Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law Mary L. Dudziak recently published an article in The Washington Post on how the Korean War shaped the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of the United States government. Dudziak, who is affiliated faculty in the History Department, charts how Harry S. Truman’s 1950 decision to authorize military action in the Korean peninsula without congressional authorization established a precedent that U.S. presidents have invoked since. Read an excerpt of Dudziak’s piece below and the full article, “The toxic legacy of the Korean War,” here:

“The Korean War precedent converged with and informed another practice. After Korea, authorizations for the use of military force became the primary way for Congress to exercise its constitutional power. This method has been around since 1798, when President John Adams sought authority to use the Navy to protect American ships during an undeclared naval war with France.

Authorizations replaced war declarations for even large-scale wars like the one in Vietnam. In 2001, Congress passed an Authorization for Use of Military Force approving armed conflict “against those nations, organizations, or persons” who had “planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,” and those who had harbored them. Like the Korean War precedent, this had unexpected aftereffects. It was later interpreted to apply to groups that did not even exist at the time it was passed. Through this process, presidential war power has become a one-way ratchet. By failing to step in, Congress has acquiesced in the loss of its own power.”