Do you find Vitoria’s conception of a “just war” compelling? Explain why or why not.
18 Replies to “Week 2: Early Modern Encounters”
Vitoria’s interpretation of a “just war,” contradicts what actually fueled war against the American Indians, but is well argued to compel a reader to justify such a war. On its own, the argument has some great points. Vitoria claims difference of religion, extension of an empire, and personal gain shouldn’t cause war, saying that ultimately the only cause is for the peace and betterment of the enemy and the country.
In the case of Native Americans, this contradicts Vitoria’s reasoning for not fighting for power or personal gain, the true desires fueling European conquest. However, Vitoria frames the Spanish efforts to control Natives as a desire to better them, even saying that Indigenous people are wrong and the Spaniards can rightfully profit from them. “Indians are not making a just war on the Spaniards (it being assumed that the Spaniards are doing no harm), it is not lawful for them to keep the Spaniards away from their territory,” and “it is lawful to make good out of enemy property the expenses of the war and all damages wrongfully caused by the enemy.” Vitoria’s reasoning wrongfully justifies the Spaniards’ claim to Native land under the guise of fighting a “just war.”
Though Vitoria’s concept of “just war” seems sensible, it is hardly applicable to a world with multiple societal, cultural, and moral practices. His claims are neither outlandish nor necessarily unreasonable, but they lack an understanding of relativism. His “just war” depends on the assumption that what is just to the declarer of war is what is just to the declaree. He states, himself, in Proposition IV that “there is a single and only just cause for commencing a war, namely a wrong received.” What is wrong among one group may not be wrong among another; inherently, a “just war” is not easily defined, because there is no universal definition of what is just.
In addition to this issue, Vitoria’s claim is quite idealistic, given that anyone can twist a moral into seeming just in order to pursue their own personal interest. To claim that the Spaniards would harm the Native Americans only in the case of their resistance is to deny any coexisting motives for war, such as interest in territorial expansion or natural resources. It is possible that no war has ever been waged for one reason alone, and rarely are those multiple reasons all in the name of righting wrongs (even if some are). Whether one motive for war outweighs another, it stands to reason that even if a war is being fought due to a “wrong received” that it is not Vitoria’s “just war” if it is also fought for the reasons to which he is opposed (as was the case in the conflict between the Spanish and the Native Americans).
Vitoria’s conception of a “just war” is anything but compelling. First, Vitoria states that the reasons for a “just war” are not religion, extension of the empire, and personal “glory,” yet we know for a fact that this contradictory to the “White Man’s Burden,” which was used to justify colonization. Next, Vitoria also believed that peace and the advancement of the state were the primary reasons for a “just war” but at what cost? The cost was the murder of an entire society, and along with it a non-European way of thinking.
In the case of the Spanish and the Native Americans, Vitoria states “It is for a prince, after gaining the victory, in a just war and after retaking property, and even after the establishment of peace and security, to avenge the wrongs done to him by the enemy and to take measure against the enemy and punish him for these wrongs,” which demonstrates that the Spanish were fight the things that Vitoria believes is not a cause for a “just cause.” The Spanish had nothing to “retake;” the Spanish stole that property, therefore ultimately extending their empire.
Francisco de Vitoria’s discussion of the concept of a “just war” involves two concepts: the circumstances under which a war can be waged and the actions that are allowed surrounding wartime. I find his analysis of these two ideas very interesting. To begin, Vitoria discusses what circumstances would allow for a “just war”. He states that religion, desire for land, and personal pride are not “just” causes for war, and that the only justification for war is to retaliate after being severely attacked by another nation. Vitoria continues by addressing the second part of a “just war” by determining what actions are permissible during and after a war. He believes that a nation is allowed to take back anything that has been taken from them by another nation. Additionally, he says that the leader of the nation can, “claim it all and exact it all by war”. The phrase “it all” meaning any resources, land, or riches that the other nation has to offer. He goes on to state that the ruler is also free to take any actions necessary to “obtain peace and security from the enemy”.
After reading through Vitoria’s conception of “just war”, I agree with most of the criteria he lays out. I believe that the circumstances under which a “just” or “unjust” war can take place are correct. However, I do not agree with some of the permissible actions during wartime. In my opinion, the idea that a ruler is free to do whatever they feel is necessary to maintain peace and security in enemy territory is not just. I think that, in wartime, there is no such thing as peace. I believe that Vitoria uses the idea of a sense of peace to justify unnecessary stealing land, resources, and humanity from enemy nations. At the same time, I disagree with one nation being able to take back everything and more than what was taken from them during the war. This is not only unfair but will also lead to greater tension and animosity between the nations.
Vitoria’s conception of a “just war” is primarily compelling for its explication of three utopian canons governing an act of warfare. Underlying the three idealistic canons are conservative values encouraging discretion, restraint and humility in an event of war and negotiation. These points are certainly compelling for their disregard of traditional points of conflict – such as religion, power and glory – as appropriate reasons to strike out in an act of violence. Vitoria denounces these traditional instigators of war due to the fact that belligerents on opposing sides may purport equally persuasive reasons to engage in combat. Rather, Vitoria contends, a wrong received is the singular just cause for commencing an offensive war in a way that evades tyrannical motives of profit and advantage. While this may be convincing at first glance, Vitoria does not, however, indulge the actual preeminent mindset that impelled the mass conquest of Native Americans. Specifically, how might Vitoria dissuade an emperor from engaging in a crusade or other war for specific economic or political reasons detached from a wrong received? Further, how might Vitoria prioritize reasons of peace, security and the public good over the existing desire of political entities for power and control?
