Are you more convinced by Sahlins’ or Obeyesekere’s arguments? Focus in particular on their interpretations of indigenous Hawaiian cultural categories and the idea of “practical rationality.”
HIST 285 / AFS 270 | SPRING 2019
HIST 285 / AFS 270 | SPRING 2019
Are you more convinced by Sahlins’ or Obeyesekere’s arguments? Focus in particular on their interpretations of indigenous Hawaiian cultural categories and the idea of “practical rationality.”
Obeyesekere argues the myth of James Cook as the Hawaiian “god” Lono is due more to the European imagination and idealization of imperial conquests than Native Hawaiian belief. Obeyesekere is skeptical to accept that the Hawaiian people recognized Cook as a benevolent god considering his poor treatment of them and desire to claim their land. He says Cook’s attitude toward the indigenous people was that “any resistance cannot be tolerated.” Additionally, “normal beliefs of the Hawaiians were that their god Lono arrives at the Makahiki festival as an invisible presence,” and James Cook “neither spoke the native language” nor looked Hawaiian. Obeyesekere said that simply assuming he was the god Lono would “violate Hawaiian commonsense expectations.” This reasoning is “practical rationality” and he believes effectively argues against the European myth of John Cook’s divine status.
Sahlins contradicts this, criticizing Obeyesekere’s work for ignoring important details saying, “such omissions at least are consistent with his habitual reliance on the logical fallacy of converting an absence of evidence into the evidence of an absence.” Sahlins suggests Obeyesekere’s argument is founded through common sense and not facts, saying that the concept of practical rationality actually hurts his argument rather than improves it.
While Obeyesekere’s interpretation of how the Hawaiians viewed Cook is more believable than to simply accept that they recognized Cook as a god, I agree with Sahlins that Obeyesekere’s argument is not particularly well-founded. Even though Obeyesekere may be correct, Sahlins recognizes detailed accounts that he failed to dispute, showing how Obeyesekere relied too heavily on “practical rationality,” unfortunately making his argument less convincing than Sahlin’s.
Both historians delve into the concept of “practical rationality”. “Practical rationality” is a way of processing information simply through reasoning. The two men discuss the role they believe Captain Cook played, or did not play, in Hawaiian culture.
To begin, Obeyeskere states the concept of Captain Cook being viewed as a Hawaiian God is simply a European myth. Specifically, he believes that, “To put it bluntly, I doubt that the natives created their own European god; the Europeans created him for them”. Common for western imperialism, Cook treated the Natives in Hawaii very poorly. Cook’s willingness to threaten and attack the natives would not qualify as “God-like” behavior. Along with not acting in accordance with the Hawaiian God Lono, Cook also looked like a foreign and spoke a foreign language. Obeyeskere notices this contradiction and notices how it does not align with traditional Hawaiian beliefs. Obeyeskere proves this with, “…Cook’s arrival would violate Hawaiian commonsense expectations, though it could be consonant with European assumptions regarding native perceptions of white ‘civilizers’”. All of these concepts lead to the conclusion that the natives did not view Cook as Lono.
On the other hand, Sahlin does not agree with Obeyeskere’s explanation of Cook’s interaction with Hawaiian civilization. Sahlin believes that Obeyeskere relies too much on the logical fallacy of linking information together that is not related. For example, Sahlin states, “Such omissions at least are consistent with his habitual reliance on the logical fallacy of converting an absence of evidence into the evidence of absence: if the British do not explicitly say that the Hawaiians received Cook as Lono, this must mean that he was not Lono”. Sahlin also highlights Obeyeskere’s lack of knowledge of Hawaiian natives culture, beliefs, or traditions as a whole with, “It follows that, on the basis of common humanity and a shared sense of reality, Obeyesekere has the possibility of immediately understanding Hawaiians, without regard for any cultural practicalities or presuppositions”.
