,” Mental Culture: Classical Social Theory and the Cognitive Science of Religion. D. Xygalatas and W. W. McCorkle, Jr. (eds.). London: Acumen.

McCauley, R. N. (2013). “Why Science Is Exceptional and Religion Is Not: A Response to Commentators on Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not,” Religion, Brain & Behavior 3 (2), 165-182.

McCauley, R. N.  (2012).  “About Face:  Philosophical Naturalism, The Heuristic Identity Theory, and Recent Findings about Prosopagnosia,” New Perspectives on Type Identity:  The Mental and the Physical.  S. Gozzano and C. S. Hill (eds.).  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press,  pp. 186-206.

McCauley, R. N. (2009). “Time Is of the Essence: Explanatory Pluralism and Accommodating Theories about Long Term Processes,” Philosophical Psychology 22, 611-635.

McCauley, R. N. (2008). “De la réduction d’une science.” Des Neurosciences à la Philosophie: Neurophilosophie et Philosophie des Neurosciences. P. Poirier and L. Faucher (eds). Paris: Syllepse, 205-231.

McCauley, R. N. (2007). “Enriching Philosophical Models of Cross-Scientific Relations: Incorporating Diachronic Theories,” The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. M. Schouten and H. Looren de Jong (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 199-223.

McCauley, R. N. (2007). “Reduction: Models of Cross-Scientific Relations and Their Implications for the Psychology-Neuroscience Interface,” Handbook of the Philosophy of Science: Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. P. Thagard (ed.). Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 105-158.

McCauley, R. N. and Henrich, J. (2006). “Susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer Illusion, Theory Neutral Observation, and the Diachronic Cognitive Penetrability of the Visual Input System,” Philosophical Psychology 19, 79-101.

McCauley, R. N. and Bechtel, W. (2001). “Explanatory Pluralism and The Heuristic Identity Theory,” Theory and Psychology 11, 738-761.

McCauley, R. N. (2000). “The Naturalness of Religion and the Unnaturalness of Science,” Explanation and Cognition. F. Keil and R. Wilson (eds.). Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 61-85.

Bechtel, W. and McCauley, R. N. (1999). “Heuristic Identity Theory (or Back to the Future): The Mind-Body Problem Against the Background of Research Strategies in Cognitive Neuroscience,” Proceedings of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. M. Hahn and S. C. Stones (eds.). Mahway, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 67-72.

McCauley, R. N. (1999). “Reductionism,” The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. R. Wilson and F. Keil (eds.). Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp. 712-714.

McCauley, R. N. (1999). “The Cognitive Foundations of Religion and Science,” Religion im Wandel der Kosmologien. D. Zeller (ed.). Berlin: P. Lang, pp. 55-67.

McCauley, R. N. (1998). “Levels of Explanation and Cognitive Architectures,” Blackwell Companion to Cognitive Science. W. Bechtel and G. Graham (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 611-624.

McCauley, R. N. (1996). “Explanatory Pluralism and the Coevolution of Theories in Science,” The Churchlands and Their Critics. R. N. McCauley (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 17-47.

               (2001). reprinted in Philosophy of Neuroscience, W. Bechtel (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

McCauley, R. N. (1993). “Why the Blind Can’t Lead the Blind: Dennett on the Blind Spot, Blindsight, and Sensory Qualia,” Consciousness and Cognition 2, 155-164.

McCauley, R. N. and Lawson, E. T. (1993). “Connecting the Cognitive and the Cultural: Artificial Minds as Methodological Devices in the Study of the Sociocultural,” Minds: Natural and Artificial. R. Burton (ed.). Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 121-145.

McCauley, R. N. (1993). “Brainwork: A Review of Paul Churchland’s A Neurocomputational Perspective,” Philosophical Psychology 6, 81-96.

McCauley, R. N. (1993). “Cross-Scientific Study and the Complexity of Psychology,” Annals of Theoretical Psychology—Volume 9. H. V. Rappard and L. P. Mos (eds.). New York: Plenum Press, pp. 413-420.

McCauley, R. N. (1992). “Defending Normative Naturalism: A Reply to Ellen Klein,” Philosophical Psychology 5, 299-305.

McCauley, R. N. (1988). “Epistemology in an Age of Cognitive Science,” Philosophical Psychology 1, 143-152.

McCauley, R. N. (1987). “The Role of Theories in a Theory of Concepts,” Concepts and Conceptual Development. U. Neisser (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 288-309.

(1989). translated into Italian: “Il Ruolo Delle Teorie in una Teoris dei Concetti,” Concetti e Sviluppo Concettuale. G. Pessa (trans.) Rome: Città Nuova Editrice, pp. 402-431.

McCauley, R. N. (1987). “The Not So Happy Story of the Marriage of Linguistics and Psychology or How Linguistics Has Discouraged Psychology’s Recent Advances,” Synthese 72, 341-353.

McCauley, R. N. (1987). “The Role of Cognitive Explanations in Psychology,” Behaviorism (subsequently titled Behavior and Philosophy) 15, 27-40.

McCauley, R. N. (1986). “Truth, Epistemic Ideals and the Psychology of Categorization,” Philosophy of Science Association—1986, Volume 1, A. Fine and P. Machamer (eds.), (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 198-207.

McCauley, R. N. (1986). “Intertheoretic Relations and the Future of Psychology,” Philosophy of Science 53, 179-199.

(1993). reprinted in Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind, S. M. Christensen and D. R. Turner (eds.), Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 63-81.

McCauley, R. N. (1986). “Problem Solving in Science and the Competence Approach to Theorizing in Linguistics,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 16, 299-312.

McCauley, R. N. (1981). “Hypothetical Identities and Ontological Economizing: Comments on Causey’s Program for the Unity of Science,” Philosophy of Science 48, 218-227.