When looking at Vitoria’s conception of a “just war,” his entire argument falls apart during his description of the situation between the Spaniards and the Indians. In order to describe a just war, both parties on either side of this conflict have to understand the mutual rules of war, but in this case, the Spaniards have a very traditional, Western European conception of war, but the indigenous population would never approach the conflict as such. In the view of the indigenous people, the Spanish were infringing upon their land and their rights, but to the Spanish, they were acting under God’s orders, which told them it was perfectly fine to colonise land that belonged to another group. While Vitoria uses the three types of law to create a definition of a just war, he loses his credibility by diminishing the value of the indigenous’ claim to the land by claiming that divine law supersedes the sovereignty that he holds so highly. It is impossible for conflicts between the two groups to be considered just because not only was the level playing field was never established and the two never entered a conflict with a mutual understanding of what war truly would entail. Vitoria’s conception of a just war becomes transparent in its effort to justify the imperialist connotation of the Spanish contact with the indigenous people, but this transparency destroys the idea of a “just war” as the war is commenced not for self-defense, but for an ulterior, expansionist motive.
“Just war” is the term used to describe a conflict that is arguably morally justified, and Victoria’s definition of just war is one that does not align with the modern definitions that come out of a post-colonial era.
I was lost on Victoria’s argument when he proposed that while the American Indians did possess reason and were therefore subject to jus gentium, they chose to be “backward” and “barbaric.” For that reason, Indians “lose” their equal status in jus gentium, and lose sovereignty. Victoria’s theory of just war is completely dependent on this sovereignty, so a peoples without sovereignty is a peoples on whom war can be waged and that war would be unequivocally just.
Along this idea that the qualities of a peoples determines their sovereignty, Victoria also argues that those qualities decide whether or not a war is just. A war waged against the “barbaric” Indians would be just on accord of the sovereignty of the offensive (Spain), but a war waged by the Indians could never be, because their qualities as a people make it impossible for them to sovereign, and, in turn, wage a just war, according to Victoria.
The logical gaps are clear here– sovereignty is regarded today as ideally separated from intercultural perception and regard, and is a matter of human and cultural rights, and, optimistically, dignity. This is the ideal of sovereignty that I adhere to, and Victoria does not appeal to this notion.
Victoria’s theology for “just war” essentially battles morality. It states that wars should not be created solely based off of enemies or for forms of punishments. Victoria explains that if those are in doubt or having conflicted views, they should turn to authoritative figures for wise advice. It identifies that the Spaniards have the rights to ‘travel to the lands of the Indians so long as they do not harm,’ however proceeds to be contradictory by saying that ‘it is not lawful for them to keep the Spaniards away from their territory.’ In doing so, it is justifying the fact that the Spaniards are able to establish control over the aborigines Americans without their consent. In my opinion, it should be considered unlawful for the Europeans, who consider themselves as more civilized, to be able to conquer property from the aborigines, who in the eyes of Victoria were seen as ‘barbarians.’ Due to the fact that they had more people that followed these established laws by the reverend father Franciscus De Victoria, they were able to ensure that they were implemented and followed more rigorously than the ones that were undocumented through their legal systems.
On its surface, Vitoria’s conception of a “just war” is rather compelling. He plainly states that, “the only just cause for commencing a war, namely, is a wrong received” (170). This explanation is rather easy to comprehend, and furthermore, incredibly straightforward. Our modern conception of justice — fair treatment and conduct — would lead us to believe that Vitoria’s assertion is true: that the only circumstance in which war is appropriate is one in which a wrong has been committed. Yet it is incredibly difficult to know exactly what “wrong” means in context. Is an action’s relative wrongness based upon some sense of universal morality? Religion? An arbitrarily developed and imposed standard of conduct? At the outset of his argument, Vitoria acknowledges the existence of cultural diversity between the Spaniards and the Indians. He notes that the Indians, “ . . . have definite marriage and magistrates, overlords, laws, and workshops, and a system of exchange . . .” (127). While Spaniards share these institutions, in that theirs are also founded upon “the use of reason,” Indian institutions possessed their own distinct qualities. This necessitates a difference in culture between the two groups. The only thing that unites them is the apparent universal natural law that governs the conduct of all sovereign bodies.
Jus gentium, however, does not and cannot account for cultural diversity. Regardless of the fact that the concept is a set of universal standards, Vitora notes that these are not met by Indians. Although Vitoria claims to understand, and quite possibly accept, the cultural differences between Indian society and Spanish society, he has internalized a sense of Spanish superiority. While “religious diversity” is not a “just” cause for war, highly unique cultural (i.e. religious) viewpoints logically lead to different perceptions of what is considered just. Given its subjectivity, how can “wrongness” act as an effective qualifier? It is far too general to do so. Simply because something is perceived as wrong does not mean it is fundamentally so. After facing even the slightest challenge, the fundamental premise of Vitoria’s understanding of a just war seems to fall apart.