Obeyeskere employs “practical rationality” when delving into how the natives would have viewed Captain Cook. It is unreasonable to assume that the natives would view someone so drastically different from them as their God so quickly. Also, Cook’s treatment and regards towards the natives are not in line with their perception of Lono. Clearly, Cook’s actions towards the natives led to his untimely death. But, I agree with Obeyeskere that they probably never even believed Cook was a God in the first place. However, Europeans could benefit off of this self-fulfilling story. Cook being seen as a God would reinforce the idea that natives are unintelligent, gullible individuals that see foreigners as holier than them.
Sahlin is more opposed to the concept of “practical rationality”. Instead, I think that Sahlin sees rationality on a culture-by-culture basis. There is no universal way of understanding or processing a situation and its effects on a community. I understand why Sahlin would have this view. But, I still find Obeyeskere’s arguments more convincing. Also, I think that the claims that Obeyeskere makes are evident many times throughout history, and not just in the case of Captain Cook.
I absolutely, though reluctantly, find Sahlins’ argument more convincing and compelling than Obeyesekere’s. Taking both his original work and his rebuttal to Obeyesekere into account, Sahlins’ claims do appear to be more directly supported by historical evidence. While reading Obeyesekere’s proposal, I noticed that Obeyesekere’s basic claim about Captain James Cook as a character in a myth—that he embodied two colonial archetypes, Prospero and Kurtz, and that it was his embodiment of the Kurtz archetype that brought his downfall in his third voyage to the South Pacific—appeared to be at least partly a mythical invention of Obeyesekere, himself. Sahlins’ tale of Captain Cook’s time in Hawaii is rooted in reasonable observations that we can accept to be true. However culturally-derived these observations may be, Sahlins is able to form from them a convincing story about how the Hawaiians received Captain Cook. Obeyesekere’s, conversely, makes little use of factual evidence, and relies rather heavily on character assessments of Captain Cook that are admittedly aggrandized.
Obeyesekere’s argument about “practical rationality” and its role in understanding the Hawaiian response to Captain Cook’s arrival is much more compelling than is his argument that Captain Cook is yet another villainous colonizer (which I do believe to be true; I simply don’t think it was argued well). However, Sahlins does note an unfortunate basic issue with this idea, that much of Obeyesekere’s argument relies on the notion that to see Captain Cook as Lono would be irrational, and that the Hawaiians’ actions must therefore be interpreted in a context of this having never been their understanding. The evidence that the Hawaiians saw Lono is very strong. Not only are there first-hand reports implying so, but the close alignment of Captain Cook’s time in Hawaii with Makahiki strongly supports this interpretation. Nevertheless, Sahlins’ response to Obeyesekere’s writing is alarmingly reductive and almost taunting in a manner that makes me wonder whether I, myself, have been so influenced by the West that I am unable to give Obeyesekere’s argument its due credence. Many of Sahlins’ claims, particularly about rationality, are flawed and limited in their defensiveness, but his basic story about Captain Cook is more believable (in my opinion) because it is supported by historical and anthropological evidence. I think that either of the authors would do well to acknowledge that veneration of Captain Cook by the Hawaiians who received him does not actually reduce the evils of his actions. To that end, Sahlins is the one of the authors who appears to better attribute this reception to rationality within its context, and that also weakens Obeyesekere’s argument.
I am far more convinced by Sahlin’s arguments than Obeyesekere’s. The latter author asserts that the legacy of Captain James Cook is entirely a European creation: that the Hawaiians’ perception of him as the god Lono can only be explained by European conceptions of their own supposed greatness. He initially poses his assertion as a rhetorical question: “Could it be that the myth of Lono was a European construction, attributing to the native belief that the European was a god?” Thus, the self-obsession of the Europeans, and their belief in their own cultural superiority, accounts for the widely-held belief that Captain Cook was received in a god-like manner by the Hawaiian natives. Obeyesekere notes that it would not make sense for the native Hawaiians to accept Captain Cook as the physical manifestation of Lono, because he did not “look . . . Polynesian nor sp[eak] the native language . . .” On this basis, he introduces the idea of “practical rationality”: the universal ability of the individual to make decisions by “weighing the issues.” Because Hawaiian natives inherently possessed this ability, it would have been illogical for them to regard Captain Cook as Lono. Obeyesekere frames his argument with the notion that he identifies with the Hawaiian plight: he is, by ancestry, Sri Lankan. This, he asserts, is grounds for a sense of empathy and understanding that cannot be achieved by individuals whose ancestors were conquerors of any sort, much less Europeans. Because he supposedly intimately understands the imposition of European beliefs, Obeyesekere asserts that his claims are far more legitimate of those belonging to non-subjugated historians and anthropologists.