I do not find Vitoria’s argument that the Indians cannot declare a certain war “just” compelling. Vitoria discredits divine law, ultimately the Pope, by saying it is not justifiable to declare divine right as probable cause for starting a war and invading foreign lands. He ultimately comes to the conclusion of jus gentium, which he states the Indians have due to their reasoning. After clever thinking and wording, Vitoria justifies war with the Indians by using jus gentium and the belief that Spanish intrusion on the Indians is lawful. Alluding back to divine law, Vitoria basically rephrased and relabeled Medieval Christian practices of militaristic and cultural invasion under natural laws with the introduction of jus gentium.
With that in mind, the Spanish knew such extreme intervention into Indian society would lead to war or revolt, thus Vitoria labels Spain as sovereign and the Indian states as partially sovereign. Sovereignty was basically gifted to Christian states, and since the Indians practiced paganism, they lacked full sovereignty. The importance of sovereignty during this time was the labeling of potential wars as justifiable. Since the Indians lacked complete sovereignty, no war against the Spanish was just; thus, resulted in utter retaliation from the Spanish. Therefore, I do not find Vitoria’s argument compelling, because he wrote such bias and deceiving works that ultimately hurt the Indians while also justifying Spanish expansionism.
Vitoria’s theory of just war is undoubtedly a compelling proposal. The concept of “just war” sounds oxymoronic at first glance, as war is often (and correctly) characterized as inherently unjust. However, if war is taken as an inescapable fixture of human nature, then it makes sense for people with an interest in justice and fairness to entertain a vision of warfare that resembles justice within that context. The principles Vitoria outlines also seem like fairly reasonable guidelines for a less heinous method of warfare; he condemns killing innocent people when it can be avoided, defends the personal right to conscientious objections, and rebukes war fought for any reason other than a “wrong done” by an outside force. However, it is this last proposition that brings Vitoria’s philosophy into question in context of Vitoria’s broader opinions on Spanish-Indigenous relations. Vitoria elaborates elsewhere in his writing that any acts of resistance indigenous people take against Spanish colonizers from settling in their homeland constitutes a “wrong done” that justifies war and military response. This unjust interpretation of a “wrong done” completely negates the merits of Vitoria’s other theories of just war, as it justifies killing and dominance of native people for doing anything besides passively allowing the Spanish to overtake their society.
Francisco de Vitoria’s interpretation of a “just war” is not compelling because his justifications for commencing such a conflict do not support the Spanish colonization of the Native Americans. He states, ”Everything is lawful that is not harmful to others in some way.” Regarding the Native Americans, he claims that this rule was not violated because the Spaniards did not cause any harm to them during colonization. This assertion is blatantly untrue. The process of conquering the native peoples involved murder, rape and the destruction of many aspects of their culture. Victoria views the work of the Spaniards in the Americas as solely beneficial to those living there because of the, so called, “superior” knowledge and religion that they brought to them. He didn’t understand the harm that their conquest caused. His argument is therefore significantly damaged because he tries to bend his own laws to support the Spaniards. According to his rule, “One who has been contumeliously assaulted can immediately strike back, even the assaulter was not proposing make further attack,” the Native Americans were justified in fighting to defend their country and the Spaniards were behaving unlawfully. Victoria lays out an ethical and well thought out set of rules, but his attempts to justify the Spanish government’s colonization of the Americas completely undermine his argument.
At the surface, Vitoria’s conception of a “just war” is not only highly compelling but strikingly egalitarian for its time. A just cause of war, he states, is not difference of religion, extension of empire, or personal glory—all causes that fueled colonialist ideals for centuries. Instead, Vitoria perceives that a just cause of war is purely defensive—in response to “a wrong received”—and that the defensive war must be proportional to the wrong (must not exceed in violence or extremity the harm itself), in the aim of achieving “peace and security”. War in revenge can only be pursued by a sovereign state due to its duty towards its subjects, whereas an individual, responsible only for themselves, may not pursue avengement. Such strict, “fair” boundaries for war are difficult to contest.
Placed against the stark backdrop of 16th century Spanish-Indian relations, however, Vitoria’s argument twists to not only explain but, indeed, justify, Spanish colonization of the Natives. By rejecting “divine law” as a framework for just war, Christianity evolves into a universal norm instead of an overarching idea. By arguing for the Natives’ autonomy, humanity, and—perhaps most importantly—their ability to reason, Vitoria suggests that they willingly chose to reject such a “universal norm” (all Spanish norms were automatically regarded as universal). This rejection fit Vitoria’s definition of a wrong against the Spanish, justifying colonialism and its accompanying racist views as a “just war”.
Victoria’s conception of a ‘’just war’’ is compelling on certain aspects, but is fundamentally biased and inaccurate on justifying colonization of the Indians. The conditions of a ‘just war’ include legitimate authority, a just cause and right intention. In terms of legitimate authority, the Indians have no requirement to follow Christianity or the divine authority of the Pope. Victoria states that Christians ‘have a right to preach and publish the Gospel in the lands of barbarians,’ ‘convert the Indian aborigines,’ and basically destroy their property and even take them as slaves if they do not accept the faith. In terms of just cause, a just war needs to be in the response of a wrong suffered. In Indian’s defense, no harm has ever been given to the Spaniards. According to Victoria, a war is only justified if the peace after the war exceeds the peace before. Yet colonization is simply an expansionist ideology from the Europeans to take power, rather than a quest for peace. Victoria is fundamentally biased in that it shows no respect to Indian’s indigenous culture and dictates their own laws. The statement that the Spaniards did no harm to the Indian aborigines is simply inaccurate. Victoria also justifies the fact that Spaniards have a right to import the goods which the aborigines lack and take away gold and silver which the Indians abound. The doings of the Spaniards do not reflect the principles of Victoria’s standards for a just war, and thus Victoria’s work fails to provide any righteousness to Spanish colonization
In considering Vitoria’s Reflections on the Indians and the Law of War and his conception of a “just war”, I quickly came to realize how weak his whole argument was, especially in describing the situation between the Spaniards and the Indians, which, according to him, is one in which war is justified. According to Vitoria, “If the Spaniards have used all diligence… to show that nothing will come from them interfering with the peace and well-being of the Indians, and the latter nevertheless persist in their hostility and do their best to destroy the Spaniards, they can make war on the Indians, (as they should now be) no longer as on innocent folk…and may enforce against them all the rights of war”.
I personally see this quote as pivotal because it essentially disallows any indigenous people to claim any justification for defending themselves in the face of imperialists, simply because these imperialists arrived with the stated aim of providing “peace and well-being” to the colonized. This also addresses one essential aspect of colonial violence that may be at times overlooked in the literature. Stances such as this clearly contribute to the fueling of audacious behavior of many colonial powers – from the case of Italians in Ethiopia or the French in Algeria- by normalizing and validating violence against the previously sovereign nations, as it essentially equates the violence of colonization to self-defence from the perceived hostility of the people being invaded.
On the one hand, Vitoria’s basic concept of a “just war” under international law seems reasonable enough. Defending oneself is an important concept, and violations of international norms (“natural law” in Vitoria’s understanding) need to be acknowledged and opposed, or else those norms are not norms at all. That said, there are several key flaws in his position with regard to Indians/Native Americans:
1) Vitoria effectively defines the universal human norms of natural law that apply to all people as “Spanish norms with the serial numbers removed.” He makes little effort to be truly universal in his approach.
2) There is no indication that the Indians actually understand these “rules” which they might break, other than “they have reason, so surely they figured out that ambassadors are to be protected, and furthermore that missionaries are ambassadors of a sort,” which is not very convincing.
3) Vitoria’s natural law has a very skewed understanding of self-defense. Defending yourself while exercising universal freedom of navigation or doing missionary work is okay. But firing on someone who has sent heavily armed warships into your people’s land without your permission is considered to be aggression, in the same way it is wrong to shoot someone who is breaking into your house.
Vitoria’s basic concept is workable, but it is hobbled by both a lack of knowledge of the variety of human cultures and societies, and, more importantly, the fundamentally self-serving nature of the project. The Spanish government is going to reject any legal framework that keeps them from exploring, claiming land and seizing gold, so Vitoria is forced to create an explanation for how foreign aggression is actually defensive, which simply does not work.
Vitoria’s concept of a “just war” is fundamentally flawed due to its over emphasis on the divinity of the Christian faith. In his attempts to humanize the Natives to the Spanish through an establishment of basic rights for property and sovereignty, the concept of the “just war” became legal loophole to exploit indigenous populations; Vitoria, though far more respectful of the indigenous populations than his contemporaries, still inadvertently provided a way to wage war with militaristically inferior nations and allowed the invaders to be free from guilt. In a way his views perpetuated the harmful practice of Imperialism and in the attempt to assimilate the local populations, laws were enacted that allowed the foreign invaders to not only retain power, but also expand militarily. In a sense the idea of the “just war” allowed the Spanish to take land and when met with resistance they could claim protection over sovereign land. The hostile takeover of the land was just the militaristic side of the “just war,” but the cultural conversion of the people is just as harmful as the physical massacre of the populations. In conclusion, the ideas put forth by Vitoria on the sovereignty of groups of people humanized the indigenous populations, but only in a sense that it acted as a legal loophole of imperialism.
Vitoria’s concept of a just war is illogical as it implies there is some moral law that is superior to all other laws. This arouses a multitude of questions that do not yet, or may never, have any valid answers to. While he asserts that a just war is one that will bring about more peace isn’t necessarily wrong it isn’t right either. For example, one could bring about supposed world peace, or no current active wars between two sides by simply having a dictator holding dominion over every other group. Thus, even though there is a state of acclaimed world peace, it isn’t necessarily peace in the conventional notion. Furthermore, this incapability of what even is a valid moral law that would be the supportive evidence behind a “just war” would most likely not be unique to one specific group of people, let alone one that is notorious for impeding in on other’s domain and claiming it for themselves.
In addition, Victoria asserts that the Natives had rationality that had all the capability of following the Pope; however, he fails to mention that his culture is also surmised of the same rationale that chose not to believe in the Native’s own religion. So, who is to say one side is right over the other. Ultimately, Victoria does compose his argument with eloquence, but it lacks any substantial evidence behind his claim of the war being “just”.