This perception is entirely convoluted, as proven by Sahlins. He asserts that Captain Cook was indeed accepted by Hawaiian natives as Lono, their God, and that a malleable conception of practical rationality is what lead them to this conclusion. On the other hand, Obeyesekere asserts that a fixed doctrine of universal “practical rationality” exists. As a result, he does away with the recognition of individual cultural norms and practices. In other words, he assumes that practical rationality would lead the Hawaiians to believe that Captain Cook was merely a European colonizer out to pillage land in the name of empire. This may very well be true: there is certainly some anthropological and historical evidence to suggest it. Obeyesekere’s version of practical rationality, however, is entirely skewed: it only accounts for what he views as the “correct” outcome: one that, seemingly, automatically relegates the European colonizer to a self-obsessed, violent individual out for nothing but his own gain. While I personally do not sympathize with European colonizers, in that much of their behavior goes against modern beliefs regarding sovereignty and human rights, Obeyesekere’s claims are poorly argued: their logical conclusion is a one-sided interpretation of any and all colonial events. Sahlins states this outright: “ . . . [Obeyesekere] willingly substitutes our rationality for the Hawaiians’ culture.” The imposition of modern (Eurocentric, possibly?) beliefs onto native cultures is what Obeyesekere is trying to avoid, but his own theory negates that implicit purpose.
Both Sahlins’ and Obeyesekere’s arguments have distinct merits: Obeyesekere applies a psychoanalytic perspective tainted by his Sri Lankan background to Captain Cook’s third expedition in attempt to illuminate the ethnocentric core of Sahlins’ European construct; conversely, Sahlin refutes Obeyesekere with accusations of an inverse ethnocentrism catalyzed by Obeyesekere’s placement of “practical rationality” on Hawaiians while simultaneously subverting the white colonist to fatuous imagination. On the one hand, Obeyesekere’s claim that Sahlin possesses too parochial a view in assuming the Hawaiians believed Cook was, indeed, the god Lono arriving for the festival of Makahiki is convincing as it furthers Obeyesekere’s claim that the European narrative violates Hawaiian commonsense. Consequently, however, Sahlin inquires as to why Obeyesekere had to integrate his Sri Lankan background so forcefully into his analysis if he may have understood the Hawaiians immediately through this shared sense of “common humanity and a shared sense of reality.” Sahlin contends that in no way does Hawaiian thought differ from Western empiricism by an inattentiveness to the world, but rather by the fact that they allot greater space for divinity and subjectivity within it. Thus, I agree with Sahlin that blanketing Hawaiian thought with a “bourgeois rationality” is quite ironic in comparison to Obeyesekere’s simultaneous claim that Hawaiians, quite ignorantly, ate the myth of Cook as Lono as if it were spoon fed to them out of European imagination. Sahlin stresses that mapping Obeyesekere’s direct background and notion of rationality onto the natives’ rationale may weaken the historical rigor of his analysis. Thus, while I, like Obeyesekere, find it difficult to believe that the natives, without linguistic or ethnic evidence, purported Cook to be the god Lono, I am equally persuaded by Sahlins’ refutation that Obeyesekere’s erasure of Hawaiian discourse as replaced by Western mythical thought is, in itself, an unconventional rhetorical imperialism.
Obeyesekere makes a very convincing argument about the verity of the idea that Cook was believed to be a god by the indigenous people of Hawaii. He states that this “fact” is merely a product of the European imagination. He begins by breaking down the idea that Cook was an idealistic explorer, open to new ideas and not influenced by previously held biases about non-Europeans. He gives an example of when Cook justifies an encounter with the natives in which he mistakes a group of them for being hostile and kills them. Obeyesekere comments on Cook’s justification and writes, “The latter part of this statement exemplifies the attitude of Cook toward natives: Any resistance cannot be tolerated.” He is stating that Cook’s visceral and violent response to perceived resistance from the natives revealed an internal prejudice that the lives of the native people were somehow less important than his. Obeyesekere goes on to disprove the previously stated fact through a rational process of thinking called “practical reasoning”. He says, “Cook’s arrival would violate Hawaiian commonsense expectations, though it could be consonant with European assumptions regarding native perceptions of white ‘civilizers.’” This fact, along with many others, is extremely convincing evidence that the indigenous Hawaiians did not view these European travelers as gods. Sahlins, on the other hand, aggressively contradicts Obeyesekere’s writing. He states that Obeyesekere’s use of “practical rationally” is biased and must imply that the natives did not at all adapt their beliefs to their changing way of life through the years. In addition, Sahlins writes that Obeyesekere’s writing is based on the assumption that the Hawaiians did not view Cook as a god. Many forms of physical evidence, including written accounts, are presented to support the claim that Cook was viewed as a deity. Sahlins essay comes across as defensive. Though his historical evidence is compelling, the lingering stereotypes of non-whites being less intelligent than their white counterparts shows the negative affect that stories like this have had on our society.
While Obeyesekere’s arguments follow logical consistencies, ultimately Sahlin’s arguments have more credence due to evidence-based rebuttals and historical examples. Both arguments center on the supposedly historical occurrence of Captain Cook’s landing on Hawaii, where he was perceived—as argued by Sahlin and multiple other scholars—as Lono, the god associated with natural growth and human reproduction.
While Sahlin argues such an interpretation of the Hawaiians’ response can be logically and empirically supported by the mythologies that Cook’s arrival played into, as well as the ritualistic behavior of the Natives upon Cook’s arrival, Obeyesekere contends that such a viewpoint oversimplifies. The critic cites evidence that Cook increasingly behaved violently and irrationally throughout his third voyage without the balancing check of scientists on board, suggesting that the explorer incited the violence leading to his death. He supplemented this argument with the idea of “practical rationality”—logical reasoning—suggesting that the Hawaiians would have been able to differentiate between myth and reality upon Cook’s arrival, that the image of a white male did not fit the image of Lono. Moreover, Obeyesekere argues, the assumption that the Natives’ perception of deification was the same as that of Europeans is presumptuous: he suggests instead that the ritualistic, reverential behavior the Hawaiians displayed towards Cook more resembled the attitude they would display towards a chief. The overall narrative develops as one where the Hawaiians are aware of Cook’s mortality through practical rationality and attack because they perceive him as an aggressor, not as a god who had transgressed divine norms.
Sahlin is quick to point out the flaws on Obeyesekere’s arguments. First, he points out, Obeyesekere is a Native of Sri Lanka—a region with cultures and norms starkly removed from those of Hawaii—and, thus, any reasoning stemming from his own viewpoint as a “Native” should be discounted. Second, Obeyesekere’s view of “practical rationality” as the driving factor for the Natives’ perception of Cook, Sahlin argues, actually serves to demean the autonomy, voice, and culture of the Hawaiians themselves. By substituting the reader’s rationality for the Hawaiians’ historical perception, Sahlin makes a salient point that evidence-based argumentation should not replace simply “rational” arguments—especially when the rationality itself stems from a European worldview. Finally, Sahlin notes that the false dichotomy of “myth” against “reality” may not—and indeed, was not—necessarily the case for the Hawaiians who received Cook, leaving room for the argument that they could easily have blended religious and mythological truth with their encounter with Captain Cook.
For these reasons, I am more convinced by Sahlin’s argument than Obeyesekere’s.