Vitoria’s interpretation of a “just war,” contradicts what actually fueled war against the American Indians, but is well argued to compel a reader to justify such a war. On its own, the argument has some great points. Vitoria claims difference of religion, extension of an empire, and personal gain shouldn’t cause war, saying that ultimately the only cause is for the peace and betterment of the enemy and the country.
In the case of Native Americans, this contradicts Vitoria’s reasoning for not fighting for power or personal gain, the true desires fueling European conquest. However, Vitoria frames the Spanish efforts to control Natives as a desire to better them, even saying that Indigenous people are wrong and the Spaniards can rightfully profit from them. “Indians are not making a just war on the Spaniards (it being assumed that the Spaniards are doing no harm), it is not lawful for them to keep the Spaniards away from their territory,” and “it is lawful to make good out of enemy property the expenses of the war and all damages wrongfully caused by the enemy.” Vitoria’s reasoning wrongfully justifies the Spaniards’ claim to Native land under the guise of fighting a “just war.”
Though Vitoria’s concept of “just war” seems sensible, it is hardly applicable to a world with multiple societal, cultural, and moral practices. His claims are neither outlandish nor necessarily unreasonable, but they lack an understanding of relativism. His “just war” depends on the assumption that what is just to the declarer of war is what is just to the declaree. He states, himself, in Proposition IV that “there is a single and only just cause for commencing a war, namely a wrong received.” What is wrong among one group may not be wrong among another; inherently, a “just war” is not easily defined, because there is no universal definition of what is just.
In addition to this issue, Vitoria’s claim is quite idealistic, given that anyone can twist a moral into seeming just in order to pursue their own personal interest. To claim that the Spaniards would harm the Native Americans only in the case of their resistance is to deny any coexisting motives for war, such as interest in territorial expansion or natural resources. It is possible that no war has ever been waged for one reason alone, and rarely are those multiple reasons all in the name of righting wrongs (even if some are). Whether one motive for war outweighs another, it stands to reason that even if a war is being fought due to a “wrong received” that it is not Vitoria’s “just war” if it is also fought for the reasons to which he is opposed (as was the case in the conflict between the Spanish and the Native Americans).
Vitoria’s conception of a “just war” is anything but compelling. First, Vitoria states that the reasons for a “just war” are not religion, extension of the empire, and personal “glory,” yet we know for a fact that this contradictory to the “White Man’s Burden,” which was used to justify colonization. Next, Vitoria also believed that peace and the advancement of the state were the primary reasons for a “just war” but at what cost? The cost was the murder of an entire society, and along with it a non-European way of thinking.
In the case of the Spanish and the Native Americans, Vitoria states “It is for a prince, after gaining the victory, in a just war and after retaking property, and even after the establishment of peace and security, to avenge the wrongs done to him by the enemy and to take measure against the enemy and punish him for these wrongs,” which demonstrates that the Spanish were fight the things that Vitoria believes is not a cause for a “just cause.” The Spanish had nothing to “retake;” the Spanish stole that property, therefore ultimately extending their empire.
Francisco de Vitoria’s discussion of the concept of a “just war” involves two concepts: the circumstances under which a war can be waged and the actions that are allowed surrounding wartime. I find his analysis of these two ideas very interesting. To begin, Vitoria discusses what circumstances would allow for a “just war”. He states that religion, desire for land, and personal pride are not “just” causes for war, and that the only justification for war is to retaliate after being severely attacked by another nation. Vitoria continues by addressing the second part of a “just war” by determining what actions are permissible during and after a war. He believes that a nation is allowed to take back anything that has been taken from them by another nation. Additionally, he says that the leader of the nation can, “claim it all and exact it all by war”. The phrase “it all” meaning any resources, land, or riches that the other nation has to offer. He goes on to state that the ruler is also free to take any actions necessary to “obtain peace and security from the enemy”.
After reading through Vitoria’s conception of “just war”, I agree with most of the criteria he lays out. I believe that the circumstances under which a “just” or “unjust” war can take place are correct. However, I do not agree with some of the permissible actions during wartime. In my opinion, the idea that a ruler is free to do whatever they feel is necessary to maintain peace and security in enemy territory is not just. I think that, in wartime, there is no such thing as peace. I believe that Vitoria uses the idea of a sense of peace to justify unnecessary stealing land, resources, and humanity from enemy nations. At the same time, I disagree with one nation being able to take back everything and more than what was taken from them during the war. This is not only unfair but will also lead to greater tension and animosity between the nations.
Eliana Lavine
Vitoria’s conception of a “just war” is primarily compelling for its explication of three utopian canons governing an act of warfare. Underlying the three idealistic canons are conservative values encouraging discretion, restraint and humility in an event of war and negotiation. These points are certainly compelling for their disregard of traditional points of conflict – such as religion, power and glory – as appropriate reasons to strike out in an act of violence. Vitoria denounces these traditional instigators of war due to the fact that belligerents on opposing sides may purport equally persuasive reasons to engage in combat. Rather, Vitoria contends, a wrong received is the singular just cause for commencing an offensive war in a way that evades tyrannical motives of profit and advantage. While this may be convincing at first glance, Vitoria does not, however, indulge the actual preeminent mindset that impelled the mass conquest of Native Americans. Specifically, how might Vitoria dissuade an emperor from engaging in a crusade or other war for specific economic or political reasons detached from a wrong received? Further, how might Vitoria prioritize reasons of peace, security and the public good over the existing desire of political entities for power and control?