Under the idea of “practical rationality,” which is defined by Obeyesekere as “the process whereby human beings reflectively assess the implications of a problem in terms of practical criteria,” I believe that Obeyesekere’s argument is more convincing. Although Sahlins’ argument did provide more historical evidence,
Obeyesekere states, “…Cook’s arrival would ‘violate’ Hawaiian commonsense expectations, though it could be constant with European assumptions regarding native perceptions of white ‘civilizers’.” Obseyesekere is displaying the Hawaiians as a culture outside of Europe, with its own rituals and practices and addressing the fact that the idea of Cook being a god is a European idea. Conversely, Sahlins’ argument aggressively refutes the entirety of Obseyesekere’s argument and the idea of “practical rationality,” saying that does not account for the fact that Hawaiians did not change their culture to colonization. It is obvious that Sahlins’ argument comes from a place of privilege and does not view Cook as someone that just so happened to die when he arrrived.
By analyzing both arguments, Obeyesekere and Sahlin, I was able to approach the argument in question from two diametrically opposed sides. Obeyesekere argues that indigenous Hawaiian’s were rational and capable of logical conclusion. This is mainly due to his analysis of the myth model, and how it relates to “practical rationality”, in that historical myths were adapted to encompass the current condition of the then present. Whereas, Sahlin, argued the opposite that
First, by looking at Obeyesekere ‘s argument, with emphasis placed on the cultivation of a myth. Obeyesekere argued that “historical conditions obviously play a role in resuscitating a myth model buried in a tradition; and political and social conditions may either foster a particular myth model” (Obeyesekere 11). This quote from his argument demonstrates his viewpoint of how the past can alter and shape the current socio and even political climate. Furthermore, this means that the current situation of a civilization may result in the resurgence of a historic myth, that has long been forgotten, and is reborn and tailored for the new conditions. To give an example we can look to one of the most infamous examples, or at least an example of such in my own opinion, of a resurgence of a historical story altered by modern conditions: from rags to riches. One of the most classic myths there is Cinderella. A story where in which you work hard and persevere despite adversity you can achieve anything and all that hocus pocus. However, the classic rendering of the story is a bit more chaotic. Where in the modern adaptation Cinderella simply has to be the perfect fit for a shoe (that was already custom made for her exact feet). Despite this fact, her step sisters desperately attempt to fit their either too big or too small feet into the shoe. Obviously, this does not fool the prince (since apparently the fact that they looked nothing like the woman from the ball didn’t tip him off). Thus, with a bit of luck Cinderella was able to demonstrate her validity as the Prince’s true love by being a perfect fit. In contrast to this modern adaptation though, the original consists of the evil step-sisters mutilating their own bodies in order to be a better fit for the shoe. It goes without saying, this is not on brand for Disney, so it was so that the step sisters were not so animalistic and feverous in their pursuits. This can be applied to Cook, as it is in typical fashion for the victors to write history. Thus, this provides a plausible explanation as to how there is an ill-advised notion of Cook being viewed as a God by the indigenous Hawaiians. Because, while ultimately, it is not wholly factual or well supported, it is more dominant in the historical realm. Therefore, it is still entirely plausible that the Hawaiians did not view Cook as a God, despite common notion. Furthermore, Obeyesekere is able to provide credibility to his argument by aligning himself with that of the native Hawaiian’s by recounting the parallels between Hawaii and his own native land of Sri Lanka.
In contrast Sahlin demonstrated how it was beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Hawaiians did in fact view cook as a reincarnation of their God Lono. Despite my adversity for his tactlessness in his argument, he does arouse suspicion towards Obeyesekere’s argument. Supported by factual evidence of Obeyesekere’s mistakes, including the misremembrance of the year the lecture was presented by Sahlin or to the aversion to the published response to the criticization. Even without having to look at Sahlin’s argument and view of indigenous Hawaiian’s cultural category and practical rationality one can begin to see the cracks amassing in Obeyesekere’s argument. The most prevalent point in my opinion thought, is how Sahlin is able to demonstrate how in fact the native Hawaiians did treat Cook in similar fashion to that of a God. Surely, this can be the proof beyond shadow of a doubt as both sides agree to Cook being treated as such. Therefore, it is more than likely that native Hawaiians treated Cook with the same respect and servitude they would of a God reincarnate.
I agree with Obeyesekere’s argument that the Europeans attached deity status to Cooks from the perspective of the indigenous people. Sahlin uses the indigenous people’s religion to argue that Cooks embodied a certain religious icon that represented man’s reproduction and consumption of the gods. Although Sahlin makes an reasonable argument, I believe Obeyesekere’s argument more, because he scrutinized Cooks as an individual more than Sahlins did. Alluding to Cook’s first two voyages for the king, Obeyesekere mentioned the first two trips had many scientists on board. The presence of scientist abated or at least shadowed Cook’s violent tendencies. Using “practical rationality”, Obeyesekere views this as a mode of thinking and not as a mode of thought. It is obvious there are numerous modes of thought about the encounter between Europeans and the Hawaiians; which is important due to the argumentative nature of this topic. The two contrasting beliefs between the authors’ results in rational weighing of the issues involved. However, I do disagree with Obeyesekere on practical rationality, because rationality is subject to biases. What I deem acceptable and ultimately rational may contradict someone else’s way of thinking. Sahlin disagrees with many aspects brought up by the other; however, I think both have issues in their descriptions that ultimately hurts their arguments.
Both Sahlins and Obeyesekere consider into the concept of “practical rationality”, which, in general terms, is a way of processing information through logic and reasoning. The two then proceed to examine the role they believe Captain Cook may have played in Hawaiian culture.
According to Sahlins, the Hawaiians resourcefully used their own understanding of categories and interpretative discourses to decipher the newcomers and visitors. Fundamental to his argument is the evidence indicating that the Hawaiians saw Cook as a manifestation of the god Lono on the basis of a number of coincidences that implied connections between the British and certain practices of Hawaiian myth, including in the festival that celebrated Lono’s annual return, which interestingly coincided with the arrival of the British during the Makahiki season.
Obeyesekere assumes a critical approach to thinking about European myths surrounding Captain Cook’s voyage of exploration in the Pacific. Obeyesekere seems skeptical and believes that the Hawaiians had another resource based on epistemology: a universal ‘practical reason’ or ‘pragmatic common sense’ rooted in certain facts. He argues that Sahlins’ analysis promotes imperialist European power dynamics that makes the natives seem to possess a foreign and ‘primitive mentality’. To him, European records of native peoples who mistake white people for gods simply reinforces a European myth of their own superiority, not native beliefs.
I find Obeyeskere’s arguments convincing, especially since his claims of are almost recurring throughout colonial and imperialist history (and not just in the case of Captain Cook and the British.), since it is not atypical for Europeans to write history from viewpoints that promote imperialist power dynamics that makes the natives seem to possess a foreign and ‘primitive mentality’. Unfortunately, in the end, even though this perception of Cook by Hawaiians as a god may not be completely factual, it is more dominant in the history books, as history is, lamentably, typically written by the most powerful and influential. With that being said, it may even be possible that the Hawaiians did not view Cook as a God, despite commonly noted in history.
In Obeyesekere and Sahlins’ disputation of sorts, both authors take head-on the image of Captain James Cook in regard to the Hawaiian people of the 18th century, who, it is argued by Sahlins, was believed to be the Hawaiian god Lono upon his arrival in the islands.
Obeyesekere argues that the story that Sahlin and others build their arguments of the perception of James Cook by native Hawaiian islanders is unreasonable, as it belittles the rational abilities of natives, who he argues could regard and worship him more as an ancestral deity after perceiving him as a European explorer and not a god. Additionally, Obeyesekere uses his own perspective as a native Sri Lankan to argue the mentality and attitude of natives. However, Sahlin points out that Sri Lanka and Hawaii are worlds apart– geographically and culturally, and that his experiences cannot be compared. Obeyesekere calls upon”practical rationality” to oppose the European insertion of themselves into native “mythology.” He refers to practical rationality as “the process whereby human beings reflectively assess the implications of a problem in terms of practical criteria,” and uses this to claim that because natives possess this rationality, they could have the ability to know James Cook was not Lono, and perhaps rather another deity or not a deity at all.