When looking at Vitoria’s conception of a “just war,” his entire argument falls apart during his description of the situation between the Spaniards and the Indians. In order to describe a just war, both parties on either side of this conflict have to understand the mutual rules of war, but in this case, the Spaniards have a very traditional, Western European conception of war, but the indigenous population would never approach the conflict as such. In the view of the indigenous people, the Spanish were infringing upon their land and their rights, but to the Spanish, they were acting under God’s orders, which told them it was perfectly fine to colonise land that belonged to another group. While Vitoria uses the three types of law to create a definition of a just war, he loses his credibility by diminishing the value of the indigenous’ claim to the land by claiming that divine law supersedes the sovereignty that he holds so highly. It is impossible for conflicts between the two groups to be considered just because not only was the level playing field was never established and the two never entered a conflict with a mutual understanding of what war truly would entail. Vitoria’s conception of a just war becomes transparent in its effort to justify the imperialist connotation of the Spanish contact with the indigenous people, but this transparency destroys the idea of a “just war” as the war is commenced not for self-defense, but for an ulterior, expansionist motive.
“Just war” is the term used to describe a conflict that is arguably morally justified, and Victoria’s definition of just war is one that does not align with the modern definitions that come out of a post-colonial era.
I was lost on Victoria’s argument when he proposed that while the American Indians did possess reason and were therefore subject to jus gentium, they chose to be “backward” and “barbaric.” For that reason, Indians “lose” their equal status in jus gentium, and lose sovereignty. Victoria’s theory of just war is completely dependent on this sovereignty, so a peoples without sovereignty is a peoples on whom war can be waged and that war would be unequivocally just.
Along this idea that the qualities of a peoples determines their sovereignty, Victoria also argues that those qualities decide whether or not a war is just. A war waged against the “barbaric” Indians would be just on accord of the sovereignty of the offensive (Spain), but a war waged by the Indians could never be, because their qualities as a people make it impossible for them to sovereign, and, in turn, wage a just war, according to Victoria.
The logical gaps are clear here– sovereignty is regarded today as ideally separated from intercultural perception and regard, and is a matter of human and cultural rights, and, optimistically, dignity. This is the ideal of sovereignty that I adhere to, and Victoria does not appeal to this notion.
Victoria’s theology for “just war” essentially battles morality. It states that wars should not be created solely based off of enemies or for forms of punishments. Victoria explains that if those are in doubt or having conflicted views, they should turn to authoritative figures for wise advice. It identifies that the Spaniards have the rights to ‘travel to the lands of the Indians so long as they do not harm,’ however proceeds to be contradictory by saying that ‘it is not lawful for them to keep the Spaniards away from their territory.’ In doing so, it is justifying the fact that the Spaniards are able to establish control over the aborigines Americans without their consent. In my opinion, it should be considered unlawful for the Europeans, who consider themselves as more civilized, to be able to conquer property from the aborigines, who in the eyes of Victoria were seen as ‘barbarians.’ Due to the fact that they had more people that followed these established laws by the reverend father Franciscus De Victoria, they were able to ensure that they were implemented and followed more rigorously than the ones that were undocumented through their legal systems.
On its surface, Vitoria’s conception of a “just war” is rather compelling. He plainly states that, “the only just cause for commencing a war, namely, is a wrong received” (170). This explanation is rather easy to comprehend, and furthermore, incredibly straightforward. Our modern conception of justice — fair treatment and conduct — would lead us to believe that Vitoria’s assertion is true: that the only circumstance in which war is appropriate is one in which a wrong has been committed. Yet it is incredibly difficult to know exactly what “wrong” means in context. Is an action’s relative wrongness based upon some sense of universal morality? Religion? An arbitrarily developed and imposed standard of conduct? At the outset of his argument, Vitoria acknowledges the existence of cultural diversity between the Spaniards and the Indians. He notes that the Indians, “ . . . have definite marriage and magistrates, overlords, laws, and workshops, and a system of exchange . . .” (127). While Spaniards share these institutions, in that theirs are also founded upon “the use of reason,” Indian institutions possessed their own distinct qualities. This necessitates a difference in culture between the two groups. The only thing that unites them is the apparent universal natural law that governs the conduct of all sovereign bodies.
Jus gentium, however, does not and cannot account for cultural diversity. Regardless of the fact that the concept is a set of universal standards, Vitora notes that these are not met by Indians. Although Vitoria claims to understand, and quite possibly accept, the cultural differences between Indian society and Spanish society, he has internalized a sense of Spanish superiority. While “religious diversity” is not a “just” cause for war, highly unique cultural (i.e. religious) viewpoints logically lead to different perceptions of what is considered just. Given its subjectivity, how can “wrongness” act as an effective qualifier? It is far too general to do so. Simply because something is perceived as wrong does not mean it is fundamentally so. After facing even the slightest challenge, the fundamental premise of Vitoria’s understanding of a just war seems to fall apart.