Sahlins rebuts Obeyesekere in arguing that in bringing up the “practical rationality” possessed by the natives, Obeyesekere inadvertently belittles their experiences– their belief in gods that reincarnate and appear on specific dates, and how an appearance that aligned with this would be undoubtedly meaningful. Sahlin compares this to the Christian belief of transubstantiation, and argues that having a narrative in which “natives” believe the “unbelievable” is not created from a superior, Eurocentric view of the “new” lands being discovered and their inhabitants, but rather a common part of a global human story.
I find Sahlins’ argument more convincing. Obeyesekere seems to swayed by his own interpreted shared experience as a person who considers himself a “native” and repeatedly embarks down shallow arguments that take away from the beliefs and experiences of the Hawaiian people according to their religion and beliefs about how that religion manifests. Sahlins seems more grounded in academic research and arguments, while Obeyesekere operates in a psychoanalytical and detached philosophical sphere, and Sahlins’ argument resonates well and sits better with me.
Both Obeyesekere and Sahlin seem to have different approaches when discussing the actual events that led to Captain Cook’s death. Obeyesekere explains, “To put it bluntly, I doubt that the Europeans created their European god; the Europeans created him for them.” Obeyesekere does not think that the foreigners and the natives lived in harmony, due to Captain Cook’s violent and irrational character, which he believes led to his death. In this way, Obeyesekere is using “practical rationality” to process the information which is being presented. He does not believe that the natives decided that Cook was their god Lono so quickly due to the language barrier and because of the differences in appearances and attitudes. Sahlin, on the other hand, argues with the points that Obeyesekere has presented. He states, “If the British do not explicitly say that the Hawaiians received Cook as Lono, this must mean that he was not Lono.” In this way, Sahlin is not using the idea of “practical rationality,” but could be using a more theoretical approach than giving his opinion on the matter. Though I find both arguments to be very compelling, I am more convinced by Sahlin’s argument, due to the fact that I believed his argument to be stronger than Obeyesekere’s.
Throughout history, the faults of European exceptionalism blinded countries of European descent to the complexities of cultures that they stumbled upon. One example of this is seen in Marshall Sahlins’ response to Obeyesekere’s argument on “practical rationality.” I think the issue of practical rationality is inherently linked to a proper understanding of history especially when looking at Cook and the indigenous people of Hawaii because, through a Eurocentric view, one might question the complexity of the island culture, yet when examined under the lens of practical rationality it becomes clear that the true “dummies” were the egotistical explorers who likened themselves to the divine. In a sense, the issue with Cook and the people of Hawaii was an inherent condescension to the intelligence of non-European people. The superficial differences gave way to a misguided ethnocentric way of thought that was extremely harmful not only to the relationship between the native Hawaiians and the explorers, but also proved to be detrimental to their beautiful Polynesian culture. What Sahlins speaks to is the underlying logic within all of us that would bar people from jumping to unfathomable conclusions. He writes, “Hawaiians would never come to the objectively absurd conclusion that a British sea captain could be a Polynesian god … such “practical rationality” is a universal human disposition.” (How Natives Think, Marshall Sahlins). The power of this argument is rooted in the simple truth that the situation set up by cook proves a level of either miscommunication of misdirection of the part of the European explorers and not that of the people of Hawaii. At its most fundamental level, Sahlins’ argument is stating that it is fundamentally ridiculous that assumptions of this magnitude would be made by indigenous Hawaiians or any other people for that matter when confronted with other humans. In conclusion, the universality of “practical rationality” inherently disproves an ethnocentric view of indigenous cultures especially when examining the people of Hawaii and moving away from such destructive historical views provides a clearer picture of the complete human experience.
When differentiating between the two arguments, Obeyeskere’s argument is presented in a much more convincing manner. While Sahlins’ articles detail Cook’s work as a discoverer and a deity on the island, Obeyesekere’s article does a better job at changing the perspective of the Native understanding of Cook’s arrival in Hawai’i. The introduction to Sahlins’ article provides an analytical look at the deification of Cook on the island but seems to gloss over the notion that Obeyesekere may be correct in saying that the Hawai’ian people may have not deified Cook and it was a manifestation of Europe. In Obeyesekere’s definition of practical rationality as a “judgements based on a rational weighing of the issues involved,” he pulls from the many personas of Cook, evaluating them through the lens of his Sri Lankan heritage. Sahlins’ articles do not provide an understanding of how some traditions truly work. While Cook’s place in history should not be entirely negative, the consequences of European imperialism allowed for him to enter Hawai’i and history as a hero. Sahlins’ articles regard him as such, when Obeyesekere’s article looks at it from a different context that is significantly more open to indigenous voices in Hawai’i, allowing for concepts like practical rationality that combats Sahlins’ biases that come from his perspective as a non-indigenous person. Sahlins articles have a significant amount of research that Obeyesekere lacks, but he makes up for it by providing a set of explanations that provide a rationalization for the deification and importance of indigenous voices that Sahlins lacked.
Practical rationality is simply the way of processing information through reasoning. In The Apotheosis of Captain Cook, Obeyesekere argues that the Hawaiians are capable of effective reasoning and it is the Europeans that created their deity status. “I doubt that the natives created their European god; the Europeans created him for them.” Ultimately Obeyesekere argues that Cook’s godlike image is not reflected in the native’s reception, but in Westerner’s superior self-image. However, I find Sahlin’s argument to be more effective because it resembles western scholastic style with concrete historical evidence. Sahlin included Hawaiian cultural records, Cook’s expedition testimony and contemporary scholarship. Sahlin proves that there is evidence that Captain Cook is initially accepted by the Hawaiians as a Lono, or God. Sahilin argues that Cook resembles the image of the god that the Hawaiians aspire to. Even though Obeyeskere explains his concept of practical rationaility, it is Sahilin that uses logical deduction to effectively establish Cook’s divine status, while Obeyesekere argues through more common sense than facts. Obeyesekere uses his perspective as a native Sri Lanka to try to understand the native mentality, but Sahlin argues that Sri Lanka and Hawaii are fundamentally different. Though I find Sahlin’s arguments to be more effective, I call into question if the ‘natives’ can ever stand on the same ground as the western academics in scholarly debates.
The selections from Sahlins and Obeyesekere regarding the validity of the validity of Captain James Cook’s apotheosis by Hawaiian natives upon the his arrival are chiefly concerned with the concept of practical rationality. Obeyesekere claims that the assertion that Cook was deified as the god Lono minimizes native Hawaiian’s ability to discriminate between gods, the human embodiment of gods, and god-like essences of human beings. His argument is grounded in his general skepticism toward European “explorers,” and the dubious characterization of James Cook as a benevolent traveller standing in contrast to the brutality of colonizers like Hernan Cortez. Cook’s apotheosis, Obeyesekere believes, is as much mythical as any story of Hawaiian gods.
Sahlins rebukes Obeyesekere’s characterization of his work as Eurocentric, and argues that asserting Hawaiian’s interpretation of Cook as the god Lono is in itself disrespectful toward the rational, nuanced, and meaningful basis for their belief. He argues that Obeyesekere jumped on a possibility of imperialist apologism too quickly.
I sympathize with Obeyesekere’s skepticism toward the narrative of any “benevolent colonizer,” and agree that the practices of environmental “domestication,” mapping and renaming of places, and Cook’s apparent violent and problematic behavior on board his ships is important and valid criticism that calls the apotheosis into question. However, I also find substance in Sahlins’ argument, that there is significant cultural and historical evidence for this event that cannot easily be written off as simply excusing settler colonialism.