I do not find Vitoria’s argument that the Indians cannot declare a certain war “just” compelling. Vitoria discredits divine law, ultimately the Pope, by saying it is not justifiable to declare divine right as probable cause for starting a war and invading foreign lands. He ultimately comes to the conclusion of jus gentium, which he states the Indians have due to their reasoning. After clever thinking and wording, Vitoria justifies war with the Indians by using jus gentium and the belief that Spanish intrusion on the Indians is lawful. Alluding back to divine law, Vitoria basically rephrased and relabeled Medieval Christian practices of militaristic and cultural invasion under natural laws with the introduction of jus gentium.
With that in mind, the Spanish knew such extreme intervention into Indian society would lead to war or revolt, thus Vitoria labels Spain as sovereign and the Indian states as partially sovereign. Sovereignty was basically gifted to Christian states, and since the Indians practiced paganism, they lacked full sovereignty. The importance of sovereignty during this time was the labeling of potential wars as justifiable. Since the Indians lacked complete sovereignty, no war against the Spanish was just; thus, resulted in utter retaliation from the Spanish. Therefore, I do not find Vitoria’s argument compelling, because he wrote such bias and deceiving works that ultimately hurt the Indians while also justifying Spanish expansionism.
Vitoria’s theory of just war is undoubtedly a compelling proposal. The concept of “just war” sounds oxymoronic at first glance, as war is often (and correctly) characterized as inherently unjust. However, if war is taken as an inescapable fixture of human nature, then it makes sense for people with an interest in justice and fairness to entertain a vision of warfare that resembles justice within that context. The principles Vitoria outlines also seem like fairly reasonable guidelines for a less heinous method of warfare; he condemns killing innocent people when it can be avoided, defends the personal right to conscientious objections, and rebukes war fought for any reason other than a “wrong done” by an outside force. However, it is this last proposition that brings Vitoria’s philosophy into question in context of Vitoria’s broader opinions on Spanish-Indigenous relations. Vitoria elaborates elsewhere in his writing that any acts of resistance indigenous people take against Spanish colonizers from settling in their homeland constitutes a “wrong done” that justifies war and military response. This unjust interpretation of a “wrong done” completely negates the merits of Vitoria’s other theories of just war, as it justifies killing and dominance of native people for doing anything besides passively allowing the Spanish to overtake their society.
Francisco de Vitoria’s interpretation of a “just war” is not compelling because his justifications for commencing such a conflict do not support the Spanish colonization of the Native Americans. He states, ”Everything is lawful that is not harmful to others in some way.” Regarding the Native Americans, he claims that this rule was not violated because the Spaniards did not cause any harm to them during colonization. This assertion is blatantly untrue. The process of conquering the native peoples involved murder, rape and the destruction of many aspects of their culture. Victoria views the work of the Spaniards in the Americas as solely beneficial to those living there because of the, so called, “superior” knowledge and religion that they brought to them. He didn’t understand the harm that their conquest caused. His argument is therefore significantly damaged because he tries to bend his own laws to support the Spaniards. According to his rule, “One who has been contumeliously assaulted can immediately strike back, even the assaulter was not proposing make further attack,” the Native Americans were justified in fighting to defend their country and the Spaniards were behaving unlawfully. Victoria lays out an ethical and well thought out set of rules, but his attempts to justify the Spanish government’s colonization of the Americas completely undermine his argument.
At the surface, Vitoria’s conception of a “just war” is not only highly compelling but strikingly egalitarian for its time. A just cause of war, he states, is not difference of religion, extension of empire, or personal glory—all causes that fueled colonialist ideals for centuries. Instead, Vitoria perceives that a just cause of war is purely defensive—in response to “a wrong received”—and that the defensive war must be proportional to the wrong (must not exceed in violence or extremity the harm itself), in the aim of achieving “peace and security”. War in revenge can only be pursued by a sovereign state due to its duty towards its subjects, whereas an individual, responsible only for themselves, may not pursue avengement. Such strict, “fair” boundaries for war are difficult to contest.
Placed against the stark backdrop of 16th century Spanish-Indian relations, however, Vitoria’s argument twists to not only explain but, indeed, justify, Spanish colonization of the Natives. By rejecting “divine law” as a framework for just war, Christianity evolves into a universal norm instead of an overarching idea. By arguing for the Natives’ autonomy, humanity, and—perhaps most importantly—their ability to reason, Vitoria suggests that they willingly chose to reject such a “universal norm” (all Spanish norms were automatically regarded as universal). This rejection fit Vitoria’s definition of a wrong against the Spanish, justifying colonialism and its accompanying racist views as a “just war”.
Victoria’s conception of a ‘’just war’’ is compelling on certain aspects, but is fundamentally biased and inaccurate on justifying colonization of the Indians. The conditions of a ‘just war’ include legitimate authority, a just cause and right intention. In terms of legitimate authority, the Indians have no requirement to follow Christianity or the divine authority of the Pope. Victoria states that Christians ‘have a right to preach and publish the Gospel in the lands of barbarians,’ ‘convert the Indian aborigines,’ and basically destroy their property and even take them as slaves if they do not accept the faith. In terms of just cause, a just war needs to be in the response of a wrong suffered. In Indian’s defense, no harm has ever been given to the Spaniards. According to Victoria, a war is only justified if the peace after the war exceeds the peace before. Yet colonization is simply an expansionist ideology from the Europeans to take power, rather than a quest for peace. Victoria is fundamentally biased in that it shows no respect to Indian’s indigenous culture and dictates their own laws. The statement that the Spaniards did no harm to the Indian aborigines is simply inaccurate. Victoria also justifies the fact that Spaniards have a right to import the goods which the aborigines lack and take away gold and silver which the Indians abound. The doings of the Spaniards do not reflect the principles of Victoria’s standards for a just war, and thus Victoria’s work fails to provide any righteousness to Spanish colonization
In considering Vitoria’s Reflections on the Indians and the Law of War and his conception of a “just war”, I quickly came to realize how weak his whole argument was, especially in describing the situation between the Spaniards and the Indians, which, according to him, is one in which war is justified. According to Vitoria, “If the Spaniards have used all diligence… to show that nothing will come from them interfering with the peace and well-being of the Indians, and the latter nevertheless persist in their hostility and do their best to destroy the Spaniards, they can make war on the Indians, (as they should now be) no longer as on innocent folk…and may enforce against them all the rights of war”.
I personally see this quote as pivotal because it essentially disallows any indigenous people to claim any justification for defending themselves in the face of imperialists, simply because these imperialists arrived with the stated aim of providing “peace and well-being” to the colonized. This also addresses one essential aspect of colonial violence that may be at times overlooked in the literature. Stances such as this clearly contribute to the fueling of audacious behavior of many colonial powers – from the case of Italians in Ethiopia or the French in Algeria- by normalizing and validating violence against the previously sovereign nations, as it essentially equates the violence of colonization to self-defence from the perceived hostility of the people being invaded.
On the one hand, Vitoria’s basic concept of a “just war” under international law seems reasonable enough. Defending oneself is an important concept, and violations of international norms (“natural law” in Vitoria’s understanding) need to be acknowledged and opposed, or else those norms are not norms at all. That said, there are several key flaws in his position with regard to Indians/Native Americans:
1) Vitoria effectively defines the universal human norms of natural law that apply to all people as “Spanish norms with the serial numbers removed.” He makes little effort to be truly universal in his approach.
2) There is no indication that the Indians actually understand these “rules” which they might break, other than “they have reason, so surely they figured out that ambassadors are to be protected, and furthermore that missionaries are ambassadors of a sort,” which is not very convincing.
3) Vitoria’s natural law has a very skewed understanding of self-defense. Defending yourself while exercising universal freedom of navigation or doing missionary work is okay. But firing on someone who has sent heavily armed warships into your people’s land without your permission is considered to be aggression, in the same way it is wrong to shoot someone who is breaking into your house.
Vitoria’s basic concept is workable, but it is hobbled by both a lack of knowledge of the variety of human cultures and societies, and, more importantly, the fundamentally self-serving nature of the project. The Spanish government is going to reject any legal framework that keeps them from exploring, claiming land and seizing gold, so Vitoria is forced to create an explanation for how foreign aggression is actually defensive, which simply does not work.
Vitoria’s concept of a “just war” is fundamentally flawed due to its over emphasis on the divinity of the Christian faith. In his attempts to humanize the Natives to the Spanish through an establishment of basic rights for property and sovereignty, the concept of the “just war” became legal loophole to exploit indigenous populations; Vitoria, though far more respectful of the indigenous populations than his contemporaries, still inadvertently provided a way to wage war with militaristically inferior nations and allowed the invaders to be free from guilt. In a way his views perpetuated the harmful practice of Imperialism and in the attempt to assimilate the local populations, laws were enacted that allowed the foreign invaders to not only retain power, but also expand militarily. In a sense the idea of the “just war” allowed the Spanish to take land and when met with resistance they could claim protection over sovereign land. The hostile takeover of the land was just the militaristic side of the “just war,” but the cultural conversion of the people is just as harmful as the physical massacre of the populations. In conclusion, the ideas put forth by Vitoria on the sovereignty of groups of people humanized the indigenous populations, but only in a sense that it acted as a legal loophole of imperialism.
Vitoria’s concept of a just war is illogical as it implies there is some moral law that is superior to all other laws. This arouses a multitude of questions that do not yet, or may never, have any valid answers to. While he asserts that a just war is one that will bring about more peace isn’t necessarily wrong it isn’t right either. For example, one could bring about supposed world peace, or no current active wars between two sides by simply having a dictator holding dominion over every other group. Thus, even though there is a state of acclaimed world peace, it isn’t necessarily peace in the conventional notion. Furthermore, this incapability of what even is a valid moral law that would be the supportive evidence behind a “just war” would most likely not be unique to one specific group of people, let alone one that is notorious for impeding in on other’s domain and claiming it for themselves.
In addition, Victoria asserts that the Natives had rationality that had all the capability of following the Pope; however, he fails to mention that his culture is also surmised of the same rationale that chose not to believe in the Native’s own religion. So, who is to say one side is right over the other. Ultimately, Victoria does compose his argument with eloquence, but it lacks any substantial evidence behind his claim of the war being “just